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Concepts of Ideal Rulership from Antiquity to the Renaissance

edited by
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D/2018/0095/186

DOI 10.1484/M.LECTIO-EB.5.115718

ISBN 978-2-503-58077-7

e-ISBN 978-2-503-58078-4

ISSN 2565-8506

e-ISSN 2565-9626

Printed on acid-free paper.

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PERIPHERAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE TRADITION OF ‘MIRRORS FOR PRINCES’

1. *The tradition of works On kingship in Antiquity*

The *Lexikon des Mittelalters* gives the following definition of a mirror for princes:¹

Bei einem F[ürstenspiegel] handelt es sich um ein in paränet[i-scher] Absicht an einen K[öni]g oder Regenten gerichtetes Werk (selbständig oder als abgeschlossener Teil einer Sammlung). Die Paränese kann sich in direkten Ermahnungen zur Gestaltung der herrscherl[ichen] Ethik und Amtsführung, darüber hinaus in der auf die Person des Empfängers bezogenen Erörterung staats- und gesellschaftstheoret[ischer] Zusammenhänge ausdrücken.

If one asks which works from Greek and Roman Antiquity may fit this definition, those titled, or subtitled, *On kingship* (Περὶ βασιλείας) spontaneously come to mind.² In many of them, a man who presents himself as a philosopher speaks to a king with frankness (παρρησία) and instructs him on the principles of good rule, combining general ethical reflections with practical advice. In line with this is perhaps the only general statement from Antiquity on these works. It is an apothegm attributed to Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 360-280 BC) who after ruling Athens autocratically on

¹ Anton 1989, col. 1040-1041.

² An overview of these and related works can be found in Hadot 1972; Schulte 2001; Haake 2003 & 2011; Sidebottom 2006; for the Hellenistic period, see Murray 1970.

behalf of Cassander lived in Egypt as an exile and advisor of king Ptolemy I:³

Demetrius of Phalerum advised King Ptolemy to acquire the books dealing with kingship and leadership (τὰ περὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας βιβλία), and to read them: for the things their friends do not dare to offer to kings as advice, are written in these books.

Are we thus entitled to claim the existence of the literary genre of mirrors for princes already in Antiquity and identify them with the works *On kingship*? In order to give an answer to this question we will start with a brief sketch of this tradition.

It is probably not just a coincidence that the first works *On kingship* we know of date to the fourth century BC, a period when ‘tyrants’ appeared again more frequently in the Greek poleis and Macedon became a world power. The first such work preserved in full is Isocrates’ (436-338 BC) speech *To Nicocles or on kingship* (*Or.* 2), in which he instructs Nicocles, the young king of Cyprian Salamis and, as later tradition has it, his former student, on the right way of ruling. Nothing speaks against classifying this work as a mirror for princes in the above sense. It is, however, part of a literary triptych known as the *Cyprian orations* (datable around 370 BC) to which also *Euagoras* (*Or.* 9) and *Nicocles or Cypriotes* (*Or.* 3) belong.⁴ The *Euagoras* is an encomium for Nicocles’ father, the deceased king Euagoras of Salamis, in which Isocrates praises him as the perfect king. But he explicitly states that he has written this work in order to encourage Nicocles and his children and to provide them with a good example. Thus, concerning its function, the *Euagoras* is very close to the *To Nicocles*. In *Nicocles or Cypriotes* Isocrates has Nicocles speak to his people. He has him argue that monarchy is the best of all constitutions and that he himself rightfully reigns over Salamis. Subsequently ‘Nicocles’ instructs his subjects on how he expects them to behave under his rule. The speech, then, has the function of instructing the king

³ Fr. 63 Wehrli = 38 Stork, van Ophuijsen & Dorandi (the translation is taken from the latter edition).

⁴ On the three *Cyprian orations*, see e.g. Frey 1946; Mason 1976; Eucken 1983, p. 213-269; Schulte 2001, p. 50-75; Alexiou 2010; various papers in Bouchet & Giovannelli-Jouanna 2014.

and at the same time his subjects. Already the study of the works of this first author thus shows that the instruction of a king can take on various literary forms. In addition, we are confronted with a central problem that will come back time and again in the study of later works that present themselves as instructions of kings, viz. the question of addressee: did the author primarily write to teach Nicocles good rulership or did he also, or even primarily, aim at the instruction of a wider audience,⁵ and if so, which audience did he have in mind?

Turning to Isocrates' contemporary Antisthenes (c. 445-365 BC) we see that the title *On kingship* may also be given to works that were not addressed to a specific ruler, be this by the author himself or, as it is more likely here, by later pinacographical tradition.⁶ Only a few fragments have been preserved, or can be attributed, to his *Cyrus or on kingship* and *Archelaus or on kingship*.⁷ The *Cyrus* was possibly a philosophical dialogue between Cyrus the Elder and the wise Oibares or between Socrates and Alcibiades.⁸ Since for Antisthenes the wise man is identical with the good king, his dialogues titled *Herakles* should not be neglected either, although they do not bear the subtitle *On kingship*. In one of them he described how this hero acquired wisdom, i.e. became a sage-king.⁹ Antisthenes' concept of the ideal king would have an enormous impact on later Stoics, and we can still find it being adopted in the paraenetic speeches *On kingship* by Dion of Prusa and Julian the Apostate. We thus see that, although the subtitles were probably of secondary nature, Antisthenes' works on the sage-king and contemporary as well as later paraenetic speeches were part of the same intellectual discourse. On the analogous

⁵ The latter is argued by Eder 1995 regarding Isocrates' and Xenophon's works on monarchy. On this thesis, see Christodoulou in this volume.

⁶ On Antisthenes' ethical and political theory and his concept of the sage-king, see Giannantoni 1990, IV p. 387-411; Mueller-Goldingen 1995, p. 25-44; Brancacci 2005. A recent commentary on the fragments can be found in Prince 2015.

⁷ See the titles in the list of works in SSR V A 41. The evidence for the *Cyrus* in SSR V A 141. On these works, see Giannantoni 1990, IV p. 295-322; 347-354. A speculative reconstruction of *Archelaus on kingship* is provided by Brancacci 1992.

⁸ See Giannantoni 1990, IV p. 300.

⁹ SSR V A 92-177.

case of Plato's *Politicus* which was also, in Hellenistic times, given the subtitle *On kingship*, see below.

From the mid-fourth century BC on, works *On kingship* became very popular and the list of their authors reads like a *Who's Who* of Hellenistic philosophy. In some cases they were addressed to certain kings and probably corresponded to the above definition of mirror for princes, but in most cases we do not have enough fragments to characterise them. Authors of such works were:¹⁰ Anaxarchus of Abdera, *On kingship*,¹¹ Aristotle, *On kingship*,¹² Cleanthes of Assus, *On kingship*,¹³ Persaeus of Citium, *On kingship*,¹⁴ Euphantus of Olynthus, *On kingship*,¹⁵ Epicurus, *On kingship*,¹⁶ Sphaerus of Borysthenes, *On kingship*,¹⁷ Theopompus, *On kingship*,¹⁸ Theophrastus, *To Cassander on kingship*,¹⁹ Strato of Lampsacus, *On kingship*,²⁰ in three books, and Xenocrates of Athens, *To Alexander or on kingship*, in four books.²¹

Possibly of Hellenistic origin as well are three longer excerpts from Pseudo-Pythagorean treatises *On kingship* ascribed to Diotogenes, Ecphantus and Sthenidas.²² They contain rather theoretical discussions of ideal monarchy, without apparent paraenetic or perlocutionary aspects. Although they are often regarded as mirrors for princes, it is far from certain whether they were written to serve this function.²³

¹⁰ Cf. Sidebottom 2006, p. 124-126; Haake 2011, p. 69-72.

¹¹ DK 72 B 1-2.

¹² Fr. 646-647 Rose.

¹³ SVF I 107; no fragments preserved.

¹⁴ SVF I 96; no fragments preserved.

¹⁵ Test. 68 Döring; no fragments preserved.

¹⁶ Fr. 9 Arrighetti.

¹⁷ SVF I 139; no fragments preserved.

¹⁸ Not the historian from Chios according to our source: FGrHist 115 T 48.

¹⁹ Fr. 600, 602, 603, 612 Fortenbaugh *et al.* On the various works of Theophrastus bearing this title or subtitle, see Sidebottom 2006, p. 125.

²⁰ Fr. 141 Wehrli = fr. 1.59 Sharples; no fragments preserved.

²¹ Fr. 2.14 Isnardi Parente; no fragments preserved.

²² Edited with commentary by Delatte 1942; cf. Squilloni 1991.

²³ Murray 1970, p. 280, for instance, rather regards them as handbooks 'designed to fill a gap in the Pythagorean library, to complete the canon'. On the date, see below n. 50. We leave aside here the so-called *Letter of Aristeas*. It has been argued that the dialogue between king Ptolemy and the 72 Jewish envoys

That paraenetic kingship treatises could be adapted to new political situations and environments is shown by Philodemus' *On the good king according to Homer*.²⁴ The Epicurean wrote this work for his *patronus* L. Calpurnius Piso Caesonius, probably on the occasion of the latter's proconsulship of Macedon (January 57 to mid-summer 55 BC).²⁵ Homeric heroes such as Agamemnon, Achilles or Odysseus had frequently been adduced as examples of good and bad rulership in kingship literature since the time of Antisthenes. Using Epicurus' *On kingship* (and probably other such works) as his source and applying the moralizing exegesis of the Homeric poems characteristic of the Hellenistic period,²⁶ Philodemus hands out advice to Piso on the principles of good rule. The exempla in Homer provide the 'starting points' (ἀφο[ρ]ῶν) 'for helping Piso to set things right in his task as a provincial governor of Macedon'.²⁷

It is in particular Seneca's *On clemency* (*De clementia*), addressed to the just eighteen-year-old *princeps* Nero (thus not long after 15 December 55),²⁸ that has been called an ancient mirror for princes,²⁹ not least as it uses the mirror metaphor in its opening passage (1.1.1; see below) and remained a source of inspiration for later mirrors for princes until modern times. The peculiarity of this paraenetic work is its strong focus on one single virtue and its large amount of theoretical reflection, while other paraenetic kingship treatises usually try to promote the whole range of kingly virtues and avoid getting into technical

in ch. 187-300 reuses an Hellenistic work *On kingship*; on this work, see Schulte 2001, p. 159-166.

²⁴ Thus the title in the *subscriptio* of the papyrus: Φιλοδημ[ου] περὶ τοῦ καθ' Ὁμή[η]ρον ἀγαθοῦ βασι[λέως], followed by the number of *stichoi* which is only partially legible; see Del Mastro 2014, p. 339-341. The most recent complete edition is by Dorandi 1982; partial new editions by Fish 2002 & 2016. On this work within the context of kingship literature, see Murray 1965 and the works quoted below.

²⁵ See Fish 2016, p. 57-58.

²⁶ Cf. Dorandi 1982, p. 36-39; De Sanctis 2006 & 2008.

²⁷ See now the new edition of the difficult programmatic passage in col. 98 = 43 Dorandi by Fish 2016, p. 64-65 with commentary on p. 77-81 (quotation on p. 81).

²⁸ On this work, see e.g. Adam 1970, Mortureux 1973 and especially Braund 2009 (on the date, p. 16-17).

²⁹ E.g. by Schulte 2001, e.g. p. 195, 206.

philosophical discussions. Braund therefore sees in it a work *sui generis*: ‘The resulting essay is a blend of (i) kingship treatise and (ii) panegyric oration and (iii) philosophical treatise which adds up to a protreptic, which is itself a form familiar to the Romans from oratory and philosophy’.³⁰

The most prolific writer of works on kingship is the orator Dio of Prusa, the author of four speeches *On kingship* (*Or.* 1-4).³¹ They show at the same time how strong the influence of the previous tradition was in such works, as they draw extensively on fourth-century BC and Hellenistic material, and how flexible such works were in terms of formal presentation. In *Or.* 1, Dio discusses the nature of the ideal king basing himself on Homer. The addressee is the emperor who is, however, never mentioned by his name or title. In *Or.* 3 he explicitly speaks to the emperor and presents to him his personal ideal of kingship. In contrast, *Or.* 2 and 4 report dialogues, *Or.* 2 one between the young Alexander the Great and his father Philip on the function of Homer and other poets for the instruction of kings, *Or.* 4 one between Alexander and the Cynic Diogenes of Sinope on monarchy and tyranny.³² The king to whom these speeches were addressed is usually identified with Trajan.³³ It is however a matter of dispute whether some or all of them were really performed before the emperor or only delivered in the Greek cities during Dio’s tours of the empire.³⁴ This raises again the question of the

³⁰ Braund 2009, p. 17-23 (quote on p. 23); cf. Haake in this volume, p. 312, who also refers to Braund’s characterisation with approval.

³¹ But one may also mention other speeches that are thematically related: *Or.* 6 *Diogenes or on tyranny* (a commentary in Krappinger 1996); *Or.* 56 *Agamemnon or on kingship*; *Or.* 62 *On kingship and tyranny*. On Dio’s kingship orations see Sidebottom 2006 (with further literature in n. 5 on p. 117-118). He sees in Dio the author who ‘resuscitated a moribund genre, and in so doing changed its nature from a *treatise sent* to a ruler to a *speech delivered* to a ruler’ (p. 118; and then argued for on p. 129-154). According to him there was a gap in the tradition of *On kingship* between the Hellenistic era and the time of Dio.

³² But also *Or.* 1 and 3 contained dialogic elements and *Or.* 2 and 4 monologues; see the lists in Sidebottom 2006, p. 146 n. 139 and 140.

³³ Thus e.g. Schulte 2001, p. 207-208 and Moles in his various articles (see n. 35). Literature in Sidebottom 2006, p. 146 n. 137.

³⁴ The latter is argued by Whitmarsh 2001, p. 190-216; *contra* Haake 2011, 80 with n. 57 (literature).

addressee—or possibly, primary and secondary addressees—and of the intention of these works.³⁵

Probably between March and October 359 the Caesar Julian composed *Or. 3 (2) Bidez*, titled *On the achievements of the emperor or on kingship*.³⁶ In contrast to *Or. 1*, the *Encomium on the emperor Constantius* (II) of 357, this is not a purely panegyric oration. The open paganism of the speaker and his hardly veiled critique of Constantius have often puzzled scholars. These features can, however, be explained by the tradition of works *On kingship*, in which Julian situated the speech by its subtitle: the speaker has, in his function as a philosopher, who as such is in the possession of a higher knowledge, the right to instruct the ruler by a traditional, i.e. pagan, ideal of kingship, and to criticise him.³⁷ The apothegm by Demetrius of Phalerum quoted above makes it probable that frank, and sometimes critical, words were not so rare as the preserved works *On kingship* might lead us to believe.

This hypothesis is confirmed by the last work *On kingship* from Antiquity to be mentioned in this survey, the speech *To the Emperor on kingship* by the philosopher Synesius of Cyrene, declaimed before Arcadius probably in January 400.³⁸ No other work combines the exposition of an ideal of kingship with such an open and often fierce critique of the policy of the emperor and his court, so that today many scholars still doubt whether it was really presented to the emperor in its present form or even made accessible to a wider audience.³⁹ But here too, the conventions of *On kingship* enabled the philosopher to speak with *parrhesia*.⁴⁰ Formally it is a *Crown speech* (στεφανωτικός λόγος), delivered when Synesius handed over a golden crown on behalf of his province.⁴¹ As conventional in such speeches, he also asks the emperor for

³⁵ In particular Moles has tried to identify the various figures mentioned in the speeches with Trajan and persons of his environment: Moles 1984; 1990; 1995; 2003.

³⁶ On this speech see Schorn 2008; cf. Curta 1995 and 1997.

³⁷ Thus the interpretation of Schorn 2008; on this function of *On kingship* in general, see Haake 2003.

³⁸ The exact date is controversial; the above date in Lamoureux & Aujoulat 2008, p. 11-26.

³⁹ Thus e.g. Schmitt 2001, p. 282-288.

⁴⁰ See now Hagl 1997, p. 76-102; Schorn 2008, p. 256-257.

⁴¹ On the genre, see Hagl 1997, p. 76-82.

amenities, in this case tax relief for his province, and does not seem to see this in contradiction with his criticism of the emperor. At the same time it fits, as well as Julian's speech, the definition of a mirror for princes according to the definition quoted in the beginning of this contribution.⁴²

This sketch has shown that works *On kingship* did not form a 'genre' with a certain number of common characteristics but that this title, or subtitle, could be used for various kinds of works: paraenetic speeches, philosophical dialogues and theoretical philosophical treatises.⁴³ Only the first group fits the modern definition of mirror for princes. At the same time Isocrates' *Cyprian orations* have made it clear that the instruction of a king was not restricted to this kind of paraenetic speech. Furthermore, all the works discussed above belong to the same intellectual discourse in which all philosophical schools participated, viz. that on the ideal king, and there was an intensive dialogue between all of them. As Haake rightly argues in this volume, there was no specific well-defined literary genre of mirror for princes in Antiquity that would fulfil the requirements of modern literary theory. There were, however, some works *On kingship* that fit modern definitions of mirrors for princes.

2. Beyond the well-known examples: the focus of the present volume

The above survey may suffice as a very brief introduction to the broad outlines of the ancient tradition of literature *On kingship*. These works have received a lot of scholarly attention, and even though many of them would still repay further study, the ambitions of the present collection of articles lie elsewhere. In this volume, we deliberately leave the centre and turn to the periphery, to the grey zone where matters usually prove even more complicated. This book, then, contains no chapter on Isocrates or Dio of Prusa, nor on Seneca. When such authors occasionally receive attention,

⁴² Cf. Hagl 1997, 80: 'Die Königsrede des Synesios ist also ein Fürstenspiegel, drapiert als Kranzrede und versehen mit einigen versteckten Hinweisen auf den eigentlichen Grund der Gesandtschaft'. Cf. Lamoureux & Aujoulat 2008, p. 26-35.

⁴³ Haake 2011 pleads for a genre *On kingship*.

they do so only in passing, as a source or model of later writers. Instead, we are interested here in other authors who deal with analogous problems and raise similar questions in other contexts, authors who also addressed powerful rulers or developed ideals of right rulership, while choosing very different literary genres, or works on kingship that have almost been forgotten. By this choice to leave well-trodden paths, we hope to contribute to the scholarly debate by bringing in some new relevant material and confront it with the well-known classic texts that are often discussed. This confrontation even throws a new light upon the notion itself of 'mirror for princes'. Moreover, by selecting peripheral texts from Antiquity to the Renaissance, it becomes possible to reveal several patterns in the evolution of the tradition over a longer period of time. Since these are two significant topics concerning which the present volume breaks new ground, it is appropriate to elaborate on both in what follows.

2.1. The notion of mirror and ancient paraenesis

It has become clear above that the application of the notion of mirror for princes to texts of Antiquity is far from unproblematic. As a matter of fact, we here encounter a striking paradox, as the notion itself can be traced back to ancient sources. Its earliest roots are perhaps to be found in a crucial passage from Plato's *First Alcibiades* (if Plato is indeed its author),⁴⁴ as shown by Joosse in the present volume. Later, the image of the mirror prominently appears in the programmatic opening of Seneca's *De clementia*—often considered the textbook example of an ancient *speculum principis*—and also occurs in Cicero (*rep.* 2.69) and Plutarch.⁴⁵ There can be no doubt, then, that a literary work could be regarded, with respect to its function, as a 'mirror for princes' in Antiquity, although the genre, as pointed out above, did not exist.

⁴⁴ Joosse in this volume leaves the question of authorship open. Erler 2007, 290-291 tends towards inauthenticity; Döring 2016, 164-172 does not see compelling arguments for spuriousness. It is generally acknowledged that the *First Alcibiades* was written early in the fourth century BC.

⁴⁵ On the image of the mirror in Plutarch, see Duff 1999, p. 32-34; Stadter 2003; Zadorojnyi 2010; Frazier 2011; and Jacobs in the present volume.

This observation may be regarded as a legitimation that the *concept* of a ‘mirror for princes’ need not be avoided as anachronistic when one speaks of Greek and Roman texts. We should return to the ancient sources and do justice to what we can find there. Seneca, for instance, writes his *De clementia* in order to act as a kind of mirror (1.1: *speculi uice*), Cicero argues that the ideal statesman should provide himself, as it were, as a mirror for his fellow citizens (*rep.* 2.69: *sicut speculum*), and Plutarch says at the beginning of his *Life of Aemilius* that he uses history as a mirror to adorn his life (*Aem.* 1.1: ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ). In all of these passages, then, the mirror motif is not used in order to indicate the literary genre of the work but in order to clarify the functional relation between two poles, viz. the (idealised) model described in the work on the one hand and the reader on the other. In his work, the author provides his readers with a kind of ‘mirror’, and the reader, while looking into this mirror, somehow recognises himself. This understanding of the ‘mirror relation’ between work and reader has several important implications.

To begin with, it obviously presupposes that there are sufficient correspondences between what can be seen in the mirror and the situation of the reader (who is, after all, presumed to see himself in the mirror). When an ordinary citizen, an erudite grammarian, an architect or a sculptor like Phidias reads such *specula*, the mirroring function will not fully work. In other words, such mirrors indeed presuppose an aristocratic and public-spirited reading public: kings, princes, but also (in a ‘democratic’ setting) powerful officials and politicians, whose actions and decisions have direct consequences for the public interest. It is also obvious that such works allow for more than one intended audience.

Yet the matter is still more complex, since the image that can be seen in the mirror does not entirely reflect the character of the reader. Some of his features appear more beautiful and noble in the mirror than they are in real life. They thus challenge the reader and urge him on to fashion himself after the idealised mirror image. A look into the mirror is a confrontation with one’s better self and as such has a normative dimension. The opposite, however, is equally true. The mirror indeed also reveals several negative traits that the reader should avoid and that he probably even has already avoided, at least to a certain extent. In that sense, a look

into the mirror thus also involves moments of encouragement, when the reader realises that he has already made some progress. All this shows that there is no simple one-to-one relation between the reader who looks into the mirror and his mirror image but that we are dealing with a complex and dynamic process.

This complex process of mirroring what is, ought, and ought not, is made possible by the specific nature of the medium. For as the relevant ancient texts show, this medium is not a true mirror but rather concrete examples of illustrious kings, statesmen, philosophers and even mythical heroes who function as a mirror. An important text in this respect is Plato's, or Pseudo-Plato's, *First Alcibiades*, where Socrates offers himself to Alcibiades as a kind of mirror. Conversing with him, so Socrates suggests, is like looking into a mirror, discovering one's true self, and becoming a better man (see Joosse in this volume). Somewhat similarly, Seneca presents himself with his treatise on clemency as a mirror for the emperor Nero. Furthermore, philosophers are not the only ones who qualify as mirroring figures: the great heroes of the past can have the same function, as is illustrated in Plutarch's *Parallel lives*,⁴⁶ and even elaborate abstract, theoretical designs of the 'ideal king' as in the Pseudo-Pythagorean texts can serve as a mirror. In all of them, indeed, the king as well as the aristocratic and powerful reader can to a certain extent recognise themselves.

This explains why these 'mirrors of princes' can be found in several literary genres. When a famous king or statesman is presented as the mirroring figure, authors can also turn to biography (e.g. Plutarch; see Jacobs) or history (e.g. Dio Cassius; see Gangloff). A special case are encomia and panegyrics. Here, the addressee is himself the concrete example of virtue, so that the man who looks into the mirror and the image in the mirror itself seem to coincide. Even in this case, however, there is no one-to-one-relation. Panegyrics indeed are never purely descriptive but as a rule also contain a normative aspect. Pliny's *Panegyric*, for instance, should not be understood as a neutral and faithful description of Trajan, of course, and an analogous conclusion holds true for later panegyrics as well (see Murray and Rees). Emperors who looked

⁴⁶ Cf. the interpretation of Plutarch's program in the *Lives* by Stadter 2015, e.g. p. 52.

into these mirrors always saw their better selves. These texts, then, subtly and often masterfully combined their lavish praise with a paraenetic dimension.

All of these works, in spite of their mutual differences, can in their own way function as ‘mirrors for princes’—not in the sense that they all belong to the same literary genre, but in the sense the ancients themselves gave to the concept. They all contain a well-considered model of an ideal ruler that might have functioned as a kind of mirror for a powerful reader. By thus underscoring the specific link between the mirroring work and its mirrored reader, such a concise functional definition does justice to the specific perlocutionary character of these works. At the same time, it undermines common scholarly classifications and widespread convictions as to which works can or cannot be regarded as mirrors for princes. To confine ourselves to just a few examples, the introduction to Plutarch’s *Sayings of kings and commanders* explicitly mentions its mirroring function: the words of the famous rulers, so Plutarch argues, enable us to observe their minds, as in mirrors (ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις, 172D). From the functional point of view developed above, then, this mere collection of apophthegms perfectly qualifies as a *speculum principis* (even more so since it is addressed to the emperor Trajan himself).⁴⁷

Yet things are more complicated, for a merely functional definition of ‘mirror for princes’ also has its blind spots. By greatly emphasising the importance of the mirroring function, it indeed risks neglecting the relevance of the content. Plutarch’s *De profectibus in virtute*, for instance, is dedicated to his powerful Roman friend Sosius Senecio (who also received the *Parallel Lives*). In this treatise, Plutarch deals with the topic of moral progress and we may presume that he indeed wished to contribute to the improvement of his influential friend. He even explicitly thematises the mirror motif, arguing that we should consider what virtuous men like Plato, Epaminondas, Lycurgus or Agesilaus would have done and then, as if looking in a mirror (οἷόν τι πρὸς ἔσοπτρα), fashion ourselves after their example (85B). From the functional

⁴⁷ On the difficult problem of the authenticity of the work’s preface, which has important implications for Plutarch’s attitude towards the emperor, see esp. Flacelière 1976, p. 100-103 and Beck 2002; cf. Roskam 2015, p. 190-191 for an additional argument in support of authenticity.

point of view, the treatise would perfectly qualify as a 'mirror for princes', yet few scholars would be inclined to regard it as such. Or take Colotes' notorious essay *That conformity to the doctrines of the other philosophers even makes life impossible*. The work was dedicated to King Ptolemy⁴⁸ and Colotes' general message to the king was perfectly clear: only Epicurean philosophy guarantees human happiness and a well-ordered society. Yet again, although the work probably had a protreptic goal⁴⁹ and although Epicureanism there in all likelihood functioned as a kind of mirror into which the king had to look, most scholars would no doubt regard the treatise as a technical philosophical polemic rather than as a 'mirror for prince'. When discussing 'mirrors for princes', then, we cannot bracket the content altogether. When advising kings or rulers, ancient authors usually deal with basically the same topics, beyond the borders of literary genres, but also irrespective of the perlocutionary character of their work. There are many thematic correspondences between the speeches of Dio of Prusa (which have a clear perlocutionary aspect) and the Pseudo-Pythagorean treatises *Περὶ βασιλείας* (where the perlocutionary aspect is absent or fades into the background) or Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (which one might call a 'historical romance' with a philosophical agenda). In short, the functional approach to the 'mirrors of princes' should at least to a certain extent be complemented by other criteria that have to do with the content.

The different chapters of this volume show how several authors received and refigured traditional topics in light of their own authorial goals. The mirroring function of their works is seldom thematised but is nearly always latently present and thus constitutes one of the connecting threads throughout this book. At the same time, the chapters illustrate how this mirroring function is time and again creatively adapted to the concrete circumstances and how different generations of authors laid their own accents. This brings us to the second point.

⁴⁸ Probably Ptolemy II Philadelphus; see Westman 1955, p. 41.

⁴⁹ Cf. Westman 1955, p. 93.

2.2. A special diachronic perspective

In this volume we have deliberately opted for a *longue durée* perspective. This enables us to follow the tradition of ‘mirrors for princes’, understood as moral and political advice to the powerful, for nearly two millennia. Our prime interest, as said above, is in the periphery. This does not imply, however, that we are mainly dealing with obscure authors. The first two contributions focus on two important dialogues of the *corpus Platonicum*: the *First Alcibiades*, where we can find the origin of the mirror image (see Joosse), and the *Politicus*, subtitled *On kingship*, where we can already find several basic commonplaces that will frequently return in the later tradition (see Chrystodoulou). After Plato, the next generations both developed and criticised (aspects of) Plato’s political thinking. The issue of kingship and the duties of the king soon received ample attention and many treatises *Περὶ βασιλείας* were written, most of which have been lost. In this volume, we again deal with two texts that have been neglected in scholarly research: a fragment from Aristotle’s lost *On kingship* (see Buekenhout) and scraps from a papyrus from the third or second century BC (see Amendola). These texts still belong to a relatively early stage of the tradition, in which the classical topics and arguments were further elaborated. It is only when we turn to the Roman imperial period that we again have complete texts, those briefly discussed above. In this volume, we have chosen to turn to Plutarch’s *Parallel lives* (see Jacobs), to sections of the *Roman history* of Cassius Dio (see Gangloff), and to Latin panegyrics (both poetry and prose; see Rees and Murray).

The end of Antiquity did not mean the end of the tradition of ‘mirrors for princes’, for in the early Byzantine period, too, authors invited their emperors to look into the mirror of ideal rulership (see Piepenbrink and Tougher). In the Middle Ages, analogous ideas and ideals remained popular and not only circulated in the royal courts but also in local Italian cities, where the *podestà* could benefit from these age-old insights and pieces of advice (see Napolitano). They even made their influence felt in Persian poetry and Islamic philosophy (see Stoneman). The final essay deals with Erasmus’ *Panegyric* to Philip the Handsome, in which the author, on the threshold of a new era, recalls many traditional themes while modifying them in light of the new politi-

cal circumstances (see Tinelli). We can recognise here analogous cases to that of Philodemus in the late first century BC which show that classical kingship literature was adaptable to different political environments.

This concise overview shows that this volume indeed follows an idiosyncratic approach towards the rich tradition of 'mirrors for princes', by combining a *longue durée* perspective with a distinct preference for the periphery. It is clear that such an approach can only yield a partial picture of this tradition and that it needs to be completed by more general and systematic surveys. Yet at the same time, it provides a necessary complement to such surveys, for several reasons.

Firstly, it illustrates how several fundamental ideas about the good ruler, which remained basically unchanged throughout so many centuries, did not merely occur in the famous, classic works but also in many more peripheral writings. The great emphasis on the various virtues of the ruler, for instance, or on his responsibility for the well-being of his subjects, can be found in almost all the texts that are discussed in this volume. Sometimes, such commonplaces are crystallised into general truths that can even be used regardless of the contemporary context. They then outline the ideal ruler as a theoretical construction *in vacuo*. This holds true, for instance, for the Pseudo-Pythagorean treatises *On kingship*⁵⁰ and for some chapters of Agapetus' *Ekthesis*, which show a very general conception of rulers and subjects (see Piepenbrink). Much more often, however, traditional ideals are reoriented and adapted in light of the contemporary context and the specific agenda of the authors. Although the terminology of the single virtues remained basically identical through the ages, their semantic value did

⁵⁰ It is no accident in this respect that these treatises are notoriously difficult to date. They have been regarded as products of the Hellenistic period (thus Goodenough 1928 and Thesleff 1961, who opt for the third century BC). Other scholars rather argue that they have been written between the first century BC and the first century AD (thus, e.g., Zeller 1903, p. 123 and Murray 1970, p. 280) or in the early imperial period (first or second century AD; thus, e.g., Delatte 1942 and Squilloni 1991) or in Late Antiquity (Sidebottom 2006, 134: 'not long before the early fifth century AD'). See also Andorlini & Luiselli 2001 on the fragments from Diotogenes' *Περὶ βασιλείας*. They argue that in P. Bingen 3 (last years of the first century BC/beginning of the first century AD) a passage from Diotogenes has been reused which would constitute a *terminus ante quem* for this treatise. Cf. Haake 2011, p. 71-72 with n. 26 who however prefers a date in Imperial times.

indeed change. Some conventional qualities could disappear into the background, whilst other suddenly come to the fore. Imperial mobility and *praesentia*, for instance, are greatly emphasised in the Latin panegyrics of the third and fourth centuries AD, which fits in very well with the particular interests of the provinces (see Rees). Again, Basil's advice for his son Leo VI often reflects Macedonian dynastic concerns (see Tougher). Nevertheless, in spite of the many subtle and strategic modifications which have to bring traditional ideals up to date, the general leitmotifs fundamentally remain the same through the ages.

Yet these 'mirrors for princes' do not only recommend philosophical ideals of moral virtue and insight. Several authors were also interested in pragmatic aspects.⁵¹ Realising very well that the rulers were not living in Plato's state and that they also had to bear in mind the demands of the concrete political situation, they gave some attention to the issue of political effectiveness (see Jacobs and Napolitano). For such advice, they, again, had to take into account the peculiarities of their own times. These peculiarities also conditioned the choice, presentation and evaluation of the models and their mirroring function. A Byzantine emperor and a local *podestà* obviously consider the great examples of the past from a different perspective. For Plutarch, Plato was a divine philosopher,⁵² for Amir Khusraw, he was a Sufi mystic (see Stone-man).

Secondly, the general approach of this volume also considers the different ways in which the various authors use their principal sources in an interesting light. The majority of the texts that belong to the discourse on ideal kingship form a complicated intertextual web of quotations, references and allusions. The classic examples, such as Isocrates' *Cyprian orations*, Seneca's *De clementia* or Pliny's *Panegyric*, repeatedly occur, but are also combined with other models, borrowed from other literary traditions. Interesting material could for instance be derived from the rhetorical tradition of the βασιλικὸς λόγος (see Murray). No less important is the rich philosophical tradition, especially the Platonic and Stoic positions. Several works contain echoes of the well-known debate

⁵¹ Somewhat differently Haake 2011, p. 76.

⁵² See *De cap. ex inim.* 90C and *Per.* 8.2.

about the best constitution (see Gangloff) or raise the question as to what extent the author's philosophical advice to the ruler is compatible with the position he adopts in other writings (see Buekenhout). In late Antiquity and the early Byzantine era, a new voice gradually gains importance, viz. that of the Bible. The Christian perspective entails a new interpretation of the ruler's position and tasks and on his duties towards his subjects, although this new skin on closer inspection still proves to contain much old wine.

Finally, the combination of the *longue durée* perspective and the focus on the periphery reveals some interesting variations with regard to the relation between writer and addressee. Many traditional 'mirrors of princes' were written by philosophers who presented themselves as counsellors to their king or to powerful rulers. They followed in the footsteps of Isocrates, Plato or the Stoics and claimed to give straightforward advice with philosophical frankness (*παρρησία*).⁵³ Yet providing the 'prince' with idealising mirrors was not the privilege of the philosopher alone. Pliny's *Panegyric*, for instance, is the work of a clever politician rather than a public-spirited philosopher, and Cassius Dio, in the person of Maecenas, also opts for a politician rather than a philosopher as the speaker of his embedded 'mirror' for Augustus. Such texts, then, raise questions about the credibility of the author: why, after all, should the powerful king listen to the advice of one of his subjects, be it a philosopher or a politician? In the early Byzantine era, the Church enters the field as a new player. The emperor is now supposed to listen not (only) to distinguished philosophers but (also) to a deacon like Agapetus. A special case is Basil, who advises his own son *in propria persona*. Such a paraenetic work, authored by the emperor himself, obviously contains an *argumentum ex auctoritate* of a special kind. That Basil was in all likelihood not the true author complicates the matter even more. The work exemplifies a particularly complex and multi-layered relation between the true author, the supposed one, the addressee, and the reader. Analogous examples can be found in the panegyrics, where the author at least to a certain extent serves the purpose of the dedicatee, without being his mouthpiece and while retaining a certain

⁵³ On the aspect of frankness in kingship literature, see e.g. Haake 2011, p. 75-77.

amount of freedom to choose his own emphases (see Rees and Murray).

Thus, this collection of essays tells a story of continuity and discontinuity, of creative innovation and inventive reception, of the modification of age-old models in light of brand-new ideals and insights. It refuses to be straitjacketed in established scholarly generalisations, recognizing that the whole literary tradition of ‘mirrors for princes’ is far too complicated to be reduced to facile, overarching schemas—as complicated, indeed, as life itself.

The articles in the present volume were originally presented and discussed at an international conference held in Leuven from Wednesday, December 2, to Friday, December 4, 2015. The conference was organized by LECTIO and received additional funding from FWO-Vlaanderen, the Doctoral School for Humanities and Social Sciences (KU Leuven), the Van de Wiele Fund, and Graecitas Christiana. We are much indebted to our colleagues Erik De Bom, Peter Van Deun, and Gerd Van Riel for helping us to define the scholarly focus of the conference, to Marleen Reynders and Erika Gielen for the practical organization, to all the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback and suggestions, and to Brian Lapsa for checking the English of most of the contributions.

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ALBERT JOOSSE

REFLECTIONS AND RIVALRY:
THE ORIGIN OF THE MIRROR
TRADITION IN THE PLATONIC
FIRST ALCIBIADES

The relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates became a major preoccupation for the Socratic writers and for generations of philosophers after them. The pair—the one the most extravagant Athenian politician of his time, the other the very paradigm of philosophy—came to represent the problem of how philosophers should interact with those who show great promise but who lust after power.¹

This volume is devoted to mirrors for princes. The concept of a ‘mirror for a prince’ is not unproblematic: it is hard to delineate a set of texts to which it applies and it may suggest a cohesion and continuity of genre that most likely never existed.² It nevertheless has its uses. It calls to mind texts that are written by or from the perspective of a wise person (a councillor, a philosopher), addressed to someone (soon to be) in power whose practice of ruling they aim to influence, and that may constitute a model for the ruler to imitate or a set of expectations and practical guidelines to follow. In classical antiquity, texts of this kind may have been rarer than one imagines, but there is at least one paradigm text that seems to have been formative for later mirrors for princes as well. In the opening lines of his treatise *De clementia*, Seneca describes himself as the ‘mirror’ within which the newly-installed

¹ On the historical Alcibiades see De Romilly 1995; Hatzfeld 1951. Gribble 1999 studies representations of Alcibiades in classical literature generally. Roskam 2012 discusses Plutarch and Proclus’ treatments of Alcibiades’ failure despite his association with Socrates.

² On these issues see Jónsson 1995; 2006; Haake 2015; and Haake in this volume. In Hadot’s *RE* article (1972), the concept has a very wide scope indeed.

emperor Nero may see himself. What Seneca subsequently offers is an image that appears to reflect Nero's current character but is at the same time very much an ideal, normative image to which Nero must aspire. The treatise also contains historical examples for imitation and avoidance, as well as a more theoretical account of clemency as the core virtue of a ruler.³ With reference to this paradigmatic text, it is theoretically justifiable to discuss other ancient texts as mirrors for princes as well.

This chapter concerns the *First Alcibiades* and its possible place in the tradition of mirror literature. The *First Alcibiades* is a dialogue written by Plato or by someone in his school, somewhere in the fourth century BC (I will return to the question of dating below, p. 50-51).⁴ It portrays a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, who was famous as the most beautiful and talented young man of his generation, as a brilliant general in the Peloponnesian War, but also became infamous by repeatedly changing sides in that war and because of his allegedly excessive private life. For all his ambitions, however, Alcibiades never became a monarch. In that sense, the *First Alcibiades* is not a mirror for a prince. It nevertheless contains important features associated with mirrors for princes. Most importantly, the text offers an implicit theoretical reflection on the mechanism of mirroring as a means to self-improvement and good rulership.

I will argue that this dialogue participates in a discourse and responds to texts that one might classify as ancient mirrors for princes. The link between them is found in a central speech, in which Socrates tries to convince Alcibiades that he should improve himself by comparing his situation to that of the Persian and Spartan kings. I will contend that this speech links the *First Alcibiades* in a generic way to other advisory or deliberative literature that uses the device of portraying foreign kings—specifically to Xenophon's writings. I will further argue that the dialogue presents a reflection on this device, in two steps: it gives a more radical ver-

³ The importance of Seneca's *De clementia* for early modern mirrors for princes is brought out in Stacey 2007.

⁴ On the question of authenticity, on which I will remain neutral, see Döring 2016, p. 164-172; Jirsa 2009; Denyer 2001, p. 14-26; Marbœuf & Pradeau 1999, p. 25-29.

sion of it by having the portrayed look back towards the interlocutors; and it characterises the device in terms of mirroring.

But the dialogue does not stop at characterising this device. It also advances an alternative model of the formation of a ruler: the figure of the philosopher. The explicit introduction of the metaphor of the mirror is thus connected to the philosopher's claim that he is indispensable to the ruler and greatly superior to mere advice by historical or mythical paradigm.

1. *Moments of mirroring*

In the course of the conversation in the *First Alcibiades*, Socrates convinces the initially arrogant Alcibiades of the need for self-improvement. More specifically, he convinces him that he needs to know himself. Socrates also offers his own person as the mirror in which Alcibiades can come to know himself.

When Socrates introduces the mirror image, at the end of the text, he uses it to characterise the method by which someone can come to know himself (we will consider the passage in due course). In the traits of this method scholars have long recognised philosophical dialectic: the discourse by question and answer through which a soul may converse with another soul, typically carried out by Socrates himself.⁵ In his comments at the end of the dialogue, in other words, Socrates portrays his own discussions as the best way to know oneself, and by implication presents his current conversation with Alcibiades as another instance of this method of mirroring.

When we start reading the text again with this characterisation in mind, we find elements of mirroring in many places.⁶ Many of these concern Socrates' words and behaviour, others occur within the framework of the speech Socrates delivers halfway through the dialogue.

⁵ See e.g. Gill 2007, p. 107-111; Belfiore 2012, p. 32-67; Joosse 2014.

⁶ Werner 2013 has demonstrated the interpretive fruitfulness of reading earlier parts of the dialogue in terms of mirroring (the specifics of his analysis differ from mine).

The dialogue starts with the following words of Socrates (*Alc. I* 103a1-3):⁷

ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἶμαί σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστῆς σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι[.]

Son of Cleinias, I think you are amazed that I, who was the first to become your lover, am the only one not to have left you after the others stopped loving you.

Socrates contrasts his own constancy with the flight of the other lovers, each of whom failed to impress Alcibiades because Alcibiades, as Socrates puts it, thinks that he needs nobody. After all, he is rich, good-looking, has Pericles as his guardian, and is well-connected through his family (103b2-104c6). Alcibiades responds that he is indeed somewhat puzzled that Socrates keeps following him around (104c7-d5). In order to explain his position and motives, Socrates adopts a specific technique. As he puts it himself (105a1-2), *κατηγορήσω διανοήματα σὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν σέ* ('I will declare your thoughts to yourself'). Alcibiades is about to hear what Socrates thinks he has been thinking. Socrates starts by saying (105a3-6):

δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, εἴ τίς σοι εἴποι θεῶν. "ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, πότερον βούλει ζῆν ἔχων ἃ νῦν ἔχεις, ἢ αὐτίκα τεθνάναι εἰ μὴ σοι ἐξέσται μείζω κτήσασθαι; δοκεῖς ἂν μοι ἐλέσθαι τεθνάναι.

I think—if one of the gods said to you: 'Alcibiades, would you wish to live in possession of what you now possess, or would you wish to be dead straightaway if you wouldn't be allowed to acquire more?'—I think that you would choose to be dead.

The turn the text takes is significant. After his stated purpose of describing Alcibiades' thoughts to himself, Socrates could have gone on to describe, to the best of his ability, what Alcibiades' thoughts actually were in rejecting one or another of his would-be lovers. But Socrates clearly does not intend to describe Alcibiades'

⁷ The perceived significance of this beginning is indicated by the fact that the words *ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου* were commented on at length by Proclus (*in Alc.* 24.12-26.12). In modern times, Denyer 2001 *ad loc.* and Renaud & Tarrant 2015, p. 25-28 have also emphasised these first words.

actual thoughts in this sense. Rather, he introduces an imaginary interlocutor—a god, no less—who poses a question to Alcibiades, or his imagined alter ego. However, in mentioning this hypothetical question, Socrates stimulates in Alcibiades' mind the very thought that he then goes on to describe—if Socrates is correct about this thought, of course. In other words, Socrates does not merely report a mental state that is already there, he manipulates the situation in such a way as to bring to light something that was present only in a dispositional way in Alcibiades' mind.

Alcibiades' hypothetical response that he would rather be dead than live in contentment with his present achievements and possessions shows that he is ambitious. Socrates next starts to indicate the extent of this ambition, first by suggesting what Alcibiades plans to tell the Athenians in the assembly (105a7-b4):

ἡγῆ (...) ἐνδείξεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ἄξιος εἶ τιμᾶσθαι ὡς οὔτε Περικλῆς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς τῶν πάποτε γενομένων, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐνδείξάμενος μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει[.]

You think (...) that you will demonstrate to the Athenians that you are worth it to be honoured as neither Pericles was nor anyone else who ever lived, and that once you have demonstrated this you will be able to do very great things in the city.

In fact, Socrates continues, Alcibiades is so ambitious that he wants to dominate not only Athens, nor even the whole of Europe, but Asia as well, in order to fill all people with his name and his power (105b5-c4). According to Socrates, Alcibiades thinks nobody really worth mentioning except Cyrus and Xerxes, the famous kings of Persia (105c5-6). And so Socrates imagines that Alcibiades asks himself what hope Socrates can have, that prevents him from giving up as well (105c7-d1). Socrates responds to this imaginary question by means of a large claim, which in its wording picks up on Alcibiades' imagined speech to the Athenian assembly described just before (105d7-e5):

ὥσπερ γὰρ σὺ ἐλπίδας ἔχεις ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι αὐτῇ παντὸς ἄξιος εἶ, ἐνδείξάμενος δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ παραυτίκα δυνήσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ γὰρ παρὰ σοὶ ἐλπίζω μέγιστον δυνήσεσθαι ἐνδείξάμενος ὅτι παντὸς ἄξιός εἰμί σοι καὶ οὔτε ἐπίτροπος οὔτε συγγενὴς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς ἰκανὸς παραδοῦναι τὴν δύναμιν ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖς πλὴν ἐμοῦ, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι.

Just as you hope to show in the city that you are worth everything to her, by showing that there is nothing you won't instantly be able to do, in the same way I too hope to be able to do great things by you, by showing that I am worth everything to you and that neither guardian nor relative nor anyone else is able to provide you with the power that you desire except me—with the god, that is.

The sheer implausibility of this claim makes Alcibiades willing to enter the rest of the conversation with Socrates, because he is so curious how Socrates will defend this claim.

Thus far, Socrates has acted as a mirror by voicing Alcibiades' ambitions back to him. Alcibiades' ambitions of world domination certainly are not safe material for open proclamation in Athens, and Alcibiades' rebarbative attitude to his lovers would not easily have allowed him to admit to his deepest motives in Socrates' presence. Moreover, Alcibiades may not even himself have known quite what his ambitions are really like. Hence the clever device Socrates adopts: saying to Alcibiades what Alcibiades is thinking, and so slowly eliciting his affirmation of these unvoiced thoughts. In this way, Alcibiades can see what his ambition is like, and so get to know himself.

Another moment of mirroring occurs in the last citation I gave. Down to his very phrasing in 105d7-e5 (and compare 105a7-b4), Socrates makes his position relative to Alcibiades a mirror image of Alcibiades' imagined position relative to the Athenians. This too acts as a device of externalisation that allows Alcibiades better to appreciate the plausibility of his own claims.

As the conversation continues, Socrates uses a classic elenctic strategy to demonstrate the untenability of Alcibiades' claims and to convince him that he is ignorant of all that is important. In his choice of topic, Socrates again mirrors Alcibiades in choosing politics, justice, and advantage, things about which Alcibiades claims expertise.⁸

The elenctic conversation leads to Alcibiades' admission of ignorance (116e2-4). But he nevertheless keeps resisting the infer-

⁸ See Werner 2013, p. 319 for this strategy (which he calls 'mimetic irony', following Mitchell 2004, p. xxviii-xxx) as an instance of Socrates' mirroring of Alcibiades.

ence that he needs to improve himself. He argues that the others are no better: all politicians lack knowledge. And since they are all equal in terms of knowledge, Alcibiades will carry the day on the merits of his natural advantages alone. To Socrates' dismay, Alcibiades even thinks he equals the kings of Sparta and Persia in terms of birth and possessions (119b1-121a2).⁹

It is in order to cure him of this *hybris* that Socrates pronounces his speech. In it, Socrates paints an impressive picture of the Spartan and Persian kings' lineage (121a3-b4), the protection of their women (121b5-c4), the birth, rearing and education of their princes (121c4-122a8), their possessions (122b8-c3, d3-123c3), and their virtues (122a3-8, c5-8). The account is neither historically accurate nor indeed plausible. For instance, Socrates claims that the princes of Persia have four tutors, one for wisdom, one for justice, one for temperance and one for courage (121e5-122a8). This is an obvious projection of Socratic ideas. It also contains passages like the following (123b4-c2, as the narrative, after a section on the Spartans, turns to the Persians again):

ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χώραν πάνυ πολλὴν καὶ ἀγαθὴν, ἐγγὺς ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, ἣν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζώνην τῆς βασιλείως γυναικός· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὐτὸς καλεῖσθαι καλύπτραν, καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξηρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικός[.]

I once heard from a trustworthy man from among those who went up to the king, who said that he travelled through a large, fertile region, nearly a day's distance, which the inhabitants call the belt of the king's wife; and that there is another which is called the veil, and many other beautiful, good places which had been selected for the jewels of that woman.

After such fairy tale-like elements, Socrates pictures the response of the Persian king's mother (123c4-d4):

εἴ τις εἴποι τῇ βασιλείᾳ μητρί, Ξέρξου δὲ γυναικί, Ἀμήστριδι, ὅτι ἐν νῶ ἔχει σοὺ τῷ υἱεὶ ἀντιτάττεσθαι ὁ Δεινομάχης υἱός, ἧ ἔστι κόσμος ἴσως ἄξιος μνῶν πεντήκοντα εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ, τῷ δ' υἱεὶ αὐτῆς γῆς πλέθρα Ἑρχίασιν οὐδὲ τριακόσια, θαυμάσαι ἂν ὅτω ποτὲ πιστεύων

⁹ Cf. Döring 2016, p. 99 on Alcibiades' arrogant description of his rivals.

ἐν νῶ ἔχει οὗτος ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης τῷ Ἀρτοξέρξει διαγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ οἶμαι ἂν αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ ἄλλῳ πιστεύων οὗτος ἀνὴρ ἐπιχειρεῖ πλὴν ἐπιμελεία τε καὶ σοφία· ταῦτα γὰρ μόνᾳ ἄξια λόγου ἐν Ἑλλήσιν.

If someone would tell the mother of the king, Xerxes' wife, Amestris: 'the son of Dinomache, who possesses jewels worth perhaps 50 minas at most, and whose son does not even have 300 plethra of land in Erchia, plans to oppose your son', I think she would be amazed at what possibly this Alcibiades is trusting in in contending against Artaxerxes, and I also think that she would say: 'this man makes his attempt in reliance on nothing other than training and wisdom, for these alone are worth mentioning among the Greeks'.

If the queen would then hear that Alcibiades does not think he needs training or wisdom, and that he trusts in his natural advantages (123e5-124a4):

ἡγήσαιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὧ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, μαίνεσθαι πρὸς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ἀποβλέψασα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λαμπιδῶ, τὴν Λεωτυχίδου μὲν θυγατέρα, Ἀρχιδάμου δὲ γυναῖκα, Ἄγιδος δὲ μητέρα, οἱ πάντες βασιλῆς γεγόνασιν, θαυμάσαι ἂν καὶ ταύτην εἰς τὰ παρὰ σφίσιν ὑπάρχοντα ἀποβλέψασαν, εἰ σὺ ἐν νῶ ἔχεις τῷ υἱεῖ αὐτῆς διαγωνίζεσθαι οὕτω κακῶς ἡγμένος.

she would look at all these things on their side and consider us crazy. And I think Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus, the mother of Agis, all kings, would also be amazed when she looks at all such things on their side, if you plan to contend against her son with such bad training.

It is worth pausing here to describe Socrates' narrative technique. He evokes a scene that is interestingly similar to the beginning of the dialogue. Just as Socrates introduced a hypothetical conversation between a god and Alcibiades at 105a3-6, so too in the case of the Persian queen: he imagines that 'someone' describes Alcibiades' plans to Amestris. The queen herself is said to be 'amazed' (θαυμάσαι) at the source of Alcibiades' confidence (ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων, 123c8), much as Alcibiades was amazed (θαυμάζειν, 103a1; θαυμάζω, 104d4) at Socrates' apparently bizarre behaviour and wondered about the source of Socrates' confidence (τί ποτε βούλει καὶ εἰς τίνα ἐλπίδα βλέπων, 104d2; cf. ὅτῳ ποτὲ πιστεύων,

123c8). The imagined queen is as a mirror in which Alcibiades is confronted by his own bewilderment; by this means he is invited to redirect his initial surprise at Socrates' hopes towards his own ambitions.

Having conjured up the responses of the Persian and Spartan queens, Socrates asks whether it wouldn't be shameful if the women among their enemies had a better estimate of their position than they themselves (124a5-a7). Instead, he exhorts Alcibiades (124a8-b2),

πειθόμενος ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι, γνῶθι σαυτόν, ὅτι οὗτοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν ἀντίπαλοι, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὓς σὺ οἶει·

listen to me and to the inscription at Delphi: know yourself, that these are our rivals, and not the ones you have in mind.

This call to self-knowledge marks the end of the speech, and Alcibiades now agrees that he must indeed improve himself.

The dialogue continues with an exploration of the proper method of self-improvement. Socrates urges on Alcibiades the need to know himself before he can improve himself (you must know what to improve). Once more he appeals to the Delphic motto: 'know yourself' (129a2-3). Socrates offers an argument to show that Alcibiades is his soul, not his body (129b5-130c4). What the Delphic motto really exhorts Alcibiades to do is therefore to 'know your soul' (130e7-8). Alcibiades' efforts at self-improvement must likewise be directed at his soul, not his body. As Alcibiades notes, however, he still has not heard Socrates describe the way in which he may improve himself and asks him for elucidation (132b4-5).

2. *The mechanism of mirroring*

In this way, the dialogue reaches the mirror passage which I mentioned at the beginning, in which Socrates offers his famous analogy between self-seeing eyes and self-knowing souls (132c9-133a7):

ἄρα πρὸς θεῶν εὖ λέγοντος οὗ νυνδὴ ἐμνήσθημεν τοῦ Δελφικοῦ γράμματος οὐ συνίμεν; (...) εἰ ἡμῶν τῷ ὁμματι ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβουλευόν· εἶπεν 'ἰδὲ σαυτόν', πῶς ἂν ὑπελάβομεν τί παραινεῖν; ἄρα οὐχὶ εἰς τοῦτο βλέπειν, εἰς ὃ βλέπων ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἐμελλεν αὐτόν

ιδεῖν; (...) — Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι εἰς κάτοπτρά τε καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. — Ὅρθῳς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ ὃ ὀρώμεν ἔνεστί τι τῶν τοιούτων; — Πάνυ γε. — Ἐννεονόηκας οὖν ὅτι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τὸ πρόσωπον ἐμφαίνεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ὧσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ, ὃ δὴ καὶ κόρην καλοῦμεν, εἰδῶλον ὃν τι τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος; — Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. — Ὁφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὀφθαλμὸν θεώμενος, καὶ ἐμβλέπων εἰς τοῦτο ὅπερ βέλτιστον αὐτοῦ καὶ ὃ ὀρά, οὕτως ἂν αὐτὸν ἴδοι.

Do we fail to understand, by the gods, the Delphic inscription we just mentioned and that puts it so well? (...) If it counselled our eye as if it were a human being and said ‘see yourself, what would we take it to exhort us and how? Wouldn’t it be to look into that in which the eye would see itself, if it looked into it? (...) — It is clear, Socrates, that it is to look into mirrors and things of that kind. — That’s correct. Isn’t there also something of the sort in the eye with which we see? — Definitely. — So have you observed that if someone looks into an eye his face appears in the sight of his opposite partner as in a mirror, which after all we do call ‘pupil’, this being an image of the person who looks into it? — It is true what you say. — An eye, therefore, that regards an eye and looks into that which is best in it and by means of which it sees, may in that manner see itself.

This last point is important—Socrates repeats it a little later: it is specifically the pupil, the locus of activity in the other eye, that allows an eye to see itself (133b2-5). Furthermore, the only way to see a mirror image of yourself in another eye is to look into an eye that looks at you.

The same mechanism also holds in the case of souls—and therefore also with respect to self-knowledge (133b7-c6):¹⁰

Ἄρ’ οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ ψυχὴ εἰ μέλλει γνῶσεσθαι αὐτήν, εἰς ψυχὴν αὐτῇ βλέπτεον, καὶ μάλιστ’ εἰς τοῦτον αὐτῆς τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ, σοφία, καὶ εἰς ἄλλο ὃ τοῦτο τυγχάνει ὁμοιον ὄν; — Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. — Ἐχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς θειότερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ ὃ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν; — Οὐκ ἔχομεν. — Τῷ θεῷ ἄρα τοῦτ’ ὅμοιον

¹⁰ I follow the current consensus that the lines 133c8-17 were interpolated later (Favrelle 1982, p. 367-374 states the case well). For the alternative view see Döring 2016, p. 136-139.

αὐτῆς, καὶ τις εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων καὶ πᾶν τὸ θεῖον γνούς, θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν, οὕτω καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἂν γνοίῃ μάλιστα.

The soul too, dear Alcibiades, if it is to know itself, it must look into a soul, and most of all into that area in which the excellence of the soul comes to be, wisdom, and into what else this is similar to. — It seems so to me, Socrates. — Can we say, then, that there is a more godlike [element] of the soul than this, around which knowing and thinking revolve? — We cannot. — Then this in the soul resembles the god, and someone who looks into this and has come to know all of the godlike, god and thought, may in this manner come to know himself most of all as well.

The soul's regard should fix on the best aspect of another soul, which Socrates identifies as that soul's thinking. The passage as a whole is particularly rich. It begins with literal mirroring in general, zooms in on the mirror function of eyes, draws its core analogy with psychic mirroring, and extrapolates this line of vision to everything godlike. Here I would like to concentrate on Socrates' characterisation of the mechanism of looking at others who look at you in terms of mirrors. The mechanism of mirroring is introduced explicitly by Alcibiades in response to Socrates' question of how an eye might see itself. Socrates bypasses ordinary mirrors and things of the sort (in suggesting these, Alcibiades may have been thinking of reflecting surfaces of water, cups, etc.) to focus on a much more difficult kind of mirroring: that in the eye of another. The reason for this zooming-in is clear. The case of literal mirroring is used as an analogy for the mechanism of psychic mirroring. By focusing so much on the activity of sight as the privileged mirror for an eye that wants to regard itself, Socrates makes the case of literal mirroring even more analogous to psychic mirroring than general instances of mirroring are. More specifically, eyes and souls share, but other mirrors lack, an active element that is the same in the mirror and in the person who looks into it (on the mirroring and on the mirrored side of the relation). And it is this active element that makes reflection at all possible. One sees oneself insofar as one sees the other seeing oneself.

Socrates' description of the way to self-knowledge as a kind of mirroring is evocative and a powerful emblem of what philosophy might be. Scholarship has justifiably concentrated on the philo-

sophical role and message of the analogy.¹¹ However, we should not overlook the important retrospective function of the description. The mechanism which Socrates describes is also at play throughout the dialogue and particularly in the central speech. The description of 132c9-133c6 fits very well with the scenes featuring the queen-mothers of Persia and Sparta. They are imagined as observing Alcibiades, eliciting information about Alcibiades from ‘someone’, and passing judgement on Alcibiades. By mediation of Socrates, Alcibiades himself is able to observe these scenes and to study the queen-mothers’ judgement and observations about him. As we saw, Socrates brings the show to a close by invoking the motto ‘Know yourself’; in doing so, he drops an anchor to which he can explicitly refer back in 132c9-10, the start of the passage that explains what self-knowledge is and how it can be acquired.¹² Part of what Socrates is doing in 132c9-133c6, therefore, is to characterise the device he adopted earlier in the dialogue as a kind of mirroring.

3. Background to the speech

Socrates’ retrospective characterisation of his own narrative device as a kind of mirroring does not yet explain, however, why he introduced this device at all, why he thought it worth characterising, and why he included this speech about the Spartan and Persian kings and queens in the first place. It is to these questions that we turn now.

The speech has been an interpretive problem for both historians and philosophers.¹³ It is historically blatantly inaccurate (to mention only one thing: the Spartans are described as incred-

¹¹ See, in addition to the items in n. 5, Bos 1970; Soulez-Luccioni 1974; Brunschwig 1996; Johnson 1999; Rider 2011; Werner 2013; Tarrant & Renaud 2015, p. 57-71.

¹² Note also that the description of the queen-mothers’ responses uses visual language similar to that used in the mirror passage: ἀποβλέψασα in 123c6-7 and 124a3, where the queens look away at their own possessions—implying they were looking (mentally) at Alcibiades before.

¹³ Among historians, see for instance Tigerstedt 1965, p. 278, who comments that the author of the *First Alcibiades* (which he judges spurious) ‘misrepresented his master’, i.e. Plato’s other pronouncements on Sparta. Among philosophers the speech is cited as an argument for inauthenticity.

ibly wealthy, which applies neither to the dramatic date nor to any possible authorial date of this dialogue); passages like the one about the queen's jewelry seem designed to be humorous and ill-suited to serious exhortation, and the speech contains a reference to comedy (121d1-2)¹⁴ as well as to Aesop's fables (123a1-4).¹⁵ Philosophers have also deemed the speech trivial, devoid of philosophical content, and a seemingly perverse incentive for Alcibiades to pursue virtue.¹⁶

Nevertheless, it could be argued that the speech is tailored to Alcibiades and that its presence in the composition is therefore justified by the character of Socrates' interlocutor. For on the level of the conversation with Alcibiades, the appeal to the Spartans' and especially Persians' qualities has an important exhortative function. The rich phantasy contains many elements that we can plausibly interpret as intended to boost Alcibiades' ambition and to intensify his desire. Socrates contrasts Alcibiades' lineage with that of his opponents; points out that the birthdays of Persian kings are celebrated on a grand scale, whereas Alcibiades' own passes unnoticed; the frequent appeals to the many possessions of the Spartans and Persians make us suspect that Alcibiades is not indifferent to wealth, despite Socrates' flattering comment at the beginning of their conversation that he was (προσθήσω δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῶν πλουσίων· δοκεῖς δέ μοι ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἥκιστα μέγα φρονεῖν, 104b8-c1). And didn't Socrates mention that Alcibiades considers nobody except Cyrus and Xerxes worth talking about (105c5-6)? Socrates' all but final comment in the speech is also clearly meant to rouse Alcibiades from his self-satisfaction (124a5-7): καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ αἱ τῶν πολεμίων γυναῖκες βέλτιον περὶ ἡμῶν διανοοῦνται, οἷους χρὴ ὄντας σφίσιν ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἢ ἡμεῖς περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; ('But don't you think it is shameful if the women of our enemies deliberate better about us than we about ourselves, when it comes to the question of what sort of people we must be in order to fight with them?')¹⁷ To judge by the characterisation

¹⁴ Plat. com., fr. 227 Kassel/Austin. Pradeau judges the 'fable ... éminnement comique', in Marbœuf & Pradeau 1999, p. 54.

¹⁵ 197 Chambry = 147 Hausrath = 142 Perry.

¹⁶ See most recently Renaud & Tarrant 2015, p. 45-53.

¹⁷ Archie 2008 makes the argument that Socrates has a positive view of the judgement of these Spartan and Persian women, but it seems to me that this is

of Alcibiades we have been given at the beginning of the text and throughout the dialogue, the speech is well-placed to drive him to his admission that there is a lot of self-improvement he must do before he can plausibly make an attempt on the Spartans and Persians. One could therefore argue that as far as Alcibiades is concerned, the speech is just what he needed.¹⁸

This answer, however, is unsatisfactory. The speech contains too many strange features to be explained by its exhortative function alone: a different kind of speech would have served such a purpose as well. Moreover, this explanation does not address the level of communication between the author of the dialogue and his readers.

In order to understand the form and content of this speech as well as its presence in the dialogue, I submit, we need to consider its genre and literary context. It can be compared to other texts of the same period along three axes. As a historical excursus in the form of a speech in the middle of an otherwise dialectical text, this speech has analogues in Platonic texts like the *Minos*, the *Hipparchus*, the *Alcibiades II* (the second of the two speeches there, 148b9-150b4).¹⁹ None of these dialogues are usually admitted as genuine, and we cannot exclude the possibility that the *First Alcibiades* set the trend in the Platonic corpus. If it did, it was likely in imitation of the *Alcibiades* of the Socratic Aeschines. This dialogue contained a central speech about Themistocles, in which Socrates showed that even Themistocles with his wisdom was unable to secure a happy life for himself. Socrates concludes from this example that it is foolishness of Alcibiades to trust merely in his natural advantages. Alcibiades is so impressed that he bursts out crying.²⁰ There was precedent, therefore, in the restricted domain of *Alcibiades* dialogues,²¹ for adopting this format, even if this does not yet explain why the author in this particular case

an anachronistic valuation and misses the point of Socrates' remark here: if even women judge better than Alcibiades, he is in really bad shape.

¹⁸ I thank Geert Roskam for pressing this point during the conference.

¹⁹ For an analysis of this correspondence in formal terms see Dönt 1963.

²⁰ For this dialogue see SSR VI A 41-54; the discussion and reconstruction of Dittmar 1912 is still of great value.

²¹ On this subgenre see Döring 2016, p. 149-164; Neuhausen 2005, p. 176-179.

chose to do so. Moreover, the comparison with Aeschines makes clear that an exhortative central speech in an Alcibiades dialogue would not necessarily have the fairy tale-like elements that the speech in the *First Alcibiades* contains.

A second axis along which the *First Alcibiades*' speech may be compared to other texts of the time is what I will call its orientalis-ing aspect.²² The tale is about foreign rulers, who are described in very positive terms. And while the Spartans too are said to be incredibly rich, well-born and virtuous, it is clear that the Persians are the real heroes of the account.²³ Greek and more specifically Athenian interest in Persian matters is clear from historical works like those of Herodotus (whose *Histories* appeared at the end of the fifth century) and Ctesias (whose *Persica* probably date from the turn to the fourth century).²⁴ In Herodotus, whose work has been preserved in full, we can detect a clear comparative interest. Such a comparative perspective is also present in Plato's *Laws*: in book 3, the Athenian stranger treats of Persian history as part of a comparison between the Persian and the Athenian political models.²⁵ Plato's fellow Socratic Xenophon combined an interest in Sparta and Persia. Sparta is the subject of his idealising *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* and his eulogy of Agesilaus.²⁶ Persia plays a

²² Edward Saïd's thesis of 'orientalism' (1978) concerns a very different era and has a technical use that does not apply here. I use the word 'orientalising' in a weakened sense for idealising descriptions of eastern, specifically Persian rulers, history, customs. On the 'other' in Greek literature, see Gruen 2011.

²³ On the complicated story of Laconism in Athens which is in the background here, see among others Tigerstedt 1965, p. 108-227; Rawson 1969, p. 12-55 and p. 61-80.

²⁴ The fragments of Ctesias' *Persica* are collected in FGrHist 688 F 1-44. See König 1972. In Herodotus, the famous scene in which a Persian scout watches the Spartans prepare for battle at Thermopylae (7.208-209) is a fine example of the Greeks' interest in barbarian responses to their own way of life and showcases the implicit feeling of superiority that often accompanies such comparisons or, often, projections. (I owe the reference to an unpublished paper by Irene de Jong, who, with reference to Hartog's classic *Le miroir d'Hérodote* (1980), speaks of 'mirror minds'.) Incidentally, Herodotus here uses the same narrative technique as Socrates in his description of the queens' responses to Alcibiades. The constitutional debate (3.80-82) is a more straightforward projection of Greek (sophistic) ideas onto Persian characters.

²⁵ Plato's *Menexenus* and *Critias* also include important reflections on the relationship Athens-Persia.

²⁶ On Xenophon and Sparta, see Tigerstedt 1965, p. 159-178.

naturally prominent role in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon's account of his own campaign in support of the coup the younger Cyrus launched against his brother, and in the *Cyropaedia*, an account of the birth, upbringing, conquests, character and adventures of the old Cyrus.²⁷ In his choice of this protagonist, Xenophon was most likely following another Socratic, Antisthenes, who devoted two dialogues to the founder of the Persian empire. Few fragments survive, but there are plausible indications that Antisthenes projected his Greek ethical ideals onto the Persian Cyrus.²⁸

Xenophon's *Agesilaus* and *Cyropaedia* are also clear instances of the third type of literature with which the *First Alcibiades*' central speech may be compared: the encomium of foreign kings.²⁹ The composition of the *Agesilaus* shows that Xenophon responded consciously to the *Euagoras* of Isocrates; this work, which its author claims is the first prose encomium of a contemporary person, praised the birth, training, virtues and deeds of Euagoras, the king of Cyprus.³⁰ Isocrates himself followed up on this work by writing two treatises dedicated to Euagoras' son Nicocles (*To Nicocles*, *Nicocles*). If one wishes to identify a genre of mirrors for princes in fourth-century Greece, these written speeches are the most likely candidates.³¹ Kingship literature in antiquity repeatedly and emphatically returned to the themes sounded in Isocrates' Cyprian orations (as the three speeches are called) and to

²⁷ On the *Cyropaedia* see Mueller-Goldingen 1995; Gera 1993; Tatum 1989. Xenophon's portrait of Cyrus as an ideal leader is examined by Due 1989, p. 147-184; Carlier 2010.

²⁸ On Antisthenes see Patzer 1970. Fragments from the Cyrus dialogues are collected in SSR V A 84-91. Herodicus *apud* Athen. 5.220c preserves a fragment from one of Antisthenes' Cyrus dialogues in which Alcibiades is criticised for sleeping with mother, sister and daughter, the way the Persians do (SSR V A 141a). What this means and what context it might belong to is unclear. There was also an *Alcibiades* of Antisthenes, as well as an *Archelaus*; see the possible fragments at SSR V A 198-202, 203. For discussion, see Patzer 1970, p. 131-133; Neuhausen 2010, p. 220-238; Prince 2015, p. 414-415, 678-687.

²⁹ As Döring 2016, p. 99-100 notes, the way Socrates starts his speech (120d12-e5) by mentioning ancestry and upbringing (εὐγένεια and τροφή/παιδεία) is typical for encomia.

³⁰ On the *Euagoras* (written about 374-370) see Alexiou 2010, esp. p. 28-37. The relations between the *Euagoras* and the *Agesilaus* (written in 360-359) are discussed in Krömer 1971, p. 65-80 and p. 116-125, and by Hirsch 1985, p. 57-60.

³¹ On this question of classification see Eder 1995, p. 155-159; Schulte 2001, p. 46-118.

Xenophon's *Agesilaus*.³² The *Cyropaedia* is on a much larger scale and is much more obviously fictional. It includes descriptions of battles, conversations with other kings, anecdotes on many different topics. But it is also one great encomium of Cyrus, who is viewed as the historical embodiment of what Xenophon saw as virtue.³³

The author of the *First Alcibiades*, I argue, responded to texts of the latter two types that I have outlined, and especially to their combination: works in praise of rulers, especially foreign ones, that aim to exhort a new generation of philosophical statesmen to follow these more or less fictional paradigms of virtue. The central speech of the *First Alcibiades* has been framed to recall such texts, while at the same time exaggerating standard elements of them. The result is a very implausible account of oriental virtue and rule. If despite its implausibility the speech nevertheless appeals to Alcibiades and successfully rouses him to improve himself, this shows the distance he still has to travel. The readership of the dialogue is expected to recognise this and perhaps to laugh at Alcibiades. Moreover, the fantastical style of the speech may also be intended as a comment on the implausibility of orientalis-ing encomia more generally. This would not have been an empty exercise: Xenophon and Antisthenes in particular, fellow Socratics of Plato's, will have been perceived as rivals to the educational vision of our author (whether Plato or someone close to him). As I will argue below, the *First Alcibiades* propagates a move beyond the type of exhortation embodied in the speech, towards a truly philosophical education for rulers.

4. *Specific connections to Xenophon*

The literary context that I have sketched is not only an important background to the central speech of the *First Alcibiades* in a general way. The speech also contains specific allusions to works of Xeno-

³² See the survey in Cairns 1989, p. 10-21.

³³ On the reception of the *Cyropaedia* as (what we call) a mirror for a prince see Tatum 1989, p. 3-33. In Cicero's oft-cited remark, Scipio Africanus always had the work close to hand during his campaigns (*ad Q. fr.* 1.1.23; *Tusc.* 2.62). The ancient reception of Xenophon is studied by Münscher 1920 (p. 45 on the *Cyropaedia*).

phon. This contemporary of Plato's came into view already as a relevant author in the overview of literary comparanda above. We can now identify him more specifically as the target of Socrates' speech. In 123b4-c2, a passage I have cited above on p. 37, Socrates says: ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα. As Denyer has noted, in τῶν ἀναβεβηκότων 'it is hard not to catch (...) an allusion to Xenophon',³⁴ who wrote his ἀνάβασις about his own expedition towards (and back from) Persia. It is very plausible that this is an allusion to Xenophon since the tale Socrates proceeds to tell bears a close resemblance to something actually written in the *Anabasis*. Socrates says that he has heard this person talk of his journey through a fertile region which the locals call ζώνην τῆς βασιλέως γυναικός (the belt of the king's wife). In *Anabasis* 1.4.9, Xenophon mentions in passing villages that were allocated to Parysatis for the sake of (to pay for) her belt: αἱ δὲ κῶμαι ἐν αἷς ἐσκήνουν Παρυσάτιδος ἦσαν εἰς ζώνην δεδομέναι.³⁵

The allusion to Xenophon is even more extensive than this. The sentence begins with the words ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου. This imitates a particular formulation that Xenophon uses to introduce a Socratic conversation. His *Oeconomicus* starts with the words: ἤκουσα δὲ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιάδε διαλεγομένου; in the *Memorabilia* too, the formulation ἤκουσα δὲ ποτε αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ φίλων διαλεγομένου (2.4.1; similarly 2.5.1, 1.4.2) is used to introduce a Socratic dialogue.³⁶ Xenophon uses

³⁴ Denyer 2001 *ad* 123b5. The identification was already made in antiquity: Olymp., in *Alc.* 167.23-24 reports: περὶ Ξενοφώντος φασὶ λέγειν αὐτόν· οὗτος γὰρ ἐν τῇ Ἀναβάσει ἱστέρηκεν τὰ Περσῶν[.]

³⁵ Denyer 2001 *ad* 123b5. Johnson 1996, p. 208-209, followed by Döring 2016, p. 111, rejects the identification with Xenophon on the grounds that Socrates mentions details that do not occur in Xenophon; that other Platonic texts do not refer to Xenophon so explicitly; and that there were other Greeks who travelled to Persia. The detail of the belt is very specific, however, and Socrates' inclusion of other details is part of the game he plays (see below). Plato's *Menexenus* is proof that Plato was willing to respond to historiographical texts (Thucydides), and (as Johnson recognises) *Laws* book 3 most likely responds to Xenophon too (see below, n. 41).

³⁶ The few phrases closely resembling ours in the rest of the Platonic corpus support the idea that a specific reference is intended. Of five occurrences, two are from works that postdate the *Alc. I* by many years and that depend on it: *Alc. II* 148d4 (where the phrase, significantly, figures in the second mythical-historical speech and seems to refer to a historical work) and *Ax.* 369b5 (referring to Prodi-

these opening phrases to create the illusion that he was first-hand witness to these conversations, but it is clear that his Socratic conversations are as fictional as other Socratic literature. It is a particularly nice touch that the author of the *First Alcibiades* has his character Socrates use Xenophon's Socratic formula to refer to Xenophon. More generally, however, our author uses Xenophon's formula as a marker that he is imitating Xenophon's type of writing.

Moreover, it is with strong irony that the author has Socrates designate the man from whom he has heard the story as ἀνδρὸς ἀξιοπίστου. For Socrates' version differs in important respects from the report in the *Anabasis*. Xenophon spoke of a region that was given to the queen in order to produce the revenue needed for her belt.³⁷ Socrates tells Alcibiades that the region was *called* the belt of the queen, and amplifies on that by saying (123b7-c3):

εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἣν αὐτὸς καλεῖσθαι καλύπτραν, καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς τόπους καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἐξηρημένους τὸν τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχειν ἐκάστους τῶν τόπων ἀπὸ ἐκάστου τῶν κόσμων[.]

and that there is another which is called the veil, and many other beautiful, good places, selected for the jewelry of that woman, and that each of these places is called after each of her jewels.

cus). Two others mark a specific intertextual reference: *Lys.* 215c2 (ἤδη ποτὲ τοῦ ἥκουσα λέγοντος, cf. 214b2-5 and 216a1-2) refers to a (too) general cosmological idea deemed implausible (the reference is to a work of natural philosophy, probably Empedocles). At *Grg.* 493a1-2 (ἤδη γὰρ τοῦ ἐγωγε καὶ ἥκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, cf. a5-6), concerning the idea that the body is the tomb of the soul, the reference also seems to be precise, although hard to pin down for us (Philolaus? Empedocles again?). At *Smp.* 201d2 Socrates speaks of the λόγος, ὃν ποτ' ἥκουσα γυναικὸς Μαντινικῆς Διοτίμας, another precise reference for an account clearly meant to be seen as fictional. In our passage, the clear reference to Xenophon in the other two parts of the phrase and his conspicuous use of it to commence dialogues support reading this part of our passage too as an intertextual reference to his works, with polemical intent.

³⁷ Other authors, incidentally, claimed similar things: according to Thucydides, 1.138.5, Artaxerxes I gave Themistocles three cities: Magnesia for bread, Lampsacus for wine, Myus for meat. Herodotus mentions the city of Anthylla in Egypt which he says was to provide for the Persian queen's shoes 2.98. (These references are in Denyer 2001 *ad* 123b7-c3.) Cf. Döring 2016, p. 111.

Our author is clearly exaggerating Xenophon's account and so making it ridiculous. By having Socrates call his informant *ἄξιόπιστος*, he implies the opposite: Xenophon is not a trustworthy reporter. In the combination of this word with what I have dubbed Xenophon's Socratic formula (*ἤκουσα ποτὲ αὐτοῦ*), we may perhaps even detect an additional attack on the veracity of Xenophon's portrayal of Socrates generally.

The sentence we have examined, then, has strong intertextual connections to Xenophon. There may be more connections in the speech. Denyer has pointed to the phrase by which Socrates indicates the contrast between the lineage of the Spartans and Persians and that of Alcibiades and himself (121a4-8): in a characteristic phrase, their families *ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀρξάμενα βασιλῆς εἰσιν ἐκ βασιλέων μέχρι Διός* ('starting with them, they are kings born from kings, all the way up to Zeus'), whereas *ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοὶ τε ιδιώται καὶ οἱ πατέρες* ('we ourselves are private folks, as were our fathers'). Given the connections with Xenophon that we have already seen, it is plausible to see here a link to the beginning of Xenophon's *Agésilas* (1.2):

περὶ μὲν οὖν εὐγενείας αὐτοῦ τί ἂν τις μείζον καὶ κάλλιον εἰπεῖν ἔχοι ἢ ὅτι ἔτι καὶ νῦν τοῖς προγόνοις ὀνομαζομένοις ἀπομνημονεύεται ὁπόστος ἀφ' Ἡρακλέους ἐγένετο, καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ιδιώταις ἀλλ' ἐκ βασιλέων βασιλεῦσιν;

What could one say about his high birth that is greater and finer than that people call to mind even now how many generations he comes after Heracles by naming his ancestors—ancestors who are not private folks but kings from kings?³⁸

The allusions to Xenophon help date the dialogue. It seems clear that the direction of the intertextual connection is from Xenophon to the *First Alcibiades*: it is unlikely that Xenophon would have called his work the *Anabasis* and made mention of the belt villages on the basis of Socrates' words in our passage. Now the *Anabasis* was finished after 371 (this date is based on 5.3.7). The

³⁸ The connection is suggested by Denyer 2001 *ad loc.* He also detects an allusion in 104a6-b1 (*ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν τῆς πατρίδος ἐντιμώτατον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ πόλις ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἐνδοξοτάτη*) to the next sentence in the *Agésilas* (1.3): *ἔπειτα νεανικωτάτου γένους ἐν τῇ σεαυτοῦ πόλει, οὕση μεγίστη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων.*

Agesilaus was composed immediately after the death of this Spartan king, in 360-359. The *First Alcibiades* must therefore have been written after 371 and most likely after 360.³⁹ (This dating is compatible with Plato's having written the text as well as with an associate of his having done so.) This date would make the *First Alcibiades* more recent also than the *Cyropaedia*, which was most likely composed in the late 360s.⁴⁰ In chronological terms, therefore, the speech in the *First Alcibiades* can plausibly be read as a response to this latter work as well, even if no specific references to it seem to be present in the text.⁴¹

The deliberateness and irony of the allusions we have considered make it clear that the speech in the *First Alcibiades* serves to comment on Xenophon's work, and particularly on his fictionalised accounts of foreign kings as models for Xenophon's fellow Athenians to imitate.⁴² The central speech is a parody of that kind of account.⁴³ Behind Xenophon, moreover, we can discern other

³⁹ Denyer 2001, *ad* 116d8 adduces a further circumstantial argument: Socrates speaks of someone advising the inhabitants of the island Peparethos about justice. This island was very insignificant and therefore would have been in an author's mind (and in that of his audience) only after particular historical events had put it there. Such an event was Alexander of Phrae's capture of the island, the Athenians' despatch of a relief force, and Alexander's subsequent punitive expedition against the Piraeus in 361. Pavlu 1905, p. 66-67 points to an alternative event, in 340-339, when Philip of Macedon destroyed the island; there is no doubt 'quin saepius de foedere cum Philippo icto, de aequitate, de iustitia verba facta sint'. Baynham & Tarrant 2012, p. 216-219 also favour this second event as a more plausible *terminus post quem* (on the basis of language of justice versus advantage in Demosthenes *Or.* 12 and 7). However, Denyer's event has the advantage of fitting very well with the allusions to Xenophon.

⁴⁰ See Mueller-Goldingen 1995, p. 45-55.

⁴¹ It has been argued, plausibly so in my view, that the discussion of Persian history in Plato's *Laws* book 3 (esp. 694a2-698a8) also responds to the *Cyropaedia*. See Schöpsdau 1995, p. 456-469.

⁴² As Walter Eder (1995, p. 171-173) has argued, perhaps the main, even if indirect, audience of Isocrates' and Xenophon's monarchical texts was the Athenian upper class. This position has come in for criticism from scholars who point to the presence of non-Athenians among the pupils of Isocrates and to Xenophon's residence in Spartan territory. Still, it remains plausible that a major function of these texts was precisely their role within Athenian discourse.

⁴³ The concept of 'parody' has received particularly rich discussion in the field of literary studies. A parody, as I use the term here, is an exaggerated imitation of a text or type of text that is meant to be recognised as an exaggerated imitation and so serves the purpose of mocking the original. This may be done without ulterior motives but it may also serve, as I argue it does here, a further authorial end (in

rivals of the Platonic school, like Antisthenes and Isocrates, who are targets by extension of the author of the *First Alcibiades*.

What kind of comment is the speech intended to express and convey? What is the point of the parody, except to suggest that Xenophon's princely and orientalising writing is implausible? The point, I argue, is double. First, the author of the *First Alcibiades* classifies the device Xenophon uses as 'mirroring'. We have seen that he introduces vignettes with the Persian and Spartan queen-mothers evaluating Alcibiades' ambitions. He thereby extends Xenophon's device and makes its pedagogical structure explicit: not only is the foreign prince held up as an example in which to see oneself and after which to mould oneself, he (or rather his mother) also looks back onto the Greek onlooker and gives him explicit advice.⁴⁴ We have also seen that Socrates refers back to the central speech when he starts the mirror passage and in this way characterises the technique used in the queen vignettes as a kind of mirroring. By way of these vignettes, then, the author has Socrates classify Xenophon's narrative and exhortative device as a kind of mirroring as well. Second, this classification prepares the way for the subsequent alternative which the author advances as much superior to Xenophon's education-by-oriental-example: that of philosophical dialogue, to which I will now turn.

5. *The philosopher's mirror*

Let us return to the mirror passage. Socrates recommends that Alcibiades look deeply in someone else's soul in order to know himself. Socrates tactfully doesn't say so explicitly, but the whole setup of the dialogue makes clear that Socrates himself is the primary candidate for Alcibiades' gaze.

this case: to advertise an alternative model of education). See Dover's *OCD* entry 'parody, Greek' (Hornblower & Spawforth 2012, p. 1083).

⁴⁴ One might wonder whether the moral examples included in the Platonic corpus should not be treated similarly to the depictions in Xenophon. To the extent that these moral examples are indeed only proffered as ideal figures for young would-be rulers to imitate, they may indeed be included in the characterisation as mirrors that is made here. But I suspect that in most cases in the Platonic corpus, the moral examples do not stand alone and are being commended to the extent that they embody successful instances of philosophical dialectic. (Many thanks to an anonymous reader for pressing the point.)

As we saw, the description of psychic mirroring is applicable to the fictional advice of the Persian and Spartan queens, and by extension to orientalisising exhortative literature. But we have also reviewed the many elements of mirroring in Socrates' own posture *vis-à-vis* Alcibiades from the very beginning of the dialogue. By inviting Alcibiades to listen to Socrates' regard of him, Socrates enables Alcibiades to get to know himself through Socrates' thinking about him. Socrates assumes postures symmetrical to those of Alcibiades. More importantly, however, he uses his cognitive powers to draw out Alcibiades' thoughts. At first, he does so by voicing Alcibiades' ambitions in a speech that he makes to his face (in 103a1-c6 and 104e4-106a1). That type of discourse gives way to an exchange of question and answer, in the course of which Socrates makes clear to Alcibiades that it is actually he who affirms the judgements involved in Socrates' questions. The very questions that Socrates poses and the answers which Socrates urges Alcibiades to keep giving are the mechanism by which Socrates holds up the mirror for Alcibiades.⁴⁵ Socrates' questions spring from his thinking and knowledge, and it is in this faculty of thought that Alcibiades can come to know himself.

In proposing himself and his philosophical questioning as the best mirror, Socrates bypasses the appeal to idealising royal literature. The direct route to self-knowledge leads through philosophical conversation. Rather than reading the *Cyropaedia*, one should engage in philosophical dialectic. The author asserts the superiority of Platonic philosophy to the *paideia* of Xenophon and his likes. Improvement results not from reading about or from imitating oriental kings but from looking to and conversing with the *person* of the philosopher. Socrates *himself* is the mirror.

Furthermore, only the philosopher can give Alcibiades access to what is godlike in himself and in reality as a whole, as Socrates says in 133c1-6 (cited on p. 40-41). This is a decisive new step that goes beyond anything an oriental, fictional mirror can offer. If we look again at the mirror passage, we see that something peculiar is happening with the mirrors in it. The passage combines two distinct ways of using mirrors. One way to use mirrors is in what we can call the frontal way: this is the way to see our own faces, when

⁴⁵ On Socrates' questions as the mirror see Belfiore 2012, p. 61.

the mirror offers us a view of ourselves, the viewers. In our passage, the mirror is first of all used for such frontal purposes. An eye cannot see *itself* and needs a mirror in order to see itself. The seeing eye and the eye that is seen are the same. The image is complicated, of course, by the fact that it is *another* eye that constitutes the mirror. But it is not primarily the desire to see something else that leads the eye to look for itself in something else, but the desire to see itself. Similarly, it is in search of *self*-knowledge that a soul will look into another soul.

In the course of the passage, however, this frontal use of the mirror is combined with another use. We can also use mirrors to make visible things that hide behind a particular angle, like a car in a sidestreet; or things that are too bright to look at directly, like a solar eclipse that we view via a mirror. In fact, when similes about mirrors are used in earlier Greek literature, it is such indirect uses that predominate.⁴⁶ Our author is therefore to some extent innovative in focusing first on the frontal use. When Socrates goes on to say, however, that the soul will be able to see god and all that is godlike, it is an indirect use of the mirror he envisages. In this case, it is definitely something different that is seen in the mirror of the other soul. The wise soul's similarity to god allows it to offer a view of god. In this way, the passage combines a descriptive vision of oneself with a normative one. Alcibiades will get to know *himself*. Paradoxically, what he sees when he sees himself is wisdom and knowledge. He sees what he is and what he ought to be.

Philosophical knowledge bears a resemblance to the divine, which allows the philosophical educator to lead his student towards the god and what is like the god within himself. Only a grasp of what is godlike within himself allows the ruler to know himself and to act and rule in the best way possible.

⁴⁶ Jónsson 1995, p. 21-61. Prominent ancient examples include the *ὁμιλίας κάτοπτρον* of Aesch., *Ag.* 839; deeds seen through song in Pind., *Nem.* 7.14; texts as indicators of a speaker's progress over time in Alcibi., *Soph.* 196-201; the same Alcibiades called the *Odyssey* a *καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον* (*apud* Aristot., *Rh.* 3.3.1406b12-13); in Plato, compare Socrates' instant creation by mirror at the beginning of *Republic* book 10; mirroring as a means to see what blinds one in direct sight: *Phd.* 99d4-e6 and *Lg.* 10.898d8-e2. On ancient mirroring see further Bartsch 2006. McCarty 1989 focuses from the outset on mirrors as devices with which to see oneself and neglects this indirect kind of vision.

6. Conclusion

I have argued that the *First Alcibiades* participates in a discourse that exhorts aristocratic Athenians to virtue by means of glowing descriptions of foreign kings. At the same time, the text offers a parody of such discourse and thus sets up a cross-generic rivalry between it and philosophical dialectic. The imagery of mirroring which Socrates introduces in this dialogue may both be taken to describe the mechanism used in such other texts and to show that the philosopher alone is able really to improve someone.

That the dialogue was influential in doing so may be inferred from the use made of this imagery many centuries later, when Seneca opens his treatise *De clementia* with the words (1.1):

Scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi uice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem peruenturum ad uoluptatem maximam omnium.

I have undertaken to write on mercy, Nero Caesar, in order to act as a kind of mirror, showing you to yourself on the point as you are of attaining the greatest of pleasures.

The mirror image comes straight from the *First Alcibiades*. This emerges from the precise role of the image in the text. Like Socrates, Seneca designates *himself* as the mirror into which this young man must look. As in the *First Alcibiades*, the mirror is both descriptive and paradigmatic: Nero will see himself, but the picture Seneca gives is that of an ideal.⁴⁷

Scholars have characterised the *De clementia* as the first theoretical justification of a monarchy that had *de facto* been in place for the better part of a century.⁴⁸ It is significant that this first justification squarely puts the philosopher in between the monarch and his self-knowledge.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ I hope to return to the connection between the *First Alcibiades* and Seneca's *De clementia* in the near future.

⁴⁸ e.g. Schofield 2015, p. 68-73; Grimal 1978, p. 129-134.

⁴⁹ I thank the participants of the conference and two anonymous readers for their helpful comments.

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Abstract

This paper argues that the Platonic *First Alcibiades* occupies an important role with respect to *Fürstenspiegel*-literature. Its central speech, full of praise for Persian and Spartan princes, links the dialogue in genre and content to exhortative texts that offer idealising accounts of foreign princes. The *First Alcibiades* responds to such accounts and characterises them as a type of mirroring. At the same time, the dialogue represents philosophical counsel as a superior form of mirroring and of education for the would-be prince.

LE *POLITIQUE* DE PLATON: UN DISCOURS *PERI BASILEIAS*? *

Dans une étude importante Walter Eder avait élaboré l'idée audacieuse selon laquelle ce qui a donné naissance au genre littéraire du 'Fürstenspiegel' au IV^e siècle av. J.-C. est le désir chez Isocrate et de Xénophon d'éduquer les aristocrates athéniens pour les préparer à une activité politique concrète: modifier et réformer les institutions athéniennes en vue d'établir un régime aristocratique¹.

Walter Eder considère que trois éléments caractérisent les discours monarchiques de ces penseurs: il s'agit de louanges en prose, ils s'adressent à un prince ou homme politique et ils respectent le critère de 'praticabilité', en effet ils doivent être utiles à leurs destinataires. Il n'est dès lors pas surprenant que l'auteur ait exclu les œuvres platoniciennes de ce genre littéraire². Respectant

* Je remercie très vivement les éditeurs, les lecteurs anonymes ainsi que Jean-Marie Bertrand, dont la lecture attentive et les remarques précieuses m'ont aidé à mieux formuler mon argument. Toute erreur ou omission est exclusivement attribuable à l'auteur.

¹ Eder 1995. L'auteur considère ainsi les *Discours Chypriotes* ou la *Cyropédie* et l'*Agésilas* comme des 'miroirs aux aristocrates' athéniens. Comme l'a montré Cournarie 2011, p. 36-43 cette proposition n'est pas convaincante mais il s'impose d'admettre que l'étude de Walter Eder est extrêmement importante dans le sens où elle tente d'apporter une réponse à une question majeure: pourquoi la réflexion sur la royauté s'épanouit-elle au sein de la démocratie athénienne du IV^e siècle av. J.-C.?

² Eder 1995, p. 159: 'Unter diesem Aspekt—und nach Meinung eben des Begründers dieser Gattung, Isokrates—dürfen politische Ratschläge nichts Utopisches behandeln. Nehmen wir bei der Definition des Fürstenspiegels zu dem formalen Kriterium (Prosa-Enkomion) und dem inhaltlichen Kriterium (Lob eines Fürsten) noch das Kriterium des Praktikabilität der Ratschläge hinzu, so definiert sich der Gegenstand des Fürstenspiegels im 4. Jh. als die Darstellung politisch-ethischer Ziele, die im praktischen Leben anzustreben und zu erreichen sind, und zwar am Beispiel der Erziehung oder des Handelns idealer Herrscher. Die

une conception bien enracinée parmi les historiens et les philosophes de l'antiquité, Eder considère Platon comme un auteur d'utopies philosophiques construisant des cités idéales mais peu soucieux d'étudier les moyens qui peuvent améliorer les cités existantes. Paul Cournarie avait bien révélé la faiblesse de l'hypothèse de Walter Eder, en montrant que l'ensemble de son argumentation est contestable sur plusieurs points et critique avec justesse l'idée de retirer de la liste des miroirs aux princes les œuvres platoniciennes³.

Dans les pages suivantes je vais mettre à l'épreuve cette idée et argumenter en faveur de l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'objet d'étude de Platon dans le *Politique* n'est pas seulement l'homme royal mais aussi la politeia royale, qui ne constitue pas pour Platon un enjeu théorique mais une perspective politique réelle. Le lecteur du discours est conduit à réfléchir sur les modalités de la mise en place, de l'administration et de la gestion d'une cité se trouvant sous le contrôle d'un individu éminent et il est particulièrement difficile de croire que Platon considère cette réflexion comme 'utopique' et irréalisable. Ainsi le *Politique* a aussi pour but de transmettre un enseignement de nature philosophique et politique, d'élaborer une réflexion profonde sur la question de savoir comment diriger de la meilleure façon les hommes. La littérature sur le roi idéal au IV^e siècle av. J.-C. s'engage à répondre à cette question et le *Politique* ne fait pas exception. Détaché de son contexte philosophico-politique mais aussi du milieu intellectuel au sein duquel il a été élaboré, cette œuvre pâlit par une interprétation unidimensionnelle et, ajouterons-nous, insuffisante.

La littérature sur le roi idéal au IV^e siècle av. J.-C.

Pierre Hadot a proposé de considérer certaines œuvres des penseurs du IV^e siècle av. J.-C., et plus précisément l'*À Nicoclès*, *Nicoclès* et *Évagoras* d'Isocrate, la *Cyropédie* et l'éloge à *Agésilas* de

Schriften Platons und dann dieser "Gebrauchsliteratur" nicht mehr zuzuordnen. Es bleiben die einschlägigen Schriften Xenophons und des Isokrates, die nun im Mittelpunkt stehen sollen, wenn es darum geht, die These vom Fürstenspiegel als verhüllten Aristokraten- oder Oligarchenspiegel zu erhärten'.

³ Cournarie 2011, p. 38-39. Je remercie très vivement Paul Cournarie de m'avoir donné l'occasion de lire son excellent travail.

Xénophon et la *République* et le *Politique* de Platon, comme la manifestation d'une réflexion novatrice qui s'occupe de traités d'éducation ou de conseils au prince⁴. Le philosophe suggère que dans les œuvres évoquées se cristallisent les éléments qui dans les siècles suivants constitueront les traits d'un ensemble de textes que nous appelons *speculum principis* ou *Fürstenspiegel*, ou encore *miroirs aux princes*⁵.

Dans une série d'études Matthias Haake paraît être sceptique quant à l'utilisation de ces termes pour désigner les œuvres consacrées à la figure du bon roi à l'époque classique et hellénistique ou encore à l'époque médiévale⁶. Matthias Haake, dont l'approche est novatrice et permet de renouveler le débat sur ce sujet important, propose d'étudier les traités *Sur la royauté* comme les fruits d'une activité intellectuelle très complexe qui, d'une époque à l'autre, présente des caractéristiques très différentes. Ainsi les œuvres *Sur la royauté* de l'époque hellénistique, appartiennent pour l'essentiel à un genre littéraire particulier et singulier qui fut développé dans des conditions historiques précises, fait qui les distingue fondamentalement des textes de l'époque classique mais aussi de l'époque médiévale⁷. L'auteur indique que les traités philosophiques consacrés à la monarchie apparaissent après l'avènement d'Alexandre⁸. Sans vouloir contester cette affirmation il nous semble que pendant la première moitié du IV^e siècle av. J.-C. et, plus précisément entre les années 380 et 355, les traités politiques comme la *République* et le *Politique* de Platon, les *Discours Chypristes* (*À Nicoclès, Nicoclès, Évagoras*) d'Isocrate et la *Cyropédie* de Xénophon peuvent être étudiées comme un ensemble

⁴ Hadot 1972, p. 574-581.

⁵ Hadot 1972, p. 556.

⁶ Haake 2003; 2013; 2015. Voir aussi Jónsson 2006.

⁷ Haake 2013.

⁸ Haake 2013, p. 168. Murray 2007, p. 17: 'There seem to have been three periods in the production of philosophical treatises on kingship. The first was the age of Alexander; the second was the period of the Diadochi, but there was little evidence for the continued production of such works in the middle and later Hellenistic period. There succeeded a third period, of what might be called pastiche or literary forgery, combined with the use of kingship ideas in other forms of literature; this activity may be late Hellenistic, but it persisted into the Roman empire and may even have been revived in late antiquity'. Cf. Haake 2013, p. 178.

d'essais théoriques où se développe l'idée novatrice de la *royauté philosophique*⁹.

En premier lieu, ces textes majeurs de la réflexion politique grecque ont été composés par des penseurs qui revendiquaient, chacun à sa manière, la qualité de philosophe et ils entretenaient des relations directes ou indirectes avec le cercle de Socrate, un fait qui influença de façon décisive leur orientation intellectuelle¹⁰. Autre point important, au-delà des multiples polémiques qui les opposent, Platon, Isocrate et Xénophon peuvent être considérés comme les premiers à avoir systématiquement défendu l'idée que l'éducation 'philosophique' sert à la formation de celui qui, possédant par nature les qualités nécessaires, acquerra, par l'exercice et l'entraînement, les savoirs et les compétences qui lui permettront de conduire la cité à la perfection dont elle est capable¹¹. Dans ce contexte la littérature sur le roi idéal établit un lien étroit entre la philosophie et le pouvoir royal. L'épanouissement du véritable homme politique est étroitement lié à un type d'organisation politique spécifique: la royauté¹². Ainsi dans un premier temps il faut admettre que les traités philosophiques sur la monarchie apparaissent bien avant l'avènement au pouvoir d'Alexandre.

Les philosophes athéniens du IV^e siècle av. J-C. présentent comme absolument nécessaire la coexistence du pouvoir et du

⁹ J'ai développé cette idée dans Christodoulou 2016. Sur la chronologie des discours sur l'homme politique idéal, voir Christodoulou 2008, p. 6-10. Sur la place de la monarchie dans la littérature de l'époque classique voir parmi les nombreuses études Barceló 1993 et plus récemment Luraghi 2013.

¹⁰ Demont 2011, p. 186: 'Ces trois Athéniens, et d'autres encore, ont appartenu aux mêmes cercles, notamment celui de Socrate, et élaboraient en partie leur pensée les uns par rapport aux autres'. Cf. Gray 2000, p. 142. Sur les liens entre Xénophon et Isocrate voir Mathieu 1925, p. 184; Azoulay 2006, p. 139. Il n'est plus question de continuer de nier à Isocrate le titre de philosophe. Voir Eucken 1983; Nightingale 1995; Livingstone 2007; Azoulay 2009; Demont 2008; 2011; Christodoulou 2012; Christodoulou 2016. Pour Xénophon comme philosophe voir Brisson et Dorion 2004.

¹¹ Voir Christodoulou 2016, p. 141-145.

¹² Contrairement à Platon et Xénophon qui font usage de termes distinguant nettement la royauté de la tyrannie et le roi du tyran, la terminologie employée par Isocrate pour désigner le pouvoir monarchique n'a aucune signification quant à la légitimité du pouvoir. En effet les termes tyrannie et royauté, tyran et roi sont appliqués tour à tour comme s'ils renvoyaient à la même réalité politique. Liou 1991, p. 211-217 avait justement suggéré que, dans les *Discours Chypriotes*, Isocrate n'utilise jamais le terme tyran en lui attribuant un contenu négatif.

savoir, si bien que le modèle de l'expert politique est au centre de toute réflexion sur la constitution royale. Se révèle ainsi le caractère singulier de cette royauté qui, sous plusieurs aspects, rompt avec la monarchie traditionnelle. Platon, Isocrate et Xénophon repensent de fond en comble les critères qui rendent un régime meilleur que les autres. Ni la supériorité numérique comme le croyaient les démocrates, ni la richesse et la 'noblesse', comme le croyaient les aristocrates, ni la puissance et les origines glorieuses comme le prétendaient les détenteurs d'un pouvoir absolu, ne permettent à quiconque de revendiquer le droit d'être chargé de responsabilités politiques¹³. Le critère décisif est la possession de l'*art de gouverner les hommes*¹⁴.

Or, l'initiation à la philosophie et l'art politique demande des compétences supérieures extrêmement rares qui restent inaccessibles aux hommes 'ordinaires', incapables d'accéder à la capacité de gouverner de façon idéale. Ils doivent donc obéir aux ordres de l'expert politique, de l'homme capable de mettre en marche et de surveiller excellemment l'ensemble des fonctions gouvernementales. Dans ce contexte l'homme 'royal' ne peut pas rester à l'état de simple particulier. Il est certes inimaginable qu'il partage son

¹³ Mossé 2005, p. 105: 'En effet, ce n'est plus la naissance qui, au IV^e siècle, peut justifier l'accès à la royauté. Que la supériorité soit morale, intellectuelle, ou qu'elle embrasse tous les domaines de l'activité humaine, elle est d'abord *personnelle*, fruit d'une lente éducation, et par conséquent intransmissible'. Même Isocrate qui pense que les origines glorieuses d'Evagoras ou de Nicoclès jouent un rôle décisif dans la formation de leur personnalité, se focalise pour l'essentiel sur leurs mérites et qualités personnelles qui leur permettent de gouverner excellemment le royaume.

¹⁴ Il serait vain de prétendre que Platon, Isocrate et Xénophon nourrissent la même idée sur ce qu'est l'art politique. En les étudiant, nous observons des opinions contradictoires et des désaccords fondamentaux. Sur Platon et Isocrate, voir Demont 2011. Sur Platon et Xénophon, Dorion 2004. Sur Isocrate et Xénophon Wilms 1995; Gray 2000. La place que l'art politique détient dans l'univers politique des intellectuels du IV^e siècle av. J.C. a fait l'objet de nombreuses études dont la majorité se focalise sur l'œuvre platonicienne où s'opère une élaboration minutieuse de la *technè politikè*. Sur l'art politique platonicien, voir notamment Balansard 2001; Pradeau 2008, p. 149-156, El Murr 2014. Il est désormais admis qu'une grande partie de l'œuvre d'Isocrate mais aussi de Xénophon est consacrée à la définition et la description de la politique comme un art, comme une *technè*. Sur la place de l'art politique dans la pensée d'Isocrate, voir Demont 2008; 2011. Sur la science politique chez Xénophon, Dorion 2004. Pour une comparaison de la manière dont Xénophon et Isocrate conçoivent la politique et plus généralement le commandement comme une *technique*, voir Wilms 1995.

pouvoir avec la majorité ou même avec une minorité. *Il doit devenir roi et régner dans la cité* puisqu'il est le seul à pouvoir donner corps à la nouvelle et singulière forme royale de la souveraineté, celle qui permettra à la communauté politique d'atteindre la perfection dont elle est capable.

Cette thèse est parfaitement illustrée par Aristote qui, en examinant la constitution excellente (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), se pose la question de savoir si le principe de l'alternance au pouvoir et l'institution de l'ostracisme peuvent se pratiquer quand un être doté de capacités politiques et morales incomparables apparaît dans la cité. Le Stagirite reconnaît qu'il est impensable d'exiler un tel homme et qu'il est injuste de chercher à le commander (οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου), puisque cet individu est un 'dieu parmi les hommes (ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιούτον)'. Il faut donc obéir à ses ordres de bonne grâce (πειθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ πάντας ἀσμένως) et admettre que 'des hommes comme lui seront perpétuellement rois dans leurs cités (ὥστε βασιλέας εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους αἰδίους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν)' ¹⁵. Aristote confirme de la manière la plus explicite la thèse de Platon, d'Isocrate et de Xénophon, selon laquelle le régime royal est le meilleur et le plus souhaitable, à la condition exceptionnelle suivante: le pouvoir doit se fonder sur des valeurs éthico-politiques excellentes, incarnées par un homme dont l'apparition n'appartient pas au cours normal de l'histoire.

L'apparition donc de la littérature sur le roi idéal au IV^e siècle s'explique surtout comme le résultat d'une mutation profonde au sein du champ intellectuel athénien dont les membres élaborent systématiquement l'idée provocatrice selon laquelle les sociétés historiques s'opposent au savoir et confient l'administration de la communauté civique à ceux qui ne détiennent pas l'art de gouverner les hommes. La décadence des cités contemporaines, leur histoire politique troublée et leur instabilité constitutionnelle,

¹⁵ Arist., *Pol.* 3.13.1284b30-35. Il est très significatif qu'Aristote envisage ici la possibilité de l'apparition du gouvernement d'un monarque d'exception lorsqu'il se prononce, non pas sur les différents types de royautés, mais sur les conditions permettant la réalisation de la constitution parfaite. Il est donc imprudent de confondre, comme le fait Attack 2015, cette royauté idéale avec la *pambasileia*, qui représente un tout autre type de monarchie. Voir sur ce point les remarques très justes de Nagle 2000.

aurait ainsi une explication éminemment politique: elle serait la conséquence de la marginalisation des véritables experts, qui savent que la politique vise à subordonner les intérêts particuliers à l'intérêt de tous et établir ainsi au sein du corps civique l'idéal de la concorde. En effet, c'est à l'être exceptionnel qui incarne une nouvelle manière de penser la politique qu'il faudrait confier l'administration de la communauté politique.

Ensuite si les discours adressés aux rois ou aux princes à l'époque hellénistique et médiévale visaient à instruire leur destinataire, en lui proposant une manière de se comporter et d'exercer son autorité, la même chose peut être affirmée pour les discours royaux du IV^e siècle av. J.-C. Ces traités étaient pour l'essentiel destinés à circuler au sein d'un lectorat hétérogène, très restreint et pas exclusivement athénien, très probablement bien familiarisé avec cette littérature complexe et florissante¹⁶. Il était probablement bien connu que la théorisation des questions sur les constitutions et le commandement idéal avait aussi occupé d'autres savants—pas nécessairement des 'philosophes', mais aussi des 'historiens', comme par exemple Hérodote et Thucydide. C'est justement dans ce microcosme 'intellectuel' qui s'occupe de la politique que se pose et se développe la question pratique de l'organisation effective de la vie de la cité parfaite.

Sous cette optique nous pouvons envisager les textes sur le roi idéal comme des constructions intellectuelles profondément politiques, destinées à renouveler la littérature constitutionnelle et à repenser de fond en comble la question de la souveraineté absolue comme problème théorique et comme perspective politique¹⁷.

¹⁶ Dans un fameux passage du discours *Évagoras* (*Or.* 9.74) Isocrate se montre soucieux de rappeler à son lecteur attentif que la lecture de l'œuvre qu'il a devant lui l'intègre dans une élite cultivée et distinguée qui s'étend à la Grèce entière. Contrairement aux images et aux statues, les discours *écrits* peuvent circuler à travers la Grèce, devenant ainsi l'objet d'étude des *bons esprits* (τῶν εὖ φρονούντων) qui sont en position d'apprécier leur valeur. Isocrate utilise souvent le terme εὖ φρονούντες afin de caractériser 'l'élite de la culture' et dans le *Panegyrique* il s'engage dès les premières lignes à se présenter comme un membre de cette élite cultivée. Voir Christodoulou 2012, p. 96-97. Sur le public panhellénique d'Isocrate et de Platon voir Usener 1994, Morgan 2003, Azoulay 2007. Sur Xénophon Rood 2004.

¹⁷ Les œuvres évoquées constituent les fruits d'une pensée profondément politique. Comme l'a décrit Azoulay 2007, p. 184: 'le retrait de la vie politique ne doit pas nécessairement être interprété comme une contrainte imposée au dehors

La variété des genres littéraire ne devraient pas nous désorienter et nous conduire à classer les textes abordés dans des catégories rigides, comme celles d'œuvres philosophiques (*République*, *Politique*), de discours politiques (*À Nicoclès*, *Nicoclès*), d'éloges (*Évagoras*), de fictions historiques (*Cyropédie*). L'utilisation de différentes formes littéraires pour énoncer des idées découle, pour l'essentiel, d'une stratégie de distinction. Tous sont des ouvrages qui visent à donner une nouvelle orientation à la tradition des traités *Περὶ πολιτείας*. L'idée de Jacoby de présenter la *République* comme la seule *πολιτεία* philosophique semble être juste¹⁸. Toutefois, il est difficile de ne pas prendre en considération le point suivant: les textes des Xénophon et Isocrate entretiennent un lien direct ou indirect avec les traités *peri politeias* et tout en réservant, comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué, une place importante à la philosophie¹⁹. Comme l'a montré Jacqueline Bordes les *Discours Chypriotes* d'Isocrate tiennent une place à part dans la littérature grecque classique par les thèses qu'ils défendent et cette originalité se répercute sur l'emploi même du mot *politeia*: ces traités sont les seuls où une monarchie est appelée ouvertement et couramment

par une cité persécutrice. En réalité, il s'agit aussi d'un choix délibéré, relevant autant d'une pratique que d'une rhétorique de la rupture et qui permet à son auteur de se distinguer et, partant, de parvenir à une forme d'autorité nouvelle, intellectuelle en l'occurrence. Enfin, la profondeur de la rupture avec l'ordre civique doit être relativisée. La politique reste en effet l'horizon dans lequel s'inscrivent presque tous ces penseurs, y compris les plus marginaux: même en rupture de ban, les intellectuels n'ont pas abandonné toute idée de réforme: simplement, ils se gardent désormais d'utiliser un mode d'intervention trop direct vis-à-vis des citoyens.

¹⁸ Jacoby 1949, p. 211-212. En effet d'après Plat., *R.* 6.497b7 Socrate et ses interlocuteurs esquissent les principes de la meilleure constitution. Aussi dans *Timée* 17c1-3 Platon parle d'un traité *περὶ πολιτείας* et son effort de définir quelle est la constitution parfaite (*ἀρίστη*) et par quels hommes elle doit être appliqué. Arist., *Pol.*, 2.1.1261a6; 2.6.1264b28; 4.4.1291a12; 5.12.1316a1; 8.7.1342a33, se réfère à la *πολιτεία* rédigée par Platon. Sur l'insertion de la *République* dans le genre littéraire de traités *περὶ πολιτείας* voir l'étude complète de Menn 2005 et les remarques précieuses de Pradeau 2005, 56-58.

¹⁹ Par ailleurs Arist., *Pol.* 2.7.1266a30-35 avait observé que la rédaction de traités sur les constitutions attire l'attention des particuliers (*ιδιωτῶν*) mais aussi des philosophes et des hommes politiques (*φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν*). Sans vouloir l'analyser en profondeur il convient de remarquer qu'une telle affirmation devrait nous convaincre qu'aux yeux d'Aristote la réflexion sur la *politeia* et même sur l'*ἀρίστη πολιτεία*, se trouve au cœur de l'activité intellectuelle des plusieurs auteurs et pas seulement de Platon. Voir Meister 1994, p. 116.

politeia (...) les seuls où la monarchie est jugée la meilleure des *politeiai*'²⁰. Isocrate met considérablement et délibérément l'accent sur le terme *politeia*. Dans l'*À Nicoclès* il explique au jeune roi quels sont les premiers et les plus importants principes d'un bon régime (στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας), qui lui permettront de diriger (διοικεῖν) de la meilleure façon (ἄριστα) sa cité et sa royauté (τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν)²¹. Dans le *Nicoclès* c'est le roi lui-même qui s'emploie à énoncer les principes d'une constitution excellente. Il s'engage à rendre évident à ses sujets le fait que le régime actuellement existant mérite leur affection (τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν παροῦσαν ὡς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἀγαπᾶν), car il s'agit de la *meilleure des constitutions* (βελτίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν)²². Rien d'étonnant donc si Évagoras, en choisissant de chaque forme de *politeia* ce que chacune avait de meilleur (ἐξ ἐκάστης τῆς πολιτείας ἐξελεγκμένος τὸ βέλτιστον), a pu construire une monarchie exceptionnelle et singulière²³.

Xénophon, qui a lui-même écrit un traité *peri politeias* et qui dans le premier livre de la *Cyropédie* procède en une description très particulière de la *politeia* des Perses²⁴, évite d'utiliser ce terme pour désigner la royauté fondée par Cyrus. Cet élément le distingue considérablement de Platon et d'Isocrate. Toutefois, sa réflexion sur les différents types de constitutions au tout début de la *Cyropédie*²⁵—qui est l'une des rares prises de parole assumée

²⁰ Bordes 1982, p. 264-268, ici p. 264. Schorn 2005: 'Es liegt somit eine ungewöhnliche Kombination aus einer Schrift *περὶ βασιλείας* und einer Schrift vor, die man am ehesten als 'Untertanenspiegel' bezeichnen könnte'. Selon Jacoby 1949, p. 386 n. 54 le discours d'Isocrate *Aréopagitique* 'belongs to the literary species of Πολιτεία'. Aussi Azoulay 2012, p. 360 remarque qu'Isocrate polémique avec tous ceux qui refusent 'de considérer les monarchies comme d'authentiques *politeiai*'. Remarquons à ce propos qu'à l'époque classique la monarchie chypriote tenait une place prépondérante dans le débat sur les constitutions. Aristote (fr. 526 Rose) a écrit la *Constitution des Chypriotes* (Κυπρίων πολιτεία) et Théophraste (Photius, *Synagog.*, s.v. *τιάρα*) un traité *Sur la royauté des Chypriotes* (Περὶ βασιλείας Κυπρίων), œuvres malheureusement perdues.

²¹ *Or.* 2.2. La royauté se présente comme 'la forme de l'activité humaine la plus haute (τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων μέγιστόν ἐστι) et celle qui exige le plus de précautions' puisque le fonctionnement correct de la constitution dépend entièrement d'une seule personne, à savoir du roi (*Or.* 2.6).

²² Isoc., *Or.* 3.12.

²³ Isoc., *Or.* 9.46.

²⁴ Xen., *Cyr.* 1.2.15. Voir Azoulay 2007, p. 5.

²⁵ Xen., *Cyr.* 1.1.1.

par Xénophon²⁶—montre peut-être sa volonté de mettre en évidence le fait que son entreprise tient à renouveler la réflexion sur les constitutions²⁷. En effet il s'inscrit dans ce mouvement intellectuel qui élabore l'idée selon laquelle la meilleure constitution est celle où le pouvoir est concentré aux mains de l'homme providentiel qui détient la science de gouverner les hommes²⁸.

Cette lecture ne suggère nullement que les textes sur l'homme politique idéal constituent des traités *peri politeias* mais plutôt que les intellectuels du IV^e siècle donnent une nouvelle orientation à ce 'genre' littéraire. À l'exception de l'œuvre d'Antisthène *Cyrus* ou *De la royauté*²⁹, nous ne connaissons aucun autre texte qui aurait pu être daté avant la *République* ou les *Discours Chypriotes* et qui se focalise sur les qualités éthiques et morales de l'homme qui deviendra le dirigeant de la cité excellente. La réflexion des auteurs *peri politeias* portait pour l'essentiel sur le cadre constitutionnel du régime, ses lois ou bien évidemment les *manières de vivre* des dirigeants et les *mœurs* des membres de la communauté civique³⁰. Or, les intellectuels du IV^e siècle proposent que ce soit à l'échelle de l'individu providentiel qu'il faut parvenir pour construire la *politeia* idéale. Ainsi, sans négliger le fait que les bonnes lois et

²⁶ Pontier 2006, p. 98.

²⁷ Je suis volontairement l'idée de Gera 1993, p. 11 qui indique que: 'the remaining question raised by the framework of the *Cyropaedia* is Xenophon's choice of introduction. Why does he present the *Cyropaedia*—wide-ranging, varied work—as the end-product of his reflections on the various types of constitutions and the difficulties involved in ruling men well? The answer appears to be that Xenophon wished to ensure the work within the tradition of political treatises or πολιτεία literature'.

²⁸ Voir Mueller-Goldingen 1998, p. 278.

²⁹ Malgré les nombreuses incertitudes, Antisthène est le premier des Socratiques qui manifeste un véritable intérêt pour la rédaction d'un ouvrage consacré à la personnalité d'un chef éminent, fondateur d'une communauté excellente. Dans son œuvre *Cyrus* ou *de la royauté* rédigée sous la forme d'un dialogue, Antisthène loue la personnalité du roi Perse mais rien n'est certain car l'ensemble du corpus des textes d'Antisthène est presque entièrement perdu. Isocrate semble avoir une idée précise de cette œuvre et dans l'*Évagoras* (37-39), n'hésite pas de mettre en cause le choix d'Antisthène de consacrer un traité sur la royauté de Cyrus. Diogène Laërce, 6.15-18, indique qu'Antisthène rédigea quatre œuvres qui portaient le nom du fondateur de l'empire Perse. Sur la figure de Cyrus dans la pensée d'Antisthène voir Høistad 1948, p. 73-94. Sur les liens entre le Cyrus d'Antisthène et la *Cyropédie* de Xénophon voir Muller-Goldingen 1995, p. 25-44.

³⁰ Voir en particulier Bordes 1982, p. 139-227. Cf. Schmitt-Pantel 1992, p. 107-113; Bollansée & Schepens 2004; Azoulay 2006.

institutions constituent des éléments indispensables d'une bonne *politeia*, ils construisent la cité idéale autour de l'*ethos*, des *mœurs*, des *tropoi*, et plus généralement de la personnalité de l'homme qui dispose aussi bien des qualités intellectuelles que morales supérieures et qui sait parfaitement que sa fonction est d'établir au sein de la cité des valeurs éthico-politiques excellentes³¹.

C'est là l'élément novateur de leur démarche. Si Platon, Isocrate et Xénophon renouvellent la littérature constitutionnelle et déterminent les principes de l'administration de la communauté civique, en donnant un aperçu concret de la manière dont le roi applique son autorité, c'est parce qu'ils souhaitent montrer à leurs lecteurs *une manière d'exercer la politique*. Se manifeste ainsi la 'praticabilité' de ces œuvres, étant donné que le lecteur est conduit à réfléchir sur les pratiques de la mise en place, de l'administration et de l'entretien d'une cité qui se trouve sous le contrôle d'un individu éminent.

Le Politique de Platon: la royauté de l'homme providentiel

Des études récentes révèlent la place centrale que détient le *Politique* dans la pensée platonicienne³². L'œuvre se révèle en effet

³¹ Plat., *R.* 6.502d, développe l'idée qui est centrale dans sa réflexion politique: la qualité de la constitution tient à la valeur des détenteurs du pouvoir. Ainsi, il faut déterminer de quelle façon et sur la base de quelles mœurs (*ἐπιτηδεύματων*) seront introduits les sauveurs de la constitution, qui préserveront les coutumes de la cité et formeront les mœurs des hommes. Dans ce contexte son approche n'est pas substantiellement différente de celle d'Isocrate et de Xénophon, qui comme l'a montré Azoulay 2006, p. 152: 'développent une vision de la *politeia* marquée par une désinstitutionnalisation du pouvoir généralisée:—les lois cèdent peu à peu la place aux manières de vivre (*tropoi* ou *epitêdeumata*)—l'*archè* se vide ainsi de son contenu étroitement institutionnel, laissant le champs libre à l'irruption d'un chef charismatique, situé en dehors des cadres juridiques traditionnels'. L'attention accordée aux *mœurs* n'a rien d'exceptionnel puisque la distinction des diverses *politeiai* se fonde pour l'essentiel tant sur l'extension du souverain, de l'*archè*—qui détermine le nom de la constitution—que sur les lois et les mœurs, les manières de vivre adoptées par les gouverneurs ou encore par l'ensemble du corps civique. Voir Bordes 1982, p. 231. Dans ce contexte il n'y a rien d'exceptionnel dans l'idée d'Aristote d'intégrer les *mœurs*, les *ἐπιτηδεύματα* dans la définition de la *politeia*. Voir Lévy 1993, p. 83-84.

³² La bibliographie sur le *Politique* est considérable. Voir notamment les études réunis par Rowe 1995; Havlíček, Jirsa & Thein 2013. Aussi Brisson et Pradeau 2003, p. 11-63 et l'étude de El Murr 2014 qui cite la bibliographie la plus importante.

d'une originalité considérable puisqu'il s'agit du premier texte philosophique consacré entièrement à la description de la politique comme un 'art', comme une 'science', mais aussi à la définition de l'homme politique et de la science qu'il détient³³. Le *Politique* fournit un ensemble de termes bien élaborés qui désignent la science du gouvernement des hommes (ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς), dont l'acquisition est peut-être la plus difficile et la plus importante (τῆς χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης κτήσασθαι)³⁴ et dont le détenteur, à savoir le véritable homme politique (πολιτικός), porte le titre du roi (βασιλέας)³⁵. En effet il possède la véritable science politique (ἐπιστήμη πολιτική) qui s'appelle art royal (βασιλικὴ τέχνη)³⁶.

Platon s'intéresse fortement à discuter la typologie des constitutions³⁷ et ses interlocuteurs cherchent aussi à définir la constitution droite, la seule véritable *politeia* (τὴν ἀληθινὴν πολιτείαν)³⁸. Il s'agit de la septième forme de gouvernement qui est le seul qui soit droit, et qui comme un 'dieu parmi les hommes (οἷον θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων)' doit être mis à part de tous les autres³⁹. Elle est radicalement différente des autres puisqu'elle est la seule où le véritable roi qui détient parfaitement la science politique, exerce le pouvoir⁴⁰.

³³ Bertrand 2001, p. 953. Cf. Pradeau 1997, p. 63. El Murr 2014, p. 25-43 critique à juste titre les lectures *apolitiques* du dialogue.

³⁴ Plat., *Plt.* 292d.

³⁵ Plat., *Plt.* 276e13; 291c; 301b: 'si un homme seul exerçait son autorité en possédant vraiment la science (ἐπιστήμων ὄντως ὢν εἰς ἀρχήν, πάντως), on le désignerait tout de même de ce même nom de roi (βασιλεὺς) et aucun autre'.

³⁶ Platon parle de l'art politique (296c4: πολιτικὴν τέχνην) la science politique (300d9: πολιτικὴν ἐπιστήμην), l'art royal (287d; 289e1; 300e7: βασιλικὴ τέχνη), la science royale (261c8; 284b5; 288e5; 292e9: βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήμη) de l'homme politique (πολιτικόν) et de l'homme royal (βασιλικόν) comme des termes qui renvoient à la même réalité, celle du gouvernant savant. Comme l'a dit l'Étranger au début du dialogue, Plat., *Plt.*, 259d: 'Allons-nous mettre ensemble la science politique et l'homme politique avec la science royale et l'homme royal, de telle sorte que tout cela ne fasse qu'une seule et même chose? (τὴν ἅρα πολιτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὴν καὶ βασιλικὸν εἰς ταῦτόν ὡς ἐν πάντα ταῦτα συνθήσομεν;)'

³⁷ Plat., *Plt.* 289c-303d. Sur le classement des constitutions dans le *Politique* voir Gill 1995.

³⁸ Plat., *Plt.* 301a. Cf. 291c; 293c; 302c; 303b.

³⁹ Plat., *Plt.* 303b.

⁴⁰ Plat., *Plt.* 301a.

Certes le philosophe brosse le portrait d'un roi doté de qualités éthico-politiques très rares mais il n'a jamais affirmé que son avènement au pouvoir resterait pour toujours un idéal irréalisable et inaccessible⁴¹. L'apparition du détenteur de la science politique au sein de la communauté civique est une possibilité réelle, improbable mais non impossible⁴². Ainsi Platon n'hésite nullement à décrire tant les qualités de l'homme politique que les mécanismes que celui-ci met en place afin d'exercer son pouvoir de façon excellente, évoquant aussi les différentes étapes successives qui conduiront à la *réalisation* d'une royauté juste et vertueuse.

Dans ce contexte il n'est pas difficile d'en deviner la raison pour laquelle Diogène Laërce avait suggéré que le Politique de Platon est un traité *Peri basileias*⁴³. Étant sans doute remarquablement original le Politique détient un rapport direct ou indirect avec la production intellectuelle des autres savants qui s'engageaient à étudier les différentes constitutions et plus précisément la meilleure *politeia*.

L'organisation politique de la cité idéale

Dans le *Politique*, la formule la plus authentique d'une administration de la cité (*ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως*) est celle où l'homme savant et bon, le véritable homme politique, administre la cité d'une manière exemplaire⁴⁴. Dans la cité administrée par le véritable roi, il y a bien des stratèges, des juges, des pédagogues, et des magistrats qui constituent les éléments nécessaires d'une administration bien structurée, fondée sur l'expertise et le savoir⁴⁵. Chacun de ces hommes possède une compétence adéquate à une activité particulière. Le stratège dispose de la technique du commandement militaire (*στρατηγική*) et il conduit toute opération guerrière (*πολεμική*)⁴⁶. Les juges (*δικασταί*) ne sont pas les législa-

⁴¹ Comme le pense par exemple de Romilly 1971, p. 192. Cf. Decharneux 1995, p. 163.

⁴² El Murr 2014, p. 259-260.

⁴³ D. L. 3.58.

⁴⁴ Plat., *Plt.* 296e.

⁴⁵ Sur les magistratures dans le *Politique*, voir l'étude de Lane 2013. Cf. El Murr 2014, p. 218-220.

⁴⁶ Plat., *Plt.* 304e.

teurs mais les gardiens des lois et leur devoir est de punir les actes injustes en suivant les prescriptions du roi législateur (νομοθέτου βασιλέως)⁴⁷. Le roi confie l'éducation des gens aux pédagogues chargés de former des sujets aptes à s'intégrer parfaitement dans la cité dirigée par le roi parfait⁴⁸. L'ensemble de ces sciences est mis au service de l'art politique et leurs détenteurs ne suivent que les prescriptions et les ordres de l'homme politique, à savoir du roi⁴⁹. Pour le dire autrement, le roi se trouve au sommet d'une administration parfaitement hiérarchisée et gouverne par l'intermédiaire de savants magistrats. Aussi, dans le monde de Platon, l'homme royal possède-t-il la *science* de l'opportunité (καιρός), qui lui permet d'affronter, de s'adapter et de s'occuper de situations particulières, concrètes et changeantes, rythmant la vie d'une communauté civique⁵⁰. C'est grâce à la science royale, qui 'peut déterminer quel est le moment opportun ou non pour commencer et lancer dans la cité les activités les plus importantes (τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε περί καὶ ἀκαιρίας)', que le roi arrive à mettre en marche l'ensemble des fonctions gouvernementales⁵¹.

Soucieux de rendre clair le caractère directif de l'art politique, l'Étranger d'Élée associe l'homme qui est roi (τὸν βασιλικόν) à la technique qui consiste à donner des ordres (ἐπιτακτικὴ τέχνη), expression qui, même si elle apparaît pour la première—et dernière—fois dans l'œuvre platonicienne, manifeste la filiation idéologique entre la *République* et le *Politique*. Dans la *République* Platon se préoccupe peu de montrer le pouvoir en action, mais il ne faut pas croire qu'il se montre indifférent à la question pratique de l'organisation effective de la vie de la cité parfaite. Le roi philosophe doit prendre soin de ses citoyens et les protéger (τῶν ἄλλων

⁴⁷ Plat., *Plt.* 305b.

⁴⁸ Plat., *Plt.* 308d.

⁴⁹ Plat., *Plt.* 305c-d.

⁵⁰ Bertrand 2001, p. 957-958.

⁵¹ Plat., *Plt.* 305d: 'La véritable science royale ne doit pas être astreinte à des tâches pratiques mais elle doit avoir autorité sur les sciences qui sont en mesure d'accomplir ces tâches, car elle peut déterminer quel est le moment opportun ou non pour commencer et lancer dans la cité les activités les plus importantes, et les autres n'ont qu'à exécuter ses ordres'.

ἐπιμελῆσθαι τε καὶ φυλάττειν)⁵². Il possède une science politique prescriptive et l'exercice de son pouvoir n'est pas tout à fait direct. Aussi surveille-t-il les activités des autres principaux groupes fonctionnels de la cité⁵³, à savoir la classe des 'gardiens auxiliaires' et la classe qui s'occupe des activités productives⁵⁴. Aucun de ces groupes ne dispose d'une autonomie d'action. Les nombreux magistrats auxiliaires (ἄρχοντες ἐπίκουροι) chargés de tâches administratives et militaires doivent exécuter les ordres donnés (ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα) par les détenteurs du pouvoir⁵⁵. Le verbe ἐπιτάττειν—mettre en ordre, désigne la hiérarchie imposée, mais aussi et surtout le fait que les rois exercent une réelle autorité politique sur le corps civique⁵⁶. Platon s'attache ici à décrire la fonction 'architectonique' de la science politique.

Dans le *Politique* Platon 'confirme l'un des acquis de la *République*; dans le régime idéal, il s'agit de 'prescrire' à chacun ce qui lui est adapté'⁵⁷. L'homme savant et bon, doué de la *technè politikè* respecte en effet une seule règle fondamentale: 'distribuer entre les citoyens une justice parfaite'⁵⁸. Nous connaissons depuis la *République* que la *justice* signifie que chaque groupe constitutif de la cité et chaque individu 's'occupe de ses propres affaires' et s'en tienne à ce qui lui est propre, conservant volontairement la place que les savants dirigeants lui réservent. Dans ce contexte, dans le *Politique*, le roi construit une cité fondée sur l'idéal de l'égalité géométrique où chacun détient la place qui lui revient⁵⁹.

⁵² Plat., *R.* 7.520a. La loi fondatrice de la cité mettra les meilleurs hommes à son service pour réaliser le lien politique de la cité (ἐπὶ τὸν σύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως). Voir Cambiano 1988, p. 52.

⁵³ Plat., *R.* 6.506b: οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελέως κεκοσμήσεται, ἐὰν ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῇ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων; Le verbe ἐπισκοπέω signifie *examiner, surveiller, prendre soin*.

⁵⁴ Plat., *R.* 4.441a.

⁵⁵ Plat., *R.* 5.458c. Ces gardiens sont aussi *chefs* et *pédagogues*, responsables de l'éducation militaire des jeunes (5.467d). Sur les différentes magistratures qui existent dans la cité parfaite voir Pradeau 2008, p. 158-169. Sur le terme ἄρχοντες dans *La République* voir Vegetti 2000, p. 352-353.

⁵⁶ Sur ce que signifie le verbe ἐπιτάττειν dans la pensée platonicienne et plus précisément dans *La République*, voir Pontier 2006, p. 287-288.

⁵⁷ Pontier 2006, p. 309.

⁵⁸ Plat., *Plt.* 297b1.

⁵⁹ Sur ce que signifie l'égalité géométrique dans la pensée politique platonicienne voir Joly 1974, p. 312-322; Thesleff 1984.

L'étude de la *République* mais aussi du *Politique* permet ainsi d'affirmer que Platon ne vise pas seulement à rendre parfaitement clair le fait que son projet politique est inconditionnellement lié à la figure du roi savant, mais aussi que celui-ci s'invite à donner corps à une véritable *politeia*, dotée de lois, institutions, magistratures. Toutefois le *Politique* comporte une singularité remarquable: Platon élabore pour la première fois aussi systématiquement l'idée provocatrice selon laquelle l'homme qui va administrer la *politeia* idéale se met au-dessus de la loi étant le *nomos* vivant. De ce point de vue le *Politique* traite un problème qui dominait la vie politique des cités grecques: le rapport entre la loi et l'individu éminent.

La provocation platonicienne: le roi est la loi animée

Le pouvoir du monarque platonicien n'est limité par aucune restriction, aucune loi, aucune institution, puisque 'ce qui vaut le mieux, ce n'est pas que les lois prévalent mais que prévale le roi qui est un homme réfléchi'⁶⁰, et en faisant usage de la métaphore du pilote de navire il démontre de quelle manière le bon gouvernant, sans édicter de règles écrites, mais donnant comme loi sa propre technique, arrive à assurer la sauvegarde de ses sujets⁶¹. Ainsi dans la *politeia* idéale le vertueux utilisateur de l'art politique possède la liberté d'agir d'après son intelligence et sa sagesse sans être limité par la forme juridique du régime, et sans être obligé d'accepter la supériorité des institutions sur sa capacité d'homme doué de qualités supérieures. Il s'impose de déterminer même brièvement les conséquences de la volonté platonicienne de libérer l'être politique qui détient l'art politique de tout élément constitutionnel qui puisse restreindre son autorité et limiter le champ de son action.

En premier lieu Platon critique vigoureusement la démocratie athénienne, où même l'excellent manieur de l'art politique est obligé d'obéir aux règles rigides de la cité, de respecter les lois et surtout le cadre constitutionnel, ne dépassant ainsi jamais les

⁶⁰ Plat., *Plt.* 294a6-8.

⁶¹ Plat., *Plt.* 297a.

limites nécessaires afin d'assurer l'égalité de tous les citoyens vis-à-vis des lois et des institutions⁶². Dans ce contexte, en plaçant le roi au-dessus des lois Platon montre qu'il se révèle impossible de croire que le véritable homme politique peut s'épanouir dans une constitution démocratique. La royauté est le régime qui permet à l'homme politique doué de qualités exceptionnelles de trouver un terrain tel que sa personnalité puisse s'épanouir⁶³.

Platon critique les limites de la loi écrite, son incapacité à tenir compte de la situation de chaque individu ou de tenir compte des circonstances⁶⁴. L'idéal serait d'avoir un roi capable, à tout instant de la vie, de venir s'asseoir auprès de chacun pour lui prescrire précisément ce qu'il convient de faire⁶⁵. Néanmoins Platon n'a jamais affirmé que le roi gouvernerait sans lois⁶⁶. Au contraire puisque 'la législation relève de la fonction royale'⁶⁷ le véritable homme politique est aussi un savant nomothète qui fait œuvre

⁶² D'après la fameuse déclaration de Protagoras, 'la cité trace l'esquisse des lois, qui sont les découvertes des bons législateurs de jadis, et contraint chacun, qu'il commande ou qu'il soit commandé, à vivre en les respectant' [Plat. *Pr.* 326d]. L'emploi de cette expression, selon laquelle les lois contraignent chacun 'qu'il commande ou qu'il soit commandé, à vivre en les respectant', laisse entendre clairement qu'aux yeux du sophiste, l'institution de l'ostracisme constitue sans doute une mesure juste, car elle permet à la démocratie de se protéger contre l'influence excessive d'une personnalité éminente qui désire remettre en cause le principe selon lequel on doit offrir à tous les citoyens—même les non spécialistes dans le domaine politique—la possibilité d'exercer souverainement le pouvoir. La souveraineté de la cité, de ses lois et de son cadre institutionnel sur l'individu éminent, sur l'excellent détenteur de l'art politique, de l'homme qui surpasse en vertu la majorité de ses concitoyens, est dans l'univers démocratique, incontestable. Voir Bertrand 2001, p. 940-942.

⁶³ Rowe 2000, p. 236-237.

⁶⁴ Plat., *Plt.* 295a-c: 'La loi ne peut jamais embrasser avec exactitude ce qui est le meilleur et le plus juste pour tous au même instant, et prescrire ainsi ce qui est le mieux' car elle 's'adresse à chacun de nous (ἡμῖν ἐκάστοις) sans faire preuve d'aucun art (ἄτεχνως)' 'comme un homme arrogant et ignorant (ὥσπερ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐθάδη καὶ ἀμαθῆ) qui ne permettrait à personne de rien faire qui aille contre ses consignes et ne souffrirait non plus aucune question, et cela même s'il vient à quelqu'un une idée nouvelle qui vaille mieux que les consignes qu'il avait formulées'. Sur ce passage voir Balansard 2001, p. 149. Sur le terme ἄτεχνως dans la pensée platonicienne voir Roochnik 1987.

⁶⁵ Plat., *Plt.* 295b.

⁶⁶ Il s'agit d'une thèse soutenue par Diès 1935, p. 60 n. 1; Barker 1960, p. 330-333 et plus récemment par Balansard 2001, p. 148.

⁶⁷ Plat., *Plt.* 294a: τρόπον τινὰ μέντοι δῆλον ὅτι τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ νομοθετικῆ.

législative⁶⁸ car le bon législateur est le seul capable d'offrir par ses lois mêmes une éducation convenable aux hommes⁶⁹, son travail essentiel étant par là d'*éduquer* les citoyens, les amenant ainsi à pratiquer la vertu, les rendant aptes à reconnaître que leur intérêt demande qu'ils suivent ses décisions pour le bien de la cité toute entière⁷⁰. Comme le remarque l'Étranger d'Elée le roi arrivera à établir dans leurs âmes (ἐν [ταῖς] ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνηται) une opinion réellement vraie (ἀληθῆ δόξαν) à propos du beau, du juste et du bien (τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων περὶ καὶ ἀγαθῶν)⁷¹. Les lois édictées par le roi savant forment les *mœurs* des hommes⁷² qui, citoyens éduqués et élevés conformément aux règles qu'elles énoncent, deviendront dignes d'habiter la cité fondée par lui. L'idée est déjà formulée dans la *République*⁷³. Toutefois, contrairement aux rois-philosophes, le roi du *Politique* est lui-même le fondateur/législateur de la nouvelle cité. Avec comme base de son action les différents objets qui constituent la société humaine, il produit lui-même les institutions et les mœurs devant être adoptées par le corps civique. À l'évidence 'il produit la cité et la gouverne'⁷⁴ mais il faut insister sur le fait que dans ce cadre la loi tient une place essentielle, que légiférer est en effet un acte d'éducation car la tâche du législateur est de façonner chaque être humain se trouvant sous l'autorité du savant pour que s'incrustent dans son âme les habitudes qui doivent être propres aux habitants d'une cité juste et vertueuse⁷⁵.

⁶⁸ Plat., *Plt.* 305b; 309c. Dans la *Lettre* 7.332b, Platon présente un personnage historique, le roi Perse *Darius*, comme 'un exemple de ce que doit être le bon législateur et le bon roi; car les lois qu'il a établies ont permis à l'empire perse de se maintenir en bon état jusqu'à maintenant'. Voir les remarques de Fidio 1971, p. 255-256.

⁶⁹ Plat., *Plt.* 309e-d: τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην ἄρ' ἴσμεν ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατόν εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ὀρθῶς μεταλαβοῦσι παιδείας, οὓς ἐλέγομεν νυνδῆ;

⁷⁰ La loi a une fonction très concrète: éduquer le citoyen.

⁷¹ Plat., *Plt.* 309c.

⁷² Plat., *Plt.* 308e; 310a.

⁷³ Plat., *R.* 7.520a.

⁷⁴ Pradeau 1997, p. 64. Dans la *République* les législateurs et les fondateurs de la cité sont Socrate et ses interlocuteurs. Voir Christodoulou 2016, p. 148-149. Sur le figure de Socrate comme *oikistes* voir Brouillette 2017.

⁷⁵ Sur le rapport entre loi et éducation dans la pensée platonicienne voir Lisi 1985, p. 347-358 et Mouze 2005.

Le roi fondateur de la cité est la loi incarnée, et son discours, sa parole, tiennent la place de la loi, à l'évidence le véritable politique peut être ainsi défini comme 'l'expression présente, vivante et animée de la loi'⁷⁶, comme l'incarnation de la raison, la forme vivante de l'intellect⁷⁷.

Il est peut-être significatif que ce soit dans le *Politique* où Platon se soucie d'élaborer une théorie d'une forme positive de la persuasion politique qui n'a aucune relation avec l'art politique démocratique décrite dans *Gorgias*, puisqu'elle s'associe à la science royale (βασιλική κοινωνοῦσα ῥητορεία)⁷⁸, différente de l'art politique mais 'à son service'⁷⁹. Cette technique de persuasion et de discours⁸⁰, cette science qui a la puissance de persuader (πείθειν)⁸¹, dépend entièrement de la personnalité de l'homme royal⁸². Cette bonne et savante rhétorique permet au roi de remplir parfaitement sa tâche, à savoir gouverner une communauté qui sera parfaitement une. La loi peut être ainsi considérée comme le discours prononcé par l'autorité suprême de la cité. Si on la considère dans son ensemble, cette théorie législative est très originale et constitue une rupture remarquable avec les pratiques nomothétiques de la cité démocratique mais aussi de l'ensemble de cités grecques.

Toutefois, Platon ne renonce en aucun cas à l'idée selon laquelle l'écriture peut procurer au roi la possibilité de transmettre efficacement ses prescriptions⁸³. Le philosophe reconnaît l'impossibilité d'avoir un roi qui puisse passer sa vie à prescrire à chacun

⁷⁶ Bertrand 2001, p. 957.

⁷⁷ Sur l'idée platonicienne selon laquelle le savant gouverneur est la loi animée voir Aalders 1967 et plus récemment Ramelli 2006, p. 34-45. Aussi Lisi 2004, p. 16. L'idée évoquée aussi par Ar. *Pol.* 3.13.1284a10-15 connaîtra une postérité remarquable à l'époque hellénistique. Voir Aalders 1969; Squilloni 1991; Centrone 2000, p. 574-575; Bertelli 2002, p. 47. Sur le roi hellénistique comme principe du droit voir Lenger 1964 et Cassayre 2010, p. 43-53.

⁷⁸ Plat., *Plt.* 304a1-4.

⁷⁹ Plat., *Plt.* 304e.

⁸⁰ Plat., *Plt.* 304d7.

⁸¹ Plat., *Plt.* 304c7.

⁸² Plat., *Plt.* 304a-d. Il est très significatif que si Platon considère que l'art militaire est propre aux stratèges et l'art de la justice aux juges, il n'accepte nullement que l'art de la rhétorique puisse être l'apanage d'un homme inférieur au roi. Celui-ci est à l'évidence le seul apte à traiter la parole d'une façon juste et vertueuse.

⁸³ Sur la place de la loi écrite dans la pensée platonicienne voir Bertrand 1998; 1999.

de ses sujets ce qu'il doit exactement faire. Le roi législateur agit donc comme le médecin⁸⁴. Ce dernier s'occupe personnellement de son patient en acceptant le fait qu'il est impossible d'être à chaque instant près de lui. Pour cela il souhaite laisser à sa place un aide-mémoire écrit (*ὑπομνήματα γράφειν*), fait qui permet à son patient de poursuivre sans interruption sa thérapie⁸⁵. Toutefois il semble illusoire de penser qu'il ne soit pas nécessaire, après un certain temps, de modifier ces instructions écrites. Car l'évolution de la maladie, le nouvel état du patient demande la substitution des anciennes prescriptions écrites par des prescriptions nouvelles, rédigées après que le spécialiste ait de nouveau considéré la situation de son patient⁸⁶.

La métaphore platonicienne montre l'importance cruciale d'avoir toujours dans la cité un spécialiste compétent, apte à intervenir en cas de nécessité afin d'adapter la loi aux nouvelles données et d'assurer que celle-ci va prescrire ce qui est le plus juste et le meilleur pour tous à chaque instant. Incapable de se trouver à chaque instant auprès de ses sujets, le roi laisse à chacun des 'aide-mémoire', qu'il s'autorise pourtant, grâce à son intelligence et à sa connaissance de la science politique et nomothétique, à modifier lorsqu'il le juge nécessaire⁸⁷. Ces *hypomnemata* s'adressent à chacun mais restent sous le regard de leur rédacteur, qui sait qu'il peut intervenir pour corriger, améliorer, défendre ou adapter aux changements du temps⁸⁸. Le *memorandum* est un instrument à travers lequel le roi peut montrer ce qui lui semble juste et bon et ainsi, au lieu donc d'être un obstacle, l'écrit devient l'un des instruments nécessaires au détenteur du pouvoir. Ainsi, même si la loi écrite n'est pas l'outil le plus correct dont dispose l'homme

⁸⁴ Voir Jouanna 1978.

⁸⁵ Plat., *Plt.* 295c4. Sur la manière à travers laquelle médecin et législateur utilisent les prescriptions voir Wallach 2001, p. 344 et p. 349.

⁸⁶ Plat., *Plt.* 295c-d.

⁸⁷ Bertrand 1999, p. 87; Lane 1995, p. 287: 'The crucial mark of the statesman possessing knowledge is not his use of laws (imitations of truth) but his ability to modify them in accord with changing circumstances'.

⁸⁸ Les *hypomnemata* ne sont pas des livres, des *syggrammata*. Ceux-ci ne sont nécessaires qu'en l'absence définitive du roi savant, ce qui oblige les cités existantes qui souhaitent s'améliorer et se perfectionner à adopter les lois rédigées par les législateurs qui possèdent l'art politique. Voir Plat., *Plt.* 297d. Sur *hypomnema* et *syggramma* voir Vegetti 1988, p. 407.

politique pour mettre en œuvre son projet politique et établir le meilleur ordre possible, elle se révèle pourtant nécessaire⁸⁹. S'adressant à chaque individu, le roi construit ainsi par l'écrit de ses mémoriaux, l'unité de la communauté civique⁹⁰.

Dans le *Politique* Platon a entrepris de donner corps à l'idée selon laquelle la synthèse harmonieuse de l'ensemble des éléments qui conduiront à l'établissement d'une véritable *politeia* (lois, mœurs, institutions) peut être l'œuvre d'un savant roi, qui établira ainsi une royauté excellente. Cette *politeia* n'est pas irréalisable; la question épineuse n'est pas de savoir si et de quelle façon pourrait être réalisé le passage de la théorie à la pratique qui fera advenir dans le monde existant un modèle constitutionnel parfait, mais plutôt celle de savoir comment une cité réelle peut s'idéaliser et réussir une transformation éthico-politique⁹¹.

De la *République* aux *Lois*, le philosophe ne cesse de montrer que la méthode la plus rapide et la plus facile pour instaurer la meilleure constitution est de placer au pouvoir un monarque vertueux et savant, apte de reformer les mœurs d'une cité existante et de la conduire ainsi vers le bonheur⁹². Dans la *République* Platon insiste que les formes et les mœurs de vie historiquement existantes doivent être éliminées et remplacées par un ensemble de valeurs et de normes découvertes par la compétence philosophique réservée aux natures exceptionnelles⁹³. Il s'agit de la façon la plus rapide et la plus facile (τάχιστα τε καὶ ῥᾶστα) pour fonder une cité et une constitution politique parfaitement justes (πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν)⁹⁴. Le philosophe ne précise pas ici comment il serait possible d'intervenir aussi drastiquement dans une société existante. Il a toutefois suggéré qu'il suffirait peut-être la

⁸⁹ Plat., *Plt.* 294d.

⁹⁰ Sur la notion du *privé* et du *koinon* dans la pensée de Platon voir les remarques érudites de Macé 2009.

⁹¹ Voir Brunschwig 1986, p. 885; Pradeau 2005, p. 66-73.

⁹² Voir Vegetti 2006, p. 230-233.

⁹³ Plat., *R.* 6.541a: 'Ceux qui dans la cité, dis-je, auront de fait dépassé l'âge de dix ans, ils les enverront tous à la campagne, et ils protégeront leurs propres enfants des mœurs de l'époque actuelle, qui sont justement les mœurs de leurs parents, et ils les élèveront selon leurs propres conceptions set selon leurs lois, celles-là mêmes que nous avons exposées à l'instant (ἄλλοι μὲν ἂν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμψωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γονεῖς ἔχουσι, θρέψονται ἐν τοῖς σφετέραις τρόποισι καὶ νόμοις, οὓσιν οἷοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε)'.
⁹⁴ Plat., *R.* 6.541a4-6.

conversion à la philosophie d'un monarque ou l'avènement au pouvoir de véritables philosophes pour changer les mœurs, les lois et la manière de vivre du corps civique⁹⁵. En d'autres termes la méthode pour instaurer la meilleure constitution est d'avoir au pouvoir un ou plusieurs rois vertueux et savants, aptes à purifier une cité existante et la conduire au bonheur. Aussi dans les *Lois* Platon indique que la façon la meilleure, la plus rapide et la plus simple (ῥᾶστα τε καὶ τάχιστ' ἂν μεταβαλεῖν) possible pour qu'une cité parvienne à la condition heureuse est de convaincre un jeune et bon tyran de suivre les conseils d'un excellent législateur⁹⁶. En effet, il ne lui faut ni beaucoup de peine ni beaucoup de temps pour changer les mœurs d'une cité (οὐδέ τινος παμπόλλου χρόνου τῷ τυράννῳ μεταβαλεῖν βουληθέντι πόλεως ἥθη)⁹⁷.

C'est l'œuvre accomplie par le roi du *Politique*. La seule constitution correcte est celle où le véritable détenteur de l'art politique fait preuve d'une capacité singulière à purifier la cité pour son bien⁹⁸ en se débarrassant des gens qui ne sont pas capables d'avoir part au courage et à la réflexion (μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν ἡθους ἀνδρείου καὶ σώφρονος), ni à toutes les autres vertus (ὅσα τε ἄλλα ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετήν)⁹⁹. Il peut les tuer, les exiler ou les condamner aux peines le plus infamantes¹⁰⁰. La nouvelle communauté s'instaure donc par le roi qui exerce sa technique royale sur tous ceux qui restent et dont les natures sont assez bien nées pour se prêter à l'éducation (τοὺς λοιποὺς τοῖνον, ὅσων αἱ φύσεις ἐπὶ τὸ

⁹⁵ Plat., *R.* 5.473c-e.

⁹⁶ Plat., *Lg.* 4.710b: 'il faut donc que cette qualité naturelle, notre tyran la possède en plus des autres, si la cité doit avoir le plus vite et le mieux possible une constitution qui, une fois admise, la fera vivre avec le plus de bonheur. Pour cette cité, il n'y a pas une manière plus rapide ni meilleure d'établir une constitution'.

⁹⁷ Plat., *Lg.* 4.711b. Le tyran des *Lois* s'éloigne considérablement de celui de la *République* et dispose des qualités qui lui permettent de s'approcher au naturel philosophe. Il s'agit d'un tyran 'régulé (κόσμιος)', (comme le philosophe de *R.* 6.500d), il est tempérant (σώφρων), il a une bonne mémoire (μνήμων), la facilité à apprendre (εὐμαθής), il est courageux (ἀνδρεῖος) et il a une grandeur d'âme (μεγαλοπρεπής), en effet il dispose de toutes les parties de la vertu (σύνπασιν τοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρεσι). Sur la figure du tyran dans *Les Lois* voir Brisson 2009.

⁹⁸ Plat., *Plt.* 293d5.

⁹⁹ Plat., *Plt.* 309b. Pour une lecture novatrice de ces passages de la *République*, du *Politique* et des *Lois* voir Macé 2017.

¹⁰⁰ Plat., *Plt.* 308e-309a.

γενναῖον ἱκαναὶ παιδείας τυγχάνουσαι)¹⁰¹. Il établit ainsi une société où règne l'*amitié* et la *concorde* (ὁμονοία καὶ φιλία)¹⁰².

Ces passages, ainsi que les aventures en Sicile, témoignent du fait que Platon croyait profondément que la réalité politique et historique, si hostile qu'elle soit à son propre enseignement et à sa propre vision du monde, restait néanmoins susceptible de connaître une transformation éthico-politique radicale. Le *Politique*, est en effet un discours destiné à révéler à son lecteur la réalité de la proposition platonicienne.

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¹⁰¹ Plat., *Plt.* 309b.

¹⁰² Plat., *Plt.* 311b5.

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Abstract

In this study we argue that in the *Politicus* Plato aimed not only at defining the ideal statesman but also to present the *politeia* governed by an ideal king as the best constitution, one which does not constitute a theoretical issue but a real political perspective. Plato renews the constitutional literature and determines the principles of the administration of the civic community (laws, habits, ways of life, institutions, magistracies), offering his readers a new reflection on the way the ideal king applies his authority and exercises his power. The literature on the ideal king of the fourth century BC, which is often presented as a *corpus* of texts called *speculum principis*, aimed, among others things, at providing an answer to this question; the *Politicus* does not constitute an exception. In this context, the platonic dialogue which can be considered as a treatise *Peri basileias*, is indirectly linked to the literary genre called ‘Mirrors for Princes’.

Resumé

Dans cette étude il s'agit d'argumenter en faveur de l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'objet d'étude de Platon dans le *Politique* n'est pas seulement l'homme royal mais aussi la *politeia* royale, qui ne constitue pas pour le philosophe un enjeu théorique mais une perspective politique réelle. Platon renouvelle la littérature constitutionnelle et détermine les principes de l'administration de la communauté civique (lois, mœurs, institutions, magistratures), en donnant un aperçu concret de la manière dont le roi parfait applique son autorité. La littérature sur le roi idéal et sur la royauté au IV^e siècle, considérée souvent comme appartenant au genre littéraire de *speculum principis*, s'engage à répondre à cette question et le *Politique* n'y fait pas exception. Dans ce contexte, ce dialogue platonicien qui peut être considéré aussi comme un traité *Peri basileias* entretient un lien indirect avec les textes que nous appelons "miroirs aux princes".

BRECHT BUEKENHOUT

ARISTOTLE'S *ON KINGSHIP* AND EUERGETISM

Introduction

One of the most famous moments in antiquity where theory and practice might have intermingled is in the relationship between Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and Alexander the Great (356-323 BCE). After Aristotle had left Plato's Academy but before founding his own school, he was appointed to be the teacher of Alexander, a task that he performed for several years, beginning around 343 BCE. This connection between the philosopher and the statesman was certainly not an accident of history, since there seem to have been strong ties between Aristotle's family and the Macedonian royal house. Aristotle was supposed to be an acquaintance of King Philip II and his general Antipater; his father Nicomachus seems to have been the court doctor and friend of king Amyntas III, and his nephew Callisthenes accompanied Alexander during the latter's Asian campaign.¹ Although doubt has been raised about the extent to which Aristotle actually tutored Alexander or whether he even served as the prince's main preceptor, no one seems to deny that the philosopher was indeed involved in the education of the future conqueror.² Hence both individuals must have known

¹ See especially D. L. 5.1-5. Other biographies of Aristotle's life are collected in Düring 1957. For a discussion on Aristotle's relationship with Macedonia, see Scholz 1998, p. 153-165 and Natali 2013, p. 42-52.

² For Aristotle as tutor of Alexander, see Plu., *Alex.* 7-8. Düring 1957, p. 287 also mentions various other sources. Doubt about Aristotle as tutor of Alexander has been raised by Chroust 1973, I, p. 125-132.

each other, and it is almost certain that their relation was a personal one.³

In Aristotle's extant works, nothing is mentioned explicitly of Alexander, which makes it difficult to elucidate their relation on the basis of firsthand material. But in the ancient catalogues with book titles of Aristotle's works, there is a reference to an interesting work entitled *On Kingship* (Περὶ βασιλείας).⁴ In the fourth century BCE, and certainly during the subsequent Hellenistic period, treatises bearing this title were written by Greek intellectuals to monarchs in order to eulogize, ameliorate, or simply justify their rule.⁵ Although the treatise itself has not survived, several sources indicate that Aristotle wrote such a work to Alexander, most likely, as many scholars seem to believe, before or shortly after Alexander's accession to the throne (336 BCE).⁶ Nothing more is known with certainty on the exact form and content of this treatise. Luckily, there is at least one fragment, although strictly speaking it is a testimony, which gives us a further hint:

ἵνα δὲ καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὐεργετήσῃ, γράφει τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βιβλίον περὶ βασιλείας, διδάσκων ὅπως βασιλευτέον. ὅπερ οὕτως ἔδρασεν εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου ψυχὴν ὥς λέγειν ὅτε μὴ ὠφέλησέ τινα 'σήμερον οὐκ ἐβασίλευσα· οὐδένα γὰρ εὖ ἐποίησα' (*Vita Arist. Marc.* 94-96 Gigon = Arist., fr. 646 Rose).

And in order to confer a benefit on all mankind, he [sc. Aristotle] wrote a book to Alexander *On Kingship*, instructing him on how to rule as king. This made such an impression on

³ This could also be inferred from the fact that Aristotle supposedly wrote letters to Alexander, of which some fragments remain, see fr. 656-662 Rose. A special case is the *Letter to Alexander* on the policy to maintain after the battle of Gaugamela, which survived in an Arabic translation, see Plezia & Bielawski 1970. However, none of these letters or fragments are proven to be authentic. For discussion, see Natali 2013, p. 122-124. With regard to the authenticity of the Arabic letter, see especially Murray 1971, p. 101-134.

⁴ D. L. 5.22, nr. 18 or Hsch., nr. 16, see Düring 1957, p. 42 and 83.

⁵ For an overview of other treatises bearing such a (sub)title, see Gigon 1987, p. 301. On the occurrence of the *On Kingship* treatises in Hellenistic times, see Walbank 1984, p. 75-81 and Murray 2007, p. 17-21.

⁶ See Chroust 1973, II, p. 222; Laurenti 1987, II, p. 882-883 and Scholz 1998, p. 160.

the soul of Alexander that when he was not of service to anyone, he said: 'Today I was no king, for I did good to no one'.⁷

This passage derives from the so called *Vita Marciana*, one of the anonymous Neoplatonic biographies of Aristotle.⁸ The cited passage in itself is interesting, since it is unique in pointing to a particular feature of Aristotle's *On Kingship*, namely that a king should be a benefactor. Although the sentence ἵνα δὲ καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὐεργετήσῃ refers primarily to Aristotle as a philosopher who tried to benefit everyone by writing on how a king should rule, it is reasonable to accept that the idea of benefiting all mankind is transferrable to Alexander, who should have acted accordingly, as is suggested by the following *apophthegma*. It seems thus that the intent of the work, and therefore in all likelihood also its message, was that a king should be a benefactor to all of his subjects. One might wonder what the historical value of such a remark is.

What I want to do in this paper is to investigate this message on what one might call euergetism or the principle of beneficence, by asking two questions: first, to what extent *can* this idea be ascribed to Aristotle, and second, what does this tell us about the work *On Kingship*. After analyzing this passage from the *Vita Marciana*, I will try to answer these questions by looking into Aristotle's own theories on kingship and euergetism, respectively in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*. On the basis of these results, I will dwell upon possible consequences with regard to the form and content of *On Kingship*. My analysis remains speculative, which means that the outcome cannot be based on more solid grounds than hypotheses. It is also not the intent of this paper to draw original conclusions, but rather to support certain perspec-

⁷ Translation taken from Barnes 1984, slightly altered and completed. All other translations from Aristotle's extant works (*Politics*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric*) and fragments (fr. 658 and 659 Rose) are taken from this work as well.

⁸ The *Vita Marciana*, along with other lives, used to be considered as an epitome of the lost biography from a certain Ptolemy, see Düring 1957, p. 469-476. On the basis of a new Arabic manuscript, however, Plezia 1985, p. 1-11 was able to demonstrate that the Neoplatonic biographies (*Vita Marciana*, *Vita Vulgata*, and *Vita Latina*) cannot be deemed as mere summaries of Ptolemy's work, see Dietze-Mager 2015, p. 117-118.

tives already suggested in the literature, by relying on Aristotle's ideas on kingship and euergetism as well as his views on rhetoric.

The passage from the Vita Marciana

If one wants to investigate the worth and authenticity of such a small utterance from a single passage, then of course one must swiftly abandon hope of reaching certainty. After all, unless there appears to be a trustworthy and authoritative source, which unambiguously confirms or contradicts the above statement from the *Vita Marciana*, only conditional conclusions can be reached with regard to this message on euergetism.

One reason for taking the remark on euergetism to be untrustworthy is the consideration that the relation between Aristotle and Alexander was greatly exaggerated over time.⁹ Plutarch seems to be especially guilty of this when he describes Alexander's education by saying both that Aristotle at that time was already a very famous philosopher and that Alexander received influential insights from his ethical and political doctrines.¹⁰ The passage from the *Vita Marciana* does something similar, in so far as it also recognizes the supposed transmission of insights from one party to the other. Alexander is said to have adopted the Aristotelian thesis in its entirety, but it has long been recognized that the conqueror in the end did *not* act as his tutor advised him.¹¹ It seems safe to say, therefore, that such a strong influence was invented or

⁹ Early sources on Alexander's education as Onesicritus (FGrHist 134) and Marsyas of Pella (FGrHist 135) do not mention Aristotle as a tutor of Alexander. This suggests that later biographers overemphasized the relation between Aristotle and Alexander, probably in an attempt to establish the strongest possible connection between the philosopher and statesman, see Scholz 1998, p. 159-160 and Natali 2013, p. 43 and 163 n. 84.

¹⁰ Plu., *Alex.* 7.2-3: μετεπέμψατο τῶν φιλοσόφων τὸν ἐνδοξότατον καὶ λογιώτατον Ἀριστοτέλην (...) ἔοικε δ' Ἀλέξανδρος οὐ μόνον τὸν ἠθικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν παραλαβεῖν λόγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων καὶ βαθυτέρων διδασκαλιῶν, ὥς οἱ ἄνδρες ἰδίως ἀκροατικὰς καὶ ἐποπτικὰς προσαγορεύοντες οὐκ ἐξέφερον εἰς πολλοὺς μετασχεῖν. At the time Aristotle was tutoring Alexander (c. 343-340 BCE), the philosopher was not yet the authority that he later became, and the prince was too young to receive such a philosophical education.

¹¹ This is indicated in the passages from Plutarch and Strabo, collected as fr. 658 Rose and discussed in the last section of this paper, see also Ehrenberg 1938, p. 85-92 and Chrout 1973, II, p. 222-223.

at least overstated by later authors, such as the author of the *Vita Marciana*. It is in any case remarkable that Alexander's answer shows strong similarities with that of the Roman Emperor Titus, according to Suetonius and Themistius, when he reflected on the fact that he did not benefit anybody on a certain day.¹² This correspondence with other sources seems to indicate that the anonymous author, at least for Alexander's answer, relied on a traditional example. Given these features, it becomes difficult to trust the message from the *Vita Marciana* as historically accurate.

In contrast with this is the fact that during the Hellenistic period the principle of benefaction became a constitutive part of kingly rule. This can be inferred from both literary and epigraphical sources.¹³ Polybius, for instance, in blaming the wrongful behavior of King Philip V, says that a king, as opposed to a tyrant, should rule willing subjects by doing good to everyone.¹⁴ In another example, an inscription from the citizens of Iasos in honor of King Antiochus III connects kingship with beneficence towards (all) human beings.¹⁵ Such examples demonstrate that euergetism was associated with kingship both by various persons (intellectuals and common citizens) and within different dynasties (the Antigonids and the Seleucids). It seems to have played an important role for the self-understanding of these kings too, especially within the dynasty of the Ptolemies where two of the kings (the third and the eighth) carried the epithet *Εὐεργέτης* ('benefactor') as a personal title. It is, therefore, generally accepted that the idea of euergetism likewise must have been adopted in the trea-

¹² Suet., *Tit.* 8.1: *atque etiam recordatus quondam super cenam, quod nihil cuiquam toto die praestitisset, memorabilem illam meritoque laudatam uocem edidit: 'amici, diem perdidit';* Them., *Or.* 13, 174c: *Τίτου μὲν γὰρ δὴ ὁ λόγος οὗτος αἰοίδιμος, ὅτι τήμερον οὐκ ἔβασίλευσα. οὐδένα γὰρ τήμερον εὖ ἐποίησα.*

¹³ For euergetism as a constitutive part of kingly rule in Hellenistic times, see especially Gauthier 1985, p. 39-53 and Bringmann 1993, p. 8-25. Both examples below are taken up in these works as well.

¹⁴ Plb. 5.11.6: *τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν ἀκουσίῳ, μισοῦμενον καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους. βασιλέως δὲ τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιοῦντα, διὰ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀγαπώμενον, ἐκόντων ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ προστατεῖν.*

¹⁵ *ASAA* 45-46 (1967-1968), 447, l. 46-47: *τὸ βασιλεύειν νενομικότες πρὸς εὐεργεσία[ν] [...]σθαι ἀνθρώπων (οἱ: πάντων ἀνθρώπων),* see Garlan 1974, p. 197-198.

tises directed towards the Hellenistic kings.¹⁶ One might expect the same of Alexander's (self-)perception and Aristotle's treatise for two reasons. First, as the kings in these Diadoch dynasties may be regarded as the successors of Alexander, it seems likely that the Macedonian king understood himself in a similar way.¹⁷ Second, it was customary already in the fourth century BCE to connect the idea of a good king with the idea of being a benefactor, shown for instance in the advice from Isocrates to Philip II, Alexander's father.¹⁸ Although it seems probable that Alexander's answer in the passage from the *Vita Marciana* was a widely used historical fiction, what we know from pedagogical customs and treatises in the (late) classical and Hellenistic age suggests that Aristotle certainly may have tried to convince Alexander that he should become or remain a benefactor.

With regard to Aristotle's *On Kingship*, we do not have any evidence outside the passage from the *Vita Marciana*, but the words *εὐεργεσία* and *εὐεργετεῖν* appear relatively often in his philosophical works, especially within the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, which shows that euergetism was not unfamiliar, let alone unimportant to Aristotle. If we look to his *Politics*, we see that he uses it almost exclusively in connection with kingship.¹⁹ It is striking that half of the instances of *εὐεργ-* within this work appear in one single passage where he also, and even uniquely, mentions the Macedonian kings:

καθάπερ οὖν εἶπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους ἢ κατ' εὐεργεσίας ἢ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύνανιν. ἅπαντες

¹⁶ See Walbank 1984, p. 82 and Murray 2007, p. 24.

¹⁷ A similar, but more cautious, conclusion is taken up in Flashar 2006, p. 225: 'Die durch diesen Begriff ausgedrückte Politik der Ptolemaeer begreift sich in der Tradition Alexanders, so dass das hier angeführte Dictum in diesem historischen Kontext zumindest möglich ist.'

¹⁸ Isoc., *Phil.* 116: Καὶ μὴ θαυμάσης εἰ διὰ παντός σε τοῦ λόγου πειρώμαι προτρέπειν ἐπὶ τε τὰς εὐεργεσίας τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ πραότητα καὶ φιланθρωπίαν.

¹⁹ A textual search of *εὐεργ-* within the *TLG* database yields six instances in the *Politics* (3.14.1285b6, 3.15.1286b10, 5.10.1310b34/35/36 and 7.7.1328a13). Only the last one is not explicitly connected with kingship. The benefactions spoken of in that sentence are nevertheless seen as carried out by people called *μεγαλόψυχοι*, and these persons can be regarded as kings as well, as will be shown in the next section.

γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δ' ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοττῶν (Arist., *Pol.* 5.10.1310b31–40).

And so, as we were saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy, for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power added to them. For all who have obtained this honor have benefited, or had in their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war; others, like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or [they] have settled or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and Molossian kings.

This shows that Aristotle too made an explicit connection between euergetism and the Macedonian kingship, which brings it into line with the passage from the *Vita Marciana*. This can be argued from the other direction as well: it is notable that the word βασιλευτέον in the *Vita Marciana* seems to be a *hapax legomenon* in Greek, with an equivalent βασιλευτόν ('suited for kingly rule') used in antiquity only by Aristotle.²⁰ It is reasonable, therefore, that Aristotle, just as contemporary intellectuals, wrote to Alexander on euergetism. To understand what he might have written, it seems a good starting point to look into his ethical and political theories, in order to see how Aristotle thought about kingship and euergetism. Naturally, this does not imply that he proclaimed exactly the same views in *On Kingship*. What appears to be a plausible assumption, though, is that his own ideas must have served somehow as a starting point for a treatise to instruct the king.

Kingship and euergetism in the Nicomachean Ethics

The concept of euergetism appears most frequently in Aristotle's ethical theory. This theory is widely known as a virtue eth-

²⁰ The adjective βασιλευτός is used twice by Aristotle in *Politics* 3.17.1288a7–8. The *TLG* database indicates that it was used later only by ecclesiastics and historians as Theophylactus (eleventh-twelfth century), Nicetas Choniates (twelfth-thirteenth century) and Ephraem (thirteenth-fourteenth century).

ics wherein the good is considered a practical attitude towards a mean that lies between two vices: an ἔλλειψις ('defect') and an ὑπερβολή ('excess').²¹ To reach the goal of leading a good life, then, is not just a matter of insight or knowing what something is, but of action or knowing how something can be done. In this respect, it is not remarkable that the concept of benefaction occurs within Aristotle's ethical thought. But in connection with euergetism, it is not a matter of simply doing something good, but always with regard to someone else. There is thus not only the action itself which must be good, but also one party for whom it is good. Hence this implies a difference between two parties: the benefactor and the beneficiary or beneficiaries. Although the good deed seems especially in the interest of the benefited, Aristotle speaks with more regard of the benefactor, because he is directed to what is καλόν ('noble') rather than συμφέρον or χρήσιμον ('useful'), as in the case of the benefited. The former is considered better, because it is more pleasant, longer lasting, and requires an active input.²² According to Aristotle, there is thus something of considerable worth in being a benefactor.

Without going into detail, there are two points in Aristotle's ethical theory where euergetism seems to play an important role, and these two respectively reflect the side of the benefactor as such and his relation to the benefited. The first one is the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία ('magnanimity' or 'pride'), which is the attitude of having high ambitions in accordance with merit. According to Aristotle, a person with such a 'greatness of soul' is directed to the highest of the external goods, which is τιμή ('honor').²³ This could be reached by doing good to others. The reason why a magnanimous person especially wants to confer benefits, but is not

²¹ This can be inferred from Aristotle's famous definition of ἀρετή in *EN* 2.6.1106b36-1107a3 as ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὕσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν.

²² Arist., *EN* 9.7.1168a9-27.

²³ Arist., *EN* 4.3.1123b1-4 and 17-21. This is why in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle defines μεγαλοψυχία as ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικῆς εὐεργετημάτων (1.9.1366b17) and τιμή as σημείον εὐεργετικῆς εὐδοξίας (1.5.1361a27-28). It is interesting to note already that the first definition occurs within the chapter on epideictic rhetoric (1.9), the second within the chapters on deliberative rhetoric (1.4-8). This shows how the remark from the *Vita Marciana* as such could equally fit both genres.

keen on receiving them, is due to the fact that the former is a sign of superiority, the latter of inferiority.²⁴ Someone who is proud, then, does good to others because it demonstrates his greatness towards people who are considered lesser.

This brings us to the second point wherein euergetism is important, namely Aristotle's theory of *φιλία* ('friendship'). Here, Aristotle differentiates between friendships or, generally speaking, affectionate relationships where everyone is thought to be equal, on the one hand, and those where the *ὑπεροχή* ('superiority') of one party is implied.²⁵ A good person needs friends to benefit, for it is peculiar to a friend to do good rather than to receive benefactions, and more noble to benefit friends rather than strangers.²⁶ In a relationship between equals, this requires a reciprocity of benefactions, whereas in a relationship between superiors and inferiors, the superior will act as a real *εὐεργέτης*, by conferring benefits without receiving them back. This brings us to a passage in *EN* 8.11.1161a10-22 where Aristotle applies these ideas on kingship:

Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὐ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων· ὅθεν καὶ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ πατρικὴ, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων· αἷτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα προσνέμεται· φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατὴρ υἱῶν καὶ πρόγονοι ἐκγόνων καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευμένων. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται, διὸ καὶ τιμῶνται οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ φιλία.

Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits con-

²⁴ Arist., *EN* 4.3.1124b9-10: καὶ οἷος εὐ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου.

²⁵ Arist., *EN* 8.7.1158b11-14. Examples for such a friendship based on superiority are the relations between a father and a son, and between an older and a younger person.

²⁶ Arist., *EN* 9.9.1169b10-13: εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἔστι τὸ εὐ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὐ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνεῖων, τῶν εὐ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος.

ferred; for he confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the peoples’). Such too is the friendship of a father, though his exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing. These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one party over the other, which is why parents are honored. The justice therefore that exists between persons so related is not the same but proportioned to merit; for that is true of the friendship as well.

This passage illustrates that the above from Aristotle’s ethical theory on euergetism is applicable to the relation between a king and his subjects, just as it is applicable to the relation between a father and his children. The idea here is that there is a natural superiority of one party over the other(s), but at the same time an affectionate attitude towards the inferiors. A king will make decisions and act to the advantage of his subjects, which are his benefits to them. And this is why he is (or should be) honored by them, peculiar to the motives of a magnanimous person. Thus, in general one could say that the idea of beneficence fits with kingship, in the sense that within Aristotle’s ethical theory the concept of kingship seems to imply euergetism. Hence on this basis, as scholars recognized before, it is plausible that Aristotle wrote to Alexander to act as a benefactor.²⁷

Kingship and euergetism in the Politics

When one takes a look at Aristotle’s political theory, then the quantity of information on kingship and euergetism is reversed: the *Politics* has far less to say on euergetism as such than the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but far more on kingship and its concrete connection with euergetism. In *Politics* 3.14.1285b3-11, Aristotle starts his discussion of kingship with a division into five different cat-

²⁷ See Laurenti 1987, II, p. 884-885 and Scholz 1998, p. 161.

egories, and within his exposition of the fourth category he connects kingship explicitly with euergetism:

τέταρτον δ' εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς αἱ κατὰ τοὺς ἥρωικούς χρόνους ἐκούσiai τε καὶ πάτριαι γιγνόμεναι κατὰ νόμον. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλήθους εὐεργέτας κατὰ τέχνας ἢ πόλεμον ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, ἐγίγοντο βασιλεῖς ἐκόντων καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν τῆς τε κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας καὶ τῶν θυσιῶν, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικάι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινον.

There is a fourth species of kingly monarchy—that of the heroic times—which was hereditary and legal, and was exercised over willing subjects. For the first chiefs were benefactors of the people in arts or arms; they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them; and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those who required a priest. They also decided law-suits either with or without an oath.

This category, which can be called heroic kingship, is a legal kingship with the threefold power of being a sovereign judge, military commander and high priest. Aristotle says that this kingship derives its legitimacy from benefactions with regard to the king's expertise or warlike activities, either in founding cities or providing land. This corresponds with the previously cited passage from *Politics* 5.10, where Aristotle mentions these benefactions, conferred by Athenian (Codrus), Persian (Cyrus), Spartan, Macedonian, and Molossian kings. Aristotle thus regards these kings (both Greek and barbarian) as heroic kings, and understands the benefactions to their subjects as related to their personal excellence or ability in defending or acquiring a territory. It is, therefore, possible that Aristotle considered Alexander to be such a heroic king, because the category clearly fits his ideas on euergetism, and later *On Kingship* fragments also seem to point to a similar type of kingship.²⁸

²⁸ A similarity could be found in one of the *On Kingship* fragments in Stob. 4.7.61 on the threefold power of a king, see Walbank 1984, p. 79: 'His triple function as supreme commander, dispenser of justice and overseer of divine cults corresponds to the Homeric division of powers as set out in Aristotle.'

The problem with this heroic kingship, however, is that it is thought to be, and described as, a kingship from the past.²⁹ Aristotle argues elsewhere, in a passage where he again connects past kingships with euergetism, that the individual virtue of subjects increased in the course of time and that the populations of communities grew larger, which is why others became entitled to a share of power.³⁰ No one, in other words, seems to be virtuous enough to rule all by himself, as kings from the heroic times did. This is why such a kingship, according to Aristotle, evolved to either a merely religious office, as in Athens, or remained a kingship, but only as a military command, as was the case in Sparta.³¹ In that respect, it becomes difficult to connect the rule of Alexander with heroic kingship, since Aristotle seems to be of the opinion that it does not occur any longer.

We should look therefore to the remaining categories from *Politics* 3.14 and consider the possibility of connecting them with euergetism. Three possibilities remain: the generalship for life, the barbarian monarchy, and the absolute kingship.³² The first category is the most moderate version and is considered as a typically (though not necessarily) Greek variant, like the Spartan kingship. The second contains more power, appears among some of the barbarians and consists of a despotic rule. The third is called a *παμβασιλεία* ('all-kingship') and is an unlimited or absolute kind of rule, similar to that found in a household. Although none of these categories are connected explicitly with well-doing, as was the case with the heroic kingship, it is not that difficult to read this connec-

²⁹ Notice the past tenses *ἐγίνοντο* (3.14.1285b8) and *ἦσαν* (3.14.1285b9), and compare them with the present tenses within the descriptions of the first two types of kingships in *Politics* 3.14.

³⁰ Arist., *Pol.* 3.15.1286b8-13: *καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὐρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. ἔτι δ' ἀπ' εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλ' ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.*

³¹ Arist., *Pol.* 3.14.1285b13-19. It must be said that Aristotle does not mention Athens or Sparta explicitly. That both cities fit the respective descriptions can be inferred from Aristotle's *Constitution of the Athenians* (57) on the *ἄρχων βασιλεὺς*, and the earlier definition of the Spartan kingship (*Pol.* 3.14.1285a3-8).

³² These are the first, second and fifth category of a kingship within *Politics* 3.14. The third category, the *αἰσυρμητεία*, is an elective tyranny from the past, and therefore does not need to be taken into account here.

tion implicitly. After all, Aristotle argues that a kingship, as every correct constitution, must be directed towards τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ('the common advantage') or even τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων ('the advantage of the ruled'), rather than towards the mere advantage of the ruler(s).³³ This seems to presume that a king acts in the interest of his subjects and thus tries to benefit them, since συμφέρον is the term that Aristotle also uses to indicate the position of the benefited. Moreover, Aristotle indicates that a king, in contrast to a tyrant, looks to what is noble rather than pleasant, and aims for honor rather than money.³⁴ The words καλόν and τιμή are clearly reminiscent of Aristotle's terminology on well-doing. Since the generalship for life, the barbarian monarchy, and the παμβασιλεία are all variants of kingship, they also seem to imply euergetism.

With regard to Alexander, scholars have often shown a tendency to look only to the last variant.³⁵ As such, this is not remarkable, since Aristotle especially considers the παμβασιλεία as a true kingship and only bothers to investigate that category on its merits and problems in *Politics* 3.15-16. It is particularly in a passage just prior to his discussion of kingship that Aristotle describes the rule of such an absolute king in a way that many scholars have been tempted to see as a reference to Alexander. Within this passage, Aristotle mentions an individual with such an ὑπερβολή ('preeminence') in virtue (and political capacity) that any comparison with others is excluded, which would make it wrong to deny such a person, who is like a god among human beings, to be sovereign over all.³⁶ As such, this could fit both the divine recognition and the striving for omnipotence that Alexander seemingly sought him-

³³ Arist., *Pol.* 3.7.1279a32-1279b10; *EN* 8.10.1160b2-6.

³⁴ Arist., *Pol.* 5.10.1311a4-7: ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ μὲν χρημάτα τυραννικά, τὰ δ' εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικά μᾶλλον.

³⁵ See Kelsen 1937, p. 31-32; Tarn 1948, p. 366-369; Kahn 1990, p. 380; Greenwalt 2010, p. 158-160 and Dietz 2012, p. 281-283.

³⁶ Arist., *Pol.* 3.13.1284a3-14: Εἰ δὲ τίς ἔστιν εἰς τοσοῦτον διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολὴν ἢ πλείους μὲν ἑνός, μὴ μέντοι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μηδὲ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων, εἰ πλείους, εἰ δ' εἷς, τὴν ἐκείνου μόνον, οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως· ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἴσων ἄνιστοι τοσοῦτον κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος. αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι νόμος.

self towards the end of his life.³⁷ Since Aristotle never indicates that this is a kingship from the past, the *παμβασίλεια* could have been the kingship that he had in mind when he thought of Alexander's rule. Some utterances from later *On Kingship* fragments at least show similarities with Aristotle's presentation.³⁸

Nevertheless, a closer comparison between the *παμβασίλεια* and Alexander shows that it is unlikely that Aristotle saw the Macedonian monarch as an absolute king. In general, the *παμβασίλεια* can be considered as a philosophical rather than a historical category of kingship.³⁹ The divine character of the absolute king shows that it is simply an ideal rather than the description of a historical ruler.⁴⁰ But even if Aristotle had an individual in mind, then it is hardly likely that it was Alexander, because his character does not correspond with Aristotle's picture of the *παμβασίλεύς*. To start with, an argument given by Aristotle himself in *Politics* 3.15 against the rule of an absolute king is that human passions like *ὀργή* ('anger') can corrupt a ruler's judgment.⁴¹ And in the next chapter, he argues more generally that *θυμός* ('passion') could distort rulers, even the best men.⁴² Although he does not connect this explicitly with Alexander, it is significant that according to other authors, it is exactly this temper that Alexander was known

³⁷ For Alexander's desire for deification, see Worthington 2003, p. 236-272, with extracts from W. W. Tarn, E. Badian and G. L. Cawkwell.

³⁸ In Stob. 4.7.61 (line 38), there is not only an exact correspondence in portrayal of the king as *θεός ἐν ἀνθρώποις*, but he is also depicted as *νόμος ἐμψυχος* ('animate law'). This fits Aristotle's description in *Politics* 3.13.1284a13-14 of the godlike ruler as being a law himself, and reminds us of his description of the judge in *EN* 5.4.1132a21-22 as *δικαίον ἐμψυχον* ('animate justice'), see Goodenough 1928, p. 63.

³⁹ This could be inferred from the fact that Aristotle only introduces such a kingship in *Politics* 3.14 after the summary of the four historical kingships, thus implying that the *παμβασίλεια* differs from these. Nagle 2000, p. 121-124 nevertheless argued that you could make a distinction between a theoretical and a historical version of the *παμβασίλεια*. There is no need, however, for such a distinction.

⁴⁰ In *Pol.* 7.14.1332b23-27, Aristotle argues that it is not easy to assume such godlike superiority in an individual. Some scholars, however, have argued that the ideal could yet be used to evaluate and assess existing rulers, see Mulgan 1974, p. 27.

⁴¹ Arist., *Pol.* 3.15.1286a33-35.

⁴² Arist., *Pol.* 3.16.1287a31-32.

for.⁴³ Although less trustworthy, there is even an epistolary fragment that Aristotle was concerned with trying to diminish Alexander's anger:

Ἀλέξανδρον Ἀριστοτέλης ὀργιζόμενον πραῦναι βουλόμενος καὶ παῦσαι χαλεπαίνοντα πολλοῖς ταυτὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν γέγραφεν· ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ οὐ πρὸς ἥσσους ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς κρείττονας γίνεται· σοὶ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἴσος'. (Ael., *VH* 12.54 = Arist., fr. 659 Rose)

Aristotle, wishing to pacify Alexander's rage and to put a stop to his anger with so many people, wrote to him as follows: 'Passion and rage are directed not against lesser men but against greater; and you have no equal'.

This fragment seems to correspond only superficially with Aristotle's own definition of anger.⁴⁴ Yet it indicates that Aristotle is also supposed to have recognized Alexander's anger, which would exclude the latter from being an absolute king in the former's eyes. But even if Aristotle completely recognized Alexander as a god-like king, it would be odd that he simultaneously believed that the king should do good to his subjects. Although Aristotle's general terminology on kingship indeed points to euergetism, as was argued above, a closer reading nevertheless shows that it becomes difficult to apply it to the divine character of the absolute king. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.7, he indicates quite clearly that when the distance between two parties becomes too great, as in the case of

⁴³ Sen., *dial.* 5.17: *Haec barbaris regibus feritas in ira fuit, quos nulla eruditio, nullus litterarum cultus imbuerat. Dabo tibi ex Aristotelis sinu regem Alexandrum, qui Clitum carissimum sibi et una educatum inter epulas transfodit manu quidem sua, parum adulantem et pigre ex Macedone ac libero in Persicam servitutem transeuntem*; Plu., *Alex.* 51.3: τοῦ δὲ Κλείτου μὴ εἰκοντος, ἀλλὰ εἰς μέσον ἃ βούλεται λέγειν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον κελεύοντος, ἢ μὴ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δέϊπνον ἄνδρας ἐλευθέρους καὶ παρρησίαν ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ μετὰ βαρβάρων ζῆν καὶ ἀνδραπόδων, οἱ τὴν Περσικὴν ζώνην καὶ τὸν διάλευκον αὐτοῦ χιτῶνα προσκυνήσουσιν, οὐκέτι φέρων τὴν ὀργὴν Ἀλέξανδρος μῆλων παρακειμένων ἐνὶ βαλὼν ἔπαισεν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον ἐζήτει.

⁴⁴ According to Hose 2002, p. 288, this advice to Alexander corresponds quite well with Aristotle's definition of anger in *Rh.* 2.2.1379b11-13: ὑπόκειται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσήκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥττοσι μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν. It must be noted that in the advice, Aristotle supposedly said that you cannot be angry at lesser people, whereas the definition in the *Rhetoric* still endorses this. Since anger is caused by the contempt of lesser persons, it remains possible to be angry at them.

a god and human beings, there is no more room for *φιλία*.⁴⁵ As we have already seen, however, the friendship between a king and his subjects was constitutive for the benefactions of the former towards the latter.

One could say, therefore, that Alexander's character not only differs factually from Aristotle's godlike king, it even seems necessarily so in order to receive instructions with regard to euergetism. This allows us to say, in accordance with other scholars, that within Aristotle's political theory, Alexander can hardly be identified with the concept of the *παμβασιλεύς*.⁴⁶ This does not come as a surprise if one reads Aristotle's conclusion in *Politics* 5.10 regarding kingship in his own days: 'no one is so immeasurably superior to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity of the office' (*μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὥστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς*, 5.10.1313a7-8). This is why the remaining existing kingships, the generalship for life and the barbarian monarchy, are either strongly reduced versions of former kingships or variants of one-man rule over non-Greeks. Neither of these monarchies seem to require a preeminently virtuous nature, which could complicate their connection with euergetism. It is not necessary, however, to go into these two categories right now. At this point, it suffices to say that if Alexander was not an heroic or absolute king in the eyes of Aristotle, it is not obvious why Aristotle would link Alexander with the idea of euergetism.

Consequences for On Kingship

What can be inferred from the above with regard to both the form and content of *On Kingship*? If we begin with the form of the treatise, then the passage from the *Vita Marciana* only indicates that it was a *βιβλίον*. That it consisted of only *one* book and was thus a

⁴⁵ Arist., *EN* 8.7.1158b35-1159a5: δῆλον δ' ἂν πολὺ διάστημα γένηται ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἢ εὐπορίας ἢ τίνος ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν· πλείστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασιλέων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι οἱ πολὺ καταδέεστεροι, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις οἱ μηδενὸς ἄξιοι. ἀκριβὴς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμός, ἕως τίνος οἱ φίλοι· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων ἔτι μένει, πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι.

⁴⁶ See Ehrenberg 1938, p. 71-85 and Schütrumpf 1991, II, p. 517-534.

short work becomes evident from a similar passage from the *Vita Vulgata*, another Neoplatonic biography on Aristotle's life.⁴⁷ And in the book catalogues of Aristotle's works, it is indicated as well that *Περὶ βασιλείας* only consisted of one ($\bar{\alpha}$) book.⁴⁸

Some scholars in the past have argued that it probably was a dialogue.⁴⁹ One of the arguments is that the title *Περὶ βασιλείας* appears among similar '*Περὶ ...*' titles in the book catalogues, and we know from the remaining fragments of some of these, as Aristotle's work *On Good Birth* (*Περὶ εὐγενείας*), that they were indeed dialogues.⁵⁰ It is, however, not necessary for *On Kingship* to be a dialogue simply because some other treatises with similar titles were.⁵¹ Although one can surely address a king by means of a dialogue, as Dio Chrysostom did in some of his works *On Kingship*, the fragments from the treatises *On Kingship* of the later pseudo-Pythagorean authors do not reveal a dialogic structure, nor does this form seem to have been a frequent feature of such works.⁵² More important is the argument that the chapters in the *Politics* where Aristotle discusses kingship (3.14-17) constitute a clear, delineated unit, both starting and ending with the words '*περὶ βασιλείας*' (3.14.1284b36 and 3.17.1288a30), which makes it a plausible assumption that Aristotle integrated (parts of) an earlier dialogue on kingship in the *Politics*.⁵³ This seems tempt-

⁴⁷ *Vita Arist. Vulg.* 22 (see Düring 1957, p. 135) = Arist., fr. 646 Rose: τῷ δ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ καὶ περὶ βασιλείας ἔγραψεν ἐν ἐνὶ μονοβίβλῳ, παιδεύων αὐτὸν ὅπως δεῖ βασιλεύειν.

⁴⁸ See note 4.

⁴⁹ See Gigon 1987, p. 301.

⁵⁰ The fragments from *Περὶ εὐγενείας* which reveal the dialogue structure come from Stobaeus 4.29.24-25 = Arist., fr. 91-92 Rose. For comments, see Flashar 2006, p. 214-217.

⁵¹ Düring 1957, p. 68 and 90, for instance, does not call the first book titles 'dialogues', but rather 'the works most widely known to the general public in Hellenistic times'.

⁵² For the fragments of Diotogenes, Sthenidas and Ecphantus, see Stob. 4.7.61-66. For discussion on the authenticity and influence on Hellenistic monarchy, see especially Goodenough 1928, p. 55-102. More cautious are Walbank 1984, p. 78-79 and Murray 2007, p. 20-21.

⁵³ That Aristotle had dealt with kingship before could be inferred from the methodological remark in *Pol.* 3.15.1286a: ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς τρόπος τῆς βασιλείας πολιτείας εἰδὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε περὶ τούτου δεῖ θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνοῦσας. For according to Weil 1960, p. 158-159 this could point to *On Kingship*: 'Le verbe ἐπιδραμεῖν est remarquable, parce qu'il exprime l'idée d'une exposé rapide

ing, since within chapters 3.15-16, Aristotle presents a dialectical discussion on the advantage of kingship with both arguments pro and contra, which might give the impression that it derives originally from a dialogue. If we accept, however, that *On Kingship* was written to Alexander, the work is unlikely to have been a dialogue, for these chapters on kingship within the *Politics* offer a *philosophical* analysis of the phenomenon. Both the technical vocabulary and the anti-kingly tendencies within the chapters make it highly implausible that the same content was offered in a treatise to a living king such as Alexander.⁵⁴ It cannot be excluded that Aristotle wrote a philosophical dialogue on kingship of which *Politics* 3.14-17 reveals traces, but such a work is hardly likely to have been written to Alexander.⁵⁵

If we look to the division that was made in late antiquity, we can see that the works of Aristotle were divided into three categories. A passage from Philoponus indicates that a treatise *On Kingship* was placed not within the universal or general treatises, containing Aristotle's philosophical works (both his dialogues and esoteric writings), nor in the middle ones, containing his historical works or research compendia, but in the category of the so-called special ones, such as the letters:

Φέρε τοίνυν καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ποιησώμεθα. τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ μερικά, ὡς αἱ ἐπιστολαί, τὰ δὲ καθόλου, οἷον ἡ Φυσικὴ, ἡ Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, ὡς αἱ Πολιτεῖαι καὶ αἱ Περὶ ζώων ἱστορίαι. (...) Μερικὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα πρὸς τινὰ ἰδίως γέγραπται, ὡς αἱ ἐπιστολαὶ ἢ ὅσα ἐρωτηθεῖς ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνος περὶ τε βασιλείας καὶ ὅπως δεῖ τὰς ἀποικίας ποιεῖσθαι γεγράφηκε (Phlp., *in Cat.* p. 3 Busse [CAG XIII 1]).

Let us now also make the distinction between the Aristotelian writings. Of the Aristotelian writings, there are first the

et sommaire, sinon d'un résumé, en tous cas d'un schema. (...) S'il se contente ici d'un survol rapide, c'est que l'analyse détaillée a déjà été faite, et cela ne peut être que dans le *Sur la royauté*.

⁵⁴ See also Murray 1971, p. 75: 'The *Politics* is "esoteric", too difficult for the ordinary king in the street. Under the guise of accepting the theory of the perfect king, it offers the most devastating critique of actual kingship.'

⁵⁵ A suitable candidate seems to be the lost work *On the Statesman* (Περὶ πολιτικοῦ), see Flashar 2006, p. 205.

special ones, like the letters, second the universal ones, as the *Physic(s)*, or *On the Soul* and the others, and third those in the middle, like the *Constitutions* and the *Histories of Animals*. (...) Special writings are those that were written for some individual, like the letters or those treatises requested by Alexander of Macedon on kingship and how one ought to make colonies.

This passage suggests, first, that if a treatise like *On Kingship* did not itself take the form of a letter, it was sufficiently similar to be categorized with them.⁵⁶ That is why it seems safe to say that Aristotle's *On Kingship* probably resembled the orations of Isocrates (*Euagoras* or *Ad Nicoclem*) more than the philosophical dialogues of Plato (*Politicus*) and Xenophon (*Hieron*). But secondly, this also suggests that the treatise *On Kingship* was not a philosophical or historical work, but rather a rhetorical one.

This brings us to the content of the treatise. If Aristotle wrote it to Alexander to instruct him on how to rule as a king in order to make him a benefactor, then the treatise seems indeed rhetorical. After all, Aristotle's types of kingships which would qualify for such a message do not seem to fit Alexander: the historical category of the heroic kingship belongs to the past and the philosophical category of the absolute kingship is just an ideal that does not seem obtainable for human beings. What then could he have intended with kingship and the idea of euergetism in writing to Alexander?

Since Aristotle wrote an important treatise on rhetoric himself, one could try to understand his *On Kingship* from his own views. The first question to answer is: in what rhetorical genre would the treatise belong? In *Rhetoric* 1.3, Aristotle differentiates between three different genres: the συμβουλευτικόν ('deliberative'), the δικάνικόν ('forensic') and the ἐπιδεικτικόν ('epideictic'). The second does not qualify for *On Kingship*, but with the deliberative and the epideictic genre, we seem to have two candidates,

⁵⁶ See Murray 1971, p. 65. According to Flashar 2006, p. 224, the text from Philoponus probably does not point to *On Kingship*, but to another epistle to Alexander on kingship. It is not at all unlikely that both are nevertheless the same, for the other treatise mentioned within this passage corresponds to Aristotle's lost work *Alexander or on the Colonists* (Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀποικίων), and this work is mentioned together with *On Kingship* in the book catalogue in D. L. 5.22.

because Aristotle determines each genre with a characteristic that seems to fit the treatise.⁵⁷ If we look to the action that is undertaken, *On Kingship* belongs to the deliberative genre, for it seems to be a προτροπή ('exhortation') rather than an ἐπαινος ('panegyric'), since the treatise wants to instruct more than praise the king. But with regard to its purpose, the treatise belongs to the epideictic genre, since it seems to be directed more to something that is καλόν rather than συμφέρον, as the intent of the work was to make Alexander a benefactor of his subjects. As such, it is not remarkable that both genres qualify for the treatise *On Kingship*, because Aristotle indicates that both belong to a common type: if you have to persuade someone, you will give him advice on what you take to be laudatory and *vice versa*.⁵⁸

As Aristotle seems to have urged Alexander to become a benefactor to all of his subjects, we could now ask what the intent of such a message would be within a rhetorical treatise. As far as I can see, there is only one sentence within Aristotle's extant works, in *Rhetoric* 1.9.1367b1-7, where Aristotle says what it means 'to do good to everyone'. It appears in a passage where he, in a semi-sophistical way, describes how one could praise or blame someone by attributing qualities to him that he does not in reality possess:

καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας· εἰ γὰρ οὐ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ προετικός τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν.

Those who run to extremes will be said to possess the corresponding good qualities; rashness will be called courage, and extravagance generosity. That will be what most people think; and at the same time this method enables an advocate to draw a misleading inference from the motive, arguing that if a man runs into danger needlessly, much more will he do so in a noble cause; and if a man is open-handed to anyone and eve-

⁵⁷ Arist., *Rh.* 1.3.1358b8-13 and 20-29.

⁵⁸ Arist., *Rh.* 1.9.1367b37-1368a1: ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἐπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. ἂν γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλευεῖν ὑπόθοιο ἂν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίνονται.

ryone, he will be so to his friends also, since it is the extreme form of goodness to be good to everybody.

Since τὸ πάντα εὖ ποιεῖν corresponds quite well with the intent of *On Kingship*, according to the *Vita Marciana*, we should look to what ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς means. There seem to be two possibilities. In accordance with the *Politics*, it could mean 'preeminence of virtue', which is the virtue of an absolute king.⁵⁹ But then Aristotle's *On Kingship* must be an encomium, in the sense that it would be a laudatory oration on Alexander and his abilities to do good to everyone. It was already argued, however, that the identification of the absolute kingship with Alexander is very difficult, which makes it altogether unlikely that Aristotle would have gone so far in praising him. Encomiastic elements may always have been included in treatises *On Kingship*, intended to conciliate the addressee, though they cannot have functioned as the basis of Aristotle's work, for it would literally go against his own conclusion that the kings in his days no longer possess the greatness and dignity of the office.

A better interpretation therefore seems to render ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς, in accordance with the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as 'excess of virtue'. This is no longer a virtue, but simply too much virtue.⁶⁰ This interpretation may seem odd at first sight, because it would be a peculiar condition for doing good to everyone. Nonetheless, it is not inconsistent with what has been laid out above. In addition, it fits the passage from the *Rhetoric* well, in the sense that Aristotle argues here that in a rhetorical speech, one could present such an excess as the virtue itself and (falsely) argue that what can be done on the basis of such an excess *a fortiori* will be done on the basis of the virtue itself. If that is true, then Aristotle's *On Kingship* seems to be an exhortation, in the sense that it would contain deliberate advice to Alexander on how to rule as king. If an oration on kingship from Isocrates is the model to keep in mind, then it is likely that Aristotle's *On Kingship* resembles the *Ad Nicoclem*

⁵⁹ The preeminence of virtue of the absolute king is indicated as ὑπερβολὴ in *Pol.* 3.13.1284a4 or 7.14.1332b19.

⁶⁰ The excess of virtue is called ὑπερβολή throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*, see e.g. 2.6.1107a19-21; 5.10.1134a8-11 or 7.14.1154a15-21.

more than the *Euagoras*, because the former contained concrete advice to Nicocles, the latter mere praise for his father.

Similarities and differences with other testimonies

If the message from *On Kingship* was that a king should do good to all, as the passage from the *Vita Marciana* indicates, then three hypotheses are acceptable. First, the treatise was (akin to) a letter, rather than a dialogue. Second, its content was rhetorical rather than strictly philosophical or historical. Third, it was συμβουλευτικὸν rather than ἐπιδεικτικόν. The question that needs to be addressed, finally, is whether or not this corresponds with other passages that are considered to be possible testimonies for Aristotle's *On Kingship*. It is particularly interesting to consider whether they reveal something more than the above analysis on Aristotle's odd advice to do good to everyone, since he himself considers this to be an excess of virtue. Two passages need to be taken into consideration.⁶¹

The first passage comes from one of Cicero's letters to Atticus, wherein he mentions a work from Aristotle to Alexander. The passage is not considered to be a fragment of *On Kingship*, but a possible testimony:

συμβουλευτικὸν *saepe conor, nihil reperio. et quidem mecum habeo* Ἀριστοτέλους *et Θεοπόμπου πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον. sed quid simile? illi et quae ipsis honesta essent scribebant et grata Alexandro. ecquid tu eius modi reperis?* (Cic., *Att.* 12.40.2)

⁶¹ There is a third passage that can be left aside here: see Them., *Or.* 8.107d = Arist., fr. 647 Rose: Πλάτων μὲν οὖν, εἰ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα θεῖος καὶ αἰδοῖος, ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε ἀτεχνῶς ἀποκεκινδυνευμένως προήκατο λόγον, ὅτι μὴ πρότερον τὰ κακὰ λήξει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὶν ἢ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἢ βασιλεῖς φιλοσοφῇωσιν. ἐλήλεκται δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ δέδωκεν εὐθύνας τῷ χρόνῳ. ἀγασθαι δὲ ἄξιον Ἀριστοτέλην, ὅτι μικρὸν τὰ Πλάτωνος ῥήματα μεταθείς τὸν λόγον πεποίηκεν ἀληθέστερον, φιλοσοφεῖν μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ οὐχ ὅπως ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φάσκων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμποδῶν, τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀληθινῶς ἐντυγχάνειν εὐπειθῇ καὶ εὐήκοον. ἔργων γὰρ ἀγαθῶν τὴν βασιλείαν ἐνέπλησεν, οὐχὶ ῥημάτων. The text only indicates the difference between Plato and Aristotle on the question whether a king should be a philosopher or not. As such, the advice that a king should listen to true philosophers rather than be one himself could have been taken up in *On Kingship*, but the passage from Themistius does not give us any clue in that regard. Therefore, it could equally derive from another lost work, like *On the Statesman*. For discussion, see Chroust 1973, II, p. 216-223.

I often try a letter of advice; I find nothing to say. I have, indeed, with me the books both of Aristotle and of Theopompus addressed to Alexander. But what resemblance is there? They wrote what was both honorable to them and pleasing to Alexander; do you find anything of that sort here?⁶²

Although Cicero does not indicate that the work πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον that he had with him was Aristotle's *On Kingship*, it is a plausible assumption for two reasons. The first is that Cicero calls it συμβουλευτικόν, which is in agreement with our understanding of *On Kingship* as a rhetorical piece of advice.⁶³ The second is that the words *honestus* and *gratus* are reminiscent of Aristotle's terminology on euergetism, for these words seem to cover the aim of the benefactor (τιμὴ) and what is hoped to be received from the benefited (χάρις).⁶⁴ This seems to vary slightly from the interpretation to urge Alexander to do good to everyone, for Cicero clearly indicates that Aristotle is the one to whom this was honorable, not Alexander. This would imply that Aristotle is the benefactor and Alexander the one who is benefited.

One can argue, however, that this statement does not need to be in conflict with the *Vita Marciana*, since the few sentences on Aristotle's *On Kingship* are embedded in a larger sequence of benefits that Aristotle allegedly conferred towards men and cities.⁶⁵ As indicated in the introduction, the phrase ἵνα δὲ καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὐεργετήσῃ in our passage from the *Vita Marciana* must be read primarily as the aim of Aristotle himself. Additionally, the passage from Philoponus indicates that *On Kingship* was a treatise that was requested (ἐρωτηθείς), which certainly makes it

⁶² Translation taken from Ross 1967, slightly altered.

⁶³ See also Murray 1971, p. 63-64 and Laurenti 1987, II, p. 883-884. In another passage from one of his letters to Atticus (13.28.2), Cicero also calls these treatises to Alexander *suasiones*.

⁶⁴ The word *gratus* may also be translated as 'thankful' or 'grateful'. That benefactors hope to receive χάρις ('thankfulness') from the benefited indicates *EN* 9.7.1167b23-24: τοὺς εὐεργετήσαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας ὡς κομιυμένους τὰς χάριτας. Examples of how you could honor a benefactor are given in *Rh.* 1.5.1361a34-37.

⁶⁵ *Vita Arist. Marc.* 73-102 Gigon. Aristotle allegedly benefited the people from Stagira, Eressus and Athens with his letters to the Macedonian kings. For the tradition on the reestablishment of Stagira, see also the material collected in Düring 1957, p. 290-294.

plausible that Alexander was thankful for receiving it. This nevertheless seems to lead to the same result as our point of departure, because it is then hoped that Alexander will take over the advice and apply it in practice, whereby he would become a benefactor to everyone as well.⁶⁶ The passage from Cicero's letter to Atticus thus seems to be in accordance with our interpretation of Aristotle's *On Kingship*.

The second passage comes from Plutarch's work on Alexander's fortune and virtue, with advice from Aristotle to Alexander on how to behave to his subjects. The passage could be a testimony or a fragment, depending on how literally the advice is represented. Although it is often considered to derive from one of Aristotle's letters or another lost treatise,⁶⁷ it seems plausible that such advice occurred in *On Kingship* as well:

οὐ γὰρ ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρῶμενος καὶ τῶν μὲν ὡς φίλων καὶ οἰκείων ἐπιμελούμενος, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ζῴοις ἢ φυτοῖς προσφερόμενος, πολεμοποιῶν φυγῶν ἐνέπλησε καὶ στάσεων ὑπούλων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν (Plu., *De Al. Magn. fort.* 329B = Arist., fr. 658 Rose).

He [sc. Alexander] did not do as Aristotle advised—act towards Greeks as their leader, towards foreigners as their master, treating the former as friends and kinsmen and the latter as animals or plants—and so filled his reign with many wars and banishments and festering factions.

Since Plutarch uses the word *συνεβούλευεν*, it could be that such advice was taken up in *On Kingship*. Moreover, the description of taking care of the Greeks as friends and kinsmen (ὡς φίλων καὶ οἰκείων ἐπιμελούμενος) corresponds very well with Aristotle's own thoughts on kingship and euergetism as presented within the passage from *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.11. He argued there that the

⁶⁶ This is suggested as well in the other passage from a letter to Atticus (13.28.2), where Cicero says that eloquent and learned men encouraged Alexander 'to honor' (*ad decus*), the aim of the benefactor.

⁶⁷ In accordance with Rose are Barnes 1984, II, p. 2460 and Hose 2002, p. 117, who classify the passage among the letter fragments. Ross 1967, p. 67 and Laurenti 1987, II, p. 913-912 assign the advice to the lost work *Alexander or on the Colonists*.

friendship between a king and his subjects was based on benefits, and these benefits were conferred because a king cares for his subjects. It is of course remarkable that Aristotle here only seems to say that Alexander should benefit the Greeks, and not, as the passage from the *Vita Marciana* indicates, all men.

If we take the advice from the *Vita Marciana* into account and read it the way the passage from *Rhetoric* 1.9 prescribes as ὑπερβολὴ ἀρετῆς, then it is clear that if it is an excess of virtue to do good to everyone, it is virtuous to benefit those who truly deserve it. From Aristotle's *Politics*, it is not too difficult to understand this as an argument to benefit Greeks, who were, with regard to personal characteristics, thought to be better than barbarians.⁶⁸ Thus, in a context where a sovereign rules, or will rule, both, as was the case in the Macedonian empire, you could advise the (future) king to benefit everyone, although this would require an excess of virtue, in order to make sure that he benefits those who qualify for it most. But what would it mean to benefit them?

We can return now to the distinction made earlier between the different types of kingship in *Politics* 3.14, with an emphasis on the remaining categories, because these two are exactly the categories that illustrate the difference between the rule for Greeks and the rule for barbarians. Aristotle considers the generalship for life the most moderate form of kingship and calls the king only ἡγεμὼν ('leader') in matters related to war, whereas the barbarian monarchs are thought to be similar to tyrants with a δεσποτική ἀρχή ('despotic power').⁶⁹ Elsewhere in the *Politics*, Aristotle points out a principle for the preservation of an existing kingship: make it *more* moderate, in order that the king becomes *less* despotic.⁷⁰ One can only think then of the generalship for life, such as the kingship from Sparta, and not of the barbarian monarchy.

⁶⁸ This becomes explicit in *Pol.* 7.7.1327b18-33, where Aristotle describes how the Greeks are both full of spirit and intelligent, whereas the barbarians from Europe and Asia lack such characteristics. In 3.14.1285a19-22 he also indicates that the barbarians in general are more slavish than the Greeks (and the Asian barbarians more than the European), which is why they accept a despotic regime without any difficulty.

⁶⁹ Arist., *Pol.* 3.14.1285a5 and 1285a22.

⁷⁰ Arist., *Pol.* 5.11.1313a18-23: σώζονται δὲ δηλονότι ὡς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσω γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ὡσι κύριοι, πλείω χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν· αὐτοὶ

This may suggest that Aristotle thought that a real king could still benefit his subjects in the present, though not by doing something, but rather by refraining from something: to act only as a leader in war, and *not* as a master. That Aristotle understood this as a benefaction could be inferred from the fact that the benefactions of the heroic kings from the past were war-related as well. Whether Aristotle himself believed that Alexander was such a moderate king is not very likely, but, on the basis of this viewpoint in the *Politics*, it seems at least plausible that he urged Alexander to act as one.

A problem, however, is that this passage in Plutarch seems to be particularly *against* the barbarians, in saying that they need to be treated as animals or plants, whereas our reading of the exhortation to do good to everyone, seems particularly or even only *in the interest of* the Greeks. The side effect of the advice to benefit everyone is that barbarians will be treated in a similar way as the Greeks, which clashes with Aristotle's supposed thesis, as presented in this passage, that it is necessary to treat Greeks and barbarians differently.⁷¹ This can be backed up with the utterance in *Politics* 7.2.1324b38-40 that some people are indeed intended to be ruled despotically, 'in which case men have a right to rule as a master, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who are suited to despotic rule' (ὥστε εἴπερ ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὐ δεῖ πάντων πειρᾶσθαι δεσπότην, ἀλλὰ τῶν δεσποστών). The difference between those who should not and those who should be ruled despotically is compared next with the (un)acceptability of hunting men and animals respectively. In that sense, barbarians are compared with wild animals, which brings it in line with Plutarch's statement.⁷² But then it seems difficult to reconcile it with the *Vita Marciana*.

τε γὰρ ἦττον γίγνονται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἴσοι μᾶλλον, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθοροῦνται ἦττον.

⁷¹ See Badian 1958, p. 440-444; Mulgan 1974, p. 26 and Nagle 2000, p. 130.

⁷² This does not mean that Aristotle would have gone so far as to compare barbarians even with plants. In this respect, I agree with Badian 1958, p. 443 n. 80 that ἡ φυτοῖς must have been a rhetorical addition from Plutarch himself. In an alternative testimony from Strabo (1.4.9 [66C] = Arist., fr. 658 Rose), only men are mentioned 'who advised Alexander to treat the Greeks as friends, but barbarians as enemies' (τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ παραινούντας τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσιν ὡς φίλοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις ὡς πολέμοις).

This apparent difficulty can nevertheless be solved by making a final comparison with Isocrates. At the end of his *Philippus*, Isocrates summarizes what he has said in the discourse, in order that king Philip II could see the main points of his counsel:

φημι γὰρ χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν Ἑλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστων ἄρχειν. ἦν γὰρ ταῦτα πράττης, ἅπαντές σοι χάριν ἔξουσιν, οἱ μὲν Ἑλληνες ὑπὲρ ὧν εὖ πάσχουσι, Μακεδόνες δ' ἦν βασιλικῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ τυραννικῶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατῆς, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων γένος, ἦν διὰ σέ βαρβαρικῆς δεσποτείας ἀπαλλαγέντες Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπιμελείας τύχωσι (Isoc., *Phil.* 154).

I assert that it is incumbent upon you to work for the good of the Hellenes, to reign as king over the Macedonians, and to extend your power over the greatest possible number of the barbarians. For if you do these things, all men will be grateful to you: the Hellenes for your kindness to them; the Macedonians if you reign over them, not like a tyrant, but like a king; and the rest of the nations, if by your hands they are delivered from barbaric despotism and are brought under the protection of Hellas.⁷³

Isocrates also focusses on the fact that Philip should *benefit* the Greeks (εὐεργετεῖν), whereas he should only *be king* of the Macedonians (βασιλεύειν) or simply *rule* the other barbarians (ἄρχειν). Nevertheless, all men will be grateful (ἅπαντες χάριν ἔξουσιν), even the barbarians, since they are not ruled by a tyrant and freed from barbaric despotism. Thus, even Isocrates, who equally stresses the difference between Greeks and barbarians, indicates that Philip must act in a way that is good to all of them, although the principle of well-doing as such is only applied explicitly to the Greeks. Similarly, Aristotle believed that barbarians, due to their nature, (should) accept a different kind of rule than Greeks.⁷⁴ If our above understanding of *On Kingship* is correct, it seems that this passage from Isocrates could equally have been written by Aristotle to Alexander.

⁷³ Translation taken from Norlin 1928.

⁷⁴ See note 66.

Conclusion

What can be concluded with regard to Aristotle's *On Kingship* after examining his ideas on kingship and euergetism? Clearly, as I mentioned at the beginning, not much with any certainty. It is neither necessary nor impossible that Aristotle wrote *On Kingship* to Alexander the Great with instructions on how to rule as king in order to advise him to become a benefactor to all of his subjects. Euergetism, on the one hand, is clearly integrated within Aristotle's ethical theory, where it is connected with kingship as well. Kingship, on the other hand, is according to his political theory no longer an office that people are truly entitled to. If the saying from the *Vita Marciana* contains any truth, then we must decide that *On Kingship* probably was a work similar to a (public) letter, with rhetorical content, rather than a philosophical dialogue. Consequently, the treatise is more likely to be a piece of advice than an encomium. And finally, its focus perhaps lay on the way Greeks should be ruled: by a moderate king, who does not rule them as a master, but merely leads them in campaigns against the barbarians.⁷⁵

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⁷⁵ I would like to thank Stefan Schorn and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. I am also grateful to Jeremy Hovda and Brian Lapsa for proofreading this text. Any remaining mistakes are my own.

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Abstract

An interesting testimony to Aristotle's lost work *On Kingship* indicates that it was addressed to Alexander the Great in order to encourage him to be a benefactor. Although certain aspects of this passage are doubtful, it nevertheless seems worthwhile to investigate to what extent Aristotle may have written to Alexander on euergetism. In Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, the principle of beneficence is understood as a constitutive characteristic of kingship as such. According

to Aristotle's *Politics*, however, it is not that easy to attribute this characteristic to a current and existing king. This leads to the result that Aristotle's supposed advice from *On Kingship* corresponds in a certain sense, but not completely, to his own theoretical views. Without leaving the level of conjecture, this could support the perspective that the treatise was more likely to be a (public) letter than a dialogue, and that its aim and content were rhetorical rather than strictly philosophical or historical.

A PTOLEMAIC ‘*SPECULUM PRINCIPIS*’ IN P. BEROL. INV. 13045, A I-III? *

1. In a 2007 article on the relationship between philosophy and monarchy in the Hellenistic world, Oswyn Murray points out that ‘the surviving papyri offer very little evidence for reconstructing the literature *peri basileias*’.¹ Despite the general validity of this claim, the very paucity of the evidence from the Hellenistic period can sometimes constitute an exciting challenge, as is the case with P. Berol. inv. 13045 (MP³ 2102 + 2570; LDAB 6760; CPP 0353), which was edited in 1923 by the German philologist Karl Kunst in the seventh volume of the series *Berliner Klassiker-texte* (BKT VII, p. 13-31). The aim of this paper is to shed light on its first three columns, which contain the remains of what is possibly a Ptolemaic *speculum principis*.²

P. Berol. inv. 13045, which dates from the end of the second or the very beginning of the first century BC, was extracted from a *cartonnage* coffin found in the necropolis of Abū Šir al-Malaq, the ancient Βουσίρις ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεοπολίτῃ, during the excavations

* I would like to thank Matthias Haake, Nino Luraghi, Anna Magnetto, Oswyn Murray and Stefan Schorn for their diligent review and useful suggestions during the preparation of this paper, and the anonymous referee for helpful comments. The responsibility for errors that remain is mine alone. Abbreviations for the papyri are to be found in J. D. Sosin *et al.* (eds), *Checklist of Editions of Greek, Latin, Demotic and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca and Tablets*, available at <http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/scriptorium/papyrus/texts/clist.html>.

¹ Murray 2007, p. 21. Gruen 1993, p. 4 defines the post-Alexander world as a ‘veritable industry of “mirror for princes” publications’.

² On the applicability of this notion to texts from Greco-Roman antiquity see Haake 2011; 2013; 2015.

directed by the German archaeologist Otto Rubensohn.³ In a fairly recent study on some late Ptolemaic papyri from the same necropolis, Erja Salmenkivi conjectured that P. Berol. inv. 13045, together with P. Berol. inv. 13044 (MP³ 2068 + 2099; LDAB 6897) and P. Berol. inv. 13046 (MP³ 903; LDAB 2261), might ‘derive from the same cartonnage as the Alexandrian documents published in BGU IV’, thereby assuming an Alexandrian origin (*Schreibort*) for the three literary papyri, too.⁴

The twenty extant columns of the papyrus preserve two different texts, which date from either the third or the second century BC: the first (columns one, A I, to three, A III) might be, as suggested above, a fragment of a Hellenistic mirror for princes, while the second text (columns four, B I, to twenty, G III) is a historical work of an unusually dramatic type consisting of a dialogue between Demades and Dinarchus of Corinth on the occasion of the trial of the Attic orator at the court of Pella (cf. Plu., *Dem.* 31.6; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9 = Phot., *Bibl. cod.* 92.70a).

Despite the significance of its contents, the first text of P. Berol. inv. 13045 has been almost totally forgotten since the *editio princeps*. Among papyrologists, philologists and historians only Alfred Körte, Wilhelm Crönert and Gaetano De Sanctis, followed years later by Walter Manoel Edwards and Peter Marshall Fraser, have made any suggestions about its nature and destination, and these have been brief.⁵ As the *editor princeps* noticed in the introduction, it was Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf who first sug-

³ Kunst 1923, p. 13-31. I have prepared a new critical edition (with a translation and commentary) of the papyrus for my doctoral dissertation, supervised by Carmine Ampolo and Maria Serena Funghi (it will be published in the near future: see Amendola 2019). The text at pages 13-15, which is meant to be provisional before the publication of the edition, is based on a new autopsy of the papyrus that I carried out in August 2015 during a study visit to the *Papyrussammlung* of the *Ägyptisches Museum* in Berlin. I thank Marius Gerhardt for his help on that occasion. Excellent images of the papyrus are available at <http://ww2.smb.museum/berlpap/index.php/03612/>.

⁴ Salmenkivi 2002, p. 43. This supposition is mainly based on the fact that the Alexandrian papyri published by Wilhelm Schubart in BGU IV ‘carry systematically the consecutive inventory numbers from P. Berol. inv. 13047 through P. Berol. inv. 13094’. I will provide further arguments in favour of this hypothesis in the introduction to my edition.

⁵ Crönert 1924, p. 21; De Sanctis 1924; Körte 1924, p. 240; Edwards 1929, p. 122-123; Fraser 1972, I, p. 485, 513; II, p. 702 n. 58.

gested that, despite the presence of consecutive stichometrical letters, the papyrus contains two different texts.⁶ Although Kunst was undoubtedly right in accepting this assumption, a problem arises from the current positioning of the fragment that is presumed to correspond to the lower part of the third and fourth columns (A III and B I): according to the reconstruction made by the editor, the point of transition between the two works should be located in the alleged gap between the upper and lower parts of the third column (A III); nevertheless, since every σελίς consists of about twenty-six to twenty-nine στίχοι,⁷ there would at most be only seven lines left to fill this lacuna, which, in my view, is not enough space to accommodate the conclusion of the first text plus the heading and the beginning of the second.⁸ Two solutions may be suggested to overcome the difficulty: on the one hand, the second work may have been preceded only by ἄλλο as a heading and introduced by a very short προοίμιον; on the other hand, one might hypothesize—as I do—a different positioning of the fragment.⁹ The question is not a trivial one, since what the *editor princeps* considered to be the lower part of the fourth column (B I) contains the stichometrical letter *delta*, which indicates that four hundred lines separated it from the original beginning of the roll. However, knowing the exact position of this stichometrical letter inside the βύβλος would not enable one to assess the actual length of the first work, as it is impossible to ascertain whether others preceded it. Considering the fact that P. Berol. inv. 13045 is a rare example of a Hellenistic prose anthology, this option cannot be ruled out.¹⁰

⁶ Kunst 1923, p. 14: 'Daß auf der ersten Rolle zwei verschiedene Schriften aufeinander folgen hat Wilamowitz erkannt; nur die zweite größere, die in der Mitte von A III beginnt, läßt sich genauer bestimmen.'

⁷ As is known from those preserved in their entirety, i.e. E I = column 14 (26 lines), E II = column 15 (27 lines), F I = column 16 (27 lines), F II = column 17 (28 lines), G I = column 18 (27 lines), G II = column 19 (29 lines).

⁸ Crönert 1924, p. 21: 'der dicht vorhergehende Schluß der 1. Rede stellt nur etwa 7 Zeilen zur Ausfüllung zur Verfügung.'

⁹ I will discuss the positioning of this fragment in the introduction to my edition.

¹⁰ On this point, see Crönert 1924, p. 21: 'Die Rolle wird eine Anzahl vermischter Erzeugnisse erhalten haben'; D'Alessio 2012, p. 304-305. On Hellenistic anthologies on papyrus, see e.g. Falivene 2010; Pordomingo 2013.

2. The content of the first three columns of P. Berol. inv. 13045 can be summarized as follows: after comparing various political constitutions in the first (A I), the author goes on to praise Egypt and Alexandria in the second (A II) and expounds an ideal of kingship in the third (A III). Kunst's hypothesis that the subject of the verbs in the third column may be a king found support among the scholars that reviewed the *editio princeps*.¹¹ For instance, Crönert interpreted the fragment as the conclusion of a celebratory speech for one of the Ptolemies, which consisted in a eulogy of kingship, Egypt and the king himself,¹² while Körte deemed it too damaged to determine whether the constitutional comparison in the first column actually represents the core of a philosophical work or is subordinated to the final praise of the king.¹³ De Sanctis and Edwards also endorsed the idea that the fragment belongs to an encomium.¹⁴ However, if the scantiness of the remains and the problems posed by translating the text make it impossible to define clearly either what kind of work it is or the literary genre to which it belongs, it seems even harder to understand its structure: although the presence of first- and second-person pronouns (both singular and plural) might make one think of a dialogue,¹⁵ it should be borne in mind that an alternation between 'I' or 'we' and 'you' can also be justified by recalling what happens in orations like Isocrates' *Panathenaicus*, where the first-person speech of the orator is replaced in the final section with an imaginary dialogue with one of his pupils.¹⁶ Despite these difficulties, I would suggest three main options for characterizing the nature of this

¹¹ Crönert 1924, p. 21; De Sanctis 1924; Körte 1924, p. 240; Edwards 1929, p. 128.

¹² Crönert 1924, p. 21: 'Erhalten ist das Ende des 1. Stücks (Festrede auf einen Ptolemäer, darin Lob der Staatsform, Ägyptens (...), Alexandriens, des Herrschers selbst'.

¹³ Körte 1924, p. 240: 'Die Reste sind leider zu stark zerstört, um ein Urteil darüber zu gestatten, ob eine theoretische Schrift über verschiedene Verfassungsformen vorliegt, die in dem Preis des Königtums der Ptolemäer gipfelt, oder ob dessen Verherrlichung Hauptinhalt der Schrift und die Abschätzung der Verfassungsformen nur eingeflochten ist'. Cf. Murray 1971, p. 291.

¹⁴ De Sanctis 1924, p. 421: 'sembra il panegirico d'un re'; Edwards 1929, p. 128.

¹⁵ Schmidt 1924, p. 456: 'Möglich, daß die Schrift Dialogform hatte'. See also Tarn [& Griffith] ³1952, p. 185; Barker 1956, p. 99: 'there is some suggestion of a dialogue form in the fragmentary conclusion of A. III'.

¹⁶ Isoc. 21.200-265 Brémond. On this point, see Murphy 2013, esp. p. 349-351.

work: it is a) a rare example of Hellenistic oratory consisting in a treatise of advice to one of the Ptolemies;¹⁷ b) a rhetorical exercise (προγύμνασμα) in the form of an ἐγκώμιον, whose subject could be a king, a city or kingship itself;¹⁸ c) a philosophical treatise περὶ βασιλείας.¹⁹

3. Although the first column of P. Berol. inv. 13045 is undoubtedly the worst-preserved part of the work and the most difficult to comment on, it seems nonetheless very likely that what is being discussed here is the superiority of monarchy in the context of a sort of λόγος τριπολιτικός, so that, as already recognized by Kunst, Körte, Crönert and Edwards, the core of this section would probably consist in a constitutional comparison.²⁰ However, despite the badly damaged state of the papyrus, which prevents us from understanding who is (or are) the subject(s) of the verbs and what the doubt (διστασμός) in line 1 is about, a passage from Isocrates' *Nicocles* (12.26 Brémond) could perhaps provide a framework for the first half of A I:

εἰ δὲ δεῖ τι καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰπεῖν, λέγεται καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπὸ Διὸς βασιλεύεσθαι. περὶ ὧν εἰ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὁ δὴλον ὅτι κακείνοι ταύτην τὴν κατάστασιν προκρίνουσιν, εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν σαφές

¹⁷ On Hellenistic oratory see Kremmydas & Tempest 2013. Unfortunately, Kremmydas' essay in the volume ('Hellenistic Oratory and the Evidence of Rhetorical Exercises', p. 139-163) does not take into account the case of P. Berol. inv. 13045.

¹⁸ Cf. Theon, *Prog.* 9 Patillon [= 109.19-112.21 Spengel]. The first theoretical discussion on the praise of kings is to be found in Anaximen. *Lamps., Rh. Al.* 35 Chiron (see Murray 1998, p. 257). On papyrus fragments of progymnasmatic ἐγκώμια see Pordomingo 2007; for a Hellenistic collection of προγυμνάσματα on papyrus dating from the first half of the third century BC (P. Mil. Vogl. III 123 [MP³ 2525; LDAB 7011]) see Fernández Delgado 2012.

¹⁹ Murray 1971, p. 290: 'Though the tone is rhetorical, the author seems to have some philosophical interests'. On Hellenistic kingship theories and treatises the bibliography is extensive: I can mention here only a few relevant works, namely Goodenough 1928; Schubart 1937, p. 1-16; Squilloni 1991 (with Andorlini & Luiselli 2001); Murray 1998, p. 263-268; Virgilio 1998, p. 126-147; Hahm 2000, p. 458-464; Bertelli 2002; Murray 2007; Schorn 2008; Erskine 2010; McConnell 2010.

²⁰ This hypothesis is supported by both the explicit mention of monarchy and democracy at lines 2-3 and the presence of the ordinal τρίτος (l. 15), which probably refers to oligarchy; cf. Kunst 1923, p. 14, *ad locum*: 'dritte Staatsform (Oligarchie oder Ochlokratie?)'.

μηδεις οιδεν, αυτοι δ' εικαζοντες ουτω περι αυτων υπειληφμεν,
σημειον οτι παντες την μοναρχιαν προτιμωμεν. ου γαρ αν ποτ'
αυτη χρησθαι τους θεους εφμεν, ει μη πολυ των αλλων αυτην
προεχειν ενομιζομεν.²¹

The importance of this passage in relation to the passage under examination lies in the fact that here for the first time the preeminence of monarchy is justified both through a comparison with other forms of government and by analogy with the divine world.²² As a result, it can be hypothesized that, at the beginning of the column, it is the gods who 'preferred monarchy', all the more so since [θε]οί is compatible with the initial traces of line 2. This supposition is supported, in my view, by two further considerations: on the one hand, the phrase μη[θ]εν ἀμαρτάνοντες, | [ἀπ]αντα δὲ δυνάμενοι (l. 4-5) relates exclusively to the divinities, who are infallible by nature, as the Homeric saying goes;²³ on the other hand, the Hesiodic theme of the divine origin of kings (Hes., *Th.* 96) was exploited to the full in Hellenistic poetry, as is shown above all by Callimachus' *Hymn to Zeus* and Theocritus' *Encomium of Ptolemy*.²⁴ If we bring into focus some keywords of the first lines of the

²¹ English translation by G. Norlin: 'And, if there is need to speak also of things old in story, it is said that even the gods are ruled by Zeus as king. If the saying is true, it is clear that the gods also prefer this regime; but if, on the other hand, no one knows the truth about this matter, and we by our own conjecture have simply supposed it to be so, it is a proof that we all hold monarchy in the highest esteem; for we should never have said that the gods live under it if we did not believe it to be far superior to all other governments'. On the place of this passage in the speech see e.g. Bertelli 2002, p. 26; on Isocrates' attitude towards monarchy see Birgalias 2015. For the role of Zeus in this context cf. Call., *Jov.* 3: δικασπόλον Οὐρανιδῆσι; Theoc. 17.11-12: πάρα μυρία εἰπεῖν / οἷσι θεοὶ τὸν ἄριστον ἐτίμησαν βασιλῆων.

²² Cf. Bertelli 2001, p. 27: 'la questione della superiorità della monarchia dimostrata tramite il confronto con le altre forme di governo (...) sarà (...) anch'essa presente nella trattatistica ellenistica, ma come filone minoritario'.

²³ Hom., *Od.* 10.306: θεοὶ δὲ τε πάντα δύνανται. Cf. also X., *Cyr.* 8.7.22: θεοὺς γε τοὺς αἰεὶ ὄντας καὶ πάντ' ἐφορώντας καὶ πάντα δυναμένους; Demosth. 18.289 (l. 14 of the quoted epigram): μηδὲν ἀμαρτεῖν ἐστι θεῶν. The choice to supplement μηθὲν instead of μηδὲν does not impede us from assigning the work to the third or second century BC: for the chronological distribution of μηθὲν see Mayser ²1970, p. 148-150; Threatte 1980, I, p. 472-476.

²⁴ On this point, see Virgilio 1998, p. 112. Cf. e.g. Call., *Jov.* 73-74: σὺ δ' ἐξέλεο πτολιάρχους / αὐτούς; 79-80: ἔκ δὲ Διὸς βασιλῆες, ἔπει Διὸς οὐδὲν ἀνάκτων / θεϊότερον τῷ καὶ σφετεῖν ἐκρίναο λάξιν; Theoc. 17.73-74: Διὶ Κρονίωνι μέλοντι / αἰδοῖοι βασιλῆες. For a general overview of kings and kingship in the encomiastic

column, such as προκρίνω (l. 2), ἀμαρτάνω (l. 2), ἐπιδιώκω (l. 2), αἵρεσις (l. 2) and διαπίπτω (l. 7), it may be conjectured that the doubt at the beginning of A I regards what would be the best constitution. Therefore, what is foregrounded would be the outcome of a political choice to be made by men: they cannot be mistaken in preferring monarchy over democracy because the gods cannot have misjudged the worth of kingship.

Although the general sense of the first lines of the column is fairly clear, serious problems of interpretation remain. These are compounded by both the uncertainty of several readings and the fact that it is impossible to understand how some words are connected to each other. For instance: is the sentence beginning after the *vacuum* at line 2 (οὐ δη|[μ]οκρατία[± 3].α. εσαν) parenthetical or is it conjoined to the preceding clause by asyndeton? Is this to be interpreted as οὐ δη|[μ]οκρατία[ν ἔ]φαινες ἄν or, as seems preferable, οὐ δη|[μ]οκρατία[ι ἐπ]ταίκεσαν?²⁵ Do ψιλὴν (l. 3) and πρέπο[υ]σαν (l. 5) refer to βασιλείαν (l. 2)? Does the phrase τοῦ | [± 1]περτ-[.]αι (l. 3-4) depend on ἀμαρτάγοντες (l. 4) or on ψιλὴν (l. 3)?²⁶ Unfortunately, these questions have no satisfactory or conclusive answers. Besides these difficulties, the list of νομοθέται at lines 8-10 also deserves careful consideration; for if it is true that such a list is not unparalleled,²⁷ the association between the 'founders' of

poetry of the Hellenistic period see e.g. Weber 1993; Barbantani 2001, p. 32-61; Fantuzzi & Hunter 2005, p. 350-403 (Ch. 8: 'The Languages of Praise'); Looijenga 2014; for this aspect in Callimachus' works see e.g. Stephens 2003, p. 110-113; Barbantani 2011; Kirichenko 2012; for Theocritus see e.g. Griffiths 1979; Hunter 2003, p. 24-45; Stephens 2003, p. 148-151; for Posidippus see e.g. Bingen 2002; Meliadò 2004; Fantuzzi 2005; Thompson 2005.

²⁵ For πταίω + dative cf. e.g. Plb. 1.10.1: Οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνοι (...) τοῖς ἰδίοις πράγμασιν ἐπταικότες ὁλοσχερῶς διὰ τὰς νῦν ῥηθείσας αἰτίας.

²⁶ The reading τοῦ | [ύ]περτ[ε]ρ[ῆ]σαι could be plausible, while τοῦ | [ύ]περτ[ι]θέ[ν]αι must be rejected. For ἀμαρτάνω + genitive cf. e.g. Plb. 16.3.12: ὁ δὲ Διονυσόδωρος μετὰ βίας ἐπιφερόμενος εἰς ἐμβολὴν αὐτὸς μὲν ἡμαρτε τοῦ τρώσαι; for ψιλός + genitive (that is *bare of, separated from*) see e.g. LSJ s.v. ψιλός II 2 b.

²⁷ See, for example, Cic., *Rep.* 2.1.2; D. Chr. 80.3. Cf. also the list of lawgivers that opens the so-called *Laterculi Alexandrini* (P. Berol. inv. 13044r, col. 6, l. 10-12 = Diels 1904, p. 6): ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΑΙ | Σόλων ὁ Ἀντιγόρας ὁ Ζά[λε]υκος ὁ Χαρώνδας ὁ Δράκων. For the connection between Solon and Cleisthenes, fathers of the ancestral constitution (πάτριος πολιτεία), see e.g. Isoc. 18.16 Mathieu: ἣν ἐθελήσωμεν ἐκείνην τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλαβεῖν, ἣν Σόλων μὲν ὁ δημοτικώτατος γενόμενος ἐνομοθέτησε, Κλεισθένης δ' ὁ τοὺς τυράννους ἐκβαλὼν καὶ τὸν δῆμον καταγαγὼν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατέστησεν (English translation by G. Norlin: 'we should be willing to restore that earlier democracy which was instituted by Solon,

the Athenian democracy (Solon and Cleisthenes) and Zaleucus of Epizephyrian Locris, who is often grouped with Charondas of Katane (see e.g. Arist., *Pol.* 2.11.1274a22-31), seems to be an incongruity. Moreover, there is another element possibly connected with the history of Athens, viz. the presence (at l. 12) of unnamed ἥρωες who could be identified with the eponymous heroes of the Cleisthenic tribes, whose precinct was located in the Agora (Paus. 1.5.1).²⁸ In addition to the fact that a reference to them would be fully compatible with a discussion on democracy, this assumption is attractive for two reasons: first, it would lend support to the editor's suggestion that the obscure sequence of letters at the end of line 11 should be interpreted as a *Verschreibung* of κατὰ τὸν Πύθιον θεόν,²⁹ since it is known from Aristotle that the ten eponymous heroes of the Cleisthenic tribes were selected by the Delphic oracle out of a list of one hundred names;³⁰ secondly, it would provide a connection with the Ptolemies, as Ptolemy III was added to that group when a further tribe was created in his honour in 224/3 BC.³¹ Alternatively, we cannot rule out the possibility that the reference to heroes is intended to prove the suprem-

who proved himself above all others the friend of the people, and which was re-established by Cleisthenes, who drove out the tyrants and brought the people back into power').

²⁸ Despite the presence of Zaleucus, Körte 1924, p. 240 (cf. Murray 1971, p. 290) identifies them as the heroes of democracy (?): 'In dem Erhaltenen werden zunächst Demokratie und Königtum gegeneinander abgewogen, und, obwohl die Heroen der Demokratie Solon, Kleisthenes, Zaleukos (Z. 9 ff.) angeführt werden, entscheidet sich der Verfasser offenbar für das Königtum'. On Attic heroes see Kearns 1989; for the Monument of Eponymous Heroes in Hellenistic and Roman Athens see e.g. Shear 1970, p. 196-203; Vatin 1995.

²⁹ Kunst 1923, p. 17, *ad locum*. It is not clear whether this divinity is also the subject of ἐπέγευεν at line 14, nor can it be determined which of the three constitutions is deemed to be the most incomplete (ἀτελεστάτο[]).

³⁰ Arist., *Ath.* 21.6: ταῖς δὲ φυλαῖς ἐποίησεν [sc. ὁ Κλεισθένης] ἐπωνύμους ἐκ τῶν προκριθέντων ἑκατὸν ἀρχηγετῶν, οὓς ἀνείλεν ἡ Πυθία δέκα (English translation by H. Rackham: 'As eponymous deities of the Tribes he instituted ten tutelary heroes selected by an oracle of the Pythian priestess from a previously chosen list of a hundred').

³¹ Habicht 1992, p. 74-75; Habicht 2006, p. 202: 'En tant que héros éponyme de la Ptolémaïs, le roi eut droit à figurer sur le piédestal du Monument des Éponymes de l'Agora, où il reçut désormais également sa statue'. As is known, Paus. 1.6.8 is wholly mistaken in considering Ptolemy II as an Athenian eponymous hero: Πτολεμαῖον [i.e. Ptolemy II] ἀπέλιπεν [sc. Ptolemy I] Αἰγύπτου βασιλεύειν, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοις ἐστὶν ἡ φυλὴ, γεγονότα ἐκ Βερενίκης.

acy of monarchy over democracy also from a historical point of view; in this respect, it would follow a pattern on which Murray has already shed light: 'History also showed the temporal priority of kingship over other forms of government, and hence its closeness to the natural, primitive order of things: here the examples of the good kings and heroes of legend could be invoked (Theseus, Herakles, and so on), and also the kings of history'.³²

4. If we move now to the second column of the papyrus, we immediately realize that the task of explaining its contents is not made easier by the better state of conservation. Even in this case we are confronted with some thorny questions, even though everyone would agree that, as the mention of the city's name at lines 7-8 clearly indicates, the entire section focuses on the praise of Alexandria; moreover, the reference to 'the other πόλεις of the adjacent region' at lines 6-7 compels us to think that the previous lines also relate to a πόλις.³³ A possible link to the preceding column is perhaps suggested by the mention of the gods in line 1, where it is not clear whether the right *distinctio verborum* is θεῶν δ' ἔκτεισιν, that is '(a) punishment on the part of (the) gods',³⁴ or θεῶν δὲ †κτεισιν†, which makes no sense, but is likely to be the correct alternative as an itacistic spelling of κτῆσιν or (despite the different quantity of the first syllable) κτίσιν. I prefer the second explanation, for it can be justified by recalling the theory of the divine origin of several Egyptian cities, which is expounded, for example, by Diodorus.³⁵ Furthermore, since claiming such an origin made a city worthy of the highest praise,³⁶ this expression might refer to the fact that

³² Murray 2007, p. 23-24.

³³ The praise contained in this column has no resemblance to the *Encomium Alexandriae* in Sotadean metre published by Hendriks *et al.* 1981 and dated to the second century AD (P. Gron. inv. 66 [MP³ 1852.1; LDAB 4694]).

³⁴ The problem with this option is the fact that ἔκτεισις + subjective genitive is apparently not attested.

³⁵ D. S. 1.12.6: τῆς γὰρ πάσης οἰκουμένης κατὰ μόνην τὴν Αἴγυπτον εἶναι πόλεις πολλὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων θεῶν ἐκτισμένας, οἷον Διός, Ἡλίου, Ἑρμοῦ, Ἀπόλλωνος, Πανός, Εἰλειθυίας, ἄλλων πλειόνων; cf. also D. S. 1.42.1: ἡ πρώτη μὲν περιέχει προοίμιον περὶ ὅλης τῆς πραγματείας καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις (...) περὶ τῶν θεῶν, ὅσοι πόλεις ἐκτίσαν κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἐπωνύμους ἑαυτῶν ποιήσαντες.

³⁶ Men. Rh. 358.31-359.1 Russell-Wilson: οὐσῶν δὲ τούτων τῶν αἰτιῶν καὶ τοιουτοτρόπων εἰδέναι σε χρή ὅτι ἐνδοξόταται μὲν αἱ θεαῖαι, δεύτεραι δὲ αἱ ἡρωικαί, τρίται δὲ αἱ ἀνθρωπικαί.

Alexandria was founded by a god (namely Alexander) or, according to tradition, with the favour of the gods.³⁷

The main question to be decided in this column concerns the way the city is portrayed in its relation to the other cities. Of course, the way it is described in lines 6-8 can be profitably compared to what Menander Rhetor says about the role of *θέσις* as a motif in the praise of places, one of its aims being to depict how a *πόλις* relates to its surroundings (*χώρα*): *ἐξῆς ἤν στοιχεῖα θέσεως, ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς τὴν περιοικίδα χώραν, καὶ ὅπως πρὸς τὰς ἀστυγείτονας χώρας*.³⁸ Despite the fact that Alexandria had its own territory,³⁹ the phrase *ἡ ὑποκειμένη χώρα* (l. 6-7) probably means something different in this context, where it must have been employed to designate Egypt as opposed to Alexandria: as is well known, in Egypt the term *χώρα* ('country') specifically refers to the entire cultivable land outside the territory of the three Greek *πόλεις* (Naucratis, Alexandria and Ptolemais Hermeiou),⁴⁰ and a persuasive parallel from Diodorus is of great help in elucidating that *ὑποκείμενος* is to be understood in this case as 'adjacent'.⁴¹ I believe that supporting evidence for this reconstruction may be provided by a passage of Dio Chrysostom's Alexandrian oration where Egypt is described

³⁷ For recent studies on the Alexandrian foundation myth (esp. in the *recensio vetusta* of the Greek Alexander Romance) see de Polignac 2005, p. 307-311; Buraselis 2010, p. 265-267; Ogden 2013; Barbantani 2014, p. 224-228.

³⁸ Men. Rh. 349.3-5 Russell-Wilson. Cf. 344.16-19 Russell-Wilson: *ἐπαινος μὲν χώρας, ὡς ἀνωτάτω διελέσθαι, διττός, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ θέσιν. ἢ γὰρ πῶς κεῖται ἐξετάσαντες ἀξίαν αὐτὴν ἐπαινοῦ ἀποφαίνομεν, ἢ ὅπως πέφυκε*. On this point, see Pernot 1993, p. 203: 'Le traité de Ménandros I offre le meilleur guide pour l'analyse de ce cadre géographique, qui repose sur deux distinctions primordiales. Il faut d'abord distinguer *polis* et *khôra*, c'est-à-dire la ville proprement dite et la campagne environnante. (...) Le théoricien de l'éloge souligne la complémentarité de ces deux éléments: la cité est constituée de la ville et de son territoire, qui forment une unité inséparable'.

³⁹ For the *χώρα* of Alexandria see e.g. Fraser 1972, I, p. 5, 41, 109, 122, 127, 148; III, p. 22 (s.v. '*Chora* of Alexandria').

⁴⁰ Bingen [& Bagnall] 2007, p. xii.

⁴¹ D. S. 3.50.3. Oliver 1953, p. 881 understands the term in the same way, but I disagree with his rendering of the passage: 'Lines 28-31 read, *The other cities are towns of their adjacent territory, but are villages of Alexandria. For the civilized world has Alexandria as a town*'. Cf. De Sanctis 1924, p. 421: 'è interessante l'entusiastico riconoscimento di Alessandria d'Egitto come *Weltstadt*: della quale non sono che *κῶμαι* le altre città del territorio (*χώρα*) egiziano'.

as a προσθήκη, that is an appendage, of the city,⁴² while the pattern underlying the picture of Alexandria at lines 6-8 seems to bear a close resemblance to how the supremacy of Rome is celebrated in Aristides' oration (Aristid., *Or.* 26.61 Keil):

ὅπερ δὲ πόλις τοῖς αὐτῆς ὁρίοις καὶ χώραις ἐστίν, τοῦθ' ἦδε ἡ πόλις τῇ πάσῃ οἰκουμένῃ, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς [χώρας] ἅστῃ κοινὸν ἀποδεδειγμένη· φαίης ἂν περιοίκους ἅπαντας ἢ κατὰ δῆμον οἰκοῦντας <ἄλλους> ἄλλον χώρον εἰς μίαν ταύτην ἀκρόπολιν συνέρχεσθαι.⁴³

As a result, the designation of Alexandria as a global city (τῆς | γὰρ οἰκουμένης Ἀλεξάνδρεια πόλις ἐστίν) seems to reveal that the aim of the author is probably to assert its primacy not only over the Egyptian cities, but over the whole world.⁴⁴ Despite Körte's claim to the contrary,⁴⁵ this portrayal of Alexandria is not wholly unparalleled: besides the fact that the depiction of the city as a μητρόπολις τῆς οἰκουμένης already occurs in the *recensio vetusta* (A) of the

⁴² D. Chr. 32.36: ἡ γὰρ πόλις ὑμῶν τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ τόπῳ πλείστον ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περιφανῶς ἀποδεδεικται δευτέρα τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον. ἢ τε γὰρ Αἴγυπτος [ὑμῶν], τηλικούτον ἔθνος, σῶμα τῆς πόλεώς ἐστι, μᾶλλον δὲ προσθήκη (English translation by H. Lamar Crosby: 'For your city is vastly superior in point of size and situation, and it is admittedly ranked second among all cities beneath the sun. For not only does the mighty nation, Egypt, constitute the framework of your city—or more accurately its appanage'). In discussing this passage, Pernot 1993, I, p. 203 wrongly maintains that Alexandria had no χώρα: 'Si d'aventure une cité ne possède pas de *khôra*, comme c'est le cas d'Alexandrie, on lui en fabrique une en disant que l'Égypte tout entière lui tient lieu de territoire'.

⁴³ English translation by C. A. Behr: 'What a city is to its boundaries and its territories, so this city is to the whole inhabited world, as if it had been designated its common town. You would say that all the *perioeci* or all the people settled in different places *deme* by *deme* assemble at this one acropolis'. On this passage, where ἀκρόπολιν was considered corrupt by Bruno Keil and unconvincingly emended to μητρόπολιν by Wilamowitz (cf. Aristid., *Or.* 46.23 Keil), see de Polignac 2005, p. 312-315, who, however, does not discuss the textual problems. Perhaps the genitive τῆς πάσης οἰκουμένης transmitted by the manuscript *O* and emended to the dative τῇ πάσῃ οἰκουμένῃ by Keil could be defended by referring to A II, l. 7-8.

⁴⁴ De Sanctis 1924, p. 422; Körte 1924, p. 240. On this point, see also Pernot 1993, I, p. 203 n. 432, who refers to the Berlin papyrus: 'Un papyrus hellénistique revendique pour Alexandrie la terre entière en guise de territoire'; de Polignac 2005, p. 314, n. 11: 'Équivalence métropole/oikoumène: cité/territoire avait déjà été utilisée pour Alexandrie à l'époque hellénistique'.

⁴⁵ Körte 1924, p. 240: 'Wohl nirgends ist der Anspruch Alexandrias auf den Rang der Welthauptstadt mit solcher Bestimmtheit ausgesprochen worden'.

Greek *Alexander Romance*,⁴⁶ a passage from Diodorus (17.52.5 Goukowsky) probably deriving from his journey to Egypt (e.g. D. S. 1.44.1; 3.11.3) explicitly states that Ptolemaic Alexandria was deemed by many to be a sort of *Welthauptstadt*:

καθόλου δ' ἡ πόλις τοσαύτην ἐπίδοσιν ἔλαβεν ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον [sc. τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου] χρόνοις ὥστε παρὰ πολλοῖς αὐτὴν πρώτην ἀριθμεῖσθαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην· καὶ γὰρ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ προσόδων πληθεῖ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τρυφὴν ἀνηκόντων πολὺ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων.⁴⁷

As things stand, the question arises as to whether this claim to world-city status, which could be used to set P. Berol. inv. 13045, A I-III in a more specific historical context, actually suggests a date not earlier than the second century BC⁴⁸ or whether, as I suspect,

⁴⁶ As noted by Lumbroso 1927, p. 60. The passage is Ps.-Callisth. 1.34.9 Kroll: ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἤτησε παρ' αὐτῶν [sc. τῶν Μεμφιτῶν] φόρους, οὓς ἡτοιμάκασιν Δαρείω, λέγων· οὐχ ἵνα εἰς τὸ ἴδιον ταμείον ἀπενέγκωμαι, ἀλλ' ἵνα δαπανήσω εἰς τὴν ὑμῶν πόλιν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν τὴν πρὸς Αἰγύπτω μητρόπολιν οὖσαν τῆς οἰκουμένης.

⁴⁷ English translation by C. Bradford Welles: 'The city in general has grown so much in later times that many reckon it to be the first city of the civilized world, and it is certainly far ahead of all the rest in elegance and extent and riches and luxury'. Cf. D. S. 18.28.3 Goukowsky: ἐκρινε [sc. Πτολεμαῖος] γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰς μὲν Ἀμμωνα μὴ παρακομίζειν [sc. τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου], κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκτισμένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πόλιν, ἐπιφανεστάτην οὖσαν σχεδόν τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην, ἀποθέσθαι (English translation by R. M. Geer: 'He decided for the present not to send it [i.e. the body of the king] to Ammon, but to entomb it in the city that had been founded by Alexander himself, which lacked little of being the most renowned of the cities of the inhabited earth'); D. Chr. 32.36: κεῖται [sc. Ἀλεξάνδρεια] γὰρ ἐν συνδέσμῳ τινὶ τῆς ὅλης γῆς καὶ τῶν πλείστον ἀπωκισμένων ἐθνῶν, ὥσπερ ἀγορὰ μιᾶς πόλεως εἰς ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀνάγουσα πάντας καὶ δεικνύουσα τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε ὁμοφύλους ποιοῦσα (English translation by H. Lamar Crosby: 'For Alexandria is situated, as it were, at the crossroads of the whole world, of even the most remote nations thereof, as if it were a market serving a single city, a market which brings together into one place all manner of men, displaying them to one another and, as far as possible, making them a kindred people').

⁴⁸ As Fraser 1972, II, p. 702 n. 58 maintains. It is well known that the removal of the Egyptian capital from Memphis to Alexandria (probably in 312/1 BC) is documented by the Satrap Stela, which mentions the event before the description of the second Syrian campaign of 312 BC (English translation by Robert K. Ritner in Simpson 2003, p. 393): 'As he [i.e. Ptolemy] made his residence, named the Fortress of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt Merikaamon-Setepenre, the Son of Re, Alexander, whose former name was Rakotis, on the shore of the great green sea of the Greeks, so he assembled many Greeks with / their horses and many ships with their troops. He then went with his armies to the land of the Syrians'. On the Satrap Stela, see recently Schäfer 2011, p. 31-203; 2014, p. 447-451.

it is to be connected with the celebration of one of the first dynastic festivals of the Ptolemies,⁴⁹ either the Alexandrian Βασίλεια on the day when Ptolemy II was elevated to co-regency with his father in 285 BC or the coronation ceremony of Ptolemy II in 282 BC or the Alexandrian Πτολεμαῖα, set up by Ptolemy II in honour of his parents most probably in 279/8 BC on the penteteteric anniversary of Soter's death.⁵⁰

5. The issue of the historical framework underlying the description of Egypt in A II is closely intertwined with that of the identity of the king portrayed in A III. As can easily be seen, this portrait consists of a mere list of stock virtues, namely φιλανθρωπία, φιλαγαθία, θεοφιλία, ἐγκράτεια and many others, which were fully codified in the late classical age.⁵¹ As a pattern, this would be perfectly suitable for a Hellenistic *speculum principis*.⁵² However,

⁴⁹ Körte 1924, p. 240 also places the eulogy in the early Ptolemaic period: 'Die schwungvollen Töne verweisen den Text wohl in die frühere Ptolemäerzeit'. Cf. also Crönert 1924, p. 21: 'Rhetor aus (früh?)hellenistischer Zeit'. On Ptolemaic dynastic festivals see Koenen 1993, p. 70-81; Remijsen 2014, p. 350-355.

⁵⁰ For the date of the first Πτολεμαῖα see Thompson 2000; however, since the ἀγών is officially described as ἰσολύμπιος (IG XII 7.506, l. 7-8, 21, 26, 39 = Syll.³ 390), Santucci 2005, p. 202-206 has argued that it must have been founded in the Olympic year 280/79 BC (on the temporal meaning of ἰσολύμπιος *vel similia*, see also Stirpe 2005, p. 238-240). Both the occasion of the first celebration of the festival and its relation to the great procession described by Callixeinos of Rhodes in the fourth book of his Περὶ Ἀλεξανδρείας (FGrHist 627 F 2 *apud* Ath. 5.196a-203b) have been a matter of scholarly disputes (e.g. Hazzard 2000, p. 59-79). For a recent survey see Caneva 2010. According to Coarelli 1996, the famous Nilotic mosaic of Palestrina, whose aim would be to celebrate Egypt's opulence under the Ptolemies, is also likely to be related to the grand πομπή of the first Πτολεμαῖα (*contra* Burkhalter 1999). The mosaic probably dates from the last decades of the second century BC, but is a copy of an earlier work (possibly from the time of Ptolemy II), which might come from the Alexandrian temple of Fortune (Τυχαῖον), as Coarelli 1996, p. 136 suggests. On the mosaic, see also Meyboom 1995; Ferrari 1999; Schrijvers 2007; Swetnam-Burland 2015, p. 150-154.

⁵¹ In a famous passage of *To Nicocles* Isocrates observes that eulogies always rely on a fixed and static repertoire (Isoc. 2.41 Mathieu-Brémond): οὐκ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρὴ τοῦτοις [τῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων] ζητεῖν τὰς καινότητας, ἐν οἷς οὔτε παράδοξον οὔτ' ἄπιστον οὔτ' ἕξω τῶν νομιζομένων οὐδὲν ἕξεσιν εἰπεῖν (English translation by G. Norlin: 'the truth is that in discourses of this sort we should not seek novelties, for in these discourses it is not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside the circle of accepted belief').

⁵² Murray 2007, p. 21: 'Hellenistic views of kingship were based on ideas common since the fourth century, that the justification of monarchic rule lay essentially in the virtues of the monarch. This created an ideology, or (...) a general set

despite the standardized format of the Greek mirror for princes as a rhetorical genre, the task of assessing to what extent the virtues listed in A III coincide with the traditional ones is complicated by the fact that, except for prowess (l. 3-4) and religious devotion (l. 6-7), some of them do not have any precise verbal parallels in texts which might be usefully compared to the one under examination, i.e. Isocrates' paraenetic orations,⁵³ Xenophon's *Agesilaus* and *Hiero*,⁵⁴ Hecataeus of Abdera's idealised portrait of the βασιλεὺς εὐεργέτης which is echoed in the first book of Diodorus,⁵⁵ the series of extracts from the first λόγος of Agatharchides' Περὶ τῆς ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης that contain the advice of an unnamed ἐπίτροπος (Aristomenes of Alyzia?) to one of the Ptolemies (probably Ptolemy V),⁵⁶ the banquet scene in the second half of the *Letter of Aristaeas*, and Philodemus' treatise Περὶ τοῦ καθ' Ὁμηρον ἀγαθοῦ βασιλέως.⁵⁷ As a result, nearly all the components of the praise in A III require further explanation,⁵⁸ as is the case with πολιτικὴν ἀπάντησιν τη[[ρ]εῖ (l. 1-2), χαίρει τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (l. 2), καλοῖς ὑπερτίθεται τὰ καλὰ (l. 2-3), ζώσαν καὶ πρὸς με[[τ]-ηλλαχότας τοὺς φίλους τηρεῖ{ν} τὴν α[[ρ]εσιν (l. 4-6): for example,

of attitudes, which could be and were used to justify the rule of particular kings. The result was not so much a political theory or even political thought as a literary genre or a collection of *topoi* and analogies.

⁵³ On kingship under the Teucrids of Cyprus, see e.g. Cambiano 1999; Baurain 2011; Cannavò 2015. For a commentary to the *Euagoras* see Alexiou 2010.

⁵⁴ For a commentary to the *Agesilaus* see Luppino Manes 1991; on Xenophon's *Hiero* see recently Zuolo 2012.

⁵⁵ As is well known, the extent to which the first book of Diodorus depends on Hecataeus' Αἰγυπτιακά (FGrHist 264 F 1-6) is a subject of scholarly debate: cf. e.g. Murray 1970; Stephens 2003, p. 32-36; Sulimani 2011, p. 57-108; Sforza 2012, p. 279-289; for a very skeptical position see, more recently, Muntz 2011.

⁵⁶ Phot., *Bibl. cod.* 250.444b41-445b36. For suggestions on the identity of these two historical figures see Marcotte 2001, p. 389.

⁵⁷ On this work see e.g. Dorandi 1982; Gigante 1984; Murray 1984; Fish 2002; De Sanctis 2008; Gangloff 2011.

⁵⁸ The introduction to this list of qualities could have looked more or less like the following passage from Philodemus' *On the good king according to Homer* (Phld., *Hom.* 24.6-15 Fish): ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναχωρήσαντες, | πάλι τ[ὸ] σπουδαῖον βασιλείῃ | παραι[νῶ]μεν αὐστ[ηρὸ]ν | μὲν κα[ὶ] τραχύ [τι ἥθος καὶ] | πικρὸν ἐχθ[ρ]αίρει[ν καὶ] // π[α]ράβ[η]τα διασκεῖν κ[αὶ] // ἐπιε[κ]κεῖαν καὶ τὸ βα[σιλέ]//ως ἡ[μ]ερὸν καὶ συ[γ]γν[ω]μονικόν. On the paraenetic dimension of treatises on kingship, see Murray 1998, p. 265: 'L'intento principale dei trattati sulla regalità sembra (...) essere stato esortativo, cioè di raccomandare al governante le virtù più appropriate'.

the first clause, where πολιτικὴ ἀπάντησις probably means 'disposition towards citizens', could be equivalent to εὐαπάντητος τοῖς πολίταις ἐστί and consequently relate to the ease of getting access to the king and to the right to speak with him,⁵⁹ while the second clause might be paraphrased as φιλάγαθος καὶ μισοπόνηρός ἐστι;⁶⁰ in the case of the third, the meaning remains highly uncertain;⁶¹

⁵⁹ Hearing petitions (ἐντεύξεις) was part of being king: on this point see e.g. Adams 1986; cf. Schorn 2010, p. 47-51. For the structure of the phrase (which Murray 1971, p. 290 rightly translates as 'maintains a civil approachability') cf. I. Prose 37 = SB 6236 (70 BC), l. 25-26: βούλομαι μεταλαβεῖν τῆς ἐξ ὑμῶν πρὸς πάντας | μεγαλοψύχου καὶ εὐεργετικῆς ἀπαντήσεως. For ἀπάντησις as a synonym of διάθεσις *vel similia*, see e.g. I. Prose 25 = OGIS 737 (112/1 BC), l. 22-24: μεταδοθῆναι αὐτοῦ [i.e. τοῦ ψηφίσματος] ἀντιγραφῶν τῶι Δωρίωνι, ἵν' εἰδῇ ἥν ἔσχηκεν | πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ πόλις εὐχάριστον ἀπάντησιν; IG V 1.1145 (c. 70 BC), l. 24-27: ἀνέγκλητον | [αὐτὸν ἐν] πᾶσιν διατετήρηκεν, ἐλευθέριον πρὸς [ἄ]παντας κ[αὶ] δικαίαν τὰν ἀπάντησιν ποιούμενο[ς, κα]θὼς ἐπιβ[άλ]λει ἀνδρὶ σώφρονι καὶ πεπαιδευμ[ένωι]. For εὐαπάντητός τι ἐῖναι / γίγνεσθαι see e.g. IG ²IV 2.749 = SEG 45, 233 (Aegina, 158-144 BC): εὐαπάντητος γινόμενος τοῖς τε κατὰ τῇ[ν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς παραγινόμενοις παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶ[ν] ξένων τοῖς παρεπιδη[μοῦσι]. For a possible association with φιλανθρωπία see 2 *Macch.* 14.9: ἕκαστα δὲ τούτων ἐπεγνωκῶς σύ, βασιλεῦ, καὶ τῆς χάρας καὶ τοῦ περισταμένου γένους ἡμῶν προνοήθητι καθ' ἣν ἔχεις πρὸς ἅπαντας εὐαπάντητον φιλανθρωπίαν.

⁶⁰ Cf. Aristeeas 292: ταῦτα δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸν ἡγούμενον, ὅταν μισοπόνηρος ᾖ καὶ φιλάγαθος καὶ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενος ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου σώζειν. It is not clear whether the dative τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς is masculine or neuter: for the masculine cf. X., *Ages.* 11.4: ἥσκει δὲ ἐξομιλεῖν μὲν παντοδαποῖς, χρῆσθαι δὲ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς; for the neuter cf. what the unnamed tutor says to one of the Ptolemies in the first book of Agatharchides' *On the Erythraean Sea* (Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 250.445a38-40): σοῦ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ περιαιρούμενος [sc. ἐγώ] οὐ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀγνοίαν, ἵνα τῶν τοσούτων ἀγαθῶν φρονῶν ἀπολαύσης, μὴ διαμαρτάνων.

⁶¹ A possible, though unsatisfactory, solution could be to interpret the phrase ὑπερτίθεσθαι τί τινα as *hand over* or *communicate* a thing to another ('so in Med., esp. in order to ask advice', as LSJ s.v. ὑπερτίθημι, II 2 suggests; cf. e.g. Hdt. 1.8.1 Wilson: τούτῳ τῷ Ἰγῳ καὶ τὰ σπουδαιέστερα τῶν πρηγμάτων ὑπερετίθετο ὁ Κανδαύλης) and translate: 'The king asks good men for advice (?) on important (?) matters (or entrusts important matters to good men)'. Another possibility would be to understand the verb as signifying *to surpass* with instrumental dative (LSJ s.v. ὑπερτίθημι, II 3) and follow Murray's translation (Murray 1971, p. 290-291): 'adds noble things to noble people (or adds noble acts to noble acts)'. Cf. Arist., *EN* 8.13.1161a10-14 Bywater: καθ' ἑκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἵν' εὐ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεῖς προβάτων (English translation by H. Rackham: 'Under each of these forms of government we find friendship existing between ruler and ruled, to the same extent as justice. The friendship of a king for his subjects is one of superiority in beneficence; for a king does good to his subjects, inasmuch as being good he studies to promote their welfare, as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep'). I am grateful to Stefan Schorn for pointing me to this text.

as regards the fourth, a parallel could be provided by Diodorus' description of the funeral honours bestowed on Alexander by Ptolemy I, who is depicted as εἰς πάντας τοὺς φίλους ἐπιεικής.⁶² Furthermore, a valuable contribution to a better understanding of the pattern underlying some parts of this portrayal might come from a passage of Menander Rhetor's treatise on βασιλικὸς λόγος (Men. Rh. 361.17-20 Russell-Wilson), which describes what δικαιοσύνη consists in from a rhetorical point of view: ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνης μὲν μέρη εὐσέβεια, δικαιοπραγία καὶ ὁσιότης. εὐσέβεια μὲν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, δικαιοπραγία δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὁσιότης δὲ περὶ τοὺς κατοικομένους. Accordingly, lines 6-7 can be interpreted as obviously relating to εὐσέβεια, lines 1-2 possibly to δικαιοπραγία, and lines 5-6, where μετῆλλαχότες is a synonym for κατοικόμενοι, probably to ὁσιότης.

Although it cannot be demonstrated which of the Ptolemies is the king in question, some of the virtues described in A III might be taken to point to one of them in particular. A connection with Theocritus' descriptions of Ptolemy II had already been suggested by Körte and Edwards,⁶³ but neither of them emphasized the fact that it is *Idyll* 17 which seems to bear the closest resemblance to P. Berol. inv. 13045, A I-III.⁶⁴ Besides the central issue of the

⁶² D. S. 18.28.4-6: κατεσκεύασεν οὖν τέμενος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου δόξης ἄξιον, ἐν ᾧ κηδεύσας αὐτὸν καὶ θυσίαις ἡρωικαῖς καὶ ἀγῶσι μεγαλοπρεπέσι τιμῆσας οὐ παρ' ἀνθρώπων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καλὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἔλαβεν. (...) οἱ δὲ θεοὶ διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ εἰς πάντας τοὺς φίλους ἐπιείκειαν ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων παραδόξως αὐτὸν διέσωσαν (English translation by R. M. Geer: 'There he prepared a precinct worthy of the glory of Alexander in size and construction. Entombing him in this and honouring him with sacrifices such as are paid to demigods and with magnificent games, he won fair requital not only from men but also from the gods. (...) The gods also saved him unexpectedly from the greatest dangers on account of his courage and his honest treatment of all his friends'). On this passage see also Hornblower 1981, p. 42-43; Landucci Gattinoni 1987, p. 39-42; Landucci Gattinoni 2008, p. 138.

⁶³ Edwards 1929, p. 123 does not quote any passage, while Körte 1924, p. 240 recalls Thyonicus' praise of Ptolemy II in *Cynisca's Love* (Theoc. 14.61-64): εὐγνώμων, φιλόμουσος, ἐρωτικός, εἰς ἄκρον ἀδύς, / εἰδὼς τὸν φιλέοντα, τὸν οὐ φιλέοντ' ἔτι μᾶλλον, / πολλοῖς πολλὰ διδούς, αἰτεῦμενος οὐκ ἀνανεύων, οἷα χρὴ βασιλῇ (English translation by A. S. F. Gow: 'kindly, cultured, gallant, as pleasant as may be; knows his friend, and knows his enemy even better. As a king should be, he's generous to many, and doesn't refuse when asked').

⁶⁴ Stephens 2003, p. 147: 'In form, the *Ptolemy* has affinities to traditional hymns to the gods and earlier praise poetry, while it also displays a number of features of the prose encomium, a genre that Isocrates claims to have initiated with

divine favour towards βασιλείς, which represents the actual core of the hymn,⁶⁵ some of its central motifs, such as the praise of Egypt (Theoc. 17.79-81),⁶⁶ the celebration of Ptolemy's possessions at home and abroad,⁶⁷ and the description of the king as generous and brave,⁶⁸ can be usefully contrasted with the main themes of the second and third columns. It is, however, the piety of Philadelphus in establishing the worship of his parents, the Saviour Gods, which constitutes the distinctive feature of the portrait made by Theocritus both in the *Encomium* (e.g. Theoc. 17.123: *ματρὶ φίλα καὶ πατρὶ θυώδεας εἴσατο ναούς*) and in the *Adoniazusae*, where Praxinoa says: *πολλὰ τοι, ὦ Πτολεμαῖε, πεποιήται καλὰ ἔργα, / ἐξ ὧ ἐν ἀθανάτοις ὁ τεκών* (Theoc. 15.46-47).⁶⁹ The prominence of

his *Evagoras* (8-11). Cf. Murray 1971, p. 291-292. On the birth of prose ἐγκώμιον see Alexiou 2011; for the relationship between poetical and prose eulogy in the *Euagoras* (Isoc. 15.8-11 Brémond) see Brunello 2013.

⁶⁵ Compare, for example, the proem, on which see Di Marco 2004, and the conclusion of the hymn (i.e. Theoc. 17.137: *ἀρετὴν γε μὲν ἐκ Διὸς αἰτεῦ*). On this point, see also Hunter 2003, p. 93-96.

⁶⁶ See, for example, Theoc. 17.79-81: *ἀλλ' οὔτις [sc. ἀπειρος] τόσα φύει ὅσα χθαμαλὰ Αἴγυπτος, / Νεῖλος ἀναβλύζων διερὰν ὅτε βώλακα θρύπτει, / οὐδέ τις ἄσπεα τόσσα βροτῶν ἔχει ἔργα δαέντων* (English translation by A. S. F. Gow: 'but none is so prolific as are the plains of Egypt when the over-welling Nile soaks and breaks up the soil, nor has any so many towns of folk skilled to labour').

⁶⁷ Theoc. 17.82-94. On Ptolemaic dimensions of space in Alexandrian poetry see e.g. Bing 2005; Marquaille 2008, p. 51-52; Asper 2011.

⁶⁸ For generosity see e.g. Theoc. 17.110-111 (with Stephens 2003, p. 159-170): *πολλὸν [sc. χρυσόν] δ' ἰφθίμοισι δεδώρηται βασιλεῦσι, / πολλὸν δὲ πτολίεσσι, πολὺν δ' ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐταίροις* (English translation by A. S. F. Gow: 'much has he given to mighty kings, to cities, and to his trusty comrades'). For bravery cf. Theoc. 17.56-57: *σὲ δ', αἰχμητὰ Πτολεμαῖε, / αἰχμητᾶ Πτολεμαίῳ ἀρίζηλος Βερενίκα [sc. τέκε]*; 17.103: *ξανθοκόμας Πτολεμαῖος, ἐπιστάμενος δόρυ πάλλειν*. On this aspect, see also Gehrke 2013; Marquaille 2008, p. 45: 'As a Hellenistic king who built his authority on his capacity as a military leader, Philadelphus, despite modern accusations of an unwarlike personality (...), did spend a large part of his reign at war'. At any rate, it must not be forgotten that prowess is one of the distinctive features of Soter's portrait in the Satrap Stela (English translation by Robert K. Ritner in Simpson ³2003, p. 393): 'He is a youthful man, strong in his two arms, effective in plans, with mighty armies, stout hearted, firm footed, who attacks the powerful without turning his back, who strikes the face of his opponents when they fight, with precise hand, who grasps to himself the bow without shooting astray, who fights with his sword in the midst of battle, with none who can stand in his vicinity, a champion whose arms are not repulsed, with no reversal of what issues from his mouth, who has no equal in the Two Lands or the foreign countries'.

⁶⁹ Cf. also the way Ptolemy II is depicted in the famous decree of the League of Islanders from Nikouria (IG XII 7.506, l. 22-24 = Syll.³ 390), which dates from c. 281/0 BC: *τὴν τε πρὸς τοὺς θεοῦ[ς] εὐ[σέβ]ειαν διαφυλάττωγ καὶ τὴν πρὸς*

this aspect has recently led Murray to ‘see the poem as written specifically for probably the first, or at least one of the first two (or possibly three) festivals celebrating the new cult of Soter and Berenice’.⁷⁰ If the depiction of the εὐσέβεια of the king that is found in A III (l. 6-7: [ἄ]θανάτους ποιεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀθῶν[νάτων] τιμὰς) could actually be interpreted as a reference to the same religious occasion, it would be tempting to follow James Oliver and consider the contents of A III as a further proof that P. Berol. inv. 13045, A I-III is to be regarded as a fragment of an oration relating to the celebration of the first Πτολεμαῖα and closely connected with the institution of the cult of Θεοὶ Σωτῆρες and the famous πομπή.⁷¹ This conclusion is nevertheless far from being a necessary one and could be refuted by pointing out that εὐσέβεια was peculiar to the Ptolemaic dynasty as a heritage of the Pharaonic tradition.⁷² As a result, it cannot be completely ruled out that the actual core of the work consists in a praise of the Egyptian βασιλεία from a theoretical or general standpoint rather than, more specifically, in the eulogy of one of the Ptolemies.

6. From what has been discussed so far, it clearly emerges that one of the major problems raised by the first text of the Berlin papyrus is to place it, if possible, not only in a precise historical context, but also in a definite literary context. The difficulty in distinguishing between a philosophical treatise, a rhetorical piece περὶ βασιλείας or πρὸς βασιλέα τινά (no matter whether an oratorical fragment or a preparatory exercise), and, potentially, a

τοὺς π[ρογό]νους εὐνοίαν διατηρῶν. On the Nikouria Decree see Hazzard 2000, p. 47-58; on the κοινὸν τῶν νησιωτῶν see Meadows 2013.

⁷⁰ Murray 2008, p. 19. On the date of the poem, see also e.g. Pretagostini 2000, esp. p. 168-169; Hunter 2003 p. 3-8.

⁷¹ Oliver 1953, p. 882 n. 23: ‘If lines 39-40 [i.e. A III, l. 6-7] are, as I believe, a reference to the official establishment of the cult of Soter and Berenice by Ptolemy Philadelphus, the encomium may well have been delivered at the great victory celebration described by Callixeinus of Rhodes. The theme of the primacy of Alexandria ties the encomium and the procession together in my interpretation, and some great speech must have been made on that occasion.’ *Contra* Crönert 1924, p. 21: ‘nähere Zeitangaben sind noch nicht gefunden’. Cf. Murray 1971, p. 291.

⁷² Schubart 1937, p. 6: ‘Die übrigen hellenistischen Könige und ihre Völker waren nicht so gottselig, wie man es in Ägypten nach dem Beispiele der Pharaonen sein mußte’. On this point, see Koenen 1993; on Ptolemaic ruler cult and ideology of kingship cf. also Samuel 1993; Hazzard 2000; Pfeiffer 2008; Müller 2009.

speech from a historical work (as is the case with the already mentioned advice of the unknown ἐπίτροπος in Agatharchides' Περὶ τῆς ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης), is increased by three main factors: first of all, the amount of text preserved is so scanty that it is impossible to work out a precise framework; secondly, the almost total loss of Hellenistic prose prevents us from tracing the development or encapsulating the specific features of the various genres; lastly, the main themes of the fragment, especially the constitutional comparison and the praise of the king, would fit in perfectly with any of the three afore-mentioned alternatives.⁷³ However, before a somewhat aporetic conclusion is reached, another element must be taken into account. In 1950 Wilhelm Schubart published the scant remains of a treatise περὶ βασιλείας written on the *recto* of a papyrus fragment of the first century BC (P. Schub. 35 = P. Berol. inv. 16287r [MP³ 2594; LDAB 6758]), which was also extracted from a *cartonnage* coffin found in the necropolis of Abū Šīr al-Malaq. The surviving lines of the work express the idea that, however prosperous a king may be, he is liable to be overthrown by fortune, as was the case with Alexander and Darius.⁷⁴ On account of some similarities between the two papyri with regard to literary genre and palaeography,⁷⁵ it would be tempting to suppose that both belonged to a thematically consistent collection of Alexandrian rolls which would have been used to fabricate the *cartonnage* coffins and cases of Βουσίρις. Unfortunately, this intriguing scenario must be ruled out since Jaakko Frösén has demonstrated that P. Berol. inv. 16287 derives from the same *cartonnage* as some late Ptolemaic documents published in BGU XIV and must

⁷³ Moreover, it must not be forgotten that Hellenistic treatises *On Kingship* also had a specific addressee (Bertelli 2002, p. 28) and that most of them 'will have been in the form of lists of virtues that the king ought to possess' (Murray 2007, p. 24; cf. also Murray 1998, p. 268). For instance, the fictional example of a typical treatise Περὶ βασιλείας provided by Murray 2007, p. 21-26 includes, among other things, a constitutional comparison, a eulogy of kingship and a list of qualities of the ideal king.

⁷⁴ See for example Frösén & Westman 1997, p. 9-10, l. 10-14: Ἀλέξα[νδρος | τὸ] μέγεθος τῆς οἰκουμένης [ὑπὸ | τ]ῇ ἐαυτοῦ χεῖρᾳ λαβῶν οὐχ ἰκα[νός | ἐστ]ιν μάρτυς ὑφ' ἐνὸς ποτηρίου [φανε]ρῶς ἐλεγχθεὶς ὅτι θνητὸς ἦν;

⁷⁵ However, the hand cannot be the same, as the shapes of *delta* and *mu* clearly indicate. For a palaeographical analysis of the fragment see Frösén & Westman 1997, p. 8.

therefore have probably been written in the Herakleopolites.⁷⁶ As a result, if the only clues for contextualizing P. Berol. inv. 13045, A I-III are provided by both the alleged origin and the structure of the roll itself, we could not be far from the truth in supposing that, as a possibly famous example of epideictic oratory, it was anthologized by an Alexandrian sophist because of its usefulness in rhetorical training.

*Text and translation of P. Berol. inv. 13045,
A I-III [= Kunst 1923, p. 16-18]*

A I →

- | | |
|----|--|
| 1 | .. ±5 ..].ιγ.[±1]ρίσαι τὸν διστασμόν· ν οἱ γὰρ |
| 2 | θε]οἱ τὴν βασιλείαν προέκριναν ν – οὐ δη- |
| 3 | μ]οκρατία[±3].α. εσαν – ν ψιλήν, τοῦ |
| 4 | ±1]περτ.[. .].αι μη[θ]έν ἀμαρτάνοντες, |
| 5 | ἄπ]αντα δὲ δυνάμενοι, πρέπο[υ]σαν. ν οὐ |
| 6 | μῆ]ν ἐπεδίωξαν τὸ χεῖρον ἐν τῇ τοῦ κρείσ- |
| 7 | σο]γος αἰρέσει διαπεσόντες ν [. . ±5 ..] ἐν- |
| 8 | τα]ῦθα παραστήσω ν τοὺς δημ[οκ]ρατι- |
| 9 | κο]ύς ν τὸν Σόωνα, τὸν Κλεισθέ[νη . . .]ιον |
| 10 | ..]. . .].ε τὸν Ζάλευκον [±4].[±1]χοι τι |
| 11 | ..]. .πο[. .].ι ν ἀλ[λ]α κατατ. . . .ιον θεόν· |
| 12 | οὐ]κ ἔχω γὰρ πῶς ἐ[κ . . .τω]ν τῶν ἡρώων |
| 13 | ..]ω[. .].τ' ἐγὼ τὸν μ.[±4].αμαῖ· ν οθ[±3 |
| 14 | ..]τ' ἐπέγευεν ἀτελεστατο[. . . ±7 . . . |
| 15 | τ]ὸ τρ[ι]τον ἀσπάζομαι πόρρω[θεν ±4 |
| 16 | βασ]ιλέων ὑπάρχειν. ν ιδέ [. . . ±7 . . . |
| 17 | λες τῇ διανοίαι τὰ βάρη [. . . ±7 . . . |
| 18 | τατων κα[ι] θάρρησο[ν] ἀντισ[. . ±6 . . |
| 19 | βέλτι[. . . .].ιαν [φ]αγταζομ[. . ±5 . . |
| 20 | ..].[. .] ὑμεῖ[ς ±13 |
| 21 | ..].υδ' ἐκαστο[. . .].τ[. ±13 |
| 22 |].[. ±16 |

Supplementa editionis principis in textu adhibita tacite accepi. 1].ιγ.[±1]
ρίσαι legi :].ιτ[. .].ρον ed. pr. 2 θε]οἱ supplevi τὴν legi 2-3 δη[μ]οκρατία-

⁷⁶ Frösén & Westman 1997, p. 8; Salmenkivi 2002, p. 41-42, 47 n. 90.

[ι ἐπ]ταίχεσαν dubitanter conicio : δη|[μ]οκρατία[ν . .] αἰνεσαν[ed. pr. 3 ψιλήν legi : [. . .] ἤν ed. pr. 4 ±1]περτ[. .]αι legi (fortasse ὕπερτε[ρῃ]-σαι, ὕπερτι[θέ]ναι excludendum est) : .]μαρτ[. . .]αι ed. pr. 5 πρέπο[υ]σαν supplevi : περπο[.]σαν ed. pr. 6-7 κρείσ[σο]νος legi : κρεί[το]νος (sic) ed. pr. 7 αἰρέσει ante correctionem 9 Κλεισθέ[ν]η supplevi : Κλεισθέ[ν]η ed. pr. . .]ον legi : . .]τον ed. pr. 10 . .]ε legi : . .]νο[.]με ed. pr.]χοι τι legi :]χογτι ed. pr. 11 κατὰ το εἶπτον θεόν legit ed. pr., sed κατὰ τὸν Πύθιον θεόν dubitanter coniecit : κατὰ τὸν αἶψιον θεόν (cf. Plu. Mor. 379C) dubitanter conicio 12 ἐ[κ πάντων]ν τῶν vel ἐ[κ τούτων]ν τῶν conicio : ἐ[κ τῶν πᾶ]ντων ed. pr. 13 . .]ω[.]τ' ἐγὼ legi : ἥρωα [ζ]ητῶ ed. pr. μ.[±4].αμαι legi : τὸν μ[έλλονθ'], ἄμοι ed. pr. ὁ θ[εός] ed. pr. 14 [πο]τ' ed. pr. ἀτελεστατο[legi : ἀτελές τὸ το[ed. pr. 16 ἰδέ[legi : ἰδε[ed. pr. 17 λές legi : γος ed. pr. 18 θάρρησ[ν] supplevi : θαρρησε[.] ed. pr. 19 βελτι[legi : . .]ατ[ed. pr. 20 ὑμεί[legi :]υμεν[ed. pr. 21 . .]υδ' ἐκαστο[legi : . . .]εσκ[εύασε[ed. pr. 22]εδω[ed. pr.

... the doubt; for the gods, who never fail to ... (?), but can do everything, preferred monarchy as a simple (and) fitting (form of government) (?)—they had not made a mistake (?) about democracy. Of course, they did not seek for what is worse having blundered in their choice of what is better. ... Thereupon I will present (*or* compare) (?) the democratic (lawgivers): Solon, Cleisthenes, ... Zaleucus ... but (*or* other things) according to the (?) ... god; for I do not know how to ... amongst [all] the (*or* [these]) heroes I ... he (?) indicated (?) [*something*] as very incomplete ... I salute [the] third (type of constitution) from a distance ... of kings (?). Behold! ... through the thought ... the weights (?) ... and pluck up the courage ... I (*or* we) imagine ... you ... every ...

A II →

- 1 θεῶν δὲ κτ{ε}ῖσιν ουκ[..... ±16.....
- 2 ἀκούο[μ]εν τὴν Αἴγυπτ[ον εἶναι θεῶν
- 3 οἴκησ[ιν]. ἐρεῖς τὴν ἐπωκι[μένην ἐπὶ
- 4 τοῖς τοῦ Νείλου πέρασιν .[±4]α[±7
- 5 τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἔχουσιν τὰ κά[λλιστα·
- 6 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι πόλει[ς] τῆς ὑποκειμέ[νης χώ-
- 7 ρας πόλεις εἰσὶν, Ἀλεξανδρείας δὲ κῶμαι· τῆς
- 8 γὰρ οἰκουμένης Ἀλεξανδρεία πόλις ἐστίν.
- 9 ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτός εἰμι πολιτικὴν ἔχων ὑπ[ὲρ-]
- 10 λημψιν ν βλέπεις παν.ο[. .]...]. [±4
- 11 ὑπὸ τουδ[. .]ω[. ±18.....
- 12 ...[. . ±7 ..]. [..... ±19.....

1 δὲ κτ{ε}ῖσιν legi, sed θεῶν δὲ κτίσιν (sc. τὴν χώραν ὀνομάζων) coniecit Crönert : δεκτησεν ed. pr. (δ' ἐκτ{ε}ῖσιν dubitanter coniecit) οὐκ ἄ[ν] σφαλείης. καὶ γὰρ supplevit Crönert 2 εἶναι θεῶν supplevit Crönert 3 οἴκησ[ιν] coniecit Crönert : οικησῃ ed. pr. ἐρεῖς legi : [ἀ]θρεῖς ed. pr. [ἐπὶ] | τοῖς τοῦ Νείλου πέρασιν supplevi : [ἐν] | τοῖς τοῦ Νείλου πέρασιν ed. pr. 4 Ἀ[λεξ]ᾶ[νδ]ρειαν

conicio : π[όλιν] α[ὐτοῖς] supplevit ed. pr. 5 ὁπαλμοῖς ante correctionem
 κά[λλιστα] supplevi : κ[αλά] ed. pr. 11 ὑπὸ τοῦδ[legi : ὑπομουτ[ed. pr.

... foundation (?) on the part of [the] gods ... We know by hearsay that Egypt [is the land of the gods]. (?) [*Is a change of speaker to be supposed because of the asyndeton?*] You will mean [Alexandria] (?), which has been founded at the very end of the Nile, (a city) that has the [most beautiful] things (to be seen) by eyes (?). Indeed, the other cities of the adjacent (*or* subject) land are cities, but villages if compared to (?) Alexandria (*or* the other cities are cities of the adjacent land, but villages of (?) Alexandria); for Alexandria is a city of the whole world. Well, I entertain such a political assumption. (?) [*Is a change of speaker to be supposed because of the asyndeton?*] You see ...

A III →

- 1 αν σέβεται, πολιτικὴν ἀπάντησιν τη-
- 2 ρ]εῖ, ν χαίρει τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ν καλοῖς ὑπερτίθε-
- 3 ται τὰ καλὰ, ν μάχεται τοῖς πολεμίοις ν [ἐ-
- 4 ως τοῦ νικῆσαι, ν ζῶσαν καὶ πρὸς με-
- 5 τ]ηλλαχότας τοὺς φίλους ν τηρεῖν] τὴν α[ῖ-
- 6 ρ]εσιν, [ἀ]θανάτους ποιεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀθα-
- 7 νάτων] τιμὰς. ν τοῖς μὲν ἐπινοήμασ[ι
- 8 .. ±6 ..]. ... [±2]ωδ[±3]ελεῖ οὖν τηδ[.
- 9 ±20]. [... τ]ελέσειν, οἷδε[±1
- 10 ±26]ουγ[±1

1 [φίλῃ]||αν (cf. E. *Alc.* 279) vel [εὐσέβει]||αν (cf. S. *Ant.* 943) conicio : [π]||αν
 (sic) ed. pr. διπλῇ στιγμῇ post σέβεται 5 με[τ]ηλλαχότες ante correctio-
 nem τηρεῖν] ed. pr. 8]ωδ[legi :].οδ[ed. pr.]ελεῖ οὖν τηδ[. legi :].γει
 οὖν τιδ[ed. pr. 9 τ]ελέσειν, οἷδε[legi :]ελετιοῖδε[ed. pr.

... [the king] honours ..., is affable with the citizens (?), loves goodness (*or* good men), entrusts important (?) matters to good men (*or* adds noble acts to noble acts) (?), fights against his enemies till victory is won, keeps alive his predilection for friends even after their death (*or* even if they are dead), makes immortal the honours that are due to the immortals. With the purposes ...⁷⁷

⁷⁷ An English translation of the first three columns of the papyrus is given in Barker 1956, p. 99-100; for the translation of the second work (columns four to twenty) see Demad., *BNJ* 227 F 58 (by Sviatoslav Dmitriev).

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Abstract

The paper intends to shed light on the first three columns of what is usually referred to as the Demades papyrus, which contain the remains of an eulogy of Ptolemaic monarchy. Although found in the necropolis of Βουσίρις ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεοπολίτῃ, P. Berol. inv. 13045 is supposed to have been written in Alexandria and dates to the end of the second century BC. The content of the fragment, which has received scarce critical attention since the *editio princeps* (1923), can be summarized as follows: after comparing various political constitutions in the first column, the author goes on to praise Egypt and Alexandria in the second and expounds an ideal of kingship in the third. Besides providing a new edition, with an English translation, of the text, the paper addresses the question of its nature and destina-

tion (a philosophical treatise, a rhetorical piece *περί βασιλείας* or an oration *πρὸς βασιλέα τινά*), and considers the problem of the historical context it reflects. Particular attention is paid to assessing to what extent the stock virtues listed in the third column coincide with those codified in the treatises of advice to monarchs and princes of the late Classical and Hellenistic periods.

PLUTARCH'S STATESMEN: MIRRORS OF POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS

In his *Moralia* and *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch provided insight to rulers and magistrates in a variety of ethical and political contexts. While he often articulated his advice in the form of precepts to guide leaders in the management of public affairs (e.g. *Political precepts*), he also used historical statesmen to exemplify these precepts in action, linking the success or failure of heroes to their adoption or neglect of certain principles of effective leadership. In several instances, Plutarch refers to his portrayals of statesmen as 'mirrors' that help readers adjust their own conduct.¹ In *On progress in virtue* (75A-86A), Plutarch describes how historical statesmen function as mirrors to foster self-improvement:²

ἤδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις παρέπεται τὸ βαδίζουσιν ἐπὶ πράξεις τινὰς ἢ λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν ἢ χρησαμένοις τύχῃ τίθεσθαι πρὸς ὀφθαλμῶν τοὺς ὄντας ἀγαθοὺς ἢ γενομένους, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι 'τί δ' ἂν ἔπραξεν ἐν τούτῳ Πλάτων, τί δ' ἂν εἶπεν Ἑπαμεινώνδας, ποῖος δ' ἂν ὦφθη Λυκούργος ἢ Ἀγησίλαος', οἷόν τι πρὸς ἔσοπτρα κοσμοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἢ μεταρρυθμίζοντας ἢ φωνῆς ἀγεννεστέρας αὐτῶν ἐπιλαμβάνομένους ἢ πρὸς τι πάθος ἀντιβαίνοντας. (85A-B)

With men of this sort [i.e. men who love good men] it has already become a constant practice, on proceeding to any business, or on taking office, or on encountering any dispensation of Fortune, to set before their eyes good men of the present

¹ For a discussion of the 'mirror' image in Plutarch, see Duff 1999, p. 32-34, Stadter 2003, Zadorojnyi 2010, Frazier 2011.

² Greek texts are taken from Loeb volumes. Translations are modified versions of those in Loeb.

or the past and to reflect: ‘What would Plato have done in this case? What would Epaminondas have said? How would Lycurgus have conducted himself, or Agesilaus?’ And before such mirrors as these, figuratively speaking, they array themselves or readjust their habit and either repress some of their more ignoble utterances or resist the onset of some emotion.

In *Aemilius-Timoleon*, Plutarch reveals that he himself responds to the heroes of the *Lives* in this very way, ‘using history as a mirror and endeavoring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein’ (ὥσπερ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πειρώμενον ἀμῶς γέ πως κοσμεῖν καὶ ἀφομοιοῦν πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων ἀρετὰς τὸν βίον, *Aem.* 1.1). In *Sayings of kings and commanders*, in turn, Plutarch characterizes the vignettes as ‘mirrors that provide the opportunity to observe the workings of the mind of each man’ (ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτροις καθαρῶς παρέχουσι τὴν ἐκάστου διάνοιαν ἀποθεωρεῖν, 172D), and, as such, they are expected to be of value to Trajan, to whom this treatise is addressed.³

Plutarch’s ‘mirrors’ for princes and statesmen both overlap and go beyond the qualities emphasized by other writers. On the one hand, Plutarch creates ‘mirrors’ of the virtues of the *politikos*, reflecting the moral qualities and attitudes of the ideal statesman.⁴ The virtues emphasized by Plutarch—including the ‘cardinal’ virtues of bravery, temperance and justice,⁵ as well as magnanimity, mildness (lack of anger), humanity, compassion towards the defeated and clemency towards the convicted—are also central to portraits of ‘the good king’ in other writers, including Seneca⁶ and

³ On Trajan as the addressee of *Sayings of kings and commanders*, see Beck 2002.

⁴ On the virtues of the ideal statesman, see Wardman 1974, Frazier 1995 & 1996, Stadter 2003.

⁵ The ‘cardinal’ virtues are traceable to Plato, a primary reference point in Plutarch (Boulet 2014). See Jones 1916, p. 109-153 and Helmbold & O’Neil 1959, p. 56-63 for lists of parallels and citations.

⁶ Seneca’s *De clementia*, addressed to Nero, defines clemency to be restraint in taking vengeance or meting out punishment (*clem.* 2.2-3). On Seneca’s use of the image of a mirror (*clem.* 1.1.1) to explain his purpose, see Hammer 2014, p. 281. On the structure and content of *De clementia*, see Griffin 1976, p. 133-171 and 194, Griffin 2005, p. 539-543, Trapp 2007, p. 177-180, Braund 2009, Schofield 2015.

Dio⁷ in Plutarch's own era. Moreover, like other writers, Plutarch considered the administration of justice and tireless solicitude on behalf of one's subjects to be the primary duties of a ruler.⁸

However, in addition to depicting moral qualities, Plutarch also creates 'mirrors of political effectiveness' designed to enhance the strategic judgment of leaders in navigating the practical challenges of managing political and military matters. Unlike moral virtue and proper devotion to the common welfare—which are fostered by philosophy—the practical judgment of a statesman or general must be developed through his own experience or by watching and learning from the victories and defeats of other leaders. Plutarch notes this distinction in *Old men in politics*, where he states that, just as treatises on navigation do not make navigators, lectures on statesmanship do not make statesmen:

πόλιν δὲ μεταχειρίσασθαι καὶ πείσαι δήμον ἢ βουλὴν δύναται ἂν ὀρθῶς νέος ἀναγνοὺς βιβλὸν ἢ σχολὴν περὶ πολιτείας ἐν Λυκείῳ γραψάμενος, ἂν μὴ παρ' ἡγίαν καὶ παρ' οἶακα πολλάκις στὰς δημαγωγῶν καὶ στρατηγῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἐμπειρίαις ἅμα καὶ τύχαις συναποκλίνων ἐπ' ἀμφότερα, μετὰ κινδύνων καὶ πραγμάτων λάβῃ τὴν μαθήσιν; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. (790 D-E)

Would a young man be able to rightly manage a city and persuade the people or the council after reading a book or taking notes on a lecture on statesmanship in the Lyceum, if he had not often stood by the driver's rein or pilot's steering oar, leaning this way and that with the popular leaders and generals contending for victory with the aid of their experiences and fortunes? No one can say that.

Plutarch's careful depiction in the *Lives* of the success or failure of actions taken to solve problems at times of danger are an effort to bridge the gap between theory and practice: historical statesmen are shown in the process of analyzing problems, deliberating alternatives and implementing strategies which, if effective, become

⁷ On the *Kingship orations*, where Dio reflects the traits of the good ruler (*Or.* 1.35), see Moles 1983, 1984 and 1990; Swain 1996, p. 192-206; Swain 2000; Gill 2005, p. 604-605 and Trapp 2007, p. 180-181.

⁸ In *Philosophers and men in power*, virtue enables a ruler to fulfill his function in dispensing justice (779B) and caring for his subjects (776D, 778F). *To an uneducated ruler* notes that philosophy instills the virtues that make a ruler a representative of Zeus' justice and goodwill (781F-782A).

paradigms to imitate in similar circumstances and, if ineffective, supply cautionary lessons in strategies to avoid.

In creating such mirrors, Plutarch goes further than most other writers in also addressing the practical competencies essential to managing political and military matters effectively. Plutarch wrote his *Lives* and treatises for men exercising authority in positions well below that of Emperor—such as city archons, provincial governors, generals in the Roman army and magistrates in Rome or the cities of the provinces.⁹ In the ‘mirrors’ provided in the *Lives*, Plutarch links the key policy choices of each hero not only to moral qualities that reveal mastery over (or submission to) appetite and passion—thereby creating ‘mirrors of moral virtue’—but also to the effectiveness of these policies in producing beneficial outcomes for the state. By highlighting the strategic judgment and practical skills that enable statesmen to identify the best course of action in each situation, to gain the support of others and to successfully implement their strategies, Plutarch’s heroes become ‘mirrors of political effectiveness’ as well.

In the following sections, Plutarch’s general treatment of issues of good kingship is first examined from the perspective of his political and practical-ethical treatises,¹⁰ which articulate the moral qualities and priorities that form the foundation of praiseworthy leadership in the *Moralia* and *Lives*. We then will explore the pragmatic dimension of Plutarch’s ‘mirrors’ in five areas posing practical difficulties for men in positions of political or military authority: (1) winning over the people and subject states to obedience; (2) spending to promote the common welfare in cities and provinces; (3) putting down insurrections; (4) dealing with insubordination and (5) inspiring troops at times of great danger. By describing not only what a statesman or general accomplished in a particular situation, but also how he deliberated alternatives,

⁹ See Van Hoof 2010, p. 22-25 on Plutarch’s audience of *philologoi* and *politikoi*. Stadter 2002a, p. 5-6, 23 n. 25 and 26 lists the dedicatees, which included nine Romans and eleven Greeks. See Jones 1971.

¹⁰ The ‘political treatises’ include the four that focus on general principles—namely, *To an uneducated ruler*, *Philosophers and men in power*, *Old men in politics* and *Political precepts*. Other ‘practical-ethical’ treatises that address narrower issues of interest to men in both their social and political interactions include *On complacency*, *On inoffensive self-praise* and *On telling a flatterer from a friend*.

decided upon a particular policy and brought it to fruition, Plutarch enables his readers, who face parallel practical challenges in their own careers, to see themselves in the historical heroes and to use them as 'mirrors of political effectiveness' to enhance their own performance in office.

Plutarch's Statesmen as Mirrors of Moral Virtue

Plutarch overlaps other writers in depicting the moral qualities essential to good kingship in the two treatises that center on the relationship between the philosopher and ruler:¹¹ *Philosophers and men in power*¹² and *To an uneducated ruler*.¹³ Both of these works address the importance of two elements of kingship: a ruler's moral integrity, which sets a pattern for his people to follow, and his primary duty of administering justice, which is the basis of winning the trust and obedience of subjects. Many of the same themes are found in Dio's *Kingship orations*, Seneca's *De clementia* and Pliny's *Panegyricus*. Dio's prerequisites for good kingship, for instance, include training in philosophy and moral virtue (*Or.* 1.12-14; *Or.* 2.19-24; *Or.* 3.2-7; *Or.* 4.31-38), and it is through the practice of justice, self-control (ἐγκράτειαν), courage (ἀνδρείαν) and practical judgment (φρόνησιν) that a king brings the greatest benefits to his subjects (*Or.* 1.44-46; *Or.* 3.2-7, 4-11, 39, 58).¹⁴ Seneca, in turn, describes the duty (*officium*) of a prince to be like that of a good father: he is most forbearing (*temperantissima*) in caring for his subjects, subordinates his own interests to theirs (*sua post illos reponens*) and resorts to punishment only after exhausting gentler means of correction (*clem.* 1.14.1-3).¹⁵ Pliny, in his

¹¹ Other recent scholarship on these treatises includes Beck 2004, Trapp 2004 and Roskam 2009. Boulet 2014 discusses the relationship between the treatises.

¹² For a comprehensive treatment of *Philosophers and men in power* (776B-779C), see Roskam 2009.

¹³ For key themes in *To an uneducated ruler* (779D-782F), see Roskam 2009, p. 66-68.

¹⁴ Moreover, Dio asserts that the king must exercise power, not in his own self-interest, but for the sake of all men (βασιλεύειν γὰρ οὐχ αὐτοῦ χάριν οἶται μᾶλλον ἐνὸς ὄντος ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων, *Or.* 1.23).

¹⁵ On these and other traits of Seneca's good ruler (*clem.* 1.13.4-5), see Griffin 1976 and 2005.

Panegyricus, also ‘instructed through praise’,¹⁶ applauding actions that were beneficial in the political arena, such as advancing men based on merit (*paneg.* 69.2-70.8) and discouraging excessive honors (*paneg.* 54.5-55.1).

In his treatises, Plutarch highlights the same qualities, while also bringing added emphasis to Platonic ideals of virtue in the ruler¹⁷ and the ruler’s duty to protect his state and pursue the common good.¹⁸ *Philosophers and men in power* depicts the ideal ruler as a man who has a soul that is solicitous for many’ (ὕπὲρ πολλῶν φροντίζουσιν) and is ‘obliged to be prudent and temperate and just in behalf of many’ (πολλοῖς φρονεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ὀφείλουσαν, 776D).¹⁹ Plutarch advises philosophers to become counselors to political leaders in order to enable rulers not only to live better lives as private men, but also to more effectively perform their political functions by dispensing justice (779B), inspiring confidence and obedience (777E-F) and being attentive to the needs of subjects (776D, 778F).²⁰ *To an uneducated ruler*, in turn, instructs men in power to learn the lessons of philosophy in order to fulfill their duty ‘to serve god for the care and preservation of men’ (ὕπηρετεῖν θεῷ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν, 780D). To this end, Plutarch directs the ruler to cultivate virtue in himself, administer justice

¹⁶ Griffin 2005, p. 541-544. While Pliny’s praise is not rooted in philosophy, he pays homage to virtue in the emperor and the moral example he sets (*paneg.* 45.3-6). See also Radice 1968 and Roche 2011.

¹⁷ The Platonic virtues are key goals, but Plutarch’s ruler must also emulate the kindness (φιλάνθρωπον), mildness (πραότης) and equity (εὐνομίας) of the divine (ὁ θεός, *Ad princ. iner.* 781A).

¹⁸ The ‘common good’ refers to the harmony, justice, liberty, security and prosperity that provide the means to pursue virtue. Through philosophy, the ruler becomes a ‘common good, dispensing justice, making laws, punishing the wicked and strengthening the equitable and the good’ (κοινὸν ὄφελος ἔσται δικαιοδοτῶν, νομοθετῶν, κολάζων τοὺς πονηροὺς, αὖξων τοὺς ἐπικεῖς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, *Maxime cum principibus* 779B).

¹⁹ The principle that the ruler acts on behalf of the ruled is reinforced with an analogy to dogs watching over sheep ‘not for their own sake but for the sake of those whom they are guarding’ (οὐχ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλαττομένων, *Ad princ. iner.* 781D).

²⁰ Plutarch’s treatment of statesmanship in *Moralia* and *Lives* is often seen as the effort of a philosopher to incite contemporary statesmen to virtue. Stadter 2002a, p. 6 suggests that Plutarch, in advising statesmen, may be emulating Plato’s attempt to advise Dionysius. See also Stadter 1997.

(which is the 'work of the ruler' (ἄρχοντος ἔργον, 780E) and recognize that it is through philosophy that he can both set a pattern for his subjects to follow (780B) and acquire the virtues that will make him a true representative of Zeus' justice and goodwill (781F-782A).²¹

For Plutarch, cultivating moral virtue, administering justice and promoting the common welfare were duties incumbent on every 'ruler'—whether an emperor, provincial governor, city magistrate or general. In both *Philosophers and men in power* and *To an uneducated ruler*, Plutarch uses leaders who appear in the *Lives* as exempla, including Epaminondas, Cato Minor, Alexander, Cimon, Lucullus, Scipio Aemilianus and Dionysius.²² At the same time, the *Lives* routinely depict statesmen being aided by philosophers, including, for instance, Alcibiades being instructed by Socrates (*Alc.* 4.1-5; 6.1-4), Alexander trained by Aristotle (*Alex.* 7.2; 8.5) and Cato Minor holding discussions with Athenodorus (*Cato* 11.1-2; 6.1), Antipater the Tyrian (*Cato* 4.1) and Demetrius and Apollonides (*Cato* 65.5; 69.1).²³

Plutarch's Statesmen as Mirrors of Political Effectiveness

Plutarch also devotes several treatises to the practical problems of exercising power. What criteria should be used to determine which policy action, of the options available, will produce the best outcome? How does a ruler attract support? How does he secure obedience without resorting to oppressive actions? As a general, how does he inspire troops at times of danger? Treatises dedicated to such pragmatic themes include *On telling a flatterer from a*

²¹ Centrone 2005, p. 560 notes that the notion of the ruler assimilated with God is rooted in Plato and that Seneca presents the king as god's representative as well. In Dio, Zeus sets the standards by which a King himself is ruled (*Or.* 1; *Or.* 4.39-43; *Or.* 2.71-72).

²² Epaminondas (781C), Cato Minor (781C), Alexander (781B, 782A), Cimon (782F), Lucullus (782F), Scipio Aemilianus (782F) and Dionysius (782C) illustrate various attributes rulers should adopt or avoid.

²³ Elsewhere, Pompey consulted Cratippus (*Pomp.* 65.3-4) and Philopoemen was instructed by Ecdemus and Demophanes, who believed that 'through philosophy, they had made him a common benefit to Greece' (ὡς κοινὸν ὄφελος τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἄνδρα τοῦτον ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀπεργασόμενοι, *Phil.* 1.3-5).

friend,²⁴ *On inoffensive self-praise*,²⁵ *Old men in politics*²⁶ and *Political precepts*.²⁷ In these treatises, Plutarch joined his admonition to cultivate moral virtue with pragmatic advice on how to be effective in advancing the common good in office. These lessons are directed largely to men in city or provincial administration, but could also be of value to the Emperor or men holding broad authority as provincial governors or commanding generals.

Plutarch's blending of concerns about moral virtue with the goal of political effectiveness is well illustrated in the advice provided in *Political precepts*, which was addressed to a young man on the verge of entering the political arena but offered insights for more experienced men as well. The treatise covers a wide range of practical functions that require both a moral foundation of temperance, mildness, justice and dedication to the common welfare, on the one hand, and critical judgment about the best strategies for administering a city, maintaining its internal harmony and conducting diplomacy to protect its liberty and security, on the other. In the early sections, Plutarch advises the young man entering public life to keep his 'life and character' (τὸν βίον καὶ τὸ ἦθος) 'free of blame and ill report' (ψόγου καθαρὰ καὶ διαβολῆς ἀπάσης, 800D) in order to acquire and sustain his influence over the people and 'lead them towards what is better' (πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ὑπάγοντα, 800B). Plutarch then supplements this advice with practical pre-

²⁴ *On telling a flatterer from a friend* (48E-74E) advises readers to watch for inconsistencies (52B-53B), excessive agreement (53C-54B) or refusals to come in first or introduce anything unpleasant (54C-55E).

²⁵ In *On inoffensive self-praise* (539A-547F), a statesman is instructed to avoid 'what is frivolous and aggravating' (τὸ κενὸν καὶ δυσχεραίνόμενον, 540A) and to praise himself only because 'being trusted and enjoying good repute affords the means for further and yet nobler actions' (τὸ πιστεῦσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν χρηστὸν εἶναι πλείονων καὶ καλλίωνων πράξεων ἀφορμὰς δίδωσι, 539E-F).

²⁶ In *Old men in politics* (783A-797F), Plutarch emphasizes the role old men play in the assembly, where their practical judgment (φρόνησις), good counsel (εὐβουλία), foresight (προνοία), sensible speech (λόγος νοῦν ἔχων) and prudent thought (φροντίς πεπνυμένη) balance the problematic traits of the young: ambition (φιλοτιμία), contentiousness (φιλονεικία), love of glory (φιλοδοξία) and the desire to be first and greatest (ἡ τοῦ πρώτου εἶναι καὶ μέγιστον ἐπιθυμία, 788E; 797E; 789D-E). See Swain 1996, p. 183-184, Centrone 2005, p. 581 and Trapp 2007, p. 194-195; 202-203; 223-224 and 237-238.

²⁷ On the purpose of *Political precepts* (798A-825F), see Swain 1996, p. 161-183; De Blois 2004 and Trapp 2004. For traits of the ideal statesman, see also Beck 2004, p. 108-109 and Teodorsson 2008, p. 341-342.

cepts in areas such as how to win over the people (801C-804C; 818A-824A), how to manage relationships with colleagues (809B-811A; 816A-817F) and how to manage relations with an overlord (813D-816A). Key areas of concern and role models are summarized in Table 1. In these discussions, moral virtue is not desirable for its own sake, but as a tool of effective leadership: it provides a reputation for incorruptibility that makes a statesman more persuasive and empowers reason to guide his judgment and actions on behalf of his state.

In *Political precepts*, as well as other treatises addressing effectiveness in public life, Plutarch illustrates his precepts with historical statesmen, more than twenty of whom are also subjects of the *Lives*. Pericles, Phocion and Themistocles are cited most often as either positive or negative exempla among Greeks, while the two Catos and Pompey are the most frequently mentioned Romans.²⁸ In several cases, such as Themistocles, Pericles and Philopoemen, a particular hero is a positive model in one area, but a deterrent model in another. Such 'blended characterizations' of heroes, in which their actions model both praiseworthy conduct to emulate and blameworthy behavior to avoid, are central to the 'mirrors of political effectiveness' Plutarch provides to his readers in his *Lives*.

TABLE 1.
Key components of statesmanship

Political precepts

<i>Area</i>	<i>Sections</i>	<i>Positive Models</i>	<i>Deterrent Models</i>
Cultivating one's moral character	800B-801B	Pericles, Themistocles	Alcibiades, Cleon, Cleophon
Eloquence and persuasion	801C-804C	Pericles, Phocion	Nicias
Relations with the demos	799B-801B; 818A-824A	Pericles, Cato Maior, Epaminondas, Aristides	Alexander, Alcibiades, Cleon
Managing friendships	807A-809A	Pericles, Phocion, Timoleon	Agesilaus, Solon, Cato Minor, Themistocles

²⁸ Others cited often include Agesilaus, Alcibiades, Aristides and Cimon.

<i>Area</i>	<i>Sections</i>	<i>Positive Models</i>	<i>Deterrent Models</i>
Managing enmities and rivalries	809B-811A	Pericles, Themistocles, Aristides, Cato Maior	Pericles, Demosthenes, Philopoemen
Sharing power with others	811B-813D	Pericles	Themistocles, Cleon, Philopoemen, Hannibal
Conducting diplomacy with overlord	813D-816A	Pericles, Polybius, Areius	Pardalas
Cooperating with colleagues	816A-817F	Philopoemen, Timoleon	

The ‘mirrors’ provided to Trajan in *Sayings of kings and commanders*, mentioned earlier, illustrate a similar mix of ethical and practical attributes that enable rulers to solve problems. For instance, Dionysius the Elder (176B) must determine what to do about two men who are slandering him: he invites both men to dinner, observes their behavior and decides that the man who drank and talked freely could be ignored, but the one who was cautious and on guard was a real threat and had to be executed. Philip (177E) in a similar situation responds differently: when he hears that Nicanor is slandering him, he asks what the complaint is, and, on discovering that Nicanor felt neglected and unrewarded, Philip gives him a gift and converts him into a supporter. Philip states the principle at issue:

πάλιν οὖν τοῦ Σμικύθου λέγοντος ὅτι θαυμαστὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἐγκώμια λέγων ὁ Νικάνωρ διατελεῖ, ‘ὁρᾶτε οὖν’, εἶπεν, ‘ὅτι παρ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν’.
(177E)

So when Smicythus said that Nicanor was continually sounding the praises of Philip to everybody in a surprising way, ‘You see then’, Philip said, ‘that we ourselves are responsible for the good and the ill that is said of us’.

In other areas as well, Plutarch includes sayings that offer varied perspectives on how to handle specific challenges. Epaminondas, for instance, demonstrates two different tactics for dispelling fear in the army caused by unfavorable oracles: in one case, Epaminondas associates a refusal to fight because of bad oracles with cow-

ardice (192F), while in another he interprets a thunderclap to be a bad omen for the enemy, not his own army (193A). In all of these instances, leaders are shown responding without malice or anger to the situation at hand, while exercising prudent judgment to generate a positive result.

Plutarch's Statesmen in the 'Parallel lives'

In the preface to *Sayings of kings and commanders*, Plutarch refers to his *Parallel lives* as a broader depiction of the actions of statesmen that must be read in a leisurely manner (172E). This reference to the *Lives*, combined with the overlap between the men who are subjects of the *Lives* and the kings and commanders whose sayings are included in the treatise,²⁹ suggest that the *Lives* were designed to offer both moral and pragmatic insights to men holding supreme authority. Moreover, the routine use of the heroes of the *Lives* to exemplify key pragmatic precepts in the political treatises implies that the portrayals of statesmen in the *Lives* provided mirrors of political effectiveness.

In the five areas of managing political or military affairs discussed below, Plutarch integrates his moral lessons with pragmatic insights that could benefit both the Emperor and those at lower levels of authority. In treating the specific challenges of how to (1) win the people or subjects to obedience, (2) spend public funds to foster the common welfare, (3) put down insurrections, (4) deal with insubordination in the army and (5) inspire troops at times of danger, Plutarch demonstrates that effective leadership requires a blend of moral character that inspires confidence and practical judgment that recognizes 'what each situation requires' to achieve the best outcome for one's city. Plutarch's pragmatic focus is reflected in his portrayal of how leaders deliberate alternatives, choose among policy options and overcome unexpected hurdles to execute plans successfully. In this way, Plutarch's statesmen

²⁹ Fifteen Greeks who are subjects of the *Parallel lives* have their own sections in *Sayings of kings and commanders*: Dion, Alexander, Demetrius, Eumenes, Pyrrhus, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, Alcibiades, Phocion, Lycurgus, Lysander, Agesilaus, Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

become ‘mirrors of political effectiveness’ reflecting the ethical qualities and practical competencies of good rulers in the *Moralia*.

Winning obedience from the people and subject states

Plutarch’s portrayal of statesmen to reveal the combined roles of moral character and practical competencies in producing successes (or failures) in public life is well illustrated in his treatment of ‘the art of persuasion’. This area was of concern to all men in high authority in Plutarch’s day, including the Emperor, who wanted to enjoy ready obedience from the people and provincial cities. In Plutarch’s *Lives*, the heroes frequently confront situations where a reputation for moral integrity is not enough to elicit obedience at times of great danger. As illustrated in *Pericles*, *Cimon* and *Aemilius Paulus*, Plutarch uses authorial comments and depictions of deliberations and policy choices to demonstrate how leaders can win support for their policies and strategies in difficult circumstances.

In the area of securing the obedience of the people, Pericles is perhaps Plutarch’s most famous example of a statesman able to persuade the people to adopt his views. In Plutarch’s ‘mirror’, Pericles has been educated in philosophy and his actions, for the most part, are shown to be guided by reason rather than appetite or passion.³⁰ With regard to his moral character, Pericles’ restrained behavior in public and indifference to wealth earned him a reputation for incorruptibility that inspired confidence in his moral integrity among both Athenians and their allies (*Per.* 16.3-4). Plutarch, however, ties Pericles’ persuasiveness not simply to his character and reputation, but also to two practical competencies: his oratorical skill and his policy of ‘give and take’ in his relations with the people at times of danger.

Plutarch describes the attributes underlying Pericles’ legendary oratorical skill at *Per.* 5.1: Pericles presented a composed public demeanor, adopted lofty discourse that was ‘free from plebeian and reckless effrontery’ (καθαρόν ὀχλικῆς καὶ πανούργου βωμολοχίας)

³⁰ Plutarch is ambiguous about Pericles’ motives in actions toward Megara (*Per.* 29.4-32.3). He reports various accusations but concludes that ‘the truth about it is not clear’ (τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς ἀδηλον, *Per.* 32.3).

and remained calm in the face of attacks.³¹ As a result, throughout the *Life*, Pericles routinely strikes his hearers with amazement³² and is able to win the people over 'by persuading and instructing' (πειθων και διδάσκων, *Per.* 15.2-3). This approach to persuading the people is displayed, for instance, in Pericles' response to attacks from opponents of his project to rebuild the Acropolis using funds collected from the allies: Pericles 'instructed' (ἐδίδασκεν) the people that they owed no accounting of funds to the allies for whom they fought wars and provided protection (*Per.* 12.3). Later, when he is attacked for the expenses incurred for the project, Pericles refrains from engaging in any personal attacks or innuendo: he simply offers the people the option of letting the project be supported by him alone and dedicated under his name rather than that of the Athenians—an offer the people immediately refuse (*Per.* 14.1-2). Pericles' actions illustrate key precepts from *Political precepts* with regard to oratory (801C-804C), and thereby Pericles becomes a mirror of qualities that produce effectiveness in public debate.

At the same time, Pericles demonstrates behaviors to adopt when the people oppose measures that are critical to their own safety and well-being. In such instances, Pericles had to 'force the people into the way of their advantage' (ἐχειροῦτο τῷ συμφέροντι) and, to this end, used the people's hopes and fears (ἐλπίσι και φόβοις), like rudders (ὥσπερ οἶαξι), to first check their arrogance in a timely manner and, afterwards, to 'allay and comfort' (ἀνιείς και παραμυθούμενος) their aggravation by gratifying some of their desires (*Per.* 15.2-4). In the *Life*, this technique of 'give and take' is displayed when Pericles prevents the Athenians from attacking Archidamus and his army. Plutarch presents Pericles' reasoning as well as his specific actions:

τῷ δὲ Περικλεῖ δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο πρὸς τοὺς ἑξακισμυρίους Πελοποννησίων και Βοιωτῶν ὀπλίτας (...) ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως μάχην συνάψαι. (...) τὸν δὲ δῆμον εἰς ἐκκλησίαν οὐ συνήγε δεδιώς βιασθῆναι παρὰ γνώμην. (...) οὕτως ἐκεῖνος,

³¹ Plutarch praises the ability of Pericles and Fabius to 'endure the follies of their people and colleagues' (τῷ δύνασθαι φέρειν δῆμων και συναρχόντων, *Per.* 2.4)—shown in their composure when facing criticism.

³² Pericles routinely inspires awe when he speaks (*Per.* 7.1; 8.3; 14.2; 28.4).

τό τε ἄστῳ συγκλείσας καὶ καταλαβὼν πάντα φυλακαῖς πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν, ἐχρήτο τοῖς αὐτοῦ λογισμοῖς, βραχέα φροντίζων τῶν καταβοώντων καὶ δυσχεραίνοντων. (*Per.* 33.4-6)

Pericles, however, looked upon it as a terrible thing to join battle with sixty thousand Peloponnesian and Boeotian hoplites (...) and stake the city itself upon the issue. (...) He would not call the people together in an assembly fearing that he would be constrained against his better judgment. (...) He shut the city up tight, put all parts of it under safe garrison, and exercised his own judgment little heeding the brawlers and malcontents.

Moreover, when Pericles sent the Athenian army into Peloponnesian territory to lure the Spartans back home, he himself remained behind, ‘keeping the city under watch and ward and well in hand’ (οἰκουρῶν καὶ διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων τὴν πόλιν) until the Peloponnesians withdrew; afterwards, he ‘soothed the multitude’ (θεραπεύων δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς) and ‘won their favor by distributions of funds and proposed allotments of conquered lands’ (διανομαῖς τε χρημάτων ἀνελάμβανε καὶ κληρουχίας ἔγραφεν, *Per.* 34.1). By detailing the specific actions taken by Pericles and the reasons behind his decisions, Plutarch provides readers with a lesson in effective leadership.

This principle of engaging in ‘give and take’ with the people is articulated from different perspectives in the Prologues to *Phocion-Cato Minor* and *Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi*. In *Phocion-Cato*, Plutarch explains why a statesman, like the sun, should follow a course that is ‘slanting and slightly-inclined’ (λοξῶ καὶ παρεγκεκλιμένῳ) rather than ‘too straight’ (ὀρθίος ἄγαν, *Phoc.* 2.4):

τῆς πολιτείας ὁ μὲν ὀρθίος ἄγαν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα τοῖς δημοσίοις ἀντιβαίνων τόνος ἀπηνῆς καὶ σκληρός, ὥσπερ αὐτὸν ἀλὶν ἐπισφαλὲς καὶ κάταντες τὸ συνεφελκόμενον οἷς ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ συνεπιρρέπον, ἡ δὲ ἀνθυπείκουσα πειθόμενοις καὶ διδοῦσα τὸ πρὸς χάριν, εἴτα ἀπαιτοῦσα τὸ συμφέρον ἐπιστασία καὶ κυβέρνησις ἀνθρώπων (...) σωτήριος. (*Phoc.* 2.4-5)

In the administration of a city, the course that is too straight and opposed in all things to popular desires is harsh and cruel, just as, in turn, it is highly dangerous to tolerate or yield perforce to the mistakes of the populace. But that wise guidance and governance of men that yields to them in return for their

obedience and grants them what will please them and then demands back in payment what will advantage the state (...) is conducive to safety.

Correspondingly, in their *Lives*, Cato and Phocion illustrate this principle in various contexts,³³ with Phocion's flexibility in negotiation with Antipater producing benefits for Athens (e.g. *Phoc.* 27.1-5), while Cato's refusal to do the type of canvassing that could win the support of the people kept him from securing a consulship that might have prolonged the survival of the Republic (*Cato* 49.3-50.3).³⁴ The same challenge of managing relations with the people is addressed from the perspective of too much flexibility in *Ag.-Cl.-Gracchi* (*Agis* 1.1-2.6), where Plutarch presents statesmen who too readily altered course in step with the shifting desires and impulses of the people (*Agis* 1.1-2). Such men, in Plutarch's view, are in reality 'servants of the multitude' (ὕπηρέται μὲν τῶν πολλῶν), although they have the name of ruler, and they ruin themselves by losing their ability to direct policy to benefit the state (*Agis* 2.2-4).

As a group, the heroes of the *Lives* demonstrate how effective control of the people requires both a solid moral foundation and practical judgment about how to balance persuasion with 'coercion and compensation' to secure obedience. Although all of these heroes had a firm foundation in moral virtue, their success in political life varied because of differences in their ability to recognize when flexibility was essential to securing the best possible outcomes for their cities.

Plutarch also demonstrates strategies for attracting the support of people in subject cities—a challenge faced by the Emperor and provincial governors in Plutarch's day. Two examples of actions that could secure the obedience and cooperation of subject states are found in the *Lives* of Cimon and Aemilius Paulus, two statesmen who enjoyed reputations for moral integrity that inspired trust. Plutarch's description of how Cimon secured the

³³ In noting that the proper degree of flexibility requires a blend of 'gravity and reasonableness' (τὸ σέμνὸν ... τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, *Phoc.* 2.5), Plutarch names qualities emphasized in Seneca's *De clementia*.

³⁴ Cato Minor is a deterrent model of a statesman who shows too little flexibility. The key to achieving the requisite balance between severity and flexibility is practical judgment reinforced by moral integrity.

confidence of the allies and won them over from Sparta illustrates the blend of moral virtues and practical competencies that characterize Plutarch's 'mirrors':

ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις αἰεὶ παρείχε τοὺς πολίτας κόσμῳ τε θαυμαστοὺς καὶ προθυμίᾳ πολὺ πάντων διαφέροντας· ἔπειτα Πausανίου (...) τοῖς δὲ συμμάχοις τραχέως καὶ αὐθαδῶς προσφερομένου καὶ πολλὰ δι' ἐξουσίαν καὶ ὄγκον ἀνόητον ὑβρίζοντος, ὑπολαμβάνων πρῶως τοὺς ἀδικουμένους καὶ φιланθρώπως ἐξομιλῶν ἔλαθεν οὐ δι' ὅπλων τὴν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ καὶ ἡθει παρελόμενος. (*Cim.* 6.1-2)

During this campaign the citizen soldiers Cimon furnished on expeditions were always admirably disciplined and far more zealous than any others. And again, while Pausanias (...) was engaging the allies with harsh arrogance and displaying much wantonness of power and silly pretension, Cimon received with mildness those who brought their wrongs to him, treated them humanely, and so, before men were aware of it, secured the leadership of Hellas, not by force of arms, but by virtue of his address and character.

Here, as is often the case in the *Lives*, Plutarch juxtaposes the positive behaviors that win support with the negative behaviors that alienate subject peoples from their overlords. Cimon's success is linked to his replacement of the harshness and contempt of the Spartan rulers with practical assistance, frankness in negotiations and fair administration of justice. All of these qualities overlap the traits emphasized in works on good kingship, while also presenting specific actions that earn obedience and cooperation from subject states.

Other approaches that can win over subject peoples are illustrated in the career of Aemilius Paulus, who is shown treating the Greeks with courtesy and respecting their traditions and customs. This courtesy, combined with generous spending on behalf of the Greeks, earned their admiration:

θέας δὲ παντοδαπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ θυσίας ἐπιτελῶν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐστιάσεις καὶ δεῖπνα προὔθετο, χορηγία μὲν ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν ἀφθόνῳ χρώμενος, τάξιν δὲ καὶ κόσμον καὶ κατακλίσεις καὶ δεξιώσεις καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ τῆς κατ' ἄξιαν τιμῆς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης αἰσθῆσιν οὕτως ἀκριβῆ καὶ πεφροντισμένην ἐνδείκνυμενος ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰ μὴδὲ τὴν παιδιάν

ἄμοιρον ἀπολείπει σπουδῆς, ἀλλὰ τηλικαῦτα πράττων ἀνὴρ
πράγματα καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς τὸ πρέπον ἀποδίδωσιν. (*Aem.* 28.7-8)

[Aemilius] also held all sorts of games and contests and performed sacrifices to the gods, at which he gave feasts and banquets, making liberal allowances from the royal treasury, while in the arrangement and ordering of them, in saluting and seating his guests, and in paying to each one that degree of honor and kindly attention which are properly his due, he showed such nice and thoughtful perception that the Greeks were amazed, seeing that not even their pastimes were treated by him with neglect, but that, although he was a man of such great affairs, he gave even to trifling things their due attention.

Aemilius further strengthens his rapport with the Greeks by refusing to enrich himself from his victory over Perseus—a quality that brought him more praise than anything else (*Aem.* 18.10-13). Plutarch's description of the reaction of the Greeks conveys the political effectiveness of Aemilius' approach.

Spending to promote the common welfare

With regard to being solicitous about the common welfare, Plutarch's 'mirrors of political effectiveness' include pragmatic guidance on specific spending policies that foster widespread and lasting benefits for citizens. The topic of beneficial spending of public funds is discussed in *Political precepts* (818A-819B). Three episodes depicting actions to meet different challenges in city administration are found in *Pericles*, *Caesar* and *Timoleon*. In each case, Plutarch explains the practical problem that requires attention, the reasons behind the policy adopted and the effects on the people.

In *Pericles*, the rebuilding of the Acropolis, mentioned above as a source of contentiousness for Pericles, is also presented by Plutarch as a policy designed to expand employment within Athens and strengthen the city's reputation as the leader of the Greeks (*Per.* 12.4).³⁵ In this area, Pericles is shown facing challenges shared by city leaders of Plutarch's day and thereby conveys para-

³⁵ Azoulay (2014, p. 67-83) indicates that these initiatives could have reflected the inflow of revenue connected with Athens' leadership of the Delian league.

digms for pragmatic success in solving contemporary problems.³⁶ In the *Life*, Plutarch devotes two chapters (*Per.* 12-13) to details about the Acropolis project from its inception to its completion³⁷ and highlights its positive impact on employment and prosperity in a speech by Pericles defending the expense:³⁸

δεῖ δὲ τῆς πόλεως (...) εἰς ταῦτα τὴν εὐπορίαν τρέπειν αὐτῆς ἀφ' ὧν δόξα μὲν γενομένων αἰδῖος, εὐπορία δὲ γινομένων ἐτοιμία παρέσται, παντοδαπῆς ἐργασίας φανείσης, καὶ ποικίλων χρειῶν, αἱ πᾶσαν μὲν τέχνην ἐγείρουσαι, πᾶσαν δὲ χεῖρα κινουσαι, σχεδὸν ὅλην ποιοῦσιν ἔμμισθον τὴν πόλιν, ἐξ αὐτῆς ἅμα κοσμουμένην καὶ τρεφουμένην. (*Per.* 12.4)

It is proper that the city (...) apply her abundance to such works as, by their completion, will bring her everlasting glory and while in process of completion will bring that abundance into actual service, in that all sorts of activity and diversified demands arise, which rouse every art and stir every hand, and bring, as it were, the whole city under pay, so that she not only adorns, but supports herself as well from her own resources.

In a later comment, Plutarch points to other policies initiated by Pericles—such as military expeditions and public projects—that served the same purpose of providing a pretext for common laborers to enjoy a share of the public wealth (*Per.* 12.5).

In the *Lives* of *Caesar* and *Timoleon*, Plutarch's policy descriptions apply more generally to the vitality of whole regions. At *Caesar* 12.2-3, Plutarch presents Caesar's actions to stabilize conditions in Spain after his victory and to arbitrate between creditors and debtors:³⁹

³⁶ For a discussion of the responsibilities attached to different posts in civic administration and the most common liturgies, see Jones 1940, p. 172 and 247, Reynolds 1988 and Talbert 1996.

³⁷ The controversies about the sources and uses of funds for the Acropolis project speak to an issue relevant in Plutarch's day, as evidenced in Dio's own legal problems (*Or.* 40.5-7). Similar concerns about city finances are raised in Pliny's *Letters* (e.g. *epist.* 10.17 and *epist.* 10.39). See Radice 1969a and 1969b.

³⁸ Stadter (1989, p. 153-155) comments that the contemporary resonance of Pericles' explanation does not mean that it was anachronistic for fifth century Athens, but too close a comparison to twentieth century 'full employment' policies is not warranted. Frost (1964, p. 390-392) discusses the overlap between the motives attributed to Pericles and the situations confronted by city leaders in Plutarch's day.

³⁹ For a broader perspective on Caesar's policy for creditors and debtors, see Pelling 2011, p. 185.

θέμενος δὲ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου καλῶς, οὐ χεῖρον ἐβράβευε τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης, ὁμόνοιάν τε ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστάς, καὶ μάλιστα τὰς τῶν χρεωφειλετῶν καὶ δανειστῶν ἰώμενος διαφοράς. ἔταξε γὰρ τῶν προσιόντων τοῖς ὀφειλοῦσι καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν δύο μὲν μέρη τὸν δανειστὴν ἀναιρεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ λοιπῷ χρῆσθαι τὸν δεσπότην, ἄχρι ἂν οὕτως ἐκλυθῇ τὸ δάνειον. ἐπὶ τούτοις εὐδοκιμῶν ἀπηλλάγη τῆς ἐπαρχίας. (*Caes.* 12.2-3)

After bringing the war to a successful close, Caesar was equally happy in arbitrating the problems of peace by establishing concord between the cities and healing the differences between debtors and creditors. For he ordained that the creditor should annually take two thirds of his debtor's income, and that the owner of the property should use the rest, and so on until the debt was cancelled. In high repute for this administration, he retired from the province.

Plutarch's insertion of the terms of the agreement adds a pragmatic dimension that could be useful to men of his own day, who also faced the challenges of resolving tensions between creditors and debtors. The effectiveness of the action is revealed in the high repute it earned for Caesar.

Timoleon, in turn, faced three different issues in his efforts to place the newly-liberated Sicilian cities on a firm footing: distribution of land and property, re-population of the cities and the securing of resources to foster growth. Plutarch reports both the specific actions taken and Timoleon's reasons:

τὴν μὲν χώραν διένειμε, τὰς δὲ οἰκίας ἀπέδοτο χιλίων ταλάντων, ἅμα μὲν ὑπολειπόμενος τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Συρακουσίοις ἐξωνεῖσθαι τὰς αὐτῶν, ἅμα δὲ χρημάτων εὐπορίαν τῷ δήμῳ μηχανώμενος. (*Tim.* 23.6)

[Timoleon] divided the land [among the colonists] and sold the houses of the city for a thousand talents, thus at once reserving for the original Syracusans the power to purchase their own houses and devising an abundance of money for the community.

The effectiveness of these actions is reflected in the comment that Timoleon set out to free more cities after he saw that Syracuse had begun to revive and attract people (*Tim.* 23.8). Again, the ideas that Plutarch describes could all have been applied by his readers

in their own administration of provincial cities or provinces, as suggested by issues raised in Dio's *City orations* and Pliny's letters to Trajan.⁴⁰

Quelling conspiracy and insurrection

Similar attention to the pragmatic approaches to resolving problems in the best interest of the state is found in Plutarch's treatment of leaders handling conspiracy or insurrection. Plutarch treats this issue from various perspectives in the *Lives* of *Aristides*, *Agesilaus* and *Cicero* and in each case illustrates a different practical approach suited to the peculiarities of the situation at hand. Plutarch presents his heroes acting to break up conspiracies or avert revolts using various techniques that not only quashed the rebellion but also minimized the broader disruption caused in the city or the army. In each instance, success required moral restraint and shrewd judgment.

In *Aristides*, the insurrection occurs when Aristides is commander-in-chief of the Greeks at Plataea (*Arist.* 13.2). Of Plutarch's heroes, Aristides is perhaps one of the best mirrors of moral virtue—being called 'Aristides the Just'⁴¹—but his *Life* contains a number of episodes, including the insurrection at Plataea, in which he administers what can be called 'pragmatic justice', or the practice of adapting enforcement of the law to considerations of expediency in the immediate situation.⁴² In this incident, Aristides learns that revolution and agitation within the camp are being plotted by a group of Athenians who had lost wealth and influence as a result of the Persian Wars (*Arist.* 13.1). Lessons in political effectiveness are contained in Plutarch's descriptions of how Aristides assessed the situation and then resolved it. Aristides' assessment is reported first:

⁴⁰ The overlap between issues in the *Lives* and Pliny's *Letters* speaks to the pragmatic dimension of Plutarch's 'mirrors'. See Griffin 2005, p. 551-555 and Noreña 2007.

⁴¹ Plutarch discusses Aristides' constancy (ἡ εὐστάθεια), calm gentleness (ἀθορύβως καὶ πράως ἔχοντος, *Arist.* 3.3) and his reputation for justice, which earned him the moniker 'The Just' (*Arist.* 6.1-2).

⁴² Throughout the *Life*, Aristides balances expediency with moral principle and takes the action he considers most beneficial to the state, beginning with his opposition to Themistocles (*Arist.* 3.1-3).

αἰσθόμενος ὁ Ἀριστείδης καὶ φοβηθεὶς τὸν καιρὸν, ἔγων μήτ' ἔαν ἀμελούμενον τὸ πρᾶγμα μήθ' ἅπαν ἐκκαλύπτειν, ἀγνοούμενον εἰς ὅσον ἐκβήσεται πλῆθος ὁ ἔλεγχος τὸν τοῦ δικαίου ζητῶν ὅρον ἀντὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος. (*Arist.* 13.2)

When Aristides became aware of the matter, being fearful of the crisis that favored the plot, he determined not to neglect the matter, nor yet to bring it wholly to the light, since it could not be known how many would be implicated by a test that was based on justice rather than expediency.

In light of this consideration, Aristides arrests only eight of the many conspirators; of this group, he charges the two most guilty and allows them to flee the camp, while he releases the other six and says that their deeds in war will be their acquittal. He allows the rest to believe that they were undetected. The effectiveness of this strategy is implied by the fact that no further insurrections are reported.

The balancing of strict adherence to the law with 'expedient leniency' suited to the situation (i.e. 'pragmatic justice') is also illustrated in *Agésilas*, where Plutarch portrays Agesilaus confronting several threats of revolt in Sparta and, in each case, adopting a different tactic to avert disaster for the city. In the first instance, Agesilaus takes action to prevent an insurrection from forming immediately after the defeat at Leuctra, when the Spartan leaders were fearful that if they imposed penalties on the soldiers who had fled the battlefield, the soldiers, who were 'numerous and powerful' (πολλοῖς οὔσι καὶ δυνατοῖς), would stir up a revolution (*Ages.* 30.2). In this situation, Agesilaus removes the cause for insurrection when he convinces the Spartans to allow the laws to sleep for a day and then go back into force (ὅτι τοὺς νόμους δεῖ σήμερον ἔαν καθεύδειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας κυρίου εἶναι πρὸς τὸ λοιπόν)—a solution Plutarch considered the salvation of Sparta since by this means 'Agesilaus at once saved the laws for the city and the men from infamy' (ἅμα τοὺς τε νόμους τῇ πόλει καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιτίμους ἐφύλαξε, *Ages.* 30.3-4).⁴³

⁴³ In the *synkrisis* to the *Ages.-Pomp.* pair, Plutarch praises Agesilaus for this solution, stating that 'there was never any other political device like it' (οὐ γένομεν ἄλλο σόφισμα πολιτικόν, *Ages.-Pomp. Comp.* 2.2-3).

In two other instances, Agesilaus responds to conspiracies that are under way. In the first case, a group of two hundred Spartans has seized the enclosure holding the Temple of Artemis. Plutarch presents Agesilaus' assessment of the situation and the action he took to resolve it:

ἐφ' οὓς βουλομένων εὐθὺς ὠθεῖσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, φοβηθεὶς τὸν νεωτερισμὸν ὁ Ἀγησίλαος ἐκέλευσε τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν ἱματίῳ καὶ μεθ' ἑνὸς οἰκέτου προσήει, βοῶν ἄλλως ἀκηκοέναι τοῦ προστάγματος αὐτούς· οὐ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα κελεῦσαι συνελθεῖν οὐδὲ πάντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐκεῖ (δείξας ἕτερον τόπον), τοὺς δὲ ἀλλαχόσε τῆς πόλεως. οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἥσθησαν οἰόμενοι λανθάνειν, καὶ διαστάντες ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους οὓς ἐκεῖνος ἐκέλευσεν ἀπεχωρῶν. (*Ages.* 32.4)

The Spartans wished to make a dash upon them at once, but Agesilaus, fearing their insurrection, ordered the rest to keep quiet, while he himself, wearing his cloak and attended by a single servant, went towards them, crying out that they had misunderstood his order; for he had not commanded them to assemble in that place, nor in a body, but some of them yonder (pointing to another spot) and some of them in another part of the city. They were delighted to hear this, supposing that their design was undiscovered, and, breaking up, went off to the places he ordered them to occupy.

Subsequently, Agesilaus arrests about fifteen of the two hundred conspirators and puts them to death in the night (*Ages.* 32.5). The third conspiracy was larger, and Agesilaus concluded that 'it was impracticable either to bring the men to trial at a time of so much confusion or to overlook their plots' (οὓς καὶ κρίνειν ἄπορον ἦν ἐν ταραχῇ τοσαύτῃ καὶ περιορᾶν ἐπιβουλεύοντας, *Ages.* 32.6). He confers with the ephors and puts the men to death without process of the law, the first time this had ever happened in Sparta (*Ages.* 32.6). Here, again, Agesilaus applies 'pragmatic justice': he does not follow the letter of the law, but adapts his actions to circumstances and chooses the course that will best benefit his city.

Perhaps Plutarch's most complete treatment of the pros and cons of different responses to conspiracy is found in the account of the Catilinarian conspiracy (*Cic.* 20.4-21.5). A range of options is presented in the debate in the Senate, where Silanus argues that the conspirators should be thrown in prison and punished (*Cic.*

20.4), Caesar argues for leniency (20.5-21.1) and Cato argues for their execution (21.4). Cicero ultimately executes the leading conspirators without trial—another example of ‘pragmatic justice’ (*Cic.* 22.2-4). In addition to the deliberation process and the executions of Lentulus and Cethegus, Plutarch describes the praise Cicero earned by minimizing the broader damage to Rome:

οὐ γὰρ τὸ κωλύσαι τὰ πραττόμενα καὶ κολάσαι τοὺς πράττοντας ἐδόκει θαυμαστόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν πώποτε νεωτερισμῶν οὗτος ἐλαχίστοις κακοῖς ἄνευ στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς κατέσβεσε. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Κατρίλιναν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν συνερρηκότων πρὸς αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷ πυθέσθαι τὰ περὶ Λέντλον καὶ Κέθηγον ἐγκαταλιπόντες ὤχοντο. (*Cic.* 22.7-8)

It was not his preventing their schemes and punishing the schemers that seemed so wonderful, but his quenching of the greatest of all revolutions with the fewest possible evils, without sedition and commotion. For most men who had flocked to Catiline’s standard, as soon as they learned the fate of Lentulus and Cethegus, deserted him and left.

This comment reflects the criteria Plutarch applies in his presentation of all of the episodes describing how cities were saved from insurrections.

These episodes illustrate key techniques used by Plutarch to portray his heroes as mirrors of political effectiveness: in reporting the analysis of the leader or the deliberations of a group, a given situation is examined from different perspectives and the policy chosen is thereby presented as the one deemed most suitable to deal with the problem. By then detailing the process of implementation that led to the ultimate outcome, Plutarch completes his illustration of political effectiveness in action.

Insubordination and discontent in the army

Plutarch’s portraits of statesmen in the *Lives* also provide mirrors of effectiveness for men holding positions of military command. As in the case of his statesmen exercising authority in civic matters, Plutarch’s best generals unite a foundation of moral integrity with practical competencies that enable them to produce military victories while preserving harmony within their armies. Plutarch

also portrays ‘deterrent’ mirrors of generals whose defeats can be traced to factors such as a failure to control anger, an inability to command obedience in the ranks or misjudgments about military strategy.⁴⁴ One of the challenges most frequently encountered by generals in the *Lives* is insubordination or discontent among the officers or soldiers, especially when they disagree with their commanding general on the proper strategy for defeating the enemy. The pragmatic issue for the general is how to bring a disgruntled subordinate back into the fold—an especially important problem if a young man has the potential to produce great benefits for the state. *Fabius* and *Pompey* provide a wide array of positive and negative paradigms of actions to take or avoid in such situations.

In *Fabius Maximus*, Plutarch delivers three instructive paradigms of how to effectively deal with different forms of insubordination. One approach is illustrated in Plutarch’s depiction of Fabius’ conflict with Minucius, which passes through two phases. Initially, when Minucius, as Fabius’ Master of Horse, disobeys orders not to attack Hannibal, Fabius intends to punish Minucius but is prevented from doing so when the Romans name Minucius a co-dictator (*Fab.* 9.1-3). Subsequently, as co-dictator, Minucius attacks Hannibal again and is only saved from disaster by Fabius’ timely intervention (*Fab.* 12.3-4). Key lessons in political effectiveness are found in Fabius’ actions after Minucius has been named co-dictator. First, Fabius not only anticipates that Minucius will attack Hannibal imprudently, but also makes preparations to salvage the situation should it become necessary (*Fab.* 12.1). Secondly, when the time comes and Fabius orders his army to intercede to save Minucius and his army, he does not criticize Minucius but instead speaks highly of him and imputes honorable motives to his conduct:

τὰς δὲ σημαίας ἐκφέρειν κατὰ τάχος καὶ τὸν στρατὸν ἔπεσθαι
κελεύσας ἀνεβόησε· ἔνυν τις, ὃ στρατιῶται, Μάρκου Μινουκίου
μεμνημένος ἐπειγέσθω· λαμπρὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ καὶ φιλόπατρις. εἰ δέ

⁴⁴ For instance, Plutarch ties Leuctra to Agesilaus’ inability to control his anger and resentment (*Ages.* 26.4; 23.5); Demetrius’ loss to Pyrrhus to the defection of troops tired of fighting to support his lifestyle (*Dtr.* 46.5-6) and Varro’s defeat at Cannae to his misjudgment of Hannibal (*Fab.* 14.1-16.8).

τι σπεύδων ἐξελάσαι τοὺς πολεμίους ἡμαρτεν, αὖθις αἰτιασόμεθα'.
(*Fab.* 12.2)

Then ordering the standards to be swiftly advanced and the army to follow, he called out with a loud voice, 'Now, my soldiers, let every man be mindful of Marcus Minucius and press on to his aid; for he is a brilliant man and a lover of his country. And if his ardent desire to drive away the enemy has led him into any error, we will charge him with it later'.

Plutarch further emphasizes Fabius' restraint when, after the battle, Fabius simply despoils the enemy and returns to his camp 'without indulging in a single haughty or invidious word about his colleague' (οὐδὲν ὑπερήφανον οὐδ' ἐπαχθές εἰπὼν περὶ τοῦ συνάρχοντος, *Fab.* 13.1). The effectiveness of this approach is shown by Minucius' actions after he has been saved. He respectfully submits himself and his army to Fabius (*Fab.* 13.3) and, in two direct speeches, first communicates the lessons learned to his army (*Fab.* 13.1-2) and then expresses gratitude to Fabius and honors him by calling him 'Father' (*Fab.* 13.4-5).

In two other episodes, Plutarch addresses the problem of responding constructively to a particular soldier's discontent or insubordination. Fabius is portrayed as a mirror of political effectiveness in this area when he deals effectively with discontented, but capable, allied soldiers. At *Fab.* 20.1, Plutarch reports the general principle that guided Fabius' actions:

τὰς δ' ἀποστάσεις τῶν πόλεων καὶ τὰ κινήματα τῶν συμμάχων ὁ Φάβιος μᾶλλον ᾤετο δεῖν ἡπίως ὁμιλοῦντα καὶ πρῶως ἀνείργειν καὶ δυσωπεῖν, μὴ πᾶσαν ὑπόνοιαν ἐλέγχοντα καὶ χαλεπὸν ὄντα παντάπασι τοῖς ὑπόπτοις. (*Fab.* 20.1)

Fabius thought that the revolts of the cities and the agitations of the allies ought to be restrained and discountenanced by mild and gentle measures, without testing every suspicion and showing harshness in every case to the suspected.

This principle is illustrated with two instances where Fabius' actions produced positive outcomes. First, when Fabius learns that a capable Marsian soldier was talking about deserting to the enemy, he does not get angry: instead, he admits that the soldier's valor had been 'unduly neglected' (ἡμελῆσθαι παρ' ἀξίαν) and that his dissatisfaction 'was the fault of the commanders who distrib-

uted their honors by favor rather than for valor' (τοὺς ἡγεμόνας αἰτιᾶσθαι πρὸς χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὰς τιμὰς νέμοντας, *Fab.* 20.2)—a view that echoes Philip's attitude in the passage from *Sayings and commanders* (177E) discussed above. Similarly, as in the incident with Philip, after Fabius has rewarded the disgruntled soldier for his bravery, the young man becomes one of the most zealous and loyal men in Fabius' service (*Fab.* 21.1-2). In the second case, Fabius learns that a Lucanian soldier has been leaving his post. Here, Fabius first enquires about what kind of soldier the Lucanian is and then asks why a courageous soldier would be taking such risks. Upon discovering that the soldier was in love, he brings the girl to camp and tells the soldier he can atone for his transgressions by deeds of valor (*Fab.* 20.4-6). In both of these examples, the key lessons in political effectiveness lie in Fabius' analysis of a situation before taking action and in the link between the action and its ultimate impact on the conduct of the soldiers and the welfare of the state.

In *Pompey*, in contrast, Plutarch supplies one of his 'deterrent' mirrors of ineffective generalship, with Pompey portrayed as a general who, unlike Fabius, is unable to deal with discontent and criticism and, as a result, suffers defeat at Pharsalus. The importance of the pragmatic dimension of Plutarch's portrayal of Pompey as a 'mirror' for generals is reflected in the extensive treatment given to the motives and judgments behind Pompey's decision to engage Caesar at Pharsalus. By describing Pompey's independent assessment of the situation (*Pomp.* 66), the deliberations among the Romans (*Pomp.* 68), the preparations for battle (*Pomp.* 68-69) and the battle itself (*Pomp.* 71-72), Plutarch conveys a well-rounded portrait of the strategic options and rejected alternatives that formed the backdrop for the final decision that led to the defeat. Ultimately, Pompey's failure to follow his own assessment that battle should not be waged at that time is linked to his inability to withstand the ridicule and denunciations of his officers (*Pomp.* 67.3-4). His decision to act against his own better judgment receives pointed criticism from Plutarch as an inexcusable breach of effective generalship:

ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλὰ λέγοντες ἄνδρα δόξης ἡττονα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς φίλους αἰδοῦς τὸν Πομπήϊον ἐξεβιάσαντο καὶ συνεπεσπάσαντο ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐλπίσι καὶ ὀρμαῖς ἐπακολουθῆσαι,

προέμενον τοὺς ἀρίστους λογισμούς, ὅπερ οὐδὲ πλοίου κυβερνήτη, μήτιγε τοσούτων ἐθνῶν καὶ δυνάμεων αὐτοκράτορι στρατηγῷ παθεῖν ἦν προσήκον. ὁ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἰατρῶν τοὺς μηδέποτε χαρίζομένους ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπήνεσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ τῷ νοσοῦντι τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐνέδωκε, δείσας ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ λυπηρὸς γενέσθαι. (*Pomp.* 67.4-5)

With these and many similar speeches they forced Pompey from his settled purpose—a man who was a slave to fame and to shame before his friends, who dragged him into following after their own hopes and impulses, abandoning his best laid plans, a thing which even in the master of a ship, to say nothing of a general in sole command of so many nations and armies, would have been unbecoming. Pompey himself approved of those physicians who never gratify the desires of their patients, and yet he yielded to the diseased passion of his followers, for fear of causing distress if he tried to heal and save them.

This point is amplified in the *synkrisis* (*Ages.-Pomp. Comp.* 4.2-3), where Plutarch traces Pompey's failure at Pharsalus to an inability to stand by his best plans in the face of ridicule—a defect pardonable, perhaps, in a young, inexperienced commander, but not in a general like Pompey the Great.

Inspiring troops at times of peril

Another challenge faced by Plutarch's generals—and shared by military leaders of his day—was securing the obedience of troops under all conditions in camp and in battle. In several *Lives*, Plutarch illustrates specific actions that inspire troops. For instance, in *Caesar*, Plutarch attaches the loyalty and invincibility of Caesar's armies to specific practices by Caesar that produced this dedication in his army:

τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λήματα καὶ τὰς φιλοτιμίας αὐτὸς ἀνέθρεψε καὶ κατεσκεύασε Καῖσαρ, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν ἀφειδῶς ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι τὸν πλοῦτον οὐκ εἰς τρυφὴν ἰδίαν οὐδέ τινας ἡδυπαθείας ἐκ τῶν πολέμων ἀθροίζει. (...) ἔπειτα τῷ πάντα μὲν κίνδυνον ἐκὼν ὑφίστασθαι, πρὸς μηδένα δὲ τῶν πόνων ἀπαγορεύειν. (*Caes.* 17.1)

Such spirit and zeal Caesar himself created and cultivated in his men, in the first place, because he showed, by his unpar-

ing bestowal of reward and honors, that he was not amassing wealth from his wars for his own luxury and for any life of ease (...) and, in the second place, by willingly undergoing every danger and refusing no toil.

Similarly, Antony's ability to attract intense loyalty from his troops is also linked to specific qualities and actions, including his simplicity of manner (ἀπλότης), his love of giving and the largeness of his giving (τὸ φιλόδωρον καὶ μεγαλόδωρον) and his complaisance in affairs of pleasure or social intercourse (ἡ περὶ τὰς παιδίας καὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας εὐτραπέλεια, *Ant.* 43.3). These qualities enabled Antony to acquire three of the most critical elements of effective generalship—respect, obedience and goodwill (αἰδῶς ... καὶ πειθαρχία μετ' εὐνοίας, *Ant.* 43.2)—and to attract loyalty from men of all backgrounds and ranks that 'left even the ancient Romans nothing to surpass' (οὐδὲ τοῖς πάλαι Ῥωμαίοις ἀπέλιπεν ὑπερβολήν, *Ant.* 43.2). This dedication was reflected in his troops continuing to fight at Actium long after he had abandoned them.⁴⁵

At times, securing the obedience of soldiers also requires the ability to inspire troops in situations that are fearsome. Across the *Lives*, Plutarch illustrates a variety of tactics that could be effective in such circumstances, all of which share an element of theatricality on the part of generals who feign fearlessness in the face of a formidable enemy in order to inspire confidence in their troops. Three examples of such 'pragmatic theatricality' are found in *Timoleon*, *Aemilius* and *Fabius*. In an episode that echoes Epaminondas' behavior in the passage from *Sayings of kings and commanders* (192F-193A) discussed earlier, Timoleon must attach a positive interpretation to an omen. When Timoleon's army, on its way to confronting the Carthaginians at Crimesus, encounters mules laden with parsley, the soldiers become fearful because they associated parsley with death (*Tim.* 26.1-2). Plutarch states that in order to 'free his soldiers from superstitious fears and take away their despondency' (ἀπαλλάξαι τῆς δεισδαιμονίας καὶ τὴν δυσελπιστείαν ἀφελεῖν), Timoleon linked the parsley to the wreaths of victory at the Isthmian games and placed a wreath of parsley on his own head, inducing his officers and soldiers to

⁴⁵ Antony's army at Actium holds out for more than a week before going over to Octavian (*Ant.* 68.3).

follow suit (*Tim.* 26.2-5). In another instance, when Timoleon wants to attack an enemy in disarray even though his own army is fatigued from a long march, he inspires his troops by taking his shield, putting himself at the head and leading them 'as if to certain victory' (ὥσπερ ἐπὶ νίκην πρόδηλον), and the soldiers followed, 'emboldened by his example' (τεθαρρηκότες, *Tim.* 12.6-7).

Aemilius, in turn, engages in theatrics to inspire his troops before Pydna. Although he is 'possessed by amazement and fear' (ἐκπληξίς αὐτὸν ἔσχε καὶ δέος) when he observes Perseus' army (*Aem.* 19.2), Aemilius 'shows his soldiers a glad and cheerful countenance' (πρὸς τοὺς μαχομένους ἐπιδεικνύμενος ἴλεω καὶ φαιδρὸν ἑαυτὸν), riding in front of them without his helmet or breastplate (*Aem.* 19.3). Hannibal presents yet another approach when he tells a joke to dispel fear and tension in his officers and soldiers as they contemplate the vast Roman army at Cannae:

εἰπόντος δὲ τινος τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀνδρὸς ἰσοτίμου, τοῦνομα Γίσκωνος, ὡς θαυμαστὸν αὐτῷ φαίνεται τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολεμίων, συναγαγὼν τὸ πρόσωπον ὁ Ἀννίβας, 'ἕτερον', εἶπεν, 'ὦ Γίσκων, λέληθέ σε τούτου θαυμασιώτερον'. ἐρομένου δὲ τοῦ Γίσκωνος, τὸ ποῖον; 'ὅτι', ἔφη, 'τούτων ὄντων τοσούτων οὐδεὶς ἐν αὐτοῖς Γίσκων καλεῖται'. γενομένου δὲ παρὰ δόξαν αὐτοῖς τοῦ σκώμματος ἐμπίπτει γέλως πᾶσι, καὶ κατέβαινον ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου τοῖς ἀπαντῶσιν αἰεὶ τὸ πεπαιγμένον ἀπαγγέλλοντες, ὥστε διὰ πολλῶν πολλὴν εἶναι τὸν γέλωτα καὶ μὴδ' ἀναλαβεῖν ἑαυτοὺς δύνασθαι τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀννίβαν. (*Fab.* 15.2-3)

When one of his companions, named Gisco, a man of equal rank, remarked that the number of the enemy amazed him, Hannibal put on a serious look and said: 'Gisco, another thing has escaped your notice which is more amazing still'. And when Gisco asked what it was, Hannibal said, 'It is the fact that in this entire multitude there is no one who is called Gisco'. The jest took them all by surprise and set them laughing, and as they made their way down from the ridge, they reported the pleasantries to all who met them, so that great numbers were laughing heartily and Hannibal's escort could not even recover themselves.

Plutarch's lesson for generals lies in his description of the reaction of the soldiers: Plutarch reports that the sight of Hannibal and his staff laughing 'infused courage' (θάρσος παρίσθη) into the

Carthaginians, who reasoned that their general must have contempt for the enemy 'if he laughed and jested so in the presence of danger' (γελάων οὕτως καὶ παίζειν τῷ στρατηγῷ παρὰ τὸν κίνδυνον, *Fab.* 15.3). Such pragmatic theatrical tricks are a key aspect of the 'mirrors of political (and military) effectiveness' across the *Lives*.

Conclusion

This review of Plutarch's treatises and episodes from the *Lives* has attempted to demonstrate that Plutarch's 'mirrors for princes' were designed not only to stimulate moral virtue in leaders, but also to demonstrate specific strategies and tactics for resolving practical challenges faced by men handling political and military affairs. The heroes are presented as men of moral integrity, who blend virtues in many areas with very few vices. The qualities emphasized in other works on good kingship are prominent, including temperance, justice, mildness, humanity, magnanimity and indifference to wealth. However, in Plutarch's 'mirrors', these qualities are the foundation upon which each hero displays the practical competencies and shrewd strategic judgment that enable him to identify the best policy in each situation and to persuade others to follow his lead. Political effectiveness requires both elements.

The pragmatic dimension to Plutarch's mirrors is reflected in how his heroes deploy other statesmen as guides to their actions. For example, when Plutarch criticizes Pompey for not using Fabius, Marius, Lucullus or Agesilaus as a guide to deciding whether or not to fight at Pharsalus,⁴⁶ he indirectly reveals the pragmatic contexts in which he envisions readers 'mirroring' the heroes:

ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μὲν πεδία μυρίας δὲ πόλεις καὶ γῆν ἄπλετον ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν εὐπορία παρέσχε βουλομένῳ μιμῆσθαι Μάξιμον καὶ Μάριον καὶ Λεύκολλον καὶ αὐτὸν Ἀγησίλαον, ὃς οὐκ ἐλάττονας μὲν ἐν Σπάρτῃ θορύβους ὑπέμεινε βουλομένων Ὀθηβαίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας μάχεσθαι, (...) χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ὡς ἐβούλετο λογισμοῖς. (*Ages.-Pomp. Comp.* 4.4-6)

⁴⁶ Plutarch suggests that he should have imitated them as effective generals, not as men who excelled in a particular moral virtue. Indeed, the moral character of these four generals varied widely.

There were many plains, ten thousand cities and a whole earth that his great resources by sea afforded him had he wished to imitate Maximus or Marius or Lucullus or Agesilaus himself, who withstood no less tumults in Sparta when its citizens wished to fight with the Thebans (...) but he followed his own best counsels as he wished.

Other references to heroes as models of effectiveness are found in the comparisons of Alcibiades in his second exile to Themistocles (*Alc.* 32.4) and Aristides (*Cor.-Alc. Comp.* 2.4) and in Phocion's desire to emulate Pericles, Solon and Aristides as leaders who excelled in both oratory and generalship (*Phoc.* 7.3). In these cases, the hero's goal is to be more effective in action, rather than to cultivate virtue.

The incidents discussed above have been drawn from a variety of episodes across the *Parallel lives* in which Plutarch incorporates practical details on how his hero assessed strategic alternatives, brought strategies to fruition and inspired others to follow his lead. These incidents, however, touch on only a few of the many difficulties of exercising power addressed in the *Lives*. Other challenges, such as how to handle pressures for favors from friends or how to manage alliances and rivalries, are also built into Plutarch's 'mirrors of political effectiveness'. By treating a wide array of pragmatic problems confronted by men in power of every era—in addition to highlighting essential moral virtues—Plutarch substantially enhanced the potential benefits leaders could derive from the 'mirrors for princes' genre.

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Abstract

In the *Parallel Lives*, Plutarch refers to his portrayals of statesmen as 'mirrors' in which readers can assess themselves and make adjustments to their behavior (*Aem.* 1.1). While the *Lives* are widely recognized

for depicting leaders who manifest essential virtues in their public and private actions—in which respect they could be viewed as ‘mirrors of moral virtue’—less attention has been paid to Plutarch’s illustration of attitudes and tactics that enable leaders to successfully meet the practical challenges of ruling and producing the best outcomes for the ruled. In this paper, I discuss how Plutarch’s statesmen also serve as ‘mirrors of political effectiveness’ for political leaders of his own day. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part briefly reviews Plutarch’s treatment of the qualities of a ‘good ruler’ and his primary duties as presented in the *Moralia*. In the treatises dedicated to political concerns, Plutarch addresses many themes raised in other works on kingship in his era, such as those by Seneca, Dio and Pliny. The second part focuses on Plutarch’s portrayal of leadership in the *Parallel lives*, where moral themes are integrated with the practical aspects of effective rule, such as managing relations between leaders and the people, between hegemonies and subject states and between generals and their armies. Drawing primarily on *Pericles-Fabius*, *Agessilaus-Pompey* and *Aemilius-Timoleon*, I show how Plutarch used historical statesmen to illustrate political effectiveness in five areas: (1) winning the people and subject states to obedience; (2) fostering prosperity in cities and provinces; (3) putting down insurrections; (4) dealing with insubordination and (5) inspiring troops at times of great danger. By describing not only what a statesman or general accomplished in each case, but also how he deliberated alternatives, chose a particular policy and executed his plans, Plutarch created ‘mirrors of political effectiveness’ in which provincial governors, city archons or generals—or even Emperors—could see themselves and improve their effectiveness in office.

LA TRADITION DU MIROIR AU PRINCE ET LA FIGURE DU BON CHEF CHEZ DION CASSIUS*

Le projet d'historien de Dion Cassius semble être lié, dès le début, au pouvoir romain. Ce sont en effet les encouragements prodigués par Septime Sévère pour son histoire des guerres civiles de 193-197 qui l'ont poussé à entreprendre une histoire des Romains de l'origine à son temps¹. Sa brillante carrière de sénateur lui permit d'avoir une relative proximité avec plusieurs princes de la dynastie sévérienne: il fut gratifié du titre d'*amicus* par Septime Sévère et Caracalla², et obtint en 229 l'honneur d'exercer un second consulat, ordinaire, avec Sévère Alexandre pour collègue. Dans les livres de l'*Histoire romaine* relatifs à l'Empire, l'importance de la figure de l'empereur est remarquable: l'historien partageait avec ses contemporains, comme l'a souligné L. de Blois, la conviction que le bonheur et la stabilité de l'Empire romain reposaient sur la personne, le comportement et le gouvernement du prince³.

Sous le Haut-Empire, l'existence de discours destinés à l'empereur, pour lui expliquer les attentes des différentes composantes de l'élite (le peuple étant rarement pris en compte, ou bien 'repré-

* Je remercie les participants au colloque pour leurs remarques, Stéphane Benoist pour sa relecture et les relecteurs qui ont expertisé mon article pour leurs suggestions.

¹ D. C. 73.23.1-4; cf. 79.10.1-2, sur le songe envoyé par Septime Sévère à Dion Cassius, pour lui dire de rapporter aussi les événements postérieurs à sa mort, concernant Caracalla. La vocation d'historien de Dion Cassius semble avoir été engendrée par l'écriture d'un opuscule *Sur les rêves et les présages* ayant annoncé l'accession au pouvoir de Septime Sévère. Voir notamment Freyburger-Galland 2003; Millar 2005, p. 29-35.

² Millar 1964, p. 17-18.

³ De Blois 1998a, p. 3412-3413, 3441-3443. Voir aussi Pelling 1997.

senté' par le Sénat), est bien attestée: on peut mentionner, vers la fin de l'année 55, le premier traité *Sur la clémence* de Sénèque dont la tentative s'est soldée par un échec expliquant sans doute le silence, ou bien les jugements critiques portés sur le philosophe dans l'historiographie postérieure, les *actiones gratiarum* prononcées au Sénat plusieurs fois par an par les nouveaux consuls ordinaires ou suffects, dont est issu le *Panegyrique* de Pline le Jeune, daté dans les années qui ont suivi 100, les discours *Sur la royauté* de Dion de Pruse, dont le premier a été prononcé devant Trajan également vers 100⁴. La fin du premier siècle a connu un renouveau de la réflexion politique, après la crise constituée par le meurtre de Domitien, premier empereur dont la mémoire a été officiellement abolie par le Sénat, et par la fin de la dynastie flavienne⁵. Ces discours que l'on peut qualifier de miroirs au prince représentent, sous le Haut-Empire, des *media* privilégiés pour exprimer une pensée politique centrée sur la *persona* du prince. Ils sont composés d'un mélange de conseils et d'éloge. En parallèle, les discours grecs d'éloge au prince se sont multipliés au II^e siècle sous les Antonins⁶. Les règles de ces βασιλικοί λόγοι ont été exposées par le Pseudo-Ménandre probablement à la fin du III^e siècle; ils sont aussi dotés d'une dimension parénétique puisqu'ils reposent sur le développement des grandes vertus royales. Cette floraison des éloges au prince n'est peut-être pas étrangère à la réputation d'âge d'or qu'a laissée la dynastie antonine.

Dans son article sur les *Fürstenspiegel*, Pierre Hadot range dans la catégorie des miroirs au prince aussi bien les grands textes du I^{er} siècle que j'ai évoqués, que les éloges, y compris naturellement les βασιλικοί λόγοι⁷. Le vaste corpus qu'il a rassemblé engage d'abord à préciser les critères qui permettent d'identifier les miroirs au prince de l'Antiquité, avant d'examiner la présence, chez Dion Cassius, de cette tradition parénétique et laudative qui est déjà bien fournie quand l'historien rédige son œuvre, au début du

⁴ Gangloff 2016. Selon des sources byzantines, Dion Cassius serait, par sa mère, le petit-fils ou le neveu de Dion de Pruse.

⁵ Béranger 1965, p. 29.

⁶ Pernot 2011; Pernot 2003 sur les rapports entre les *Ecrits pour lui-même* et le miroir au prince.

⁷ Hadot 1972. Voir aussi Schulte 2001, p. 9-18 et 249-261; pour une approche critique récente de la notion de 'miroir au prince': Haake 2015.

III^e siècle. On se demandera quels sont les passages de l'*Histoire romaine* qui relèvent du miroir au prince; quel idéal politique donnent-ils à voir? Et comment l'historien s'insère-t-il à son tour dans cette tradition des conseils au prince?

Miroirs au prince, éloges et conseils chez Dion Cassius

Les miroirs au prince de l'Antiquité posent un problème de définition: le genre n'est en effet pas identifié par un titre avant le Moyen-Age, même si ses racines antiques sont indéniables, comme l'a bien montré P. Hadot⁸. Ce type de discours peut être défini par ses dimensions performative et prescriptive, dans la mesure où, dans l'Antiquité, il est composé par une figure de conseiller—le plus souvent un philosophe ou un spécialiste de rhétorique—qui expose au souverain sa conception de la royauté idéale, dans l'objectif que ses conseils soient appliqués. Il convient aussi d'insister sur sa dimension spéculaire. Elle a été soulignée par Sénèque au début du premier traité *Sur la clémence*, ouvrage qui paraît fondamental dans la constitution d'un genre dit des miroirs au prince: *scribere de clementia, Nero Caesar, institui, ut quodam modo speculi uice fungerer et te tibi ostenderem peruenturum ad uoluptatem maximam omnium*, 'J'ai entrepris ce traité sur la clémence, Néron César, pour faire en quelque sorte office de miroir et t'acheminer, en t'offrant ton image, à la volupté la plus grande qui soit au monde'⁹.

Sénèque s'inscrit ici dans une tradition philosophique exploitant l'aspect pédagogique et parénétique du miroir qui permet à l'homme de se connaître, de s'apprécier et, éventuellement, de se corriger¹⁰. Le plaisir qu'il souligne est celui du sage se réjouissant

⁸ Hadot 1972, col. 556. Voir Jónsson 1995, p. 158-159, 211; Pernot 2003, p. 91-92.

⁹ Sen., *clem.* 1.1, trad. Fr. Préchac, CUF. Voir notamment Charles-Saget 1987; Armisen-Marchetti 2006; Schofield 2015, p. 68-71, qui renvoie pour l'image du miroir à Cic., *rep.* 2.69.

¹⁰ Sen., *nat.* 1.17.1, témoigne de ce que les miroirs étaient objet d'une réflexion philosophique. Il s'intéresse surtout à son aspect pédagogique et moral (§ 4): *inuenta sunt specula, ut homo ipse se nosset, multa ex hoc consecuturus, primum sui notitiam, deinde ad quaedam consilium: formosus, ut uitaret infamiam; deformis, ut sciret redimendum esse uirtutibus quicquid corpori deesset; iuuenis, ut flore aetatis admoneretur illud tempus esse discendi et fortia audendi; senex, ut inde-*

de sa perfection morale¹¹, mais aussi celui d'un jeune prince jubilant de sa supériorité sur la foule de ses sujets et de son pouvoir:¹² ce plaisir est aussi bien sûr lié à l'éloge rhétorique, qui idéalise le vrai Néron et doit lui donner envie de correspondre à cet idéal.

Cette dimension spéculaire est également très importante chez Pline et chez Dion de Pruse, et toujours étroitement associée à l'éloge. Le *Panegyrique* de Pline décrit en effet une communication en miroir entre le prince, les sénateurs et les dieux, et Dion de Pruse, dans le fameux mythe d'Héraclès à la croisée des chemins, donne à voir dans le héros un portrait idéalisé de Trajan¹³. Le caractère spéculaire est essentiel dans la pédagogie du miroir au prince, qui, dans l'Antiquité, repose sur l'imitation.

Chez Dion Cassius, ce qui ressemble le plus à un miroir au prince au sens strict du terme, c'est-à-dire défini par cette triple dimension performative, prescriptive et spéculaire, est naturellement le discours de Mécène à Octavien au début du livre 52:¹⁴ un *amicus principis* conseille au premier personnage de la République romaine, au lendemain des guerres civiles (en 29 av. J.-C. dans le texte), de devenir un monarque idéal. Ce miroir présente une double particularité: il exploite une autre tradition formelle de la pensée politique grecque, celle du débat constitutionnel, que l'on connaît depuis Hérodote¹⁵. Et il a au moins une double contextualisation historique: il renvoie en effet à la période d'Octavien/Auguste et à celle de la dynastie sévérienne¹⁶. Il est tentant

cora canis deponeret, ut de morte aliquid cogitaret, 'Les miroirs ont été inventés pour que l'homme se connût lui-même. Bien des avantages en devaient résulter pour lui. Tout d'abord, cette connaissance même de sa personne. En outre, dans certains cas, de sages conseils: beau, il évitera ce qui le dégraderait; laid, il sait qu'il faut compenser les défauts du corps par les qualités morales; jeune, l'épanouissement de l'âge l'avertit que c'est pour lui le moment d'apprendre et d'oser de vaillantes actions; vieillard, il renoncera à ce qui déshonore ses cheveux blancs et tournera quelquefois sa pensée vers la mort', trad. P. Oltramare; voir aussi *dial.* 4.36, 1; Perrot 2003, p. 92.

¹¹ D. L. 7.86, à propos du plaisir du sage qui correspond parfaitement à lui-même.

¹² Sen., *clem.* 1.1-4.

¹³ Plin., *paneg.* 71.7-8, et 74; D. Chr. 1.59, et 61-63.

¹⁴ D. C. 52.14-40.

¹⁵ Hdt. 3.80-83.

¹⁶ Le contexte d'énonciation du discours renvoie bien à la période entre l'après Actium (sept. 31 av. J.-C.), où Octavien, maître du monde, exerce un *imperium*

de voir derrière la figure d'Octavien/Auguste celle de Septime Sévère, fondateur d'une nouvelle dynastie après une crise politique qui s'est aussi traduite par des guerres civiles. Selon Alison Cooley, Septime Sévère s'est particulièrement inspiré de la politique d'Auguste, notamment dans ses projets de construction¹⁷. L'arc de Septime Sévère, érigé en 203 sur le Forum, témoigne de la volonté de cet empereur qui s'est rattaché à la dynastie des 'bons princes' antonins de lier ses victoires militaires et celles de Caracalla à leurs vertus personnelles, comme c'était le cas aussi sur le bouclier des vertus d'Auguste¹⁸. Certaines mesures conseillées par Mécène, comme celle qui concerne la provincialisation de l'Italie, sont des projections pour le futur, probablement en cours de discussion à la cour des Sévères, ce qui suggère que le discours de Mécène était adressé par Dion Cassius, au-delà d'Auguste et de Septime Sévère, peut-être au prince sous le règne duquel il écrivait ce passage (Sévère Alexandre?) ou, plus probablement, à un 'prince idéal', de même qu'un écrivain s'adresse à son 'lecteur idéal'¹⁹.

consulaire, et janvier 27 av. J.-C., où il devient Auguste: on peut penser en effet à l'*aureus* du British Museum daté de 28 av. J.-C., qui porte sur le revers la légende *leges et iura p(opulo/i) R(omano/i) restituit*, 'il a rendu au peuple romain ses lois et ses droits' ou bien 'il a rétabli les lois et droits du peuple romain': Rich & Williams 1999. Selon Suet., *Aug.* 28, Auguste aurait songé deux fois à rétablir la République, après la chute d'Antoine et quand il était gravement malade (en 23 av. J.-C.); mais il s'est rendu compte qu'il aurait été trop dangereux pour lui de retourner dans la vie privée, et pour l'Etat de tomber dans une multiplicité de mains: les deux arguments sont exploités par Mécène chez Dion Cassius, qui, selon Millar 1964, p. 105, aurait pu s'inspirer de ce passage; Manuwald 1979, p. 85 n. 48, a objecté que Suétone n'était pas une source de Dion Cassius, et Reinhold 1988, p. 166, a suggéré l'existence d'une source commune. Pour les renvois à Auguste et aux Sévères, voir notamment, parmi une riche bibliographie, Meyer 1891; Bleicken 1962, p. 444-467; Millar 1964, p. 102-118; Espinoza Ruiz 1982, p. 273-468; Roddaz 1983, p. 67-87; Reinhold 1988, p. 180-210.

¹⁷ Cooley 2007, p. 393-394.

¹⁸ *CIL* VI 1033: *ob rem publicam restitutam imperiumque populi Romani propagatum insignibus uirtutibus eorum domi forisque*, 'pour avoir rétabli la République et développé l'Empire du peuple romain par les remarquables vertus dont ils ont fait preuve dans Rome et à l'extérieur', trad. personnelle.

¹⁹ Reinhold 1988, p. 180-182, résume le débat sur la datation; il est lui-même plutôt favorable à une datation tardive, sous Sévère Alexandre, parce qu'il voit des allusions à Macrin et à Elagabal dans le discours. Ces allusions, certes, ont un caractère très général, cependant la cohérence entre le portrait du bon prince d'après Mécène et les jugements de Dion Cassius sur les empereurs de la période sévérienne nous incitent à le suivre. Le fait que Dion Cassius est favorable à la monarchie (au pouvoir d'un seul) a été bien établi: voir en particulier le passage

La seconde hypothèse semble préférable en raison du regard pessimiste que l'historien a posé sur son époque, caractérisée à ses yeux par la violence et la guerre²⁰. Le discours de Mécène était aussi destiné, plus largement, à un public de lecteurs cultivés, issu de la cour et des élites civiques, qui à cette époque était sensibilisé à ce type de réflexion politique, comme le montrent les parallèles que l'on peut tracer entre les conseils de Mécène et ceux d'Apollonios de Tyane aux empereurs—surtout à Vespasien—dans la *Vie d'Apollonios de Tyane* rédigée par Philostrate à la demande de Julia Domna, mais achevée après la mort de l'impératrice en 217²¹.

Il s'agit donc d'un discours figuré (ἔσχηματισμενος), mettant en scène un Auguste symbole du principat, considéré comme la figure de référence—voire le modèle à imiter—par tous les empereurs²². Dans cette perspective, on peut identifier un second miroir au prince, qui est le non moins fameux discours que Livie adresse à son époux, au livre 55, pour le persuader d'adopter une politique de clémence, après la découverte du complot de Cinna (daté vers 16-13 av. J.-C)²³. Ce discours fait écho au premier traité sur la clémence de Sénèque, qui utilise, de manière plus brève, cet épisode en exemple de la *clementia principis*²⁴.

D'autres passages de l'*Histoire romaine* présentent des figures de référence du pouvoir impérial, mais non la situation d'énonciation du miroir au prince, dans laquelle un conseiller cherchait à persuader un prince de se conduire de manière exemplaire,

qui suit l'assassinat de César, où Dion Cassius fait le bilan de la politique menée par le dictateur (D. C. 44.1-2).

²⁰ Ce regard pessimiste est notamment exprimé par l'idée de la déchéance cyclique qui a lieu depuis le règne de Marc Aurèle (D. C. 71.36.4), et par la fin assez énigmatique de l'*Histoire romaine* sur une citation d'Homère, *Il.* 11.163-164 (selon un ordre donné en songe par la divinité): 'Zeus cependant soustrait Hector aux javelines, à la poussière, au massacre, au sang, au tumulte' (trad. P. Mazon), qui peut signifier que seule la divinité pourrait arrêter les guerres et désordres dans lesquels vivent les contemporains de Dion Cassius.

²¹ Flinterman 1995, p. 217-225 sur le caractère topique des conseils d'Apollonios; Schorn 2016.

²² Sous le Haut-Empire, Auguste constitue une référence incontournable dans l'historiographie comme chez les empereurs qui développent différents aspects de l'augustéisme et mettent en avant leur imitation d'Auguste; en revanche, chez Sénèque, Tacite, Suétone et Dion Cassius, Auguste est un bon prince, mais non dépourvu de défauts, et tous ses actes ne sont pas à imiter.

²³ D. C. 55.14-22; voir Chastagnol 1994; sur le discours de Livie, Giua 1981.

²⁴ Sen., *clem.* 1.9.

c'est-à-dire que le caractère performatif ou prescriptif du texte est moins marqué. Ces passages n'entrent pas, à mes yeux, dans une définition stricte du miroir au prince, mais ils sont englobés dans la définition élargie qui est celle de P. Hadot (celle-ci peut se justifier dans la mesure où le genre semble se fixer seulement à la fin du ^{XII}^e siècle). Ils sont utiles pour préciser l'idéal du bon prince selon Dion Cassius. Il s'agit de l'éloge que fait l'historien de Marc Aurèle, au moment de sa mort, et du rapide éloge funéraire de Germanicus²⁵. Tous les deux constituent des figures exemplaires du prince (Germanicus de manière très abstraite, puisque ce 'bon prince' a la particularité de n'avoir pas régné), alors que l'exemple d'Auguste est plus ambivalent: Dion Cassius semble s'être inspiré de l'analyse de Sénèque dans le premier traité *Sur la clémence*, en présentant un Octavien cruel et ambitieux pendant les guerres civiles, et un Auguste qui évolue en bon prince²⁶. Octavien/Auguste est donc un modèle perfectible, ce qui justifie les mises en scène du miroir au prince dans l'*Histoire romaine*. Une autre figure qui est à la fois référentielle et perfectible est celle de César, dont le discours prononcé devant le Sénat en 46 av. J.-C., sans être un miroir au prince au sens strict, développe aussi des thèmes récurrents de la réflexion politique de Dion Cassius; il est particulièrement intéressant pour analyser les rapports et les limites entre pouvoir monarchique et tyrannie²⁷.

Tous ces passages de l'*Histoire romaine* nous permettent d'examiner la figure du bon prince chez Dion Cassius et de vérifier la cohérence de cet idéal.

²⁵ D. C. 72.34-36; 57.18. L'éloge funéraire d'Auguste, longuement développé au livre 56.34-42, est encore plus éloigné du miroir au prince car il s'agit d'un éloge très rhétorique qui énumère les hauts faits du prince et se présente d'ailleurs comme un bilan informatif du règne: il s'agit d'une *laudatio funebris*, qui ressemble à ce que décrit Polybe, 6.52.11-54.3.

²⁶ Sur Marc Aurèle comme roi idéal, voir Bering-Staschewsky 1980, p. 8-22. Sur Auguste, voir Sen., *clem.* 1.9-11. Chez Dion Cassius, voir Millar 1964, p. 83-102; Manuwald 1979, p. 8-26.

²⁷ D. C. 43.15-18; voir Cordier 2003. On peut mettre ce texte en parallèle avec les réflexions politiques après le renvoi de Tarquin le Superbe (3 fr. 12) et avec certains passages du récit de l'invasion de Pyrrhus relatifs au tyran, à sa cupidité sans borne pour les biens d'autrui et à sa conduite répressive envers ses sujets (D. C. 9 fr. 40.14-16; 33-49), comme l'a signalé Millar 1964, p. 79-81.

Le prince idéal selon Dion Cassius

La particularité du miroir au prince placé dans la bouche de Mécène réside dans sa dimension institutionnelle, qui était certes déjà présente dans les *Res gestae* et dans le *Panégyrique* de Pline, mais pas de la même façon: l'historien envisage en effet des innovations institutionnelles et il est plus attaché à déterminer de manière institutionnelle les pouvoirs et les charges des dignitaires que ceux du prince, alors que les *Res gestae* s'efforçaient de définir le *princeps* par son usage des magistratures et des pouvoirs, et que le consulat constituait pour Pline un critère de jugement du bon prince;²⁸ chez Dion Cassius, le prince n'est pas défini fondamentalement comme un magistrat et sa supériorité va de soi. Autre particularité, le portrait du bon chef est inséré dans un débat entre Agrippa et Mécène sur la nature du régime le mieux approprié pour Rome après la victoire d'Octavien—république démocratique ou bien royauté aristocratique—ce qui lui confère une dimension au moins en apparence constitutionnelle, si l'on considère que le débat est surtout formel²⁹. Alors que Sénèque et les penseurs hellénophones de l'Empire—Musonius Rufus, Epictète, Dion de Pruse—emploient dans leurs réflexions politiques le terme de roi, *rex/βασιλεύς*, Dion Cassius l'évite soigneusement puisque Mécène, à la fin de son discours, conseille à Octavien d'exercer la royauté sans recourir au nom haï de roi, mais en utilisant celui de César ou bien le titre d'*imperator/αὐτοκράτωρ*³⁰. D'une part, le prince a clairement le pouvoir de faire évoluer les institutions et donc la nature du régime, entre tyrannie et monarchie idéale (démocratique ou aristocratique). D'autre part, le principat est défini, fondamentalement, comme une fiction constitutionnelle: c'est une royauté qui tait son nom.

Les mesures administratives préconisées par Mécène ayant déjà été l'objet d'analyses précises³¹, je vais m'intéresser aux vertus du

²⁸ *RG* 1; 5-8; 34; Plin., *paneg.* 57-58, 78.

²⁹ Je n'aborderai pas ici cette question; voir notamment Espinoza Ruiz 1982, p. 28-122, suivi par Reinhold 1988, p. 170; Favuzzi 1996, p. 273.

³⁰ D. C. 52.40. L'historien a recours au terme neutre d'*ἄρχων*, voir par exemple D. C. 52.26.5; 52.34.3; dans son traité *A un chef mal éduqué*, qui n'est pas spécifiquement destiné à un empereur, Plutarque employait le même mot.

³¹ Sur les mesures institutionnelles et administratives, voir en particulier Bleicken 1962; Millar 1964, p. 106-118; Espinoza Ruiz 1982, p. 273-468; Favuzzi 1996.

bon prince, qui déterminent les principes de son gouvernement et ses pratiques politiques: ces vertus sont disséminées parmi les propositions du conseiller (§ 18-33), puis elles sont concentrées à la fin du discours (§ 34-39), qui est focalisée sur les qualités, le comportement du bon monarque et ses relations avec ses sujets (οἱ ἀρχόμενοι). Ces qualités, beaucoup moins étudiées que les projets de réformes, ont été examinées par L. de Blois qui a mis en avant l'influence des miroirs au prince d'Isocrate et notamment de la notion d'εὐνοια, 'bonne volonté', 'bienveillance', à la base des relations entre le chef et ses sujets³². Mais, à l'époque de Dion Cassius, les idées de l'orateur grec font partie d'un fonds commun auquel ont accès les élites sociales grecques et romaines: l'εὐνοια est ainsi une vertu civique importante, soulignée dans les inscriptions honorifiques du monde grec³³. Ce qui m'intéresse ici est bien davantage de mesurer l'influence des miroirs au prince de l'époque impériale sur la réflexion de Dion Cassius, en traçant le portrait de son prince idéal.

Il faut noter tout d'abord l'insistance sur la clémence, en lien avec la justice du prince, qui renvoie naturellement aux traités de Sénèque et qui est aussi l'objet du discours de Livie à Auguste au sujet de Cinna³⁴. Au début du règne de Septime Sévère, les guerres civiles et les dures répressions qui les avaient suivies avaient redonné à ce thème son actualité: l'empereur avait prononcé devant le Sénat en 197, après la mort de Clodius Albinus, un discours louant la sévérité et la cruauté (αὐστηρία τε καὶ ὠμότης) de Sylla, de Marius et d'Auguste, par opposition à la clémence (littéralement la douceur, ἐπιείκεια) de César ou de Pompée, qui avait causé leur perte³⁵. Dans le discours de Mécène, plusieurs termes

³² De Blois 1994, p. 166-168.

³³ Lafond 2006, p. 35-37; pour la Bithynie à l'époque romaine, voir *TAM IV* 1400; *I. Apameia und Pylai* 113; *I. Pr(o)usias*, 2.

³⁴ D. C. 52.31.9-10; 34: on retrouve dans ce passage l'idée d'une politique des bienfaits, permettant au prince de s'attacher ses sujets, qui a été développée par Sénèque.

³⁵ D. C. 76.8.1; Giua 1981, p. 335. Voir aussi *Hist. Aug. Sept. Seu.* 18.6. Caracalla aussi a revendiqué Sylla comme modèle: selon D. C. 78.13.7, il fit restaurer le Mausolée de Sylla sur le Champ de Mars parce qu'il imitait sa cruauté: ἐκείνω δὲ ὅτι τὴν ὠμότητά αὐτοῦ ἐζήλου; Hdn. 4.13, mentionne aussi des statues et des monuments de Sylla; *Hist. Aug. Car.* 2: Caracalla fit plusieurs fois en public l'éloge de Tibère et de Sylla. Sur la *seueritas*, voir Molin 2006.

grecs renvoient à cette vertu romaine par excellence, présente sur le bouclier d'Auguste: la douceur, τὸ ἐπιεικές, la philanthropie, φιλανθρωπία, la générosité, μεγαλοδωρία³⁶. Les bons princes Germanicus et Marc Aurèle sont caractérisés par cette vertu, alors que les tyrans sont inversement stigmatisés par leur conduite dure et répressive envers leurs sujets³⁷. Contrairement au premier traité *Sur la clémence* de Sénèque, le portrait du chef idéal selon Dion Cassius n'est cependant pas construit tout entier autour de la clémence et l'on y trouve d'autres vertus essentielles.

La clémence n'est qu'une partie de ce qui apparaît comme la principale règle de conduite du bon chef, le fait de se maîtriser et de mener une vie mesurée: d'être κόσμιος, εὐβίωτος³⁸. Ce principe ne se réduit pas à la *ciuilitas*, qualité essentielle dans l'idéologie impériale des 'bons' Antonins. Celle-ci résidait dans le comportement simple et l'abord facile du prince, qui le faisaient apparaître comme l'égal des autres aristocrates³⁹. Si, pour Dion Cassius, l'empereur doit en effet honorer ses principaux collaborateurs—sénateurs et chevaliers—et ne pas s'en montrer jaloux, sa supériorité est indéniable⁴⁰. Le mode de vie mesuré doit régler plus largement les relations du chef avec tous ses sujets⁴¹. Il peut apparaître comme une stratégie au service d'une politique financière: éviter toute dépense inutile permet ainsi de faire accepter une politique austère d'imposition, fondée sur l'uniformisation des taxes et la fin des exemptions⁴². De manière plus large, la maîtrise

³⁶ D. C. 52.34.9: οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα ποιήσεις αὐτοὺς τῶν τε χειρόνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ, καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐφίεσθαι, τῇ μεγαλοδωρίᾳ, 'ainsi, tu les éloigneras du pire par l'amour des hommes, et tu les conduiras au meilleur par la générosité' (toutes les traductions de Dion Cassius sont personnelles).

³⁷ D. C. 57.18.7 (Germanicus); D. C. 73.34.3-4 (Marc Aurèle); D. C. 10 fr. 40.46 (dureté de Pyrrhus envers les Syracusains); D. C. 43.17 (discours de César).

³⁸ D. C. 52.39. Voir D. C. 57.18.8 (Germanicus); D. C. 73.34.4-35 (Marc Aurèle); D. C. 9 fr. 40.33-38, discours de Fabricius à Pyrrhus, sur l'idée qu'il faut se contenter de ses propres biens et ne pas désirer ceux d'autrui; D. C. 43.16 (discours de César).

³⁹ Wallace-Hadrill 1981.

⁴⁰ D. C. 52.31.8: il est sacro-saint (σεπτός); 52.33.1-2: il doit être le dernier recours et l'autorité suprême en matière de juridiction, ce qui correspond à la juridiction d'appel en première et en seconde instance, qui s'est mise en place progressivement à partir de Claude.

⁴¹ D. C. 52.39.4.

⁴² D. C. 52.28 et 29.

de soi du bon chef garantit la cohérence entre sa politique et sa conduite personnelle, lui assurant crédibilité et popularité, ce qui est un point important dans le discours de Mécène. Le prince doit vivre comme les autres, sans contradiction par rapport à ce qu'il demande à ses sujets, car il est le modèle à imiter⁴³. La maîtrise de soi permet au prince de ne pas se livrer à l'ἐξουσία, la licence, qui caractérise le tyran: il doit toujours peser ses actions selon deux critères, l'un philosophique et moral, l'autre affectif et plus stratégique, en se demandant s'il agit de manière droite (ὀρθῶς) et de façon à se faire aimer de ses sujets⁴⁴.

Avoir un train de vie mesuré se concilie, selon Mécène, avec une autre vertu impériale traditionnelle, celle de la *liberalitas*, générosité évergétique qui est justifiée quand elle s'exerce pour le bien de la collectivité: le bon chef est ainsi τὰ οἰκεῖα φειδωλότατος πρὸς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ ἀφειδέστατος, 'économe avec ses propres biens, mais non en vue du bien commun'⁴⁵. La libéralité édilitaire est en particulier encouragée pour accroître l'éclat de Rome, la capitale de l'Empire:⁴⁶ son rôle de symbole du pouvoir romain se traduit par le faste, qui est refusé à la personne de l'empereur en tant que modèle pour ses sujets.

Le bon prince doit être, ensuite, un chef militaire compétent qui aime la paix, c'est-à-dire qu'il est à la fois εἰρηνικώτατος et πολεμικώτατος, εὐπόλεμος et εἰρηναῖος⁴⁷. Ce lieu commun de la réflexion grecque sur le bon roi était devenu une composante essentielle de l'image publique d'Auguste: la *uirtus* militaire est l'une des vertus de son bouclier et la section finale des *Res gestae*

⁴³ D. C. 52.34.2-3, sur le chef comme modèle à imiter, sur lequel convergent les regards; § 39.3-4: ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου σφίσι προσφέρῃ, καὶ μὴ αὐτὸς μὲν πλουτῇ τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀργυρολογῇ, μὴ δ' αὐτὸς μὲν τρυφᾷ τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ταλαιπωρῇ, μὴ δ' αὐτὸς μὲν ἀκολασταίνῃ τοὺς δ' ἄλλους νοουθετῇ, ἀλλ' ἐς πάντα δὴ πάντως ὁμοιοτροπώτατα αὐτοῖς ζῆς, 'quand tu te comportes à leur égard sur un pied d'égalité, quand tu ne t'enrichis pas toi-même en tirant de l'argent des autres, quand tu ne vis pas dans le luxe en faisant souffrir les autres, quand tu ne t'abandonnes pas à tes passions en réprimandant les autres, mais quand, en tout point, tu mènes la même vie qu'eux'.

⁴⁴ D. C. 52.38.1-2; voir Sen., *clem.* 1.13.4: le bon roi souhaite que ses sujets approuvent l'exercice de sa souveraineté.

⁴⁵ D. C. 52.29; voir *RG* 15; 17-18: Auguste met en avant les dépenses qu'il a faites sur ses ressources propres pour le bien commun.

⁴⁶ D. C. 52.30; voir *RG* 19-23.

⁴⁷ D. C. 52.37 et 39.

est consacrée à ses exploits militaires et à son rôle pacificateur⁴⁸. Absent du miroir au prince de Sénèque, ce *topos* est réapparu dans ceux de Dion de Pruse et de Pline le Jeune, en lien naturellement avec l'image militaire de Trajan⁴⁹. Il est toujours un trait essentiel de la figure impériale pendant la période sévérienne, durant laquelle se déroulèrent quatre guerres civiles et huit grandes guerres contre des peuples extérieurs à l'Empire⁵⁰ en raison de la hausse du budget militaire sous Septime Sévère et Caracalla, Dion Cassius se montre particulièrement soucieux de trouver des ressources pour financer l'armée⁵¹.

Enfin, le bon prince est caractérisé par la *pietas*, une autre vertu du bouclier d'Auguste, qui est également associée à la *uirtus* militaire sur l'arc des Sévères à Lepcis Magna⁵². A la suite d'Antonin le Pieux et de Commode, les Sévères avaient intégré le surnom *Pius* dans leur titulature. En réaction contre les tendances religieuses générales de son temps et contre les excès de Commode dans l'*imitatio dei*, Dion Cassius insiste sur le caractère traditionnel que revêt cette piété: l'empereur doit honorer le divin selon les coutumes ancestrales et éviter pour lui-même les honneurs divins, notamment les statues en argent et en or qui sont aussi évo-

⁴⁸ RG 25-33.

⁴⁹ Isoc. 9.28; 9.61-62 et 2.24 Mathieu-Brémond. Voir Plin., *paneg.* 16.1; 17.4; D. Chr. 1.27; 1.84.

⁵⁰ Guerres civiles: Septime Sévère contre Julianus en 193, contre Niger en 193-194, contre Albinus en 196-197, et Elagabal contre Macrin en 218. Guerres étrangères: Septime Sévère contre les Parthes, en 194-195 et 197-198, contre les Calédoniens en 208/210; Caracalla contre les Germains en 213-214, contre les Parthes en 217; Macrin contre les Parthes en 217, Alexandre Sévère contre les Perses Sassanides en 231-233 et contre les Germains en 234-235.

⁵¹ D. C. 52.28: notamment par le prêt à taux modéré de l'argent tiré de la vente des terres de l'*ager publicus*, par les revenus des mines et par un système uniformisé de taxation et d'imposition. D. C. 75.2.3: les adversaires de Septime Sévère lui reprochaient d'avoir grevé le budget en alourdissant les dépenses militaires; 77.15.2: Septime Sévère, sur son lit de mort, aurait tenu à ses fils les propos suivants: ὁμονοεῖτε, τοὺς στρατιώτας πλουτίζετε, τῶν ἄλλων πάντων καταφρονεῖτε, 'Entendez-vous, enrichissez les soldats, méprisez tout le reste'. Sur les dépenses militaires de Caracalla: D. C. 78.9.1; 78.10.1 et 4; 78.24.1; sur les difficultés de Macrin, incapable à la fois de faire marche arrière et de payer la solde des soldats: D. C. 79.36.1-3. Voir Develin 1971. Voir aussi de Blois 1998b; 1998a, p. 3411-3412, 3423, sur l'idée répandue chez les historiens du III^e siècle que la rapacité des soldats conduisit l'Empire à sa perte; 1998-1999, p. 275-281; 2007.

⁵² Les reliefs de l'arc des Sévères à Lepcis Magna célèbrent ces deux vertus à côté de la *concordia* familiale: Bartoccini fig. 95-100; Townsend 1938.

quées dans les *Res gestae* et le *Panegyrique* de Pline⁵³. Reprenant la conception du sage selon les Stoïciens et les Platoniciens, l'historien affirme que 'la vertu en rend beaucoup semblables à des dieux, mais, par le vote, nul n'est jamais devenu dieu'⁵⁴.

Ainsi, derrière l'idéal du monarque exposé par Mécène, on retrouve la figure du sage présente dans les traités *Sur la clémence* de Sénèque, dans lesquels elle est déjà associée à l'image providentielle de l'empereur romain comme père et sauveur⁵⁵. Le miroir au prince est aussi marqué, notamment au début du discours de Mécène, par l'idéal de méritocratie qui était si prégnant dans le *Panegyrique* et qui est toujours propre à une certaine vision sénatoriale, conservatrice, du principat au début du III^e siècle⁵⁶.

On a beaucoup insisté sur le pragmatisme de Dion Cassius⁵⁷, et l'on a même évoqué son opportunisme politique⁵⁸, au sens où le plaidoyer de Livie pour la clémence apparaît comme une stratégie visant à assurer la sécurité du monarque. Certes, les risques du pouvoir sont particulièrement soulignés par Dion Cassius, ce qui n'a rien d'étonnant: outre les guerres civiles déjà mentionnées, la période qui va du règne de Commode à celui de Sévère Alexandre

⁵³ D. C. 52.35 et 36. Voir *RG* 24, sur les statues d'argent d'Auguste, que l'empereur fit fondre pour offrir des offrandes à Apollon; Plin., *paneg.* 52.2-7, sur la destruction à Rome des statues d'or et d'argent de Domitien, opposé à Trajan qui ne convoite pas la puissance divine et se contente de quelques statues de bronze; D. C. 79.12.7, sur la modération de Macrin; 79.18.1, sur les statues d'or et d'argent de Caracalla; 80.12.2², sur une statue d'or remarquable par ses ornements, représentant sans doute Elagabal en grand-prêtre du Soleil. Voir Piatkowski 1984; Reinhold 1988, p. 207-208; Fishwick 1990; Benoist 2006, p. 27-64; Rosso 2014.

⁵⁴ D. C. 52.35.5: ἀρετὴ μὲν γὰρ ἰσοθέους πολλοὺς ποιεῖ, χειροτονητὸς δ' οὐδεὶς πώποτε θεὸς ἐγένετο.

⁵⁵ Voir Sen., *clem.* 1.14.2; 1.15.3; l'image traditionnelle de l'empereur comme père et sauveur est rapidement évoquée par Mécène (D. C. 52.39.3), et la comparaison avec le père est aussi utilisée par César devant le Sénat (D. C. 43.17.5); le dictateur reçut le titre de *Parens Patriae* après Munda en 45 av. J.-C. Sur la sagesse nécessaire au bon prince, voir aussi D. C. 52.18.7: le bon chef est sensé, ἐμφρων, c'est grâce à cette qualité qu'il apprend qu'on peut à la fois gouverner bien et sans danger.

⁵⁶ D. C. 52.14-15 et 19; voir en particulier l'interprétation moraliste de la chute de Macrin, qui s'est perdu lui-même pour avoir aspiré à l'Empire alors qu'il n'était pas sénateur, D. C. 79.41. Voir par exemple Plin., *paneg.* 44.6-8; 70.

⁵⁷ Forte 1972, p. 350: 'Dio's political philosophy was based on class interests and personal experience, not Platonic or Stoic ideals. He was above all a practical man of the world', cité par Reinhold 1988, p. 165.

⁵⁸ Voir Giua 1981, p. 319-320, 326.

a été marquée par les meurtres de huit empereurs;⁵⁹ seul le fondateur de la dynastie des Sévères a connu une mort naturelle, alors qu'il a défendu devant le Sénat la politique de la sévérité et de la répression, contre celle de la clémence. Or, cet aspect stratégique n'est pas étranger à Sénèque non plus, qui insiste beaucoup, dans le premier traité *Sur la clémence*, sur la sécurité du bon roi, garantie par l'amour de ses sujets, et sur sa réputation comme forme de contrainte sociale⁶⁰. Il ne faut pas réduire la réflexion de Dion Cassius à sa dimension pragmatique, indéniable certes, puisque son expérience de l'administration de l'Empire est sensible et qu'elle enrichit sa réflexion. S'il n'apparaît pas lui-même comme un philosophe, il est sans aucun doute un penseur du politique. J'ai relevé des passages dans lesquels il s'inspire de la philosophie stoïcienne: il a en effet lu et médité le miroir au prince de Sénèque sur la clémence, qui lui paraît être un choix politique pertinent, aussi bien sur le plan philosophique que sur un plan réaliste, pour réduire les oppositions et les tentatives de complot. Il s'agit, aux yeux de Dion Cassius, de la seule alternative valable face au recours à la force militaire, qui caractérise selon lui les règnes de Septime Sévère et de Caracalla⁶¹. De Sénèque, on retrouve l'idée que le bon prince est celui qui ne nuit pas, qu'il ne doit pas s'abandonner à la colère;⁶² qu'il est aimé et en sécurité, comme le souligne Livie dans son discours sur la clémence d'Auguste, et, pour finir, qu'il a une vie heureuse⁶³.

⁵⁹ Commode, Pertinax, Didius Julianus, Géta et Caracalla, Macrin (et son fils Diaduménien, pourrait-on ajouter), Elagabal, Sévère Alexandre. Dion Cassius a une vision relativement pessimiste vis-à-vis de ces complots, qui est exposée dans les miroirs au prince de Livie et de Mécène, alors qu'elle n'apparaît pas dans les traités *Sur la clémence* de Sénèque. Selon l'historien, il est inévitable, car propre à la nature humaine, que les meilleurs par leur richesse, leurs compétences militaires, etc., désirent accaparer le commandement. Voir Plat., *R.* 9.571c-572b, sur la présence des désirs sauvages, tyranniques, chez tous les hommes.

⁶⁰ Sen., *clem.* 1.8.1-5; 1.15.5.

⁶¹ D. C. 75.2.2: une partie de l'élite romaine reprochait aussi à Septime Sévère 'de mettre l'espoir de son salut, non dans la bienveillance (*εὐνοία*) de ceux qui l'entouraient, mais dans la force de ses soldats'; c'est aussi la voie revendiquée par Caracalla dans une lettre adressée au Sénat, D. C. 78.20.2.

⁶² Voir Sen., *clem.* 1.5; 1.19.1 et 4-5; sur la colère: 1.1; 1.5; 1.7; 1.11; 1.17; 1.19.

⁶³ Dion Cassius, 73.35.3, insiste sur l'idée que Marc Aurèle était aimé de tous. Sénèque, *clem.* 1.1 et 1.26.5, a également souligné le plaisir et le bonheur du roi sage, alors que selon Epictète le bonheur du roi est impossible: Epict., *Diss.*

Le prince idéal de Dion Cassius est également inspiré de la réflexion de Platon dont l'historien reprend l'analyse du tyran comme celui qui ne sait pas borner son désir: celle-ci est centrale dans la pensée politique de Dion de Pruse⁶⁴. Le début du discours de Mécène affirme les principes politiques de la méritocratie et de l'égalité géométrique qui sont fondamentaux dans la *République* de Platon, mais aussi dans celle de Cicéron⁶⁵. Chez ce dernier aussi, l'action exemplaire du chef d'Etat est un moyen de gouverner en faisant respecter l'ordre et la justice⁶⁶. Le *rector* que l'orateur appelait de ses vœux possède la même dimension d'homme providentiel, père et sauveur de la République, que le bon chef de Dion Cassius⁶⁷.

L'historien, enfin, accorde une attention particulière au rôle de la *παιδεία* et des conseillers du bon chef, tout comme Sénèque et Dion de Pruse. La fonction éducative du prince, qui est un trait commun des miroirs du I^{er} /début du II^e siècle de notre ère, est soulignée à plusieurs reprises dans le discours de Mécène: le prince doit veiller à l'éducation, d'abord scolaire, puis militaire, des principaux cadres de l'Empire, les sénateurs et les chevaliers;⁶⁸ plus largement, il doit lui-même devenir un modèle vivant pour susciter l'imitation générale⁶⁹. Sur l'éducation du prince lui-

2.22.22-23; 2.24.21-23; 3.22.30-36. La mort de Julia Domna est notamment matière à réflexions sur le bonheur des puissants chez Dion Cassius, 79.24, sans doute en rapport avec le titre de *Felix* que Caracalla avait accordée à sa mère.

⁶⁴ Gangloff 2006, p. 327-331.

⁶⁵ Voir au début du discours, D. C. 52.14-15; 52.19; 52.27.4. Selon Cicéron, *Rep.* 1.43 et 53, l'égalité démocratique, l'absence de degrés de dignité, constituent un manque d'équité; sur l'influence de Cicéron dans le miroir au prince du livre 52, voir Bellissime 2013, p. 204-206. Il existe un lien important entre Sénèque et Cicéron: voir en particulier Griffin 1988; Griffin 2013, p. 7-14. Cf. *Hist. Aug. Alex.* 30.1-2: Sévère Alexandre, le prince idéal, étudiait la *République* de Platon, les *Devoirs* et la *République* de Cicéron.

⁶⁶ Cic., *Rep.* 1.34.52.

⁶⁷ Cic., *Rep.* 2.29, 2.47-48, 2.51, 2.67, 2.69; D. C. 52.9.3.

⁶⁸ D. C. 52.26.1; § 2: τὸν γὰρ ἀρχοντα τὸν ἄριστον, οὗ τέ τι ὄφελός ἐστι, δεῖ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν πάνθ' ἃ προσήκει ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπως ὥς ὅτι βέλτιστοι γίνωνται, προνοεῖν, 'Car le meilleur chef, celui qui est utile, ne doit pas seulement faire tout ce qui est convenable, il doit encore pourvoir à rendre les autres aussi bons que possible'. Sur les philosophes, rhétoriciens et grammairiens subventionnés par l'Etat à l'époque de Dion, voir *Dig.* 27.1.6.5 (Paulus): Millar 1964, p. 116.

⁶⁹ D. C. 52.34; 52.39.3-4. Sur Antonin, 'modèle vivant' pour Marc Aurèle, voir M. Ant. 1.16; 1.17.5; 6.30.

même, Mécène ne dit rien. Le thème n'est abordé que par le biais de l'éducation des sénateurs et des chevaliers, nécessaire parce que 'les gens bien élevés et instruits ne songent jamais à nuire à autrui'⁷⁰. Il entre donc naturellement dans la définition du bon prince que celui-ci ait été bien éduqué. L'éducation de Germanicus et de Marc Aurèle est en effet soulignée par Dion Cassius: Germanicus se distinguait par sa παιδεία⁷¹, celle de Marc Aurèle est à l'origine de son succès politique⁷². Dion Cassius précise que celle-ci a été à la fois rhétorique et philosophique, et elle est associée à un naturel vertueux, comme pour Germanicus, ce qui rappelle la double παιδεία royale préconisée par Dion de Pruse dans le quatrième discours *Sur la royauté*⁷³. C'est à sa vertu et à son éducation que Marc Aurèle a dû sa conduite modeste—*ciuilis*—qui l'a très tôt fait aimer de tous⁷⁴.

Concernant les conseillers du bon chef, Mécène suggère à Octavien de s'entourer d'un *consilium* composé par les principaux sénateurs et chevaliers, d'anciens consuls et préteurs, chacun étant consulté par le prince quand celui-ci le souhaite⁷⁵. Le bon chef doit encourager la παρρησία, 'sincérité, franchise' de ses conseillers⁷⁶.

⁷⁰ D. C. 52.26.6.

⁷¹ Dans la mesure où Germanicus n'est pas devenu empereur, il apparaît peut-être encore plus comme l'idéal du *kalos kagathos* que comme l'idéal du bon prince: il est à la fois beau et fort, doté d'une âme noble et bien éduqué: D. C. 57.18.6. On retrouve cet idéal du *kalos kagathos*, auquel Marc Aurèle ne correspond évidemment pas en raison de sa faiblesse physique, dans le portrait de Pertinax: D. C. 74.1.1: Περτίναξ δὲ ἦν μὲν τῶν καλῶν κάγαθών.

⁷² D. C. 72.35.

⁷³ D. Chr. 4.31. Sur la théorie de la double éducation qui est développée dans ce passage, voir Gangloff 2006, p. 344.

⁷⁴ Les contemporains de Marc Aurèle lui ont pourtant reproché son maintien austère lié à sa qualité de philosophe: Fronto, *Ep. ad. M. Caes.*, 4.12.3 Haines; *Ep. de Fer. Als.* 3 Haines; voir aussi *Hist. Aug. Aur.* 4.10; 4.22. Dans son traité *Sur les devoirs*, 1.130-131, Cicéron a fait l'éloge de la mesure dans le soin, la toilette, le costume, les gestes et les expressions; voir aussi Quint. 8.19-20; 11.3.137. Sur le lien entre éducation et mesure, voir D. C. 3 fr. 12.9: ὅτι τὸ τῆς βασιλείας πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ συνηθείας, εἴπερ τι ἄλλο, πολλῆς δέεται, καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀνευ ἐκείνων ἀψάμενόν τινα σωφρονῆσαι, 'Exercer la royauté demande non seulement de la vertu, mais encore, pour le moins, beaucoup de connaissance et d'expérience, sans lesquelles il n'est pas possible de se maîtriser au contact de la royauté'.

⁷⁵ D. C. 52.33. Voir Reinhold 1988, p. 206, sur le caractère augustéen de ce *consilium*.

⁷⁶ D. C. 52.33.

Il est remarquable que dans les deux miroirs au prince de l'*Histoire romaine*, les conseillers ne soient pas des philosophes, contrairement à ce que l'on voit chez Sénèque et Dion de Pruse. Sénèque avait déjà utilisé les figures d'Agrippa et de Mécène pour conduire une réflexion sur le rôle des *principes* dans son traité *Des bienfaits*:⁷⁷ il jugeait le rôle des deux amis d'Octavien/Auguste insuffisant, parce que, n'étant pas philosophes, ils n'étaient pas dotés de la *παρρησία*. Ce n'est plus le cas dans l'*Histoire romaine*, où Agrippa, Mécène et Livie sont caractérisés par leur liberté de parole⁷⁸. Inversement, la *παρρησία* n'est pas le propre du philosophe, comme le montre l'exemple du Cynique P. Egnatius Celer qui accusa faussement son patron, le vertueux Barea Soranus, condamné à mort par Néron en 66, en même temps que Thræsea Paetus⁷⁹.

Chez Dion Cassius, la figure de Sénèque reçoit un traitement ambivalent. L'historien exploite des traditions hostiles au philosophe qui fut le précepteur et l'ami d'un tyran:⁸⁰ alors que la semi-retraite de Sénèque est datée par Tacite de 62, après la mort du préfet du prétoire Burrus, chez Dion Cassius, c'est dès après la mort de Britannicus, c'est-à-dire dès le début de l'année 55, que Sénèque aurait renoncé, en même temps que Burrus, à s'occuper sérieusement des affaires de l'Etat, parce que tous les deux craignaient pour leur sécurité, et ce quand le propre du philosophe est de dompter sa crainte de la mort; Sénèque a donc laissé Néron dégénérer en tyran⁸¹. Sa mort est dépourvue de gloire: il a voulu entraîner avec lui sa femme Pauline (par peur de mourir seul? selon Tacite, c'est Pauline qui souhaitait accompagner son époux

⁷⁷ Sen., *benef.* 6.32.2-4.

⁷⁸ D. C. 52.3 (discours d'Agrippa): λέξω δὲ μετὰ παρρησίας· οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὸς ἄλλως ἢν τι εἰπεῖν δυναίμην, οὔτε σοὶ σύνοιδα τὰ ψευδῆ μετὰ κολακείας ἢ δέως ἀκούοντι; § 33 (conseil de Mécène): τὴν τε παρρησίαν παντὶ τῷ βουλευμένῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν συμβουλευσαί σοι μετὰ ἀδείας νέμει; § 41, après les deux discours, Octavien remercie ses conseillers de leur franchise, *παρρησία*. Voir aussi 55.16 sur la liberté de parole de Livie.

⁷⁹ D. C. 62.26.1-2. De la même manière, le Stoïcien Helvidius Priscus imite 'de façon inopportune' la *παρρησία* de son beau-père Thræsea: D. C. 65.12.1.

⁸⁰ D. C. 61.10.2. Au livre 62.24.1, l'historien reprend notamment l'accusation selon laquelle Sénèque participa à la conjuration de Pison en 65; Tac., *Ann.* 15.60.2-3, n'y croit pas; mais, aux yeux de Dion Cassius, les philosophes de cette période semblent être des fauteurs de troubles.

⁸¹ D. C. 61.7.5.

dans la mort); celle-ci fut sauvée parce qu'il tardait à mourir et que les soldats ont hâté sa fin⁸². Ce suicide raté est opposé à la mort héroïque de Thræsea qui fait une libation à Jupiter libérateur⁸³.

D'une certaine manière, le personnage de Sénèque est ainsi placé du côté des 'faux philosophes' évoqués par Mécène⁸⁴. Celui-ci engage en effet Octavien à se méfier des faux philosophes fauteurs de troubles, ce qui est très probablement une allusion aux Cyniques et Stoïciens expulsés de Rome par Vespasien en 71, ainsi qu'au Stoïcien Helvidius Priscus, le gendre de Thræsea, condamné à mort vers 71 ou peu après et sévèrement jugé par Dion Cassius qui lui reproche d'être un factieux⁸⁵. On peut comprendre alors que dans les miroirs au prince mis en scène par Dion Cassius, le conseiller ne soit pas un philosophe ou un rhéteur, mais un proche du pouvoir qui partage les intérêts du prince, tels Livie, Mécène et Agrippa.

Conclusion

Dion Cassius se situe ainsi dans la continuité de Sénèque et de Pline, en tant que membre du Sénat et *amicus principis*, et dans celle de Dion de Pruse, comme représentant de l'élite grecque d'Asie Mineure. Dans le discours de Mécène, il a développé le modèle du prince vertueux et bon administrateur de Pline, tout en attachant, comme Dion de Pruse, beaucoup d'importance à la *παιδεία*. L'historien est sensible au risque fort qu'a le bon chef de dégénérer et de devenir un tyran, celui-ci étant défini à la fois, selon le modèle platonicien fondamental chez Dion de Pruse, par ses désirs illimités et, comme chez Sénèque, par sa conduite répressive et cruelle envers ses sujets. Inversement, l'*Histoire romaine*

⁸² D. C. 62.25; voir Tac., *Ann.* 15.63.1-64.2.

⁸³ D. C. 62.26. Thræsea est implicitement opposé à Sénèque comme Soranus est opposé à Celer: chez Dion Cassius, les modèles sont les sénateurs vertueux, et non les philosophes. Chez Tacite, *Ann.* 15.62-64, Sénèque, qui n'est pas dépourvu d'ambiguïté, a cependant une mort héroïque: c'est lui qui fait la libation à Jupiter libérateur, suivi ensuite par Thræsea: Tac., *Ann.* 15.64.4; 16.35.1.

⁸⁴ D. C. 52.36.4. Voir en particulier D. C. 61.10.2-3, part. § 2: τὰ ἐναντιώτατα οἷς ἐφιλοσόφει ποιῶν ἡλέγχθη, 'Il fut accusé d'agir contrairement à ses enseignements philosophiques'.

⁸⁵ Voir la présentation très négative du gendre de Thræsea, D. C. 65.12, et le discours de Mucien contre les Stoïciens, D. C. 65.13.1^a.

montre la possibilité de passer de la *δυναστεία*, régime constitué par des factions, des pouvoirs personnels multiples et rivaux, qui caractérisent la fin de la République, à la monarchie éclairée, aristocratique, en adoptant une conduite clémente comme avait entrepris de le faire César—même s’il n’a pas abouti—et comme l’a fait Auguste. Dion Cassius se montre aussi très attentif au rôle des conseillers du prince: ceux-ci doivent être des proches du pouvoir, expérimentés (ce qu’était aussi Sénèque), mais non des philosophes comme c’est le cas chez Dion de Pruse. Le bon chef doit être bien entouré, avoir une nature vertueuse et une bonne éducation qui lui permet de mener une vie mesurée. Même si dans le discours de Mécène transparaît le modèle du roi-philosophe, présent chez Sénèque, la méfiance de Dion Cassius par rapport aux philosophes le conduit à présenter Marc Aurèle, qui incarne le prince idéal, non pas comme un philosophe mais comme le produit d’une éducation à la fois rhétorique et philosophique, ce qui fut d’ailleurs le cas de ce brillant élève de Fronton⁸⁶.

Le miroir au prince de Mécène se présente donc comme une synthèse personnelle. Par-delà la tradition grecque de réflexion philosophique et politique sur la royauté, cette synthèse contient des échos aux *Res gestae* et elle est nourrie par des miroirs au prince romains qui ont visiblement inspiré à Dion Cassius sa propre pensée politique. Il est difficile de mesurer précisément l’influence de Pline, de même que celle de Dion de Pruse; cette dernière me semble apparaître dans la conception platonicienne du tyran, dans l’évocation d’une double *παιδεία* et dans l’importance accordée à l’entourage⁸⁷. L’influence de Sénèque est beaucoup plus évidente. L’historien a lu attentivement les traités *Sur la clémence*, peut-être

⁸⁶ Les deux grands miroirs au prince de la fin du I^{er} siècle, ceux de Pline et de Dion de Pruse, ont aussi renoncé à ce modèle; le sophiste semble avoir adopté le modèle aristotélicien du roi guidé par un conseiller philosophe: D. Chr. 1.8; Arist., fr. 647 Rose = Them., Or. 8.128d.

⁸⁷ Dans le premier discours *Sur la royauté*, 64-65, Dion de Pruse souligne l’importance de l’entourage: même si Héraclès a été doté par son père d’une nature vertueuse, il risque d’être corrompu par des exemples de luxe et de licence. Chez Dion Cassius, c’est le cas de Commode, bien instruit et élevé par son père, pas méchant naturellement, mais victime de mauvaises influences et rejetant les avis des conseillers de son père, parmi lesquels figuraient les meilleurs sénateurs (D. C. 73.1); Caracalla a également été très bien élevé, mais il se serait détourné de la culture et, surtout, n’accepterait pas les conseils (D. C. 78.11.2-3 et 5).

aussi celui *Sur les bienfaits*; il connaissait la *Consolation à Polybe*, qui opposait déjà la clémence du bon prince (Claude!) à la cruauté du tyran (Caligula)⁸⁸, et l'*Apocoloquintose* qui montre l'échec de la divinisation de Claude en raison de sa cruauté⁸⁹. Le personnage du Stoïcien est pourtant présenté sous un jour défavorable dans l'*Histoire romaine*, à partir du moment où il laisse Néron dégénérer: Dion Cassius semble avoir, dans une certaine mesure, dissocié de manière originale l'homme et son œuvre, jugeant que Sénèque ne s'est pas comporté comme un vrai philosophe, tout en tenant sa réflexion politique pour essentielle⁹⁰.

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⁸⁸ D. C. 61.10.2; voir Sen., *dial.* 11.13.2, et plus largement 11.12.3-17.3 pour un portrait du bon prince indulgent et doux. Ce traité avait été adressé par le philosophe, alors exilé en Corse par Claude (entre 41 et 49), à l'affranchi *a libellis* Polybe, qui avait perdu son jeune frère en 43.

⁸⁹ D. C. 60.35.3.

⁹⁰ Cette démarche est intéressante en soi, car dans l'Antiquité, la vie des écrivains était en général étroitement associée à leurs ouvrages, comme on le voit très bien dans les vies des grands poètes grecs, reconstituées à l'époque hellénistique ou sous le Haut-Empire d'après leur œuvre. Voir aussi D. Chr. 18.17: la valeur des traités de Xénophon pour l'entraînement à l'éloquence politique repose sur son expérience personnelle. Mais cette dissociation peut s'expliquer par l'accusation couramment portée contre les philosophes à l'époque impériale, selon laquelle leur enseignement ne correspond pas à leur comportement (voir Iuv. 2.1-7; Epict., *Diss.* 2.19; 4.8.15; Philostr., *VA* 2.29.2).

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Abstract

This paper aims at showing the ways in which Cassius Dio appropriated the Roman tradition of 'Mirrors for princes' in the fictitious speech in which Maecenas addresses Octavianus in order to persuade him to establish a monarchy (D. C. 52.14-40). Greek treatises on the good king were adapted to the Roman *princeps* by Seneca in the first book *De clementia*, dated to the end of 55 CE, and Cassius Dio knew this text which seems to have developed a Roman tradition of mirrors for princes. It is problematic to analyze Maecenas's speech because we don't know exactly when the debate in the beginning of book LII was written: it seems, however, that the text was meant to address an 'ideal prince'. I first examine what is a good leader according to Cassius Dio, by comparing various texts on this subject in the *Roman History*, such as the praise of Germanicus (D. C. 57.18) and that of Marcus Aurelius (D. C. 72.34-36). Then I compare Cassius Dio's good prince with other earlier descriptions written during the early Empire: Seneca's first treatise *De clementia*, Pliny the Younger's *Panegyric* and Dio of Prusa's first oration *On kingship*, both addressed to Trajan.

Résumé

Cette étude examine la manière dont Dion Cassius s'est approprié la tradition des 'miroirs au prince' dans son *Histoire romaine*, en prenant comme point de départ le discours fictif adressé par Mécène à Octavien pour le persuader de mettre en place une monarchie (D. C. 52.14-40). Les traités grecs sur le bon roi avaient été adaptés à la figure du *princeps* romain par Sénèque dans le premier traité *De clementia*, composé vers la fin de l'année 55, or Dion Cassius connaissait bien cet ouvrage qui semble avoir donné naissance à une tradition romaine des miroirs au prince. Le discours de Mécène est complexe, car on ne connaît pas la date à laquelle a été rédigé le débat du livre 52: il paraît s'adresser à un 'prince idéal'. Les contours de la figure du bon chef selon Dion Cassius sont d'une part analysés, par comparaison avec d'autres passages de l'histoire romaine qui portent sur ce sujet, comme l'éloge de Germanicus (D. C. 57.18) et celui de Marc Aurèle (D. C. 72.34-36). Il s'agit d'autre part de mettre en rapport cette figure avec les portraits que l'on trouve dans les miroirs au prince antérieurs sous le Haut-Empire: celui de Sénèque, mais aussi le *Panégyrique* de Pline le Jeune et le premier discours *Sur la royauté* de Dion de Pruse, tous les deux adressés à Trajan.

OSWYN MURRAY

THE CLASSICAL TRADITIONS OF PANEGYRIC AND ADVICE TO PRINCES*

Antique literary form is not the same thing as stereotype or repetition, but these two categories look deceptively similar until it is understood that in antiquity, literary form, the deliberate use of language according to certain rules depending on what one wanted to say, was to a large extent considered to be the means which made expression possible in the first place (MacCormack 1981, 269).

In memory of Alan Cameron

In the panegyric you will build your preface on exaggeration, attributing magnitude to the subject under discussion, calling it difficult to approach, saying that you have entered a contest in words where success is not easy (...). Your second theme will be the grandiloquence of Homer, which alone could do justice to the subject, or alternatively Orpheus offspring of Calliope, or the nine Muses themselves, how even these could scarcely speak worthily on such a theme; but that nevertheless nothing prevents even poor me from making the attempt to the best of my ability (Men. Rh. 368.8-11; 3697-3613).

Thus Menander, Greek rhetorician of the late third century AD, perhaps from Alexandria in the Troas, offers his advice on the composition of the prooemion to a *logos basilikos*, a royal speech.¹

* This study goes back to a period in the 1960s when I was writing a thesis on Hellenistic kingship, and began a sketch for a grandiloquent history of theories of monarchy from antiquity to the Middle Ages; an early version was presented as a lecture at the Warburg Institute in 1970. But the *événements* of 'soixante-huit' made me ashamed of my youthful preoccupations, and I abandoned the project for more radical types of history. I am grateful to the organisers of this conference for provoking this opportunity to return to the development of ancient ideas on monarchy.

I have deliberately avoided the term *Fürstenspiegel* since the argument of my study serves to reinforce the mistrust of that term as applied to classical antiquity expressed by Haake 2015; to my knowledge the only uses of the mirror image in ancient kingship literature are Sen., *clem.* 1.1.1 and Them., *Or.* 6.81c.

¹ Russell & Wilson 1981; Pernot 1993, I, pt. I, ch. II and II, pt. III, ch. I.

I who will speak tonight so much of the panegyric, cannot do better than follow his suggestions. My subject is indeed a vast one, *dosodos*, difficult of approach (let me protest my sincerity in true rhetorical fashion); my competence is small. Not so my audience, but critical. And my predecessors weigh me down—the giants of earlier generations, Ernst Dümmler, Ludwig Traube, Max Manitius, Bernhard Bischoff. My *comparatio* however is not with the Muse herself, but with her Orpheus, Ernst Curtius, who dedicated his great work *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* to the founder of the Warburg Institute, the temple to *Das Nachleben der Antike*. Let me confess it: Curtius himself could have (has) scarce done justice to my theme; nevertheless nothing prevents even poor me from making the attempt to the best of my ability.

The third and final duty of an exordium, according to Menander, is that it should define the subject matter of the discourse. In his chapters on 'Poetry and Rhetoric', 'Heroes and Rulers', Curtius sketched the outlines of a wide field, of interest to students both of literature and of political history—the ways in which the medieval conception of the ruler and hero were influenced by the traditions of late antiquity.² I wish to take up this theme within a slightly wider framework, looking not just at the surface phenomena as they appear in literature, but at the institutional and formal framework which produced this succession of common *topoi* and attitudes. I intend in fact to discuss how far we can talk of a continuity of tradition, of innovation and of renaissance, from the fourth century to the end of antiquity (if indeed it ever ended) in those genres of literature that are specifically connected with the court—praise of rulers, and advice to rulers. I shall largely be confining myself to a discussion of the formal elements or generic forms in this literature, the ways in which it is organised or constructed; for it is here that the extent and limits of the continuity in tradition can best be studied; the actual contents of the works too easily reflect contemporary political problems, and obscure the question of whether earlier literature had any influence. And it is the formal element which tells us most about how the tradition was transmitted. The relevance of this to wider problems of continuity need hardly be stressed: court literature

² Curtius 1953 chs 8 and 9.

is a particularly good test case for the general theories of Curtius and others on the continuity of the classical tradition; for its existence in successive periods is attested; its types are easily isolated from the general literature of the period; and the complications of literary criticism are absent—or not pressing: modern critics unite in despising these ‘slavish compositions’ (as Gibbon called them),³ and leave them to the cultural historian, whose task it is to illuminate the dominant sentiments of a past society by rescuing its literary casualties from oblivion.

The forms of ancient literature on kingship are closely related to one of those curious phenomena which recur so often in the history of literature, and whose influence on the writing of literature is always so difficult to assess—the literary *querelle*. Like the medieval quarrel between poetry and philosophy, the fundamental conflict of the ancient literary world derives from Plato: his portrayal of Socrates against the sophists and his own quarrel with Isocrates were generalised into a conflict between two ways of life, two systems of education, the antithesis of rhetoric and philosophy. This dispute was especially active in the period of the Second Sophistic, the first and second centuries AD: philosophers and rhetoricians attacked each other in interminable pamphlets and speeches, wrote long invectives on such subjects as Plato’s criticisms of Isocrates, and vice versa. When philosophers came under suspicion of opposing the vices of emperors, rhetoricians rejoiced at their downfall; when Dio of Prusa turned from rhetoric to philosophy, he sees it in terms of a real *conversion*, in the religious sense of the word.⁴ Of course this was a period when philosophy used all the tricks of rhetoric to convince its disciples, and when rhetoricians were well aware of the perfect orator’s need for a certain amount of philosophical doctrine: as with many literary quarrels the similarities between the two sides were the more striking, the more each insisted on the differences. And yet both from the point of view of literary form, and from that of literary education (and so of the literary tradition) contemporaries were right to see the distinction as important. It was the early Roman empire that created the stereotypes and institutions within which the next few

³ Gibbon ch. XXX: ed. Womersley 1994, II p. 163.

⁴ Nock 1933, ch. XI.

centuries were to work, and nowhere is this dichotomy between rhetoric and philosophy more evident than in the court literature of Late Antiquity.

In rhetorical theory the formal praise of rulers went under different names.⁵ Usually in Greek it was a branch of the *enkōmion*, in Latin its earlier name was the *laudatio* or *laudes*. The word *panēgyrikos* was never applied to it in classical Greek, for Greek theory (influenced by Isocrates' *Panegyricus*) reserved that word for speeches at the various festivals. In Latin the word *panegyricus* emerges as a technical term only at the beginning of the fourth century. The genre was further divided according to the occasions on which such a speech might be delivered; thus Menander discusses the *logos basilikos*, the *logos prosphōnētikos* (or encomium of certain specific actions), the *logos stephanōtikos* (or address which accompanied the presentation of a gold crown to the emperor from one of the communities of the empire), the *logos presbeutikos* (or speech delivered by an embassy) and speeches summoning or welcoming a ruler to a festival or city. In contrast, Latin seems to have no technical terms based on the occasion of delivery except the *actio gratiarum*, the public thanks delivered by one of the consuls to the emperor on the occasion of taking office, a practice which can be traced from the first to the sixth century. Nevertheless it is clear from the formal differences between the eleven Gallic panegyrics, surviving in the *Panegyrici Latini*, that Latin rhetoric was well aware of the different types of panegyric. As for the origin of the theory of encomia, it seems to have developed only under the Roman empire; for there is little sign of any systematic approach in the Hellenistic period.⁶ By the third century AD a common doctrine can be seen in both the Greek and the Roman worlds visible in the actual panegyrics themselves, and in the one theoretical treatise which survives and which covers the topic in detail.

Menander's treatise has a flavour that offers perhaps the best introduction to the world of the orator. The sole purpose of an encomium is praise; nothing is to detract from that effect. Beginning with the king's birthplace you must dwell on the city if it is

⁵ See in general Pernot 1993.

⁶ See Cameron 1995; Murray 2008.

famous (a profitable source of digression, since it pleases all the listeners connected with the place); if it is not famous, then look to the nation. Praise the Greeks for their rhetoric and virtue, the Italians for their law, the Gauls and Illyrians for their courage; and as the race is preeminent in its particular way, so the king was chosen from among them for his greater glory. But if neither city nor race is famous, then drop the topic and turn to his ancestry. And if that is too appalling to mention, hurry on to the king himself, his birth, physical nature, and education: while others praise the ancestry of their rulers, I shall praise him only for himself. As for his birth, look around for portents like those that surrounded Cyrus and Romulus: invent them if necessary. The main section on the king's achievements should be divided into those in war and those in peace, and arranged according to the four cardinal virtues. Begin with his military exploits, for courage particularly distinguishes a king. But if he happens not to have fought even one war, then you will be forced to talk about peace. War gives ample scope for *ekphrasis*, set descriptions of rivers and harbours, mountains and plains, infantry and cavalry engagements, and naval battles in the manner of the great historians of the past. Homer too is here a rich source for examples, comparisons and quotations.

War exemplifies the virtues of courage and foresight; philanthropy makes a transition to peace, and the virtues of justice and self-control (*sōphrosynē*). Justice includes the various virtues of his administration; under self-control the king's life is portrayed as model for his subjects. Next comes praise of his good fortune, and a comparison with the past kings, who must not be denigrated: that would be unskilful—rather the greater their glory, the greater will be his who surpasses them. Finally the conclusion should stress the fertility and prosperity of the land under his rule.

Menander was not of course original; the close correspondence between his recommendations and our earliest surviving panegyric, that of the younger Pliny, shows that the theory is as old as the first century AD. Nor did the Latin Panegyrists of the fourth century use Menander himself: they probably had their own Latin handbooks, and copied their own Latin models. Pliny's *Panegyric* in fact survives at the head of the collection of Gallic Panegyrics of the fourth century, and was clearly used as a model in the rhetorical schools of Autun, Trèves and Bordeaux which produced the

rest of the collection: similarly traces of his influence can be found in the rhetorical schools of Rome in the same period.

The rhetorical theory of the panegyric was then a unified theory, identical in East and West. There is little difference of form at least down to the age of Theodosius. But in contrast to the form, the contents, seriousness and purposes of these works of course differ enormously: within the rhetorical framework each writer could express his personality and desires with considerable freedom. Thus the Gallic Panegyrists in general exhibit an intense local patriotism, a pride in their own provincial education and a concern for its preservation;⁷ the future emperor Julian's paganism and advocacy of the tradition of Hellenism is evident even when he addresses his bloodthirsty and intolerant Christian cousin—and Julian knew the continuous danger he was in from Constantius.⁸ Pliny's panegyric praises the senatorial virtues of the new and unknown emperor Trajan as a warning against the dangers of Domitian's tyrannical regime: he is very conscious of speaking before a senate obsessed with the problem of reconciling their own dignity with their collaboration under a tyrant.⁹ Ausonius is so amazed at his fortune in being made senior consul over his colleague Olybrius—a provincial rhetor triumphing over a member of Rome's most aristocratic family, the Anicii—that his preface extends over two thirds of the whole work; the thing is a panegyric of himself rather than the emperor, in which he indulges in such amiable oddities as an exercise in literary criticism on the letter sent to him by the emperor informing him of his appointment. After twelve chapters of this ostensible thanks to the emperor, Ausonius notes that his audience is eagerly awaiting the due praise of the emperor which was his proper business: 'I know it and I can see it in every face'. He professes to wish to leave that for another occasion, 'but they all urge me on with nods, almost with protests'.¹⁰ The panegyric itself is very perfunctory, but it is clear that Ausonius knew he could not omit it entirely; and the fact that Ausonius must have composed the whole speech

⁷ Rees 2012, 1-48.

⁸ Athanassiadi-Fowden 1981; Schorn 2008.

⁹ Durry 1938, Introduction.

¹⁰ Auson. 20.13.

in advance merely shows how certain he could be of his audience's reaction: he knew that, even in disregarding them, he still had to recognise the strict rules of the art.

It is these differences between individual authors which make it so difficult to offer any general theory of the purpose or function of panegyric.¹¹ Too often suggestions that have been put forward have ignored the complexity of the historical circumstances in which the panegyrists found themselves, and which made certain attitudes or actions on their part appropriate or inappropriate, possible or impossible. It is perhaps worth discussing some of the aims of panegyric, merely in order to bring out its flexibility and its central position as a form of political discourse under the Roman autocracy.

The most obvious and popular explanation of the purpose of panegyric is its function as propaganda for the government. The emperor chose his panegyrist, it may be argued, and told him what to say: the resulting product was not only heard by the senate or the imperial *consistorium*; it was also published and circulated, serving to expound particular policies of the emperor and to encourage loyalty in general. Some panegyrics do fit this pattern: Themistius for instance would hardly have defended Theodosius' Gothic policy, if he had not become so involved in court politics that he could not avoid doing so; and it must have been very useful to have such a man putting a respectable gloss on a policy which can only have been seen as weakness by the senators of Constantinople.¹² The act of thanks of Claudius Mamertinus to the emperor Julian for his consulate in 362 is a justification of Julian's seizure of power by one of his Gallic supporters, and seems to have been given a wide circulation as such: literary echoes of it appear in Ammianus' account of these events.¹³ So the panegyric could be used as an instrument of government policy. But it was hardly an important instrument. The circulation of these works must often have been limited to the original audience, the orator's friends, a small group of *littérateurs*, or the rhetorical schools themselves.

¹¹ See esp. the theory of 'communication ascendante et descendante' explored in the study of the *Panegyrici Latini* by Sabbah 1984.

¹² Vanderspoel 1995.

¹³ *Paneg.* 11 (3); cf. *Amm.* 16.1.2; 12.69-70.

All these groups will have appreciated the work for its rhetorical skill rather than its propaganda content. Moreover it does not seem to be true that in general the emperor chose the orator, or told him what to say. Of course, since he appointed the consuls he controlled the speakers on these occasions; but many orations were delivered by those sent on embassies to the emperor, from the senates of Byzantium or Rome, or from individual cities: the orators in these cases were chosen by the senate itself or the local *curia*. Then for an emperor to suggest a particular theme would have been an affront to the rhetorical skill of the speaker, whose theme was after all dictated by the rules of his art. Thus it happens that most of the calls to specific issues in these works reflect, not a changing imperial policy, but the interests of the orator himself. Often these interests coincide with an aspect of imperial policy, in such very general areas as the concern for the prosperity of provinces: but the Gallic panegyrists for instance can hardly be said to be spokesmen for the emperors—they are rather spokesmen for their province, or for their particular towns. More often there is a gap between the thought of the emperor and the thought of his panegyrist: so Julian pleads for toleration or encouragement of the old religion, and doubts the principle of heredity; Pliny tells Trajan the sort of emperor the senate hopes he will be. And usually the speech of an ambassador embodies a request for aid or the remission of taxes, which may or may not please the emperor and his staff.

This leads to another way in which panegyric certainly was used, as a vehicle for advice. The notion that one of the best ways to advise is to praise a particular man as if he were already the ideal figure you would like him to be, is at least as early as Aristotle.¹⁴ It is explicitly recognised by Pliny; he published an expanded version of his speech 'first so that our emperor's virtues should be welcomed in sincere praise, secondly so that future emperors should be forewarned, not by advice but by example, how best they might attain the same good fame'.¹⁵ On one occasion at least this advisory function of panegyric hovered on the borders of high treason, when in 399 Synesius, an insignificant ambassador from Cyrene, was egged on by Aurelian, the praetorian prefect and consul desig-

¹⁴ Arist., *Rh.* 1.9.1368a.

¹⁵ Plin., *epist.* 3.18.2.

nate, to demand from the emperor Arcadius the expulsion of the Goths from the imperial army and all government service in favour of a nationalist Greek policy. This involved Synesius in a number of unfavourable comparisons between the weakness of Arcadius and the greatness of his position and his predecessors—so much so that some historians have been unable to believe that Synesius would ever have dared deliver the oration as it stands; but that is no less likely than that he should have stiffened the tone of his oration later, when he returned to Cyrene and no longer had the powerful protection of his hero Aurelian.¹⁶ The most sincere and forthright of the professional panegyrists is Libanius, whose close relationship with the emperor Julian led him to compose in the period 362 to 379 a number of addresses in the panegyric genre, which contain much forthright advice and criticism, and, after Julian's death, a full scale eulogy and lament for his hero, together with a plea to the new Christian emperor to investigate the alleged murder of his pagan predecessor. So far then from seeing the panegyrist as the mouthpiece of the emperor, we must recognise him as very often a free agent, limited only by the strict conventions of his art, and his desire to win the favour of the emperor for his cause.

A third function of the panegyric, connected with the first, is that of providing information, of writing contemporary history. Symmachus, addressing the emperor Valentinian on the Rhine announces his intention of returning to Rome to give news of the emperor's glorious victories.¹⁷ History in antiquity possessed no explicit theory of its own, and since most of its writers had undergone a rhetorical education, their practices were dictated as much by the content of that education as by their individual understanding of their own position in the historiographical tradition. Thus the distinction between history and rhetoric was not absolute, and the portrayal of individuals in history was based largely on an attempt at a balanced synthesis of the rhetorical methods of praise and blame.¹⁸ This relationship between history and panegyric was

¹⁶ Bregman 1982; Gärtner 1993; Hagl 1997, 63-102; Schmitt 2001; Brandt 2003.

¹⁷ Symm., *or.* 2.31.

¹⁸ Fronto, *Principia historiae* (van den Hout p. 191-200); *De bello Parthico* (p. 206-211); Luc., *De Hist. Conscr.* 7-13; cf. Homeyer 1965; MacCormack 1976, 39-40.

recognised in the fourth century: history gave both sides of the picture, panegyric (like invective) only one. In this connection it is important to remember that panegyric often attempted a complete biography of its subject, and at least paid special attention to the details of military campaigns. This relationship is alluded to in a series of disclaimers which appear at the end of a number of historical works written in the fourth century: the historian refuses to continue his story into the reign of the present emperor, or reserves these events for another occasion according to a set formula. Eutropius is perhaps the earliest in 378: *nam reliqua stilo maiore dicenda sunt. quae nunc non tam praetermittimus, quam ad maiorem scribendi diligentiam reseruamus*. Symmachus, the greatest living panegyrist, alludes to Eutropius' phrase in a letter to him. So too Ammianus: *scribant reliqua potiores, aetate et doctrinis florentes. quos id (si libuerit) aggressuros, procudere linguas ad maiores moneo stilos*. And the *Historia Augusta* parodies the phrase twice, of which the most striking is: *supersunt mihi Carus, Carinus et Numerianus, nam Diocletianus et qui secuntur stilo maiore dicendi sunt*. There is a similar passage at the end of Festus' *Breuiarium*, and an echo of the doctrine in Jerome's edition of Eusebius' *World Chronicle*: *quo fine contentus reliquum temporis Gratiani et Theodosii latioris historiae stilo reseruauit (...)*.¹⁹

The *stilus maior*, the higher style, which requires *doctrina*, and to which the historian may or may not presume to aspire, is the style of the panegyric. In making this declaration the historian recognises the difference between history and panegyric, but also their affinity; for the subject of panegyric will become the subject of history when it becomes possible to add to the techniques of *epainos* or *laudes*, those of *psogos* or *uituperatio*, to balance *uirtutes* and *uitia*. Panegyric is contemporary history; it differs from history in two ways: it avoids certain painful issues, and it is written in the *stilus maior*. To a writer of late antiquity the second dis-

¹⁹ Eutr. 10.18; Symm., *epist.* 3.47; Amm. 31.16.9; *Hist. Aug. Heliog.* 35.5; *Hist. Aug. quatt. tyr.* 15.10; cf. *Hist. Aug. Max. Balb.* 2; Fest. 30; Hier., *chron.* p. 5 Fotheringham; cf. Straub 1939, p. 153. This is of course a trope with a long history: Cervantes ends the first part of *Don Quixote* (1605) with a quotation from Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso* (1516): 'perhaps another will sing with a better plectrum'.

tion was at least as important as the first.²⁰ After all history was as much a rhetorical reworking of the records of the past as panegyric was of the present. In a sense then panegyric has a built-in obsolescence: once the ruler is dead or the dynasty has disappeared, it can be replaced by history; a particular panegyric will survive only insofar as it is connected with a famous name, or has become a school-text, a model for future orators.

Ultimately of course the basic function of panegyric was ceremonial. The reception of an embassy, the entry into a town, the acceptance or the bestowal of high office, were ritual moments of deep solemnity: the panegyric was as much part of the necessary ceremonial as all the other complex rules of composure, precedence and vestment which fourth century writers noticed with distaste as a recent phenomenon, and attributed to the reign of Diocletian.²¹ The panegyric was a tax levied on rhetoric by a government which believed so strongly in the central importance of the rhetorical education in society that it had long provided public salaries and exempted *rhētores* from normal taxation.²²

Occasionally one can sense the boredom of the audience, or even the impatience of the emperor as he listens to the interminable dronings of his panegyrist: so Pliny refers to the normal tedium of such speeches in the senate, and Trajan turns to Dio of Prusa riding on his golden triumphal chariot to say, 'I do not understand what you are saying, but I love you as I love myself'; Marcus Aurelius mentions in passing the Greek *encomiographi* who disturb his Neapolitan peace.²³ The moral question of truth was of course (as always in rhetorical theory) ignored. Saint Augustine was a young professor of rhetoric in Milan when his slow conversion to Christianity revealed the tension between his chosen profession and his faith:

That same day, namely when I was preparing an oration in praise of the Emperor, wherein I was to deliver many an untruth, and to be applauded for my untruths, even by those

²⁰ For the importance of levels of literary styles in late antiquity see Auerbach 1965.

²¹ On panegyric as ceremony see esp. MacCormack 1981; Mathisen 2009.

²² *Hist. Aug. Pius* 11.3; *Dig.* 27.1.6.2.

²³ *Plin., epist.* 3.18.6; *Philostr., VS* 488; *Fronto, epist.* 2.8.2 (p. 30 van den Hout).

who knew I was lying, while my heart was seething with these cares and consumed with the fevers of these wasting thoughts, walking along a street in Milan I observed a poor beggar, half drunk it seemed, laughing and full of joy.

Augustine considers the difference between his own learned cares as he ‘lusted after honours, profit and marriage’, and the care-free nature of the beggar’s temporary happiness, gained by a few pence begged from passers-by, and how, although neither of them reflected the glory of God’s purpose:

Nay he truly was the happier man, not only because he was consumed with hilarity, whereas I was tortured by cares, but also because he had gained his wine by wishing people good luck, while I was seeking an illusory pride through telling lies.²⁴

On one side the gilded cage of rhetoric; on the other philosophy, which still thought of itself as pursuing the truth, and liked to portray itself as clad in cloak and sandals, with its only possessions a stick and satchel: and if at court would make a virtue of freedom of speech (*parrhēsia*—the right to abuse even the emperor). The philosophical tradition goes back to the theoretical works *On kingship* (*Peri basileias*) produced from the time of Alexander the Great onwards; but its nature is very different from that of the rhetorical tradition.²⁵ There was no standard and specific school doctrine to which to conform; rather each writer used his predecessors as he wished, more or less closely. If there are general tendencies and common themes,²⁶ it is because certain ideas and certain writers were central to the genre; we know for instance how highly both Synesius and Themistius regarded Dio of Prusa. The philosophical work *On kingship* was usually addressed to a king, in the form of a written treatise, a letter of advice or as a spoken address. The philosopher often began by asserting his independence, with a denunciation of flattery (*kolakeia*) and rhetoric; he might also lay claim to a simple style. But the most distinctive fea-

²⁴ Aug., *conf.* 6.6; the occasion of this panegyric is perhaps for the consulship of Bauto in January 385; see MacCormack 1981, p. 1, and O’Donnell note *ad loc.*

²⁵ Bertelli 2002; Murray 2007, Haake 2015.

²⁶ Barner 1889.

ture of the genre is that, in order to avoid the charge of flattery, the philosopher described the ideal king in the abstract, not as embodied in the particular example he might be addressing; the most he might do was to make some remarks such as 'If any of these attributes seem to belong to you, blessed are you for your benevolence and good nature, and blessed are we who share in them' (Dio of Prusa before Trajan);²⁷ and he might perhaps modify his picture to include a number of traits especially appropriate to the man he was addressing. The main part of the philosophic work would be taken up with a discussion of those virtues particularly appropriate to a king, and of such traditional topics as the contrast between the king and the tyrant, or the benefits of good rule.

In theory the distinction between the writings of the philosophers and the rhetoricians on kingship was absolute; it is reflected in such details as the difference between the titles used: the panegyric was a speech *eis basilea* addressed to a king, the philosophical work was *peri basileias*, *On kingship*. In practice the two genres could combine; but the point here is that, when they did merge, when rhetoric borrowed the approach of philosophy, it did so very consciously: the orator knew that he was crossing a barrier. Thus to take two minor examples, in Julian's second panegyric of Constantius there is an extensive passage describing the ideal king; Julian justifies what he recognises as a digression at the beginning, and at the end, in a long and involved section on the methodology of panegyric: he says explicitly that he has described an archetype against which kings and their praise ought to be measured;²⁸ predictably this feature of the panegyric has led to its being given two titles in some of the manuscripts, *The actions of the emperor, or concerning kingship*. Again Claudian in writing a panegyric on the fourth consulate of Honorius inserts a similar passage on the ideal king; but, because it does not fit into the natural pattern of the panegyric, he represents it as an address by the emperor Theodosius to his son on how to rule;²⁹ again the insertion of a passage appropriate to the philosophical tradition is a self-conscious artifice.

²⁷ D. Chr. 1.36.

²⁸ Jul., *Or.* 2 (3).23-33; cf. Bidez 1932, 109-110; Schorn 2008.

²⁹ Claud. 8.214-418; cf. Cameron 1970, 322.

On occasion the fusion can be more complete, but always it is conscious. The political message of Synesius and his devotion to philosophy (in particular his immense knowledge and respect for the works of Dio) turned his ambassadorial speech into what could be called *Eis ton autokratora peri basileias*—again the double title emphasises its dual background. The most original exponent of this tendency is Themistius.³⁰ Themistius retained his position as the spokesman of the senate of Constantinople through the reigns of seven emperors and over a period of thirty years; himself a pagan, it was only during the reign of the pagan Julian that he did not stand in the highest favour. Constantius praised his philosophy in a letter to the senate: ‘Themistius, accepting the Roman honour which we confer on him, brings in exchange the wisdom of the Greeks’.³¹ He gave him the task of recruiting new members to the senate, and some sort of presidency over it. Theodosius made him Prefect of the City, a post which he had refused twenty-five years earlier from Constantius; both Valens and Theodosius entrusted him with the education of their sons. Men as diverse as the militant pagan Libanius and St Gregory of Nazianzus were proud to claim his friendship. It was a career based on the making of speeches, and more successful than that of any known rhetorician. The secret of Themistius’ success with his contemporaries was indeed that he was not a rhetorician, but a professor of philosophy, the author of famous and still extant paraphrases of Aristotle, and a man whose knowledge of Plato was so profound that the fourth century text of certain dialogues can be partially reconstructed from his use of them.³² He himself attacked rhetoric, and was attacked by its professors. Though the occasions on which his own speeches were delivered were traditional ones, the speeches themselves owe very little to the conventions of rhetoric, at least in their structure: they are far closer to the works of his model Dio, or to the homilies of contemporary Christian bishops. As a result many of the works have alternative philosophical titles: *That a king is preeminently a philosopher*, *On the virtue of*

³⁰ Dagron 1974, 282-284; Vanderspoel 1995.

³¹ *Epist. Constantii ad senatum* ap. Them., *Or.* ed. Schenkl, Downey & Norman, III, p. 121-128.

³² I owe this point to a conversation many years ago with the Platonist Miss Winifred Hicken.

philanthropy, On the nature of kings, Protreptikos, On royal beauty, Which virtue is the most royal?

Themistius' success and popularity as a public figure is a direct result of his deliberate disregard of the rhetorical conventions, and his insistence on his role as *philosophic* adviser to the emperors. His activities of course provoked attack, from both sides. The professors of rhetoric could scarcely do anything but react to this new and treacherous offensive in the traditional quarrel of rhetoric and philosophy. More interesting are the philosophical objections. The dominant approach to philosophy was now neo-Platonic. Themistius was open to criticism from this school on three counts. Firstly philosophy ought not to be an activity related to the politics of this world at least. Secondly philosophy was an esoteric discipline for the few, whereas Themistius explained it in terms comprehensible, if not to the ordinary emperor, at least to his advisers. Thirdly neo-Platonism in this period was becoming more and more a system which saw itself as the bearer of the tradition of Hellenism against the New World, as partly at least in conflict with the Romanisation of the East and with Christianity. Themistius used the same weapon of philosophy in support of the New Rome and of a government essentially Christian. More interesting is the public rebuke of Themistius by the emperor Julian, if only because it has serious philosophical content. Themistius had written to Julian on his accession in a lost work, in which he had praised him as the true Platonic philosopher-king, and the representative of Aristotle's *pambasileia*. Julian replied with a letter that ridiculed Themistius, and showed from the text of Plato's *Laws* and of Aristotle's *Politics* itself that both philosophers had proved the impossibility of such an ideal king existing. This is the first time in antiquity that this particular passage of Aristotle is known to have been cited; and the effect is devastating. Relations between the two men never recovered.³³

Such were the genres of writing on kingship in late antiquity. The question of their subsequent fortunes is a complex one, but central to my enquiry. The Greek speaking world can be quickly

³³ Jul., *Or.* 6. Two Arabic texts of a letter or letters from Themistius to Julian survive which Simon Swain 2013 believes to be genuine, and to be in some sense a reply to Julian's diatribe. If so, they are completely off the point.

described. The two genres of writing, and particularly panegyric, continued to be practised through the history of Byzantium; they were joined by a third genre, the treatise *de officio*, or handbook on the duties, ceremonial and legal, of a particular position: this is in origin a Roman phenomenon, going back to the late Republic, and prevalent in Byzantium because of the central importance of such works in the tradition of Roman law. There seems to be, it is true, no extant example of a panegyric between the sixth and tenth centuries, a fact which may have something to do with the substitution of Roman law for rhetoric as the chief governmental skill required of officials. But it may also be that this is a mere accident of transmission: the inference that no panegyrics were written in this period would be a dangerous one. Certainly when panegyric reappears it still conforms in every way to the rules laid down by Menander. But again this does not imply a continuous rhetorical tradition taught in the schools; for it is clear that Menander's treatise was a standard handbook of Byzantine rhetoric; it is referred to by number of writers in the eleventh century and earlier; and in the treatise of Joseph Rhakondites in the fourteenth century what is in fact a word for word transcription of this chapter of Menander takes a central position.³⁴ Thus because of the existence of a theoretical handbook it would be very difficult to distinguish between a continuous rhetorical tradition taught in schools, and the revival of a dead one. In the Latin West no suitable rhetorical handbook has survived, and there is no sign that any lost work played the part that Menander did in the east. The philosophical tradition, it is clear, disappeared early: most of the possible models were in Greek, and knowledge of Greek effectively disappeared in the fifth century. The only known philosophical work in Latin on kingship is Seneca's *De clementia*: that was perhaps known to the end of the fourth century, to judge from the use made by Ausonius of Seneca's position as tutor and philosophical adviser of Nero (Claudian may also have been used). But there is no sign of the work being used as a model or source—and here the argument from silence is compelling. For *clementia* does not appear in any author as a particularly prominent royal virtue. Again the last author to have any detailed knowledge of any works of Seneca was

³⁴ Rhakondytes ap. C. Waltz, *Rhetores Graeci*, III p. 547-558.

Martin of Braga in Spain: in the 570s he wrote a work of advice for the last of the Suebian kings, Miro, called the *Formula uitae honestae*. Unlike Martin's other works, this one shows no sign of Christian doctrine, and has long been recognised on grounds of style and content to be an adaptation of a lost work of Seneca, *On the four cardinal virtues*. The lost work was a general moral treatise, for Martin's main text shows no sign that it is a king or emperor being addressed. Martin was clearly interested in the problems of addressing kings, as his more Christian works on Pride and Anger show. It is then significant that a man who knew a certain amount about Seneca and had these interests, did not know of the *De clementia*, and in writing a work for a king was forced to go to a far less suitable treatise for his model.

The early loss of the *De clementia* is not perhaps surprising. The pagan philosophical tradition on kingship was not one which would in general be particularly useful to the bishops of the barbarian territories, struggling to preserve the Church in conditions of increasing chaos: for it laid great emphasis on the power of the king, which was false in point of fact, and not a useful notion to encourage. Early Christian writers were more interested in denouncing the sins of pride and anger, with reference to Old Testament parallels, than in praising the power and glory of their rulers, as for instance Martin of Braga's treatise *De superbia* suggests.

The philosophical tradition disappeared early; the decline of panegyric is a more complex phenomenon. Certain basic points need to be considered in any attempt to investigate it. Firstly it is obvious that, in order to survive, the panegyric tradition requires the existence of two phenomena: it needs centres of higher learning, where the arts of rhetoric will be taught; and it needs also kings and courts interested for whatever reason in preserving and rewarding the skills involved. Very often it must have been the disappearance of a particular court which brought to an end the panegyric tradition in that area. The extent to which there was any real continuity in education in the fifth to the seventh centuries is controversial;³⁵ and here again certain points need to be

³⁵ Riché 1962.

made. The existence of certain branches of lower education does not of course imply the continued existence of higher education; and since many skills were similar at both levels an author's use of apparent elements of rhetoric may merely be due to what he picked up at a lower level. Again a man may call himself a 'rhetor' in the fifth and sixth centuries; but that implies no continuity of school techniques, nor does it say anything about the quality or competence of his instruction. It is here I suggest that an attentive reading of the available texts can give us insight into the increasing impoverishment of the rhetorical tradition. Superficially it may be true that many of the external trappings of education continued, but the content of that education became so debased that it would have been unrecognisable to a rhetor of the fourth century. By reading the texts we can get behind the boasts and claims of ignorant teachers to the reality of the education they purveyed.

There is another area where confusion can be cleared up by attentive reading of the texts. We need to be able to distinguish between instruction publicly given to a number of youths, and the sort of skills which a single person could pick up by attentive reading in his own library. This I believe is one of the basic weaknesses of the approach of Ernst Curtius. Curtius took the continuity of the *topos*, the rhetorical commonplace, as evidence for a continuity in education. But it is clear that the *topos* is a form of culture that can very easily be created and recreated in an environment where formal continuity in education does not exist. An author in his library can and will copy or develop themes found in an earlier author, without any need for the postulation of a similar education: if we look, as Curtius did, on culture as a series of atomic propositions or *topoi*, if we break it down into its smallest constituent parts, we are bound to exaggerate the extent of continuity. Certainly rhetoric taught how to develop the commonplace; but it also taught the ordering of one's speech into a larger whole, *taxis* or *dispositio*. Only when *taxis* is present as well as *topoi* can we use apparent continuity in themes to prove continuity in education. For *taxis* is not usually something that can be learned by merely reading an earlier author: the structural rules of panegyric are not immediately obvious to the solitary reader, in the way that such rhetorical tricks as comparisons and metaphors are.

Finally it is in this connection important to consider separately prose and poetry; for, as I shall show, the two traditions are to a large extent independent.

In the fourth century the art of panegyric flourished, both in Gaul and in Italy; we have the collections of Gallic panegyrics from Autun and Trèves; we know of the skills being practised in Bordeaux, Milan and Rome. As befits a technique learned in the rhetorical schools, authors were generally pagan, or at least showed no overt sign of being Christian. However Paulinus of Nola is known to have written a work later described as *panegyricum super uictoria tyrannorum* to Theodosius in 395;³⁶ and Ausonius in 379 succeeded at least in demonstrating the difficulty of adapting the strict art to Christian purposes. But with the death of Theodosius evidence for the continuous existence of the teaching of the skills of prose panegyric virtually ceases; and though it would be rash to conclude from the mere absence of evidence that panegyrics ceased to be performed, there is some sign that this particular branch of rhetorical education did collapse swiftly in the fifth century. The activity of Pacatus, the last of the Gallic panegyrists, in collecting together under Theodosius a body of models of this type of rhetoric from various disparate sources into our present collection of the Twelve Panegyrics, may well be an attempt to establish a canon and models in an age when the skills were already being neglected.³⁷

The only known author of a prose panegyric in the fifth century is the Spaniard Flavius Merobaudes, poet and *rhetor*, described as 'a man of ancient nobility and recent fame' on the base of the bronze statue which his military industry and poetic talent won for him in the Forum of Trajan; in 437 Merobaudes delivered a prose panegyric of the second consulate of Aëtius, whose first and third consulates he celebrated in verse. The grandiloquent language of the inscription suggests that Merobaudes' talents were very unusual in his age; nor is it only the combination of military experience with rhetoric which is praised: he is described as 'not allowing the vigour of his mind to grow stiff with learned idleness in darkness and shade': it looks as if in the Rome of Merobaudes,

³⁶ Paul. Nol., *epist.* 28.6.

³⁷ Pichon 1906.

rhetoric and the scholarly pursuits were already divorced from the activities of the state, and lurking *in umbra uel latebris*.³⁸ And it seems clear both that Merobaudes was primarily a poet, whose one surviving prose panegyric was his only one at least to that date, and also that such prose panegyrics were not often heard in Rome in the first half of the fifth century.

Unfortunately it is not possible to discover from the surviving fragments of Merobaudes' panegyric how far the degeneration of rhetoric had gone. It is true that Merobaudes does refer to himself *uel alii qui in hac dicendi professione sunt*, who, whenever they praise Aëtius are either exercising their own talents or expressing the prayers of others; but it is not clear whether he necessarily means writers of prose panegyrics rather than verse, or to what extent this picture of a flourishing school is the sentimental dream of a man recreating the conditions of a past age, like his contemporary Macrobius. And it is Macrobius who supplies the evidence that the products of a past age were still remembered: he mentions the three great exponents of the art, Pliny, Fronto and Symmachus.³⁹

By the end of the fifth century this branch of the art of rhetoric had certainly died out; for its revival at the Ostrogothic court of Ravenna at the beginning of the sixth century is a self-conscious renaissance. Ennodius reveals it in a letter. Pope Symmachus had asked him to compose a panegyric of Theoderic in recognition of Theoderic's final acceptance of Symmachus' papal claims against those of his rival Laurentius. Ennodius admits that he had already written such a work, and gives a sketch of it which corresponds with the extant panegyric by him.⁴⁰ Ennodius describes the request thus: *exegit a me in usum stili praesentis erumpere* ('he asked me to speak out in the manner of the modern style'). The *stilus praesens* here suggests a new style, or rather the revival of an old one—panegyric. Ennodius himself is notorious for having received a rhetorical education in North Italy, whose content was wholly in the pagan literature. And yet his panegyric shows no knowledge of the conventions of the art: for him the panegyric is genuinely a *stilus*, a

³⁸ ILS 2950; cf. Clover 1971.

³⁹ Macr., *Sat.* 5.1.7.

⁴⁰ For Ennodius see Kennell 2000.

high style, and nothing more—so high indeed, so tortured as to be almost incomprehensible. Though Ennodius knew Symmachus' works, he had no conception of the organisation of such a speech: indeed what organisation that exists is derived from the tradition of Latin biography, not from rhetoric—a solecism no trained orator would have committed. Perhaps it is worth recalling that the educational ideal of Boethius, the famous *quadriuium*, is likewise a system that could only have been put forward by someone ignorant of the earlier organisation in Rome: it looks back to a Platonic ideal, and brushes aside the whole tradition of rhetorical education. Ennodius too displays the same ignorance: he is capable of describing arithmetic as a branch of rhetoric.

The architects of the revival of panegyric in the age of Theoderic were Cassiodorus and Boethius, together, I suspect, with that other Symmachus, the Roman aristocrat and descendant of the great orator, and Boethius' protector and father-in-law: his importance in this new movement is perhaps suggested by his writing a history in imitation of one of his ancestors, and by his work on the text of Macrobius: he will surely have been interested in the standards of rhetoric exemplified by his ancestor. There is here a connection with the contemporary Byzantine renewal of interest in Latin literature; for it was to Symmachus that the Latin grammarian Priscian in Constantinople dedicated a collection of three works, with the purpose of renewing the study of rhetoric in the west.⁴¹ And in one of those works, the adaptation of Hermodenes' *Progymnasmata*, occurs the only theoretical description extant in Latin of the Menandrian rules of panegyric—a section *de laude* of little more than a paragraph, brief but recognisable.

The official encouragement of panegyric is well put by Cassiodorus in the letter which Athalaric sent to the senate of Rome about 533 on the organisation of education there: 'other nations too possess military power: eloquence follows only the kings of Rome' (*arma enim et reliquae gentes habent; sola reperitur eloquentia, quae Romanorum dominis obsecundat*).⁴² And in his panegyric to Eutheric he says that 'anyone can offer you the goods of the present: only Roman eloquence gives you what is praised in every

⁴¹ Prisc. gramm., in *Grammatici Latini* III p. 405 Keil; III p. 435-437 Keil.

⁴² Cassiod., *uar.* 8.21.4.

age'. *Eloquium Romanum* was a consciously recreated goal of government policy.⁴³

The *eloquium Romanum*, the *stilus praesens*, had little or no basis in rhetorical theory: it was the result of a careful reading of earlier panegyrics. Which these panegyrics were is reasonably clear. The sixth century writers show no knowledge of the Gallic panegyrists: the archetype of that collection returned perhaps to Gaul with its author. The Ostrogothic school was based on Italian models, on Pliny, Symmachus and perhaps Fronto. In the fragmentary state of the texts this cannot of course be proved by means of literary echoes, though Ennodius had certainly read Symmachus. But the letters of all three were used as models in the early sixth century. And the evidence of the manuscripts is surely significant. The famous sixth century palimpsest preserved at Bobbio, containing among other texts the panegyrics of Pliny and Symmachus, must be a product of this particular interest of the Ostrogothic school.⁴⁴ The fragments of Cassiodorus' own orations also originally from Bobbio can hardly be much later than his death. This small group of manuscripts connected with St Columban's foundation at Bobbio used to be thought to be derived directly from Cassiodorus' own library at his monastic foundation of Vivarium. That theory has now been generally discarded; nevertheless, if there is no evidence that the manuscripts originated from Vivarium itself, it would be rash to deny any influence of the Ostrogothic school on the curious interests exhibited in these particular manuscripts, and on their concentration in the library of one particular monastery: this must surely be the remnants of a library exhibiting the interests of this group of men at the court of Theoderic.

Nothing survives of Boethius' panegyric of Theoderic in the senate in 522, an *actio gratiarum* for the appointment of his two small boys as consuls—an occasion that would have been hard to reconcile with close attention to the traditions of the Roman

⁴³ Cassiod., *or. ffg.* p. 471 Traube.

⁴⁴ The famous Bobbio palimpsest discovered and published in 1815 by Angelo Mai seems to have contained Cicero's *De republica*, Fronto's letters, and Symmachus' second *Laudatio in Valentinianum*: see Seeck's edition of Symmachus, *praefatio* VIII n. 16. On the possible north Italian origins of these MSS and their subsequent dispersal see Mercati 1934.

consulate. But fragments of two of the many panegyrics of Cassiodorus remain. The first for the consulate of Eutheric in 519 was delivered in Rome, the second is for the marriage of Matasuntha and Vitiges in 536—both occasions of the highest political importance. The first was a celebration of Eutheric's recognition by the emperor Justin as the heir of Theoderic, symbolised by the joint consulate of Justin and Eutheric (the first German to become consul under the Ostrogoths); the second was a desperate attempt by Vitiges to give himself greater legitimacy in the face of Belisarius' advance on Rome. The importance of both situations makes it perhaps inappropriate to regard either speech from the point of view of its literary form; and both speeches are only preserved in fragments. Nevertheless, although both show a deep awareness of antiquities and of isolated rhetorical conventions, neither is analysable in terms of the traditional pattern of panegyric.

Paradoxically, it was in Constantinople that the last true formal Latin panegyric was written; for the poem that Priscian addressed to Anastasius, though as poetry it may not rank as more than grammarian's poetry, is a perfect example of the panegyric form, such as is exhibited in Greek by the prose panegyric of his contemporary, Procopius of Gaza.⁴⁵ But Priscian certainly learned his technique in the East and, despite his treatise for Symmachus, failed to influence decisively the intellectual circle he was trying to encourage in Italy. And how far the new forms of Christian advice to rulers had been developed by the age of Justinian is shown by the *Ekthesis* of 72 maxims on kingship that the obscure deacon Agapetus addressed to Justinian, presumably around the time of his accession. This work became of fundamental importance as a model of kingship in the Byzantine and Slavic tradition, but it is not formally related to the ancient tradition; it belongs rather to a new Christian tradition, whose precepts are based on biblical and earlier church writings which have mediated and transformed the *topoi* of classical kingship theory.⁴⁶ And its structure is dictated neither by rhetorical nor by philosophical models, but by the needs of an acrostic dedication. If there is any direct contact with an earlier classical model,

⁴⁵ For discussions of these texts see appendix.

⁴⁶ See the literature cited in Bell 2009; and esp. Sevckenko 1982; Henry 1967; and Piepenbrink in this book.

the very number of its 72 chapters show that this must be found in the 72 questions and answers on kingship allegedly discussed at the feasts offered by Ptolemy Philadelphus to the 72 Jewish translators of the Septuagint into Greek, in accordance with the standard legend of the translation as presented in the famous late Ptolemaic Jewish letter of Aristeeus to Philocrates.⁴⁷

Despite Justinian's avowed intention to perpetuate Theoderic's concern for the schools of Rome, with the Byzantine reconquest of Italy, Latin prose panegyric again disappears: the manuscripts of Bobbio were treated as so much scrap paper, in bindings, or cleaned and used for the recording of church councils and papal canons; they were rediscovered only in the nineteenth century.

The last man to read a prose panegyric seems appropriately to have been Isidore of Seville: one of the main sources for his brief handbook on the education of the nobility, the *Institutio-
num disciplinae*, was Pliny's *Panegyric*; how he came by it is a mystery, but his misuse of the original shows how much of the ancient structure of rhetorical education had been forgotten.⁴⁸ After that the tradition was lost, until Giovanni Aurispa, exploring the libraries of the Rhine valley after the council of Basle in the summer of 1432, found at Mainz a manuscript of the twelve Latin panegyrists.

In verse panegyric, the situation is different: the tradition is transmitted in a different way, and for this reason is to some extent at least continuous. In antiquity poetry was criticised and categorised in the rhetorical schools, but it was not taught in the same sense as the composition of rhetorical speeches in prose was. The poet was free to use his own invention, not bound by the formal rules of *dispositio*. Moreover poets learned their craft primarily through the study of earlier poets: for the sake of purity of diction, skill in metre and rhetorical effects, they read their predecessors with care; and they read them in a context outside that of formal education as well as within it. Thus the poetic tradition is not bound to the existence of a certain rhetorical education: it depends on the reading of one individual by another. Because of the importance of allusion and echo in the poetic tradition of late

⁴⁷ Murray 1967 and Zuntz 1972.

⁴⁸ Pascal 1957; cf. Beeson 1913.

antiquity, it is possible to see this process with some accuracy, to discover which poets were read and how they were read.

Panegyrics had of course been written in poetic form for far longer than in prose; but it was not until the end of the fourth century AD that this activity was reduced to anything approaching a formal art. In the Greek world the development may have been earlier: it was at least an Egyptian Greek who introduced it into Latin literature. To his contemporaries Claudian appeared a poet of the greatest power and originality, who, as the inscription set up to him by emperor and senate says 'united in one man the genius of Virgil with the muse of Homer'.⁴⁹ Poems had been recited on public occasions before. But Claudian seems to have been the first to elevate poetry to the position of prose, to establish it as a suitable vehicle of expression on those ceremonial occasions when prose panegyrics were conventional. His first Latin poem was a panegyric of the consuls of 395, which was presumably sent to them shortly after his arrival in Rome in the hope of obtaining their patronage. He was clearly successful, for in 396 he was sent on the official embassy to Honorius from the senate of Rome to congratulate him on his third consulate: his poem was delivered at an official audience before the emperor, probably in place of the usual prose offering. From then on he wrote as the official spokesman of his patron Stilicho and the emperor Honorius; his poems were often delivered in place of the appropriate speech in prose, either in the emperor's *consistorium* or in the senate at Rome. As was appropriate for works tied to such ceremonial occasions, his panegyrics conformed to a very large extent, often even down to small details, to the conventional forms and topics of a prose panegyric. So much is this so that it is for instance possible on grounds of form alone to show that the third book on the consulate of Stilicho was performed on a different occasion from the first two, which present a perfect and complete example of the panegyric in themselves. Perhaps the only major addition which Claudian made to the prose tradition lies in his use of personifications of Rome and other deities as characters to diversify the action, to plead with rulers for help and so on. This feature is derived from the Flavian poet, Statius.

⁴⁹ ILS 2949; in general see Alan Cameron 1970.

A new function of panegyric seems to emerge in the tradition of Late Latin poetic (and indeed prose) panegyric from the fifth century onwards to the end of the Ostrogothic kingdom. For the most part these late orators and poets were great landowners living in uneasy coexistence with barbarian kingdoms. Their literary activities therefore reflect their pride in the ancestral values of the Roman Empire at the same time as their claims to be of use in adorning and serving the new kings. But in all this there is little sign that they had been educated in a rhetorical tradition: rather they reflected it without any true understanding of its rules, and often turned to the poetic tradition to express their aims.⁵⁰

For the tradition established by Claudian continued. Fragments of Merobaudes' poetic panegyric for the third consulate of Aëtius in 446 survive, and show an interesting development from Claudian, away from the forms of rhetoric. The role of personification is enhanced: the panegyric begins with a conversation between two female divinities (one of whom is the goddess of war Enyo) on the deplorable and excessive respect paid to the gods of peace as a result of Aëtius' victories: they decide to make trouble to restore the balance. Next we find a speech demanding a leader to put down this renewed trouble: the leader is of course Aëtius: only then does Merobaudes launch into a description of his hero according to the panegyric conventions—the form perhaps remains, though many aspects are treated very perfunctorily. It is hard to say whether Merobaudes' knowledge of this form is derived from rhetorical theory or from the reading of Claudian, whose language he often echoes closely.

In the generation after Merobaudes the breakdown of a conventional rhetorical framework is complete. Sidonius Apollinaris in one of his letters does include the *panegyrista* among the types of authors he read in the course of his education.⁵¹ But it is clear that this is a reading list of authors not a list of subjects studied, and he reads his panegyrist to see if he has said anything *plausibile*, that is if there is any particular *sententia* or turn of phrase worthy of praise. The panegyric he is referring to is surely verse panegyric, not prose. Sidonius' own panegyrics belong wholly to the tradi-

⁵⁰ Reydellet 1981, ch. II.

⁵¹ Sidon., *epist.* 4.1.2.

tion begun by Claudian. He himself describes those who will have been his models. Among them are Claudian himself, and a group of three poets of the immediately preceding generation. The first, unnamed, was an Aquitanian, a supporter of Boniface and Sebastian, who settled in Athens. The second, Quintianus, is described as emigrating from Liguria to Gaul and writing a panegyric of Aëtius' victory there; the last is Merobaudes.⁵² Sidonius' debt to Merobaudes is very clear in both language and structure. He has merely taken over and exaggerated to excess the tendencies already in Merobaudes. No action can take place without Italia appealing to Father Tiber, who refers it to Aurora, who sends the hero Anthemius; or a council of the Provinces before Roma, at which Africa appeals; or a meeting of the gods at which Roma speaks, and Jupiter offers Avitus. The proper description of the hero, *ex ordine*, from birth to the present, is embedded in musty mythological personifications but with no real understanding of the devices employed. For instance the childhood of Avitus is mechanically modelled on Merobaudes' description of the childhood of Aëtius. Rhetorical devices, comparisons with earlier emperors, portents at birth, come so fast that any principle of organisation disappears: the rhetorical *topos* has completely taken over from the *taxis*.

This collapse of rhetoric can be seen outside Gaul. It is often said that the schools of rhetoric continued to flourish in Vandal Africa; but this is by no means clear. It is very striking that there is no sign there of a significant school of prose writers; all our evidence, from the Latin Anthology, and from writers such as Corippus and Dracontius suggest that it was mainly poetry that flourished. And the example of Corippus tends to show that African writers had no clear conception of the panegyric. His *Johannid* is not of course a panegyric, but a historical epic, which is a well-recognised independent genre.⁵³ But when he wrote his poem in praise of Justin II in 566, he wrote it, not as a panegyric, which would have been more appropriate, but in the same form as the *Johannid*; he may even have committed the solecism of calling the poem a panegyric, though that is uncertain.⁵⁴

⁵² Sidon., *carm.* 9.274-301.

⁵³ See the references in the Appendix.

⁵⁴ Nissen 1940.

The last of the Western panegyric poets, Venantius Fortunatus, shows the final stage of the ancient tradition in his poems for the Merovingian kings of the late sixth century. He owes nothing to rhetorical theory, everything to the reading of earlier poets in the tradition, whom he knew well. But, though he can refer in passing to some of the technical terms of rhetoric, his reading of his predecessors clearly gave him no insight into the principles on which they composed their work. For religious reasons, he discarded the personifications of Sidonius. His own principle is cumulative, and his virtuosity cannot disguise the lack of art or the freshness consequent on this lack. He is indeed the first medieval poet, as Sidonius is the last of the classical poets in this particular Latin tradition.

* * *

My brief sketch of the ancient tradition does not seek to offer new illuminations of individual authors or periods. Instead I have tried to suggest five main points. The first is the importance of generic form in the study of kingship literature, which shows an extraordinary stability over five centuries. The second is methodological—the complexity of the routes by which classical antiquity has influenced later ages, the selective nature of the continuity, and the problem of congruence or the spontaneous recreation of old forms. The investigation of this tradition in literature as in art is a question of the availability of manuscripts and models, of the importance attributed to certain authors in successive ages. Thirdly even in so apparently stereotyped a literature as panegyric certain key individuals stand out as innovators. Thus two great figures emerge in late antiquity—Themistius who successfully fused for the first and only time the rhetorical and philosophical traditions, and Claudian who established a new genre of poetical panegyric. These basic facts can too easily be obscured by talk of an undifferentiated rhetorical or classical tradition, talk which itself is meaningless unless we are able to define precisely what place rhetoric and the classical past held in each society, how they were taught and how transmitted. Again the tradition of kingship literature teaches us how little we know of antiquity: what survives is only a small portion of an immense rhetorical industry; for kingship literature has a built-in obsolescence, often lasting only

as long as the dynasty in question: although some authors entered the mainstream, many of those we possess exist only through one chance archetype, or as palimpsests overwritten by later texts or preserved in the bindings of later books.

Finally I have pointed to a series of dichotomies in court literature: that between rhetorical panegyric and the philosophical treatise on kingship in the ancient world; and within ancient panegyric the importance of the distinction between poetry and prose: in contrast to the Greek east, the substantive continuity in the Latin west shifted from prose to poetry, explaining perhaps why the example of Venantius is so important for the revived panegyric element in Carolingian poetry.⁵⁵

Many of the patterns suggested are natural ones. Court literature will always have two basic functions, to advise and to praise. Advice is closely related to the varying needs of society, and continuity is less to be expected. Especially in an age which looked back to an imperial past, however faultily conceived, old forms of praise are better than new. In the continuity of the classical tradition poetry is more resilient than prose, the poetic tradition more continuous. So far Curtius was right, though we may doubt some of his explanations. These points could as easily be made in studying the relationship between the Carolingian age and the high Middle Ages; for once again it is court poetry which provides the continuity; while of the later Mirrors for Princes it has been said, 'there is not the slightest evidence that the Mirrors of Smaragdus, Jonas, Sedulius, Hincmar and so on had any influence on the Mirrors or other literature of the later period, or that these works were still actively read in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries'. Discontinuity and reinvention are as important in the history of the classical tradition as the tradition itself.

So when Justus Lipsius came in 1589 to collect the wisdom of antiquity concerning the importance of monarchy in his *Politicorum siue ciuilis doctrinae libri sex*, although very few of the passages he quotes come from the literature that I have been discussing, nevertheless he was contributing to a tradition that had constantly renewed itself for a millennium and a half, if not

⁵⁵ Cf. Murray 1990.

longer.⁵⁶ But his own book with its praise of kingship based on quotations from classical authors completely ignores the difficulty of distinguishing panegyric from advice to rulers within the classical tradition.

Appendix:
Chronological list of ancient panegyrics
and works on kingship discussed

1st-2nd Centuries AD

Seneca *De clementia* to Nero, AD 55-56

S. Braund (2009), *Seneca De Clementia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pliny *Panegyricus*, *actio gratiarum* delivered 1 September 100

M. Durry (?1959), *Pline le Jeune, Tome IV. Lettres Livre X. Panégyrique de Trajan*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres; R. A. B. Mynors (1964), *XII Panegyrici Latini*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dio of Prusa *Orations 1-4 peri basileias*, delivered in part before Trajan

H. von Arnim (1893), *Dionis Prusaensis quem vocant Chrysostomum quae extant omnia*, I, Berlin: Weidmann.

Fronto AD 140 to Antoninus Pius on the war in Britain, referred to in *Paneg.* 4 (8).14: see C. R. Haines, *Marcus Cornelius Fronto*, II, London, New York: William Heinemann, p. 250.

[**Aelius Aristides**] *Or. 35* *Anonymi eis basilea* addressed to unknown second-third century emperor

Ed. B. Keil, *Aelii Aristidis Smyrnaei quae supersunt omnia*, II, Berlin: Weidmann 1898.

3rd-4th Centuries AD

Menander Rhetor II *Peri epideiktikon*

D. A. Russell & N. G. Wilson (1981), *Menander Rhetor*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981, attributed by them to the age of Diocletian (late third century).

Panegyrici Latini (289-389)

2 (10) Claudius Mamertinus: anniversary of foundation of Rome II panegyric of Maximian 21 April 289

3 (11) *Genethliacus*, panegyric of Maximian 21 July 291

4 (8) anon. Panegyric of Constantius 1 March 297

⁵⁶ See now Brooke 2012.

- 5 (9) Eumenes, *Pro instaurandis scholis*, in presence of governor of Lugdunensis spring 298
- 6 (7) anon. Panegyric of Maximian and Constantine 31 March 307
- 7 (6) anon. Panegyric of Constantine July 310
- 8 (5) anon. *gratiarum actio* to Constantine 312
- 9 (12) anon. to Constantine 313
- 10 (4) Nazarius, Panegyric of Constantine 1 March 321
- 11 (3) Claudius Mamertinus, *gratiarum actio* to Julian 1 June 362
- 12 (2) Pacatus, Panegyric of Theodosius summer 389
 E. Galletier (1949-1955), *Panegyriques latins*, 3 vols, Paris: Les Belles Lettres; R. A. B. Mynors (1964), *XII Panegyrici Latini*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

4th Century AD

Julian

- I *Enkōmion eis Konstantion* 356/7
- II *Eis Eusebian*
- III *Konstantios ē peri basileias* 358
 J. Bidez, *L'Empereur Julien. Œuvres complètes*, I 1. *Discours de Julien César*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres 1932.

Libanius

- 13 *Prosphōnētikos Ioulianōi* 362
- 12 *Eis Ioulianon autokratora hupaton* 363
- 15 *Presbeutikos pros Ioulianon*
- 17 *Monōidia epi Ioulianōi*
- 18 *Epitaphios epi Ioulianōi*
- 24 *Peri tēs timōrias Ioulianou* 379
 R. Foerster, *Libanii opera*, II, Leipzig: Teubner 1904; A. F. Norman, *Libanius. Selected Works*, I, Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press 1969.

Themistius *logoi politikoi* 317-388 addressed to emperors from Constantius to Theodosius

- 1 *Peri philanthrōpias ē Konstantios*
- 2 *Eis Konstantion hoti malista philosophos ho basileus*
- 3 *Presbeutikos*
- 4 *Eis ton autokratora Konstantion*
- 5 *Hupatikos eis ton autokratora Iobianon*
- 6 *Philadelphoi ē peri philanthropias*
- 7 *Peri tōn eutuchēkotōn epi Oulaentos*
- 8 *Pentaetērikos*
- 9 *Protreptikos Oualentinianōi neōi*
- 10 *Epi tēs eirēnēs Oualenti*
- 11 *Deketērikos ē peri tōn prepontōn logōn tōi basilei*

- [12 *Ad Valentem de religionibus*
 13 *Erōtikos ē peri kallous basilikou*
 14 *Presbeutikos eis Theodōsion autokratora*
 15 *Eis Theodōsion tis hē basilikōtatē tōn aretōn*
 16 *Charistērios tōi autokratori huper tēs eirēnēs*
 17 *Epi tēi cheirotoniai tēs poluarchias*
 18 *Peri tēs tou basileōs philēkoias*
 19 *Epi tēi philanthropiai tou autokratoros Theodōsiou*

H. Schenkel & G. Downey (1965), *Themistii orationes*, I, Leipzig: Teubner 1965.

[Arabic letter]

Symmachus

I *Laudatio in Valentinianum Augustum* I 369

III *Laudatio in Gratianum Augustum* 369

II *Laudatio in Valentinianum Augustum* II 370

Ad Theodosium imperatorem frag. Seeck, p. 340

O. Seeck (1883), *Q. Aurelii Symmachi quae supersunt*, Berlin: Weidmann (MGH AA 6.1);

Ausonius

Gratiarum actio ad Gratianum Imperatorem pro consulatu 379

H. G. Evelyn White, *Ausonius*, II, Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press 1921 vol. II 218-269; S. Prete (1978), *Decimi Magni Ausonii Burdigalensis opuscula*, Leipzig: Teubner, 214-232.

Augustine Confessions 6.6 refers to a speech to be delivered before the emperor in Milan AD 385/6

Claudian

Panegyricus dictus Probino et Olybrio consulibus 395

Panegyricus de tertio consulatu Honorii Augusti 396

Panegyricus de quarto consulatu Honorii Augusti 398

Panegyricus dictus Manlio Theodoro consuli 399

De consulatu Stilichonis I-III 400

Panegyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti 404

M. Platnauer (1922), *Claudian*, 2 vols, Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press; J. B. Hall (1985), *Claudii Claudiani carmina*, Leipzig: Teubner.

Synesius

Eis ton autokratora ē peri basileias 399

N. Terzaghi (1944), *Synesii Cyrenensis opuscula*, Rome: Officina Poligrafica; J. Lamoureux & N. Aujoulat (2008), *Synésios de Cyrène*, V. *Opuscles II*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Paulinus of Nola mentions work in praise of Theodosius, *Epist.* 28.6.

5th century AD

Flavius Merobaudes

Panegyricus prosarius in II consulatum Aetii 437

Panegyricus poeticus in III consulatum Aetii 446

F. Vollmer, *Fl. Merobaudis reliquiae, Blossii Aemilii Dracontii carmina* (...), Berlin: Weidmann (MGH AA 14); F. M. Clover (1971) *Flavius Merobaudes. A Translation and Historical Commentary*, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, p. 1-78; A. Bruzzone (1999), *Flavio Merobaude, Panegirico in versi*, Rome: Herder.

Sidonius Apollinaris

Carmen VI-VII Panegyricus Avito Augusto 456

IV-V *Panegyricus Majoriano Augusto* 458

I-II *Panegyricus Anthemio Augusto bis consuli* 468

Ed. W. B. Anderson (1936), *Sidonius. Poems and Lettres*, I, London, Cambridge, MA: Heinemann; A. Loyer (1960), *Sidoine Apollinaire, I. Poèmes*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Dracontius end of fifth century

? *Carmen in honorem Zenonis imperatoris Byzantini* (lost)

F. Vollmer (see above on Merobaudes), p. viii and 228.

6th century AD

Ennodius

Panegyricus dictus clementissimo regi Theoderico

F. Vogel (1885), *Magni Felicis Ennodi opera*, Berlin: Weidmann (MGH AA 7), 203-214; C. Rohr, *Der Theoderich-Panegyricus des Ennodius*, Hannover: Hahn 1995; S. Rota (2002), *Magno Felice Ennodio. Panegirico del clementissimo re Teorico (opusc. 1)*, Roma: Herder.

Cassiodorus

Laudatio in Eutharicum 519

De nuptiis Witigi et Mathesuenthae 536

L. Traube (1894), *Cassiodori orationum reliquiae*, in: Th. Mommsen, *Cassiodori senatoris variae*, Berlin: Weidmann (MGH 12), p. 457-484.

Boethius *cons.* 2.3.8 mentions panegyric to Theoderic on behalf of the consulship of his two sons, 522.

Priscian

De laude Anastasii Imperatoris

A. Bachrens (1883), *Poetae Latini minores*, V, Leipzig: Teubner, p. 264-274.

Procopius of Gaza

Panegyrikos of Anastasius I

Ed. K. Kempen (1918), *Procopii Gazaei in imperatorem Anastasium panegyricus*, Diss. Bonn; G. Matino (2005), *Procopio di Gaza. Panegirico per l'imperatore Anastasio*, Napoli: Accademia Pontaniana; E. Amato (2009), *Procopius Gazaeus. Opuscula rhetorica et oratoria*, Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.

Martin of Braga

Formula uitae honestae for Miro Suebian king c. 570

Patrologia Latina 72.21-28; trans. C. W. Barlow, *Martin of Braga, Paschasius of Dumium, Leander of Seville*, Washington: Catholic University of American Press 1969, p. 87-97.

Corippus

In laudem Iustini Augusti minoris I-IV 566-567

J. Partsch, (1878), *Corippi Africani grammatici libri qui supersunt*, Berlin: Weidmann (MGH AA 3.2); U. J. Stache (1976), *Flavius Cresconius Corippus in laudem Iustini Augusti Minoris: ein Kommentar*, Berlin: Mielke; Averil Cameron (1976), *Flavius Cresconius Corippus. In laudem Iustini Augusti minoris libri IV*, London: Athlone Press; S. Antès (1981), *Corippe. Eloge de l'empereur Justin II*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Venantius Fortunatus second half sixth century

F. Leo & B. Krusch (1891), *Venanti Honori Clementiani Fortunati presbyteri Italici opera poetica/pedestria*, Berlin: Weidmann (MGH AA 4.1-2); tr. J. W. George (1995), *Venantius Fortunatus. Personal and Political Poems*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press; cf. J. W. George (1992), *Venantius Fortunatus: a Latin Poet in Merovingian Gaul*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ch 2.; M. Reydellet (1994-2004), *Venance Fortunat. Poèmes*, 3 vols, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Agapetus

Ekthesis (expositio capitum admonitorum)

Patrologia Graeca 86.1.1163-1186; R. Riedinger (1995), *Agapetos Diakonos. Der Fürstenspiegel für Kaisers Iustinianos*, Athens: Kentron Ereunēs Byzantiu.

7th century AD**Isidore of Seville** *Institutionum disciplinae*

Pascal 1957, p. 425-431; cf. Beeson 1913, p. 93-98.

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Abstract

The opposed traditions of rhetorical panegyric and philosophical advice to princes of the classical age began to fuse in the fourth century AD, at the same time as prose and poetic examples began to merge. My paper traces this development from the second to the sixth centuries AD in relation to the decline of rhetorical education in Late Antiquity and the preservation of the poetic tradition in manuscript form. Finally it raises the question of the independence of the Carolingian *speculum principis* and its later revival in the Ottonian period.

ROGER REES

A HALL OF MIRRORS: THE *PANEGYRICUS* AND THE *PANEGYRICI*

1. *Introduction*

In this contribution, I seek to identify and evaluate the dynamics of reflection and refraction of models of emperorship in a collection of classical Latin panegyrical oratory. The earliest speech in the collection, Pliny's *Panegyricus* to Trajan (100 CE), designates itself a *speculum principis* for future emperors; in its original context, this figuring of Trajan as a model for his successors to emulate may simply have been a novel means of praising the current emperor. However, the speech did enjoy a long and influential afterlife and when the collection of panegyrics as we have it was put together some 300 years later, the *Panegyricus* itself took on the privileged status of a reference-point or exemplar; after anthologisation, the text and the representation of emperorship of each speech can be read against Pliny's, for each new emperor to be measured against the challenge of his *speculum Traiani*. But at the same time, political culture and its rhetorical expression in late antiquity were far removed from that of Trajan's time, with new concerns, audiences and discourses; the later speeches showcase difference as they do continuity. I shall consider how literary collectivity, intertextuality and socio-political change over time combine to ensure that the role of Pliny's *speculum principis* was far from stable in its transmission to late antiquity.

2. *The collection*

As a collection of classical Latin oratory, in size the *Panegyrici Latini* is second only to Cicero's oeuvre. The following figure

tabulates the speeches in chronological sequence, with details of the date and place of delivery, author, addressee emperor, and, in the left-hand column, the order of the speech as preserved in the manuscript tradition.¹

TABLE 1.
The *Panegyrici Latini* in chronological sequence

MSS No.	Date	Author/Emperor	Location
I	100	Pliny to Trajan	Rome
X	289	Anon. to Maximian	Trier
XI	291	Anon. to Maximian	Trier
VIII	297	Anon. to Constantius	Trier
IX	298	Eumenius to Constantius	Autun
VII	307	Anon. to Constantine + Maximian	Trier
VI	310	Anon. to Constantine	Trier
V	311	Anon. to Constantine	Trier
XII	313	Anon. to Constantine	Trier
IV	321	Nazarius to Constantine	Rome (?)
III	362	Claudius Mamertinus to Julian	Constantinople
II	389	Pacatus Drepanius to Theodosius	Rome

The earliest speech by far is Pliny's so-called *Panegyricus* to Trajan (100 CE); this is the speech discussed in his *Letters* 3.13 and 18.² The following eleven speeches are addressed to various emperors between 289 and 389 CE, and share a Gallic origin or authorship; in the case of the last three speeches, for example, Nazarius, Claudius Mamertinus and Pacatus Drepanius are all known to have been Gallic. These eleven late antique speeches addressed various government types and emperors—the Dyarchy of Diocletian and Maximian (speeches X and XI), the Tetrarchy (VIII and IX), the Constantinian dynasty (VII, VI, V, XII, IV), the apostate Julian (III) and Theodosius (II). The occasions for these speeches appear to have covered a similarly broad range, including Rome's

¹ For the manuscript tradition, see Mynors 1964, p. v-xi and Lassandro 1988. For the texts, translation and commentary, see Galletier 1949-1955 (French) and Nixon & Saylor Rodgers 1994 (English).

² *Panegyricus* was not Pliny's name for it; see Rees 2010, p. 18; 2014, p. 113; Hostein 2012, p. 50-54.

birthday (X), imperial victory celebrations (VIII, XII), an imperial wedding (VII) and the orator's consulship (III).

In fact, the collection was not organised in chronological sequence, as the following table demonstrates.

TABLE 2.
The Panegyrici Latini in manuscript sequence

MSS No.	Date	Author/Emperor	Location
I	100	Pliny to Trajan	Rome
II	389	Pacatus Drepanius to Theodosius	Rome
III	362	Claudius Mamertinus to Julian	Constantinople
IV	321	Nazarius to Constantine	Rome (?)
V	311	Anon. to Constantine	Trier
VI	310	Anon. to Constantine	Trier
VII	307	Anon. to Constantine and Maximian	Trier
VIII	297	Anon. to Constantius	Trier
IX	298	Eumenius to Constantius	Autun
X	289	Anon. to Maximian	Trier
XI	291	Anon. to Maximian	Trier
XII	313	Anon. to Constantine	Trier

Cross-reference between the two tables reveals notable peculiarities. First, the discrepancies between manuscript and chronological sequence; the only speech to have the same position in manuscript and chronological sequence is Pliny's, first in both cases; by contrast, the speech to be most transposed is Pacatus Drepanius', latest in date but second in the manuscript sequence.³ Secondly, the manuscript sequence creates some curious trajectories: the first four authors are named in the manuscripts (Pliny, Pacatus Drepanius, Claudius Mamertinus and Nazarius), the rest anonymous except for Eumenius (whose name is preserved in a letter he quotes in his speech);⁴ from II(12) through to VII(6) in the manuscript sequence, a reverse chronological direction is maintained,

³ Rees 2013, p. 241-243. In the interests of clarity, references in scholarship tend to deploy both annotation systems, by which, for example, Pacatus Drepanius' speech is II(12) [or 2(XII)].

⁴ Identification in manuscript marginalia of the author of X(2) and XI(3) as 'the same Mamertinus' [not the same man as Claudius Mamertinus] is variously contested; see Rees 2002, p. 193-204; de Trizio 2009.

followed by two pairs of speeches (VIII(4) and IX(5); X(2) and XI(3)) which preserve within them a chronological progression, before a final leap forwards in time to the closing XII(9). Two further observations on the organisation of speeches are pertinent: first, after Nazarius' speech, the manuscript archetype read *incipiunt panegirici diuersorum vii* ('panegyrics by seven different authors begin'; or 'seven panegyrics by different authors begin'). This detail might suggest that the final speech in the manuscript sequence, XII(9), was added onto an earlier collection of seven, to complete a tidy total of twelve when fronted by the 'named' four speeches from Pliny to Nazarius.⁵ Secondly, the addition of XII(9) meant that the *diuersorum vii* were bookended by the only two speeches in the collection (IV(10) and XII(9)) devoted to the same historical event—Constantine's victory over Maxentius at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312. The manuscript sequence works to give that victory great prominence.⁶

The general academic consensus since René Pichon's suggestion in 1906 has been that the collection's editor was Pacatus Drepanius:⁷ his speech to Theodosius is second in manuscript sequence, but latest in time; it is closely engaged with Pliny's in various ways, and in fact with at least nine of the other ten speeches (and possibly all of them).⁸

3. *Pliny's Panegyricus*

Pliny's *Panegyricus*, with which the collection opens, is a landmark text in the history of Latin political literature. The original was delivered to mark Pliny's suffect consulship in September 100 CE, in the Senate, at Rome.⁹ The speech was then revised and expanded before publication; it seems that these processes of revision and publication of the speech were as much part of Pliny's achievement, since panegyric speech-making long preceded him in Roman Imperial politics, although no examples survive.¹⁰

⁵ Barnes 2011, p. 182-183.

⁶ Rees 2012b, p. 216-217.

⁷ Pichon 1906, p. 290-291.

⁸ Rees 2013, p. 245-247.

⁹ Roche 2011b, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Letters* 3.13; 3.18. Rees 2007, p. 142-143.

A function of the *Panegyricus* as a *speculum principis* is made explicit early on: *boni principes, quae facerent, recognoscerent, mali, quae facere deberent* ('so that good emperors recognise what they do, and bad emperors what they ought to do, 4.1).¹¹ By September 100 CE, Trajan had been emperor for a little over two and half years; he had not hurried to Rome on being proclaimed emperor, but after a tour of frontier legions, had only entered the city in the spring of 99 (*paneg.* 20).¹² Therefore, although the *Panegyricus* was not an accession-address, it dates to early in the emperor's reign. This is an important point, since it allows for its function as a *speculum principis* to apply to Trajan himself rather than, or at least, rather than primarily to the 'good' and 'bad' emperors Pliny speaks of so vaguely. That is, if the *Panegyricus* explicitly claims a function as a manifesto of ideal emperorship, based on Trajan's example, for the benefit of future generations, that must surely be seen, at least in part, as a cover for its function as protreptic for Trajan's reign itself.¹³

The speech, then, is presented as a non-specific template for Roman emperorship, and across its ninety-five chapters, a broad suite of personal qualities are identified in Trajan and duly praised. For example, also early on the speech, Trajan is characterised as a citizen and parent: *nusquam ut deo, nusquam ut numini blandimur: non enim de tyranno, sed de ciue; non de domino, sed de parente loquimur* ('nowhere should we flatter him as a god, nowhere as a divinity, for we are speaking about a citizen not a tyrant, a parent not a master', 2.3). According to Roche who footnotes fifty-one such (in alphabetical order, starting from *abstinentia, auctoritas* ... through to *uigilantia, uirtus*) 'Trajan's virtues in the *Panegyricus* constitute the largest cluster of these abstractions attaching to a single human being in the early imperial period'.¹⁴ These multiple and exemplified ethical abstractions characterise Trajan as the rightful ruler. The moral value system they uphold is deftly presented by Pliny as in keeping with a senatorial, even Republican view, and thus Max Weber's *charismatic* model of leadership

¹¹ For the specific designation of text as a mirror, see Sen., *clem.* 1.1.

¹² Durry 1938, p. 115.

¹³ Morton Braund 1998, p. 65-68.

¹⁴ Roche 2011b, p. 8.

overlaps with his *legal* and *traditional* categories too.¹⁵ Pliny cultivates an indulgent, self-conscious style with frequent patterns of repetition, negation, and inflection to articulate the nature of Trajanic emperorship. For example, expression of Trajan's legal status deploys repetitions and chiasmus to memorable effect: *non est princeps super leges sed leges super principem* ('the emperor is not above the laws but the laws above the emperor', 65.1). Trajan's recognition of the sanctity of law is then linked to a religious dimension, *iurat in leges attententibus dis* ('he swears an oath of allegiance to the laws with the gods in attendance', 65.2). Pliny carefully orchestrates his rhetoric and subject to present an essentially charismatic model of principate which is necessarily subject to constitutional, legal and religious restrictions.

But this model of a man—a fellow citizen, in fact—who is loved and wanted as emperor for his human virtues and respect for the earthly institutions of law and state, is considerably modified late on the speech—a culmination or an afterthought?—when Trajan is cast as Jupiter's vice-regent on earth:

o uere principis, atque etiam dei curas, reconciliare aemulas ciuitates, tumentesque populos non imperio magis quam ratione compescere: intercedere iniquitatibus magistratuum, infectumque reddere, quidquid fieri non oportuerit: postremo, uelocissimi sideris more, omnia inuisere, omnia audire, et undecunque inuocatum statim, uelut adesse et adsistere! talia esse crediderim, quae ipse mundi parens temperat nutu, si quando oculos demisit in terras et fata mortalium inter diuina opera numerare dignatus est: qua nunc parte curarum liber solutusque, caelo tantum uacat, postquam te dedit, qui erga omne hominum genus uice sua fungereris (paneg. 80.3-5)

O indeed the cares of an emperor and even a god, to reconcile rival city states, and to soothe angry people not so much by power but by reason; to intervene in the injustices of magistrates, to render undone what ought not to have been done; finally, like the swiftest star, to see everything, hear everything and from wherever you have been summoned as if to be there and to help at once! I could believe such things happen when the father of the world controls with his nod, if ever he cast his

¹⁵ Weber 1947, p. 328, 341, 358-359.

eyes to earth and deigned to count mortal fate among divine duties; now free and released from this part of his cares, he is available for heaven alone, since he has given you to fulfil his role towards all humankind.

The approximation of Trajan to a god in this passage is not easily reconciled with Pliny's earlier claim that the emperor (a parent, citizen, man, fellow soldier) is not to be flattered as a *deus* or *numen*;¹⁶ this passage comes late in the very long speech, and perhaps the audience is invited cheerfully to tolerate its climactic, exaggerated tone. The characterisation of the Plinian imperial office is contradictory, a fact which further complicates the role of the *Panegyricus* in consideration of the imperial office two centuries later and beyond.¹⁷

4. *Pliny and the later Panegyrici*

It is often said that the *Panegyricus* was a 'model' for the later panegyrics in the collection, but as this discussion of the emperor's status—divine or human?—illustrates, caution should be urged in the assumptions such a label might bring with it.¹⁸ The degree of the exemplarity of Pliny's speech in the later panegyrics is markedly inconsistent in form and detail. Easy illustration of the hazards inherent in the designation of the *Panegyricus* as a 'model' can be found in consideration of the speeches' length: the *Panegyricus* is notoriously long, more than twice the length of the next longest speech in the collection, and about eight times the length of the shortest (VII(6)), so in crude terms of scale alone, Pliny's speech manifestly did not function as a model to the later ones.¹⁹ But nonetheless, the overall temptation/invitation to see the *Panegyricus* as originary and influential on late antique Latin panegyric is irresistible given its position at the head of the

¹⁶ For the epic resonances of Jupiter viewing mortal affairs from above, see Verg., *Aen.* 1.223-224, and ruling with a nod, *Aen.* 9.106.

¹⁷ Morton Braund 1998, p. 63-65; Rees 2001.

¹⁸ Rees 2011, p. 178-188; Gibson & Rees, 2013 p. 153; Formisano 2015, p. 84.

¹⁹ On the length of Pliny's speech—and its ending—, see Gibson 2010.

Panegyrici collection, and also in the collection's various ideological and intertextual debts to it.²⁰

The broad ideological debts the later speeches might be thought to owe to Pliny's *Panegyricus* include the fact that their construction of leadership, like Pliny's, is essentially *charismatic*; ethical virtues abound throughout the *Panegyrici Latini*, frequently in abstractions. Robin Seager's is the most detailed and successful analysis of how the late *Panegyrici Latini* deploy the canon of virtues to suit their individual contexts.²¹ To give just two examples: in XI(3), Maximian and his co-emperor Diocletian are lauded for their *pietas* and *felicitas* (6.1, 18.5); in III(11) Claudius Mamertinus most frequently commends Julian's *fides* and *libertas*. The choice of virtues may change, but not in an identifiably linear manner; it is not the case, for instance, that the panegyrics attest an increasing importance over time in a particular virtue or set of virtues. Instead, the interplay of ethical similarity and difference with imperial predecessors functions to craft individual characters for addressee-emperors. This dynamic involves backward arcs.

To illustrate this: in III(11) and II(12) respectively, in a way which both differentiates them from predecessors such as Maximian and Constantine, and aligns them with Pliny's Trajan (see above, *paneg.* 2.3), Julian and Theodosius are characterised as having the quality of a civilian—*ciuitas*. Claudius Mamertinus insists on the new direction Julian in which was heading: *mutauit, plane mutauit; nam ciuilior factus prosperorum infregit inuidiam* ('he has changed it, he has changed it; for being made more civilian, he has broken jealousy of prosperity', III(11)27.3).²² In his closing chapter to Theodosius, Pacatus Drepanius extends this characterisation, but also with some vocabulary even more directly reminiscent of Pliny to Trajan: *dies primus inuexerit (...) de superbia triumpharis (...) ciuilique progressu (...) priuatas quoque aedes (...) amoris excubiis* ('the first day brought you in (...) you triumphed over arrogance (...) private homes too (...) with the watch-guard of love', II(12)47.3) recalling *ac primum, qui dies (...) inuehi (...)*

²⁰ For some recent discussions, see García Ruiz, Gibson, Henderson and Rees (all 2013).

²¹ Seager 1984; see also Rodríguez Gervás 1991, p. 78-109; Mause 1994.

²² This theme is intensified by repetitions, *ciuilis animi* ('citizen's mind', 28.1), *ciuiliter facis* ('you perform as a citizen', 31.1).

triumphum, sed de superbia principum egisti (*Panegyricus* 22.1-2) (...) *priuatam domum* (23.6) (...) *sed amoris excubiis* ('At first, what day (...) to be brought in (...) you conducted a triumph, but over emperors' arrogance, (...) a private house (...) but with the watch-guard of love', 49.2). From Pliny's speech onwards, ethical virtues remain a constant building block in oratory's representation of emperorship, making it, in this respect, something of a model of political literature: and in certain cases, such as this, where the lexical similarities with as well as the speech's juxtaposition in the collection next to the *Panegyricus*, ethical virtues in his text give Pliny's work a hermeneutic potential for later readers of the collection. Nowhere in the eleven late antique panegyrics is there an unequivocal statement of a *speculum principis* role for a speech, nothing akin to the Plinian claim we saw earlier (*paneg.* 4.1). But, once the speeches were anthologised with Pliny's at the head, no further statement of a mirroring function was necessary, since the principle was already established. That is, collected and published in an anthologised context, and regardless of Pliny's original ambition and whether or not it can now be identified, these panegyrics gained new meanings in the late fourth century, meanings elicited by the critical imperative to arc the speeches back to the first one. And so, the act of collection of the *Panegyrici* in the late fourth century literally foregrounded Pliny's purpose, which can then be seen endlessly to inform the other speeches. Pliny's invitation to later emperors to recognise good emperorship in his *Panegyricus* to Trajan can be used by readers of the collection as a benchmark against which to judge the later emperors themselves. According to this hermeneutic, for example, in isolation, Maximian might seem a successful emperor in X(2) and XI(3), in the latter case for his *pietas* and *felicitas*; but when those speeches are seen as part of a collection, Maximian might seem rather less accomplished to a reader who bears in mind Pliny's *speculum principis* and its characterisation of Trajan. In the particular case of imperial *ciuitas*, the effect might even be intensified by the sequencing of the anthology: in the collection's first speech, Pliny vaunts Trajan's *ciuitas*; in its second, so too Pacatus Drepanius vaunts Theodosius'; and in its third, Claudius Mamertinus vaunts Julian's. It never features again, and to the attentive reader of the whole collection, that silence may (or may not) ring loud. As just one example of the lit-

erary dynamics that anthologisation and arrangement make real, Pliny's model of charismatic emperorship and reciprocity of *civis* and *princeps* is variously revived and reprised in the later speeches, underscoring the appreciation of the continuities in emperorship and its oratorical representation.

The case of the particular ethical characterisation of addressee-emperors highlights that for all the continuities between the *Panegyricus* and the *Panegyrici*, we should also recognise that times had changed by the late third and fourth centuries, and Roman Emperorship was not what it had been. For example, by the time the collection was put together, the imperial office had become much more itinerant than it had ever been in the high Empire, with various provincial capitals, such as Trier (the location of many of the *Panegyrici*), Milan, Antioch, Thessalonica and Constantinople. With the notable exceptions of Diocletian, Maximian and Julian, Emperors now tended to be Christian. And by the late fourth century, many imperial administrations over the previous one hundred years had been collegiate, such as Diocletian's Dyarchy and Tetrarchy, the joint reigns of his sons after Constantine's death, or of Theodosius and Valentinian II. We might expect these very significant changes since the Trajanic period to be represented in some capacity in the texts. Some are immediately apparent, certainly, but historically religion is the 'change' that has most preoccupied scholars.²³ Pliny's *Panegyricus* even plays a part in this discourse, to complex interpretative effect. At the next speech in chronological sequence, X(2), delivered at Trier in 289. Maximian—one half of the Dyarchic imperial college—was present at the speech, his colleague Diocletian was not. The anonymous orator was generally far less hesitant than Pliny in attributing divine qualities to Maximian and Diocletian;²⁴ and nowhere does he celebrate the Dyarchs as 'citizens' or as subservient to the law. Nonetheless, it seems that the paradoxical characterisation of Trajan elaborated by Pliny was used to differentiate Diocletian and Maximian and align them with their patron deities, Jupiter and Hercules, respectively.²⁵ The orator relates how Maximian

²³ Béranger 1970; Saylor Rodgers 1986; Liebeschuetz 1990.

²⁴ Saylor Rodgers 1986, p. 75-77.

²⁵ Rees 2005.

had been summoned by Diocletian to restore the state: *te, cum ad restituendam rem publicam a cognato tibi Diocletiani numine fueris inuocatus, plus tribuisse beneficii quam acceperis* ('[that] when you had been summoned by your kindred divinity Diocletian to restore the state, you bestowed more benefit than you received', X(2)3.1). This reprises language used by Pliny of Trajan's accession: *expectatum est tempus, in quo liqueret, non tam accepisse te beneficium, quam dedisse* ('The time was awaited when it would be clear that you had not so much received a benefit as given it', *paneg.* 6.3).²⁶ Such approximation by intertext of Maximian to Trajan privileges the Dyarch over his colleague Diocletian: further interplay continues later in the chapter when the orator, like Pliny had in his chapter 80, catalogues the responsibilities of imperial office:

admittere in animum tantae rei publicae curam et totius orbis fata suscipere et oblitum quodammodo sui gentibus uiuere et in tam arduo humanarum rerum stare fastigio, ex quo ueluti terras omnes et maria despicias uicissimque oculis ac mente conlustres ubi sit certa serenitas, ubi dubia tempestas, qui iustitiam uestram iudices aemulentur, qui uirtutis uestrae gloriam duces seruent, accipere innumerabiles undique nuntios, totidem mandata dimittere, de tot urbibus et nationibus et prouinciis cogitare, noctes omnes diesque perpeti sollicitudine pro omnium salute transigere (X(2)3.3-4)

to admit into your mind concern for such a state, to undertake responsibility for the destiny of the whole world, and, somehow forgetful of yourself to live for the people, and to stand at the lofty pinnacle of human affairs, from where it is as if you look down on all lands and seas, and you survey with eyes and mind in turn where calm is assured, where storms threaten, which judges copy your justice, which generals maintain the glory of your virtue, to receive innumerable messengers from everywhere, to issue as many instructions, to give thought to so many cities and nations and provinces, to spend all night and day in endless concern for the wellbeing of all.

Although cautiously modified with *quodammodo* and *ueluti*, the image of Maximian, standing at the summit of human affairs, looking down on the world and fulfilling specific tasks of government

²⁶ Klotz 1911; Henderson 2013, p. 167.

arcs back to Pliny's Trajan and Vergil's Jupiter. In the context of the Dyarchy, this is potentially divisive, as it was Diocletian who had taken the signum *Iouius* and Maximian *Herculius*. The privilege granted to Maximian might also be seen in the second person verbal forms *despicias* and *conlustres*, addressed only to Maximian, to the exclusion of Diocletian.²⁷ Perhaps this is best understood as the orator's positive spin on a characterisation of Maximian as man of action, working to bring about the stability designed by Diocletian. Such an interpretation could find confirmation later in this short speech, when the help Maximian brings to mankind identifies him as the Herculean emperor, bringing practical assistance to mankind, as Hercules had brought to Jupiter.

uestra haec, imperator, uestra laus est; a uobis proficiscitur etiam quod per alios administratur. ut enim omnia commoda caelo terraque parta, licet diuersorum numinum ope nobis prouenire uideantur, a summis tamen auctoribus manant, Ioue rectore caeli et Hercule pacatore terrarum, sic omnibus pulcherrimis rebus, etiam quae aliorum ductu geruntur, Diocletianus † facit, tu tribuis effectum (X(2)11.6-7)

This is your praise, Emperor, yours. Even what stems from you is administered by others. For as all useful things produced in heaven and earth seem to come to us through the agency of different divinities, but emanate from the highest creators, Jupiter ruler of the heavens and Hercules bringer of peace on earth, so in all the most beautiful matters, even those conducted under the leadership of others, Diocletian makes † the decisions †, you bring them about.²⁸

This assertion that as all benefits derive from Jupiter and Hercules, so too Diocletian makes the decisions and Hercules carries them out, is a more thoroughgoing rehearsal of the Dyarchs as Jovian and Herculean respectively; as such, it subtly inflects the earlier, suggestive characterisation of Maximian as Jovian, and so illustrates how, under a collegiate government of two, Pliny's *Panegyricus* could trigger or inform a range of readings. Whether or not and how redeployments of Plinian motifs and language are to

²⁷ Although n. b. the plural *uestram* and *uestrae*: Rees 2003, p. 457.

²⁸ For the text, see Nixon & Saylor Rodgers 1994, p. 71-72; for discussion, Kolb 1987, p. 97; Rees 2002, p. 48-49.

be interpreted are tricky questions. Lexical echoes assert beyond reasonable doubt that the Treveran orator knew Pliny's speech.²⁹ But X(2) predates the creation of the *XII Panegyrici Latini* collection by a full century, rendering it difficult to calibrate how its engagement with the *Panegyricus* would have resonated originally: was Pliny's speech widely known then in North-East Gaul, and so did the orator expect his audience to recognise and interpret the intertextuality? (Or was that imperative only fully realised once Pacatus Drepanius anthologised the collection in the late fourth century and chose Pliny's and X(2) as the collection's earliest two?) Did the orator consider the *Panegyricus* a *speculum principis* for Maximian and how well did the emperor bask in its reflected light? Did the nuanced redeployment of Trajanic divinity cast wholesome light on Maximian? Or were such questions only triggered by Pacatus Drepanius' editorial decisions?

Perhaps inevitably, much scholarly energy has been devoted to scrutiny of the *panegyrici* for evidence of Christianity. Of particular interest in this respect are the religious landscapes presented in the speeches to Constantine and Theodosius, two of late antiquity's most prominent Christian emperors. In XII(9), for example, dated to 313, the orator's elegant periphrasis masks what seems like considerable unease about how to name the divine realm:

quamobrem te, summe rerum sator, cuius tot nomina sunt quot gentium linguas esse uoluisti (quem enim te ipse dici uelis, scire non possumus), siue tute quaedam uis mensque diuina es, quae toto infusa mundo omnibus miscearis elementis, et sine ullo extrinsecus accedente uigoris impulsu per te ipse mouearis, siue aliqua supra omne caelum potestas es quae hoc opus tuum ex altiore Naturae arce despicias: te, inquam, oramus et quaesumus ut hunc in omnia saecula principem serues (XII(9)26.1)

This is why, greatest creator of matter, whose names you wanted to be as numerous as the languages of nations (for we cannot know what you wish to be called yourself), whether you are some divine force and mind, infused through the whole world and mixed in in all the elements, and without any influence of force acting externally you are moved by your own means, or if you are some power above the whole sky and

²⁹ Klotz 1911, p. 535; Henderson 2013, p. 167, 173-174.

look down upon this your work from nature's higher vantage point: we beg you, I say, and we beseech you to protect this emperor for all generations.

Addressing the same Emperor eight years later, Nazarius is similarly non-committal when he says *spectat enim nos ex alto rerum arbiter deus* ('god the arbiter of matter, watches us from high' IV(10)7.3). Perhaps more radical is what Pacatus Drepanius (recently identified as Christian³⁰) says of Theodosius: *deum dedit Hispania quem uidemus* ('Spain has given us a god we can see', II(12)4.5). If there is a vague monotheism in XII(9), IV(10) and II(12), there are also some phrases which would be unacceptable to orthodox Christian doctrine.³¹ It seems that in its response to and representation of the evolving religious landscape, the genre was curiously conservative and resistant to change.

In fact, however, other changes in the imperial office between Trajan and the late third century had a greater effect than on the ideological content of the panegyrics: whatever the anchoring instinct of backward-glances to a ground-breaking text such as Pliny's, the role of epideictic oratory in a more geographically and demographically diverse state, when speeches might be delivered on the rare occasion of an emperor's visit (or even in his absence³²), and in locations with some pressing and distinctly non-metropolitan concerns, would be bound to evolve.³³ Guy Sabbah's terms *communication descendante* and *ascendante* for the trajectories of communication offer illuminating ways of differentiating between texts and their functions.³⁴

The term *communication ascendante* accounts for information or even petition originating from the orator and/or those he represents, for the attention of the addressee emperor. A clear example of this phenomenon is the appeal to Constantine by an orator in 310, in which he seeks help for his children:

³⁰ Turcan-Verkerk 2003; see also Cameron 2011, p. 227-230.

³¹ Saylor Rodgers 1986, p. 85-89, 92-96.

³² Nazarius addressed Constantine in his absence (IV(10)3.1); see below on imperial *praesentia*.

³³ Pernot 2015, p. 27-28.

³⁴ Sabbah 1984.

commendo liberos meos praecipueque illum iam summa fisci patrocina tractantem, in quem me totum transtulit pietas, cuius felix seruitus, si quando respexeris, maxime tuae conueniet aetati (VI(7)23.1)

I commend to you my children and in particular that one who tends the highest interests of the exchequer, onto whom piety has completely transferred my hopes, and whose beneficial service, if ever you look to it, will most suit your age.

This is a very personal appeal, but others include civic petitions, such as for financial concessions (e.g. IX(5)20, V(8)11-13) or for securing the promise of another imperial visit (e.g. X(2)14.5). The record suggests that this sort of personal and political negotiation was a regular feature of late antique panegyric, where the duty of addressing the emperor was an opportunity to press a particular agenda. Other mechanisms for communication with the emperor existed, such as by letter or on delegation, but the circumstances and culture of these practices restricted the nature of their business.³⁵ Access to the emperor was not guaranteed to individuals, and so the premium of the opportunity to deliver an address to him to his face will have increased.

But at the same time, as Sabbah demonstrated, panegyrics could be vehicles for communication from the emperor to his subjects. The *communication descendante* function is akin to propaganda if understood as part of a systematic centralised control of the content and even means of dissemination of political ideology: but the applicability to classical panegyric of the modern term 'propaganda' is contested on various grounds, such as the independence from court control the orators appear to have enjoyed and the local and personal agenda their works often promote.³⁶ Nonetheless, it can hardly be denied that the same orator of VI(7) must have had the consent of Constantine's advisors (and might even have been primed by them) when he said, early on in his panegyric:

³⁵ Millar 1977, p. 213-228.

³⁶ Cameron 1970, Rodríguez Gervás 1991, and Whitby 1998 all enshrine 'propaganda' in their titles. Nixon 1983 demonstrated that the orators were not in the pay of the imperial court, for example.

a primo igitur incipiam originis tuae numine, quod plerique adhuc fortasse nesciunt, sed qui te amant plurimum sciunt. ab illo enim diuo Claudio manat in te auita cognatio. (VI(7)2.2)

Therefore, I will start from the first godhead of your origin, which perhaps many people still don't know about, but those who love you most know—for in you an ancestral descent from the divine Claudius dwells.

The claim that Constantine was descended from the third century emperor Claudius Gothicus has other attestations, and was clearly a calculated step in Constantine's ideological evolution: but evidence for other, immediately contemporary celebrations of this (alleged) descent is lacking, but that it was announced in a panegyric delivered in a provincial capital demonstrates how epideictic oratory could function dynamically in political communication, that is in two directions. Most readers now see the panegyrics as alert to but not products of centrally generated propaganda; as informed by/attuned with but not enslaved to aspects of imperial presentation as seen on media such as coinage, inscriptions, and legal sources. If that characterisation of panegyric is upheld, panegyrics are not so much a source of evidence for how the emperor wished to be represented to the oratory-literate public of the empire, but rather as evidence for how the orators of the empire wished to represent the emperor (and other political subjects) back to the emperor and to the wider audience. The effective difference between these two positions is perhaps not always great: for example, the insistent characterisation by Pacatus Drepanius of the late Magnus Maximus as a tyrant (II(12)2.3, etc.) in the speech of 389 is in keeping with the Theodosian obelisk, to be put up a few years later in Constantinople, *extinctis ... tyrannis* (CIL III 737), and so no doubt was acceptable to the emperor's ears; but more importantly, this characterisation would advance the Bordelais orator's identification of his fellow Gauls as victims of Maximus' tyranny and therefore as loyal servants of Theodosius.³⁷ That is, characterisation of the emperors in the panegyrics seems to have been a function of the speeches' role as *provincial political discourse* rather than as parrots of centrally controlled image making.

³⁷ Rees 2015.

And in some general themes, especially those concerning the relationship between the provinces and the emperor as their benefactor and defender, the concerns of these late speeches are very insistent. We can illustrate this through a series of examples, to consider in turn the related topics of imperial *aduentus*, mobility, *celeritas*, *praesentia* and military strength.

4.1. Imperial *aduentus*

Aduentus, ('arrival') was a particularly rich moment of imperial presence, the point at which he entered a city, sometimes in triumphal fashion. The ceremonial nature of *aduentus* is attested in many artistic and literary representations, including historiography and panegyric.³⁸ The earliest account in the late antique *Panegyrici Latini* sees the author of XI(3) of 291 wryly amused by the confusing novelty of two emperors at Milan:

quale pietas uestra spectaculum dedit, cum in Mediolanensi palatio admissis qui sacros uultus adoraturi erant conspecti estis ambo, et consuetudinem simplicis uenerationis geminato numine repente turbastis! nemo ordinem numinum solita secutus est disciplina; omnes adorandi mora restiterunt duplicato pietatis officio contumaces. atque haec quidem uelut interioribus sacrariis operta ueneratio eorum modo animos obstupescerat quibus aditum uestri dabant ordines dignitatis. ut uero limine egressi per mediam urbem simul uehebamini, tecta ipsa se, ut audio, paene commouerunt, omnibus uiris feminis paruulis senibus aut per fores in publicum proruentibus aut per superiora aedium limina imminentibus. clamare omnes prae gaudio, iam sine metu uestri et palam manu demonstrare: 'uides Diocletianum? Maximianum uidetis? ambo sunt! pariter sunt! quam iunctim sedent! quam concorditer conloquuntur! quam cito transeunt!' (XI(3)11.1-4)

What type of spectacle your piety granted, when people had been admitted to the palace in Milan and were going to adore your sacred features, and when you both became visible to them, and with your twinned godhead you suddenly abolished the custom of single veneration! Nobody followed the hierarchy of divinities in the standard manner. Every-

³⁸ MacCormack 1975; 1976; 1981, p. 17-61.

one stopped to delay in adoration, stubborn in their twofold duty of piety. As if in an inner shrine, this private veneration stunned the minds only of those whose rank granted them access to you. When you crossed the threshold and were carried together through the middle of the city, I understand the buildings themselves almost moved as all men, women, children and elderly poured out from doorways onto the streets or leaned out of the windows of uppers storeys. All shouted for joy, then without fear openly pointed at you: 'Do you see Diocletian? Do you see Maximian? They are both here! They are together! How closely they sit! How they chat in harmony! How quickly they pass by!'

Despite the novelty of a specifically Dyarchic *aduentus*, the occasion is presented as a variant of a recognised type. Among other details, the rhetoric of exclamation, the ecphrastic attention to the buildings, and the notice of the range of ages of attendant citizens mark the *aduentus* out as an exciting celebration. Although political circumstances were to change markedly in the next twenty years, a very similar suite of themes and expressions can be seen in a speech of 311, when the orator describes Constantine's arrival in Trier:

quisnam ille tum nobis inluxit dies (iam enim ad praedicanda remedia numinis tui ordine suo peruenit oratio), cum tu, quod primum nobis signum salutis fuit, portas istius urbis intrasti!— quae te habitu illo in sinum reducto et procurentibus utrimque turribus amplexu quodam uidebantur accipere. miratus es, imperator, unde se tibi tanta obuiam effunderet multitudo, cum solitudinem ex uicino monte uidisses. omnes enim ex agris omnium aetatum homines conuolauerunt, ut uiderent quem superstitem sibi libenter optarent. (V(8)7.6-8.1)

What a day then shone down on us (for now, on its course, my speech has come to proclaim the help your divinity gave), when you entered the gates of this city—which was the first sign of our wellbeing. With their appearance drawn back into a curve and with towers projecting from both sides, the gates seemed to receive you in some sort of embrace. Emperor, you wondered from where such a great crowd poured out to meet you, since from a neighbouring hilltop you had seen solitude. For all people of very age flew from the fields to see the one whom they would gladly wish to outlive them.

If notions of collegiate government have here been superseded by a focus on Constantine alone, the ideology of imperial visits to provincial cities is still being worked up in consistent and recognisable form to celebrate the moment. Another speech, also delivered in Trier a few years later, makes what was presumably an imaginative leap akin to that made in 291 by the Treveran orator who had envisioned the Dyarchs in Milan. Addressing Constantine in 313, this later orator says:

qui fuit dies ille quo Mediolanum ingressus <es>! quae gratulatio principum ciuitatis, qui plausus populi! quae securitas intuentium te matrum te uirginum, quamque duplici fructu fruebantur, cum pulcherrimi imperatoris formam uiderent et licentiam non timerent! ostentare se omnes et tripudiare sine ullo de reliquiis belli metu, et auspiciu uictoriae tuae pro consummatione metiebantur: non Transpadana prouincia uidebatur recepta, sed Roma. (XII(9)7.5-8)

What a day that was when you entered Milan! What rejoicing there was amongst the leaders of the city, what applause from the populace! What security there was for mothers and girls as they gazed at you, and what a twofold delight they derived when they looked upon the person of a most beautiful emperor and feared no licence! They all showed themselves off and danced about without any concerns for the remainder of the war; they counted the beginning of your victory as its fulfilment. It did not seem that the Transpadane province had been recovered, but Rome.

And within the collection, the motifs and rhetoric of imperial *aduentus* have their final reprisal again in a scene of vivid imagination, when the Bordelais orator Pacatus Drepanius describes the occasion of the entry into Emona of Theodosius in 388, during his campaign against Maximus:

ferebant se obuiae tripudiantium cateruae, cuncta cantu et crotalis personabant. hic tibi triumphum chorus; ille contra tyranno funebres nenas et carmen exsequiale dicebat: hic perpetuum uictis abitum; ille uictoribus crebrum optabat aduentum. iam quocumque tulisses gradum, sequi circumcursare praecedere, uias denique quibus ferebaris obstruere. nullus cuiquam sui tuiue respectus; blandam tibi faciebat iniuriam contumacia gaudiorum. (4) quid ego referam pro moenibus suis festum

liberae nobilitatis occursum, conspicuos ueste niuea senatores, reuerendos municipali purpura flamines, insignes apicibus sacerdotes? quid portas uirentibus sertis coronatas? quid aulaeis undantes plateas accensisque funalibus auctum diem? quid effusam in publicum turbam domorum, gratulantes annis senes, pueros tibi longam seruitutem uouentes, matres laetas uirginesque securas? nondum omne confecerat bellum; iam agebas triumphum (II(12)37.3-4).

Crowds of dancers brought themselves before you, everything was chiming with songs and rattles. This chorus was voicing a triumph for you; by contrast that chorus was voicing death dirges and a funeral poem for the tyrant: the latter wanted a perpetual death for the conquered; the former, frequent visits for the victors. Now, wherever you took your step, they followed, ran round, preceded, finally they obstructed the roads on which you were carried. Nobody had any respect for themselves or for you: the obstinacy of their joys made a soothing injury for you (4) Why should I recall the free nobility's festive approach before their own walls, senators conspicuous in their white clothing, *flamines* revered in their municipal purple, priests distinguished by their conical hats? Why [recall] the gates crowned with green garlands? Why the squares waving with tapestries and the day extended with lit torches? Why the houses' crowd poured out into public, old men giving thanks for their years, boys vowing long service to you, mothers happy and maidens safe? You had not yet completed the whole war; you were already conducting a triumph.

Across these various scenes of civic reception of the emperor, each in its own political and geographical context, there are various formulae, variously deployed, making *aduentus* a recognised *topos* with its own typology, including the *dramatis personae* of men, women, children, and their behaviours, such as dancing; recurrent rhetorical figures such as catalogues and exclamation, or the metaphor of crowds 'pouring out' or animated buildings. That the settings for these scenes are the provincial cities of Milan, Trier and Emona demonstrates the shift in geo-political culture since the Rome-based speech delivered to Trajan centuries before; in that respect, the wider perspective of provincial response to the changed geography of government is *sui temporis*. Nonetheless, some features of the rhetoric and lexis of *aduentus* in the late

antique speeches recall the account in Pliny's *Panegyricus* of Trajan's long-awaited entry into Rome in 99.

ac primum, qui dies ille, quo exspectatus desideratusque urbem tuam ingressus es! iam hoc ipsum, quod ingressus es, quam mirum laetumque! nam priores inuehi et importari solebant: non dico quadriiugo curru, et albentibus equis, sed humeris hominum, quod arrogantius erat. tu sola corporis proceritate elatior aliis et excelsior, non de patientia nostra quendam triumphum, sed de superbia principum egisti. ergo non aetas quemquam, non ualitudine, non sexus retardauit, quo minus oculos insolito spectaculo impleret. te paruuli noscere, ostentare iuuenes, mirari senes; aegri quoque, neglecto medentium imperio, ad conspectum tui, quasi ad salutem sanitatemque prorepere. inde alii, se satis uixisse te uiso, te recepto; alii, nunc magis esse uiuendum, praedicabant. feminas etiam tunc fecunditatis suae maxima uoluptas subiit, quum cernerent, cui principi ciues, cui imperatori milites peperissent. uideres referta tecta ac laborantia, ac ne eum quidem uacantem locum, qui non nisi suspensum et instabile uestigium caperet; oppletas undique uias, angustumque tramitem relictum tibi; alacrem hinc atque inde populum, ubique par gaudium paremque clamorem. Tam aequaliter ab omnibus ex aduentu tuo laetitia percepta est, quam omnibus uenisti: quae tamen ipsa cum ingressu tuo creuit, ac prope in singulos gradus aucta est (paneg. 22)

And first, what a day that was when you entered your city, expected and wanted! Now this fact alone—that you came in—how amazing and joyful! For earlier emperors were used to being carried or borne in, not I say, in a four-horsed chariot with white steeds, but on the shoulders of men, which was more arrogant. You were higher and loftier than the others only by the height of your body; you conducted a triumph not over our patience but over the pride of emperors. And so, neither age nor health nor sex held anyone back from filling their eyes with the unaccustomed spectacle. Small children recognised you, young men pointed you out, old men admired you; even the sickly ignored their doctors' orders and crept to see you, as if to their health and well-being. Then some said they had lived long enough having seen you, having welcomed you; others, that they now had to live longer. Even then, greatest pleasure in their own fertility overcame women when they saw for which emperor they had given birth to citizens, for which commander, to soldiers. You would see roofs shaking

and struggling, and no free space unless it was in the process of taking a poised and wobbly footstep, streets full on both sides, and a narrow pathway left for you, the lively crowd on this side and that, everywhere cheering and cheering in equal measure. At your arrival, equal happiness was felt by everyone, just as you came for everyone; but that very happiness grew with your entry and almost increased with your every step.

According to the sort of interpretative strategy that has typified intertextual analysis of classical literature over the past few decades in particular, reprisal of the original Plinian scene by each of the later, provincial orators may be thought to cast their addressees as neo-Trajanic, and their provincial capitals new Romes; such readings might find support in Pliny's early characterisation of his speech as a *speculum principis* for later emperors. Alternatively, these connections to the past may be seen to illustrate the superiority of the later emperors over Trajan, according to which their geo-politics would be celebrated as less restrictive and shackled by a Rome-based obsession than had been the case for Pliny. But the relationship between scenes of *aduentus* in Pliny's *Panegyricus* and the later panegyrics is plotted as much by anthologisation of all of them in one collection as by lexical and rhetorical intertexts between them. And so, for the reader of the complete collection, textual iteration of imperial *aduentus* effects a literary equivalent to the ceremonial as experienced in the provincial capitals. As such, the Plinian original stands as a reference point, but one that can be understood to be transcended rather than simply matched by its successors.

4.2. Imperial Mobility

Sometimes lexical threads within the *Panegyrici* collection do not arc back to the *Panegyricus*. Imperial mobility is such a case in point. The orator of 291 says in relation to the Dyarch's frenetic activity, *nam primum omnium, quidquid immortale est stare nescit, sempiternoque motu se seruat aeternitas* ('For first of all, whatever is immortal does not know how to stand still, and eternity preserves itself with everlasting motion', XI(3)3.2); in 313 an orator has similar thoughts about Constantine, *quisnam iste est tam continuus ardor? quae diuinitas perpetuo uigens motu?* ('what is

this desire, so unrelenting? What is this divinity, vigorous with endless motion?', XII(9)22.1-2); decades later, Pacatus Drepanius addressed Theodosius in like terms: *gaudent profecto perpetuo diuina motu, et iugi agitatione se uegetat aeternitas, et quidquid homines uocamus laborem uestra natura est* ('Indeed divine things take pleasure in constant motion and eternity animates itself with continuous activity, and whatever we mortals call work is your nature', II(12)10.1). What we have here, it seems, is an imperial quality that is not derived from Pliny's Trajan and which can be variously identified in late Latin panegyric despite major differences in constitutional, political and ideological contexts, and which might best be accounted for by appreciation that these speeches are particular. The people most likely to celebrate imperial *motus* are the people most likely to benefit from it—the people of the provinces.

The emperors of late antique panegyric are not only presented as on the move, but they are on the move fast. Pliny commends the speed which, even before accession, Trajan showed in travelling between military deployments (*paneg.* 14); he is also like a very swift star, *uelocissimi sideris more* (80.3; see above). But in late antique panegyric *celeritas* is elaborated into a fully-fledged imperial virtue: of Diocletian and Maximian in 291, *illum modo Syria uiderat: iam Pannonia susceperat. tu modo Galliae oppida intraueras: iam summas arces Monoeci Herculis praeteribas. ambo, cum ad Orientem Occidentemque occupari putaremini, repente in medio Italiae gremio apparuistis* ('Syria had just seen him; already Pannonia had received him; you had just shone your light on the towns of Gaul; already you were passing by the lofty peaks of the Monaco promontory. When you were thought to be busy in East and West, you both suddenly appeared in the central bosom of Italy', XI(3)4.2).³⁹ Constantius' *celeritas* caught the enemy off guard in the siege at Boulogne *statim itaque Gallias tuas, Caesar,*

³⁹ From the same speech, see also *sed remoueamus istinc fabulas imperitorum, uerum loquamur: uestra uobis pietas, sacratissime imperator, uolucres dedit cursus. etenim cum nihil sit animo uelocius, uos, quorum igneae immortalesque mentes minime sentiunt corporum moras, peruecti estis ad uos mutui desiderii celeritate* ('let's put aside the fables of the ignorant, let's speak the truth; most sacred emperor, your piety gave you winged progress. For, since nothing is faster than the spirit, you, whose fiery and immortal minds barely sense the delays of the body, were carried towards each other with the speed of mutual longing', XI(3) 8.5).

ueniendo uicisti, siquidem illa celeritas, qua omnis ortus atque aduentus tui nuntios praeuertisti, cepit oppressam Gesorigiacensibus muris pertinacem tunc errore misero manum piraticae factionis atque illis olim mari fretis adluentem portas ademit Oceanum ('And so you immediately conquered your Gallic provinces by coming, since that speed by which you anticipated reports of your accession and arrival overtook the band of the piratical faction, oppressed by the walls of Boulogne, stubborn then in their wretched mistake, and it denied to those who had once relied upon the sea, access to the Ocean which lapped at the gates', VIII(4)6.1); Constantine is said to have shown the speed of Scipio and Caesar in his campaign to recover Rome, *at enim tu id ipsum de ardore totius exercitus sentiens sine ulla haesitandi mora, qua breuissimum per Venetos iter est, rapto agmine aduolasti, celeritatem illam in re gerenda Scipionis et Caesaris tunc maxime cupienti Romae repraesentans* ('But as you sensed that very point about the enthusiasm of the whole army, without any pause for hesitation, you flew along in quick march where the route through the Veneti is shortest, showing to Rome (at that time completely eager), that speed in action of Scipio and Caesar', XII(9)15.3); Constantine's son Crispus has incredible speed, *cruda adhuc hieme iter gelu intractabile, immensum spatio, niuibus infestum incredibili celeritate confecit, ut intellegamus alacritati eius nihil asperum, qui ipsam quam a suis petebat tam laboriosam instituerit uoluntatem* ('When the winter was still cruel, he completed a journey that was impassable with ice, huge in distance, dangerous with snow, with incredible speed so that we realise that nothing troubles his energy-levels, who established as industrious a character as he sought from his men', IV(10)36.5); Claudius Mamertinus narrates Julian's voyage down the Danube, during which he is said to have blessed all the cities with his various benefactions, *qui properationem illam contemplantur, nihil egisse praeter uiam imperatorem putabit; qui gestarum rerum multitudinem considerabit, properasse non credit* ('Whoever contemplates that haste will think the emperor achieved nothing beyond a journey; whoever considers the mass of achievements will not believe he hastened', III(11)7.3); Pacatus Drepanius admires the work rate of Theodosius when summoned from Spain to military (and ultimately imperial) service *uix tecta Hispana successeras: iam Sarmaticis tabernaculis tegebaris. uix emerita arma suspenderas:*

iam hosti armatus instabas. uix Hiberum tuum uideras: iam Histro praetendebas ('Scarcely had you left the Spanish house; already you were covered by Sarmatian tents. Scarcely had you hung up your veteran arms; already you were pressing the enemy under arms. Scarcely had you seen your Ebro; already you were stretching out before the Danube', II(12)10.2).⁴⁰ As an index of itinerant government's *modus operandi*, regularly moving from city to city, deploying to military campaigns when necessary, *celeritas* was particularly likely to draw praise from provincial orators, who put a high value on what a visit from the emperor could ensure for their region. *Celeritas* could also be combined with *labor*, assuring the locals that the emperor would spare no effort to protect them: Constantine is said to have undertaken a double journey when the Franks are threatening, for example (VI(7)21.3). All in all, *celeritas* was both new and provincial as a praiseworthy characteristic of imperial government.

4.3. Imperial *praesentia*

Speed could go further. Because exaggeration was standard currency in epideictic rhetoric, an emperor's speed could be elaborated to superhuman levels: the orator of 313 said of Constantine's engagements with Franks on the Rhine, *ilico obuius adfuisti et praesentia tua, ne auderent transitum, terruisti* ('straightaway you were there in the way, and you terrified them by your presence so that they did not attempt a crossing', XII(9)22.3). Under his command, Theodosius' soldiers are said to have confessed to a sort of 'out of body' experience in the speed of their travel,

⁴⁰ Some of this language is recycled later: *uix fluiuium manus inuicta transierat; iam locum belli tenebat. uix hostem inuenerat; iam urgebat. uix pectora uiderat; iam terga caedebat* ('Barely had the unconquered band crossed the river; already it commanded the battlefield. Barely had they found the enemy; already they pressed them. Barely had they seen their chests, already they cut at their backs', 34.2). As an interesting fourth century parallel, from outside the *Panegyrici Latini*, Ausonius wonders at Gratian's speed of travel to be in attendance when he demitted consular office, *tu, Gratiane, tot Romani imperii limites, tot flumina et lacus (...) celeriore transcursu quam est properatio nostri sermonis euoluisti* ('Gratian, you speed across so many frontiers of the Roman empire, so many rivers and lakes ... with passage swifter than the haste of my speech', *Grat. Act.* 18). For imperial *celeritas*, see Lolli 1999.

which is immediately glossed by Pacatus Drepanius as a sign of divine favour:

nihil tamen sibimet hoc nomine milites tui uindicant et, si quando mirantium circulos contrahunt aut conuiuia nostra sermone producunt, operam omnem suam fine Alpium terminantes deberi sibi abnuunt illam celeritatem, quod expertes laborum peruenisse se uiderint quo ire non senserant. negant immo se suis uectos esse corporibus sed, tamquam per aliquas imagines somniorum ferrentur absentes, praeuisse gestantibus uentis otiosorum ministeria membrorum. nec fides anceps: nam si olim seueri credidere maiores Castoras geminos albetibus equis et stellatis apicibus insignes puluerem cruoremque Thessalicum aquis Tiberis abluentes et nuntiasse uictoriam et imputasse militiam, cur non tuae publicaeque uindictae confessam aliquam immortalis dei curam putemus adnism?—nisi forte maiorem diuini fauoris operam res Romana poscebat Macedonico augenda regno quam tyrannico eximenda seruitio. ego uero, si caeleste studium pro dignitate causarum aestimandum sit, iure contenderim equites tuos Pegasis, talaribus pedites uectos ac suspensos fuisse. neque enim quia se diuina mortalibus dedignantur fateri, idcirco quae uisa non fuerint dubitabimus facta, cum facta uideamus quae dubitauerimus esse facienda. (II(12)39.3-5)

However, your soldiers attribute nothing to themselves on this issue and, if ever they gather circles of admirers or extend our dinners with conversation, they deny that that speed is due to them because, completing all their own work at the boundary of the Alps, without any effort, they saw themselves arriving where they had no sense they were travelling. Rather, they deny they were carried by their own bodies but, as if in their own absence they were being transported by means of some reflections of dreams, they had offered the services of their leisured limbs to the winds that bore them. Nor is trust in doubt: for, if severe ancestors once believed that the twin Castors, distinctive for their white horses and starred hats, washing away the dust and blood of Thessaly in the waters of the Tiber had both announced the victory and taken credit for the military action, why should we not think that some acknowledged concern of an immortal god strove for your revenge and the state's?—unless, by chance, the Roman state demanded greater work of a divine favour when it was to be increased by the Macedonian kingdom than when it was to

be freed from enslavement to a tyrant. Indeed, if heaven's support were to be estimated according to the causes' worth, I would rightfully contend that your cavalry had been carried and held on high by Pegasuses, your infantry by winged footwear. For because divine things do not deign to show themselves to mortals, we will not therefore doubt that what has been seen has not been done, since we see done what we would have doubted could be done.

Following his praise of the journeys undertaken by Diocletian and Maximian (see above), the orator of 291 designates the emperors' speed divine, *diuina celeritate* (XI(3)4.4).⁴¹ And this provincial enthusiasm for imperial speed in the field is even taken so far as to become unnecessary: the emperor is everywhere at once. Expressions of this appear variously: *quid enim opus erat multitudine cum ipse pugnaret, ipse omnibus locis totaque acie dimicaret* ('what need was there for a crowd when you yourself were fighting, and in every place and the whole front line you were in combat', X(2)5.3); *neque enim pars ulla terrarum maiestatis uestrae praesentia caret, etiam cum ipsi abesse uideamini* ('For no part of the earth lacks the presence of your majesty, even when you seem to be absent', XI(3)13.5). There is a kernel of this imperial trait in Pliny's *uelut adesse et adsistere* ('as if to be there and to help', *paneg.* 80.3), but again, late panegyric's elaboration of imperial *praesentia* is perhaps indicative of its responsiveness to the realities of contemporary government's itinerant character.

But not all late Latin panegyrics indulge in this conceit of the omnipresent emperor, or not all the time. For example, Pacatus Drepanius even dares, disingenuously, to chide Theodosius for spending too long in the east while Maximus was preparing usurpation in the west:

nec tamen, imperator, existimes cuncta me ad aurium gratiam locuturum: triumphis tuis Galli (stupeas licebit) irascimur. dum in remota terrarum uincendo procedis, dum ultra terminos rerum metasque Naturae regna Orientis extendis, dum ad illos primae lucis indigenas et in ipsum, si quod est, solis cubile festinas, inuenit tyrannus ad scelera secretum (II(12)23.1)

⁴¹ See also *diuinus impetus* XI(3)8.3.

However, Emperor, you should not think everything I am about to say will be pleasing to your ears: at your triumphs, we Gauls (you will be surprised) are angered. While you advanced into the world's remote places in your conquering, while you extended the kingdoms of the East beyond the boundaries of things and Nature's turning-points, while you hurried towards those natives of the first light and the lair itself of the sun, if it has one, a tyrant found a secret place for his crimes.

This 'complaint' is predicated explicitly on the lack of imperial omnipresence. And this grittier side to the provincial perspective of late panegyric can be seen too in a recurrent anxiety about the security of the *limes* and the emperor's role in effecting that. In 289, Maximian is said to have changed perceptions about the Gallic border with Germania:

tu primus omnium, imperator, probasti Romani imperii nullum esse terminum nisi qui tuorum esset armorum (...) atqui Rhenum antea uidebatur ipsa sic Natura duxisse, ut eo limite Romanae prouinciae ab immanitate barbariae uindicarentur. ecquis umquam ante uos principes non gratulatus est Gallias illo amne muniri?

Emperor, you first of all, proved that there is no end to the Roman Empire except the end to your weapons (...) and previously, Nature herself so seemed to have led out the Rhine that Roman provinces were defended from the savagery of barbarians by that frontier. Before you emperors, whoever gave thanks that the Gallic provinces were defended by that river? (X(2)7.2-4).

The same activity is further elaborated a few years later:

tu enim ipse, tu domine Maximiane, imperator aeternae, nouo itineris compendio aduentum diuinitatis tuae accelerare dignatus repente Rheno institisti, omnemque illum limitem non equestribus neque pedestribus copiis sed praesentiae tuae terrore tutatus es: quantoslibet ualebat exercitus Maximianus in ripa

For you yourself, lord Maximian, everlasting emperor, you deigned to accelerate the arrival of your divinity by an original shortening of your journey, and suddenly you were on the Rhine, and you safeguarded that whole frontier not with cav-

alry or infantry forces but by fear of your presence: Maximian was as strong on the riverbank as however many armies you want. (VIII(4)13.3).

In 310 Constantine's activities on the Rhine at Cologne are lauded:

insuper etiam Agrippinensi ponte faciundo reliquiis adflictae gentis insultas, ne umquam metus ponat, semper horreat semper supplices manus tendat, cum tamen hoc tu magis ad gloriam imperii tui et ornatum limitis facias quam ad facultatem, quotiens uelis, in hosticum transeundi, quippe cum totus armatis nauibus Rhenus instructus sit et ripis omnibus usque ad Oceanum dispositus miles immineat

Moreover, by building a bridge at Cologne you sneer at the remains of an afflicted people, so that it may never put its fear aside, but always shudders, always stretches out suppliant hands. However, you do this more for the glory of the Empire and an ornament of the frontier than to create an opportunity of crossing into enemy territory however often you wish, since all of the Rhine is equipped with armed ships and on all the riverbanks right up to the Ocean, threatening troops are posted. (VI(7)13.1)⁴²

Here we can see a recurrent, provincial concern, especially apparent at Trier, on the Moselle, near the Rhine frontier. Representation of the emperor as the defender of the frontier was a function of the provincial provenance of the speeches.

In combination, the trope of imperial omnipresence and the theme of frontier security make possible the construction of the emperor as in control of the entire world; and in fact the *orbis* (*terrarum*) features in all 11 late *Panegyrici Latini*.⁴³ Although perhaps not incompatible with Pliny's representation of Trajan as Jupiter's agent on earth, this verbal and conceptual formula does not track the lexis of the *Panegyricus*. In the late antique speeches, *orbis* sometimes denotes the Roman world, more frequently the earth; sometimes it is not clear precisely which is denoted; generally, the construction of the imperial office has connotations

⁴² Asche 1983; see also Symm., *or.* 3.9.

⁴³ Rodriguez Gervas 1991, p. 73-76; see also Symm., *or.* 1.1, 13; 2.24, 3.11; Aus., *Grat. Act.* 8(39).

of universal dominion. This geographical aspect and its global inclusiveness, which reaches far wider than the city of Rome, was presumably a rhetorical manoeuvre designed to ensure Gaul's continuing benefit from the emperor's attention.

Inflections of *praesentia*, frontier and global security can dodge or skim over the inconsistency inherent in the competing notions of universal dominion and frontier vulnerability, to work to transform what seems at heart to be a Gallic anxiety about the enemy over the Rhine into a celebration of the imperial office:

uos (...), quos huc atque illuc tot urbes tot castra tot limites tot circumiecta Romano imperio flumina montes litora uocant, tantum animis ac fortuna ualetis ut in unum conuenire possitis, nihilominus orbe securo

[and when] so many cities here and there, so many camps, so many frontiers, so many rivers, mountains and shores from across the empire summon you, so strong are you in mind and fortune you (two) can meet together, with the world nonetheless secure. (XI(3)13.4)

Maximian is also involved in a government partnership extolled by the orator of 307:

te, pater, ex ipso imperii uertice decet orbem prospicere communem caelestique nutu rebus humanis fata discernere, auspicia bellis gerendis dare, componendis pacibus leges imponere; te, iuuenis, indefessum ire per limites qua Romanum barbaris gentibus instat imperium, frequentes ad socerum uictoriarum laureas mittere, praecepta petere, effecta rescribere

Father Maximian, it befits you from the height of power to oversee the shared earth and with your celestial nod to decree fate for human affairs, to grant the auspices for wars which must be waged, to impose the laws when peace is to be composed; and it befits you, young man, [Constantine] to go tirelessly along the frontiers, wherever the Roman Empire presses upon barbarian people, to send frequent victory laurels to your father-in-law, to seek instructions, to report your achievements. (VII(6)14.1)

These emperors are everywhere, powerful and caring.

These various panegyric constellations of the emperor's mobility, speed of travel, arrival, presence and guarantee of secu-

rity, constitute a set of concerns which Pliny seems not to have shared (at least, not in anything like such measures or formulations) but which feature to varying extents and effects in later Latin prose panegyric. This variety is an important principal, since it reveals the flexibility of the orators, their ability to manipulate stock subjects to represent their particular priorities. These late antique speeches are not 'all the same' but they trade in a common currency, and the particular differences in their representations of the emperor as beneficently itinerant seem to be not dictated by changes in, for example, imperial religious policy or practice, but by contemporary and local concerns in each case. As a collective, however, these themes bring into relief the sense that the speeches are responses to and products of the late antique phenomenon of the increased itinerancy of government. This is in keeping with Sabbah's model of panegyric as two-way traffic and with Nixon's identification of the orators' independence from centralised control. Rome is referenced, but more as a shared and accessible symbol of loyalty than a meaningful *locus* of imperial power; instead of Pliny's fundamentally metropolitan agenda, the later speeches forge their impressions of imperial character and office away from the city. Panegyric traded up and down, and its exponents were representatives of their communities and not of their addressees, and this makes possible appreciation of the speeches' points-of-view as provincial. When considered in their historical and geo-political contexts either in isolation or as a late antique collective, the eleven third and fourth century *Panegyrici Latini* present an image of the emperor as dynamically itinerant, culturally inclusive, a military defender: this contrasts with Pliny's image of emperorship-metropolitan, Roman, senatorial, sedentary.

We have, then, different conceptual frameworks for considering these speeches. Each can be seen as a particular document, with its own specific concerns, functioning not as propaganda bluntly understood, but with *communication ascendante* and (rather less) *descendante*, products of time, place and culture. Pliny's *Panegyricus* is the only text of the dozen to set itself up explicitly as what can be seen as a *speculum principis* (4.1); in the original context of 100 CE (or soon afterwards if part of the revised version), this claim would have been best understood as

a novel panegyric rhetoric which presented Trajan as a model for future generations. The subsequent act of anthologisation in the late fourth century (but possibly the culmination of earlier stages of collection too⁴⁴) realised that potential, after which each speech can be seen as part of a literary collection (or even a system), with arcs back to Pliny or to other speeches: from this less myopic or claustrophobic vantage, new vistas of interpretation are accessed with Pliny's mirror, suitably placed at the head of the collection in time and manuscript sequence, held up to those later emperors too. These different frameworks inevitably elicit different reactions. Perhaps few critics now would subscribe to René Pichon's outraged condemnation of Pacatus Drepanius, made in the early twentieth century; 'there can be no doubt that Pacatus had a very precise knowledge of the earlier panegyrics, and made a very submissive imitation of them, not to say a very servile one'.⁴⁵ By contrast, Marco Formisano has recently designated the *Panegyrici Latini*, when read together as a whole, as a 'macrotext' within which the relationships between individual speeches have a potential for 'rivalry and subversion'.⁴⁶ More than simply signal a change in geo-political culture since the Rome-centric empire of the Trajanic era, the frequency of the celebration of the virtues of imperial mobility, speed and presence in the late antique panegyrics might encourage reconsideration of Pliny's speech. In imperial *celeritas*, for example, the late antique speeches in the collection celebrate a quality essentially absent from the *Panegyricus*.

In the debate about how to read and understand intertextuality, literary collectivity has a privileged place; and in the *Panegyrici Latini* collection, that range of hermeneutic possibilities extends to the concept of modelling kingship. The prince's mirror is there, in Pliny's fourth chapter, *boni principes, quae facerent, recognoscerent, mali, quae facere deberent* ('so that good emperors recognise what they do, and bad emperors what they ought to do', 4.1); whether or not to look into that mirror when reading the later speeches is a matter of interpretative, methodological and politi-

⁴⁴ Barnes 2011, p. 182-183 suggests two earlier stages of collection.

⁴⁵ Pichon 1906, p. 289 (trans. 2012, p. 72).

⁴⁶ Formisano 2015, p. 84, 88.

cal choice. For one who looks, the self-styled mirror to future princes does not show the whole picture; rather, when placed at the head of the collection, it creates a hall of mirrors, with all its distortions and refractions.⁴⁷

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⁴⁷ With my sincere thanks to the organisers of the *Lectio* conference; to Marco Formisano for his stimulating observations; and to Catherine Ware, whose keen eye refined the paper.

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Abstract

As a collection of classical Latin oratory, in size the *Panegyrici Latini* is second only to Cicero's oeuvre. The first speech, in MS sequence and chronology, is Pliny's *Panegyricus* to Trajan (100 CE). The following eleven speeches are addressed to various emperors between 289 and 389 CE and share a Gallic origin or authorship. The *Panegyricus* is self-consciously a princes' mirror: Pliny defines his purpose *boni principes, quae facerent, recognoscerent, mali, quae facere deberent* (4.1). It is a landmark text in the history of Latin political literature. The act of collection of the *Panegyrici* in the late fourth century literally foregrounded Pliny's purpose, which can then be seen endlessly to inform the other speeches. In particular, Pliny's model of charismatic emperors and reciprocity of *ciuis* and *princeps* is variously revived and reprised in the later speeches, underscoring the appreciation of the continuities in emperors and its oratorical representation. The influence of the *Panegyricus* on the later speeches in the collection has been explored recently and debate continues. In this regard, Sabbah's 1984 model of the potential of two-way communication (*communication ascendante* and *descendante*) in the later orations highlights a significant difference from Pliny's time. The provincial context of the speeches gives evidence of a more immediate interdependence of

princeps and people and the image of the emperor in the panegyrics is affected accordingly. *Communication ascendante*—the orator’s petitioning of the emperor—reflects a ruler who is militaristic when barbarians threaten, and generous when walls need repair; *communication descendante*—the orator’s representation of the emperor to his subjects—aligns encomiastic language with centralised propaganda. This dynamic system variously emulates and competes with Pliny’s ‘model’, and provides one index of how political oratory evolved as the Empire changed.

MATTHIAS HAAKE

ACROSS ALL BOUNDARIES OF GENRE?

ON THE USES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TERM *MIRROR FOR PRINCES* IN GRAECO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY—CRITICAL REMARKS AND UNORTHODOX REFLECTIONS*

One can't be much of a king without wisdom, courage, authority, the ability to command respect, and since it is now as much my right as yours to dispense justice, I'll give you some. You did have all those qualities: in human portion, not divine.

When did I finally know this? That's an interesting question, Father. When

I became what you were, though I'd had my suspicions. You were never a

God, not even when I believed you were. There are no excuses for you, no special allowances because you were exceptional. You were no more of a man than I am. And as Madeleine said, you weren't much of a father either; so all that's left is your kingship, at which, admittedly, you were outstanding. Yet even in that you made some mistakes. Believe me, I'm more sorry to have to say this than you are to hear it.

(Tom de Haan, *A Mirror for Princes*, London: Arena Books 1988, p. [1])

* The following essayistic observations are an only slightly modified, but translated and annotated version of my original paper given at the Leuven conference. I would like to thank the organizers of this highly instructive conference for having accepted my somewhat iconoclastic proposal. For a considerable number of very fruitful and informative discussions during the conference and its aftermath, I would like to express my gratitude to many of the participants. Amongst them, I would like to single out those who kindly and generously shared their original papers or revised articles with me: Davide Amendola (Pisa), Anne Gangloff (Rennes), Albert Joosse (Utrecht), and Oswyn Murray (Oxford), whose publications on kingship and on the *On kingship* genre have been a permanent inspiration ever since I have started with my research in this field; to name but a few, see Murray 1965; Murray 1971; Murray 1990; Murray 2007. I would like to thank Hana Coufalová Bohrnová (Brno) for her generosity in making a then unpublished paper available to me: Coufalová Bohrnová 2017. Since the following observations rest upon my own preoccupation with the writings *On kingship* between the early Hellenistic period and late antiquity, the reader may turn a blind eye to the author's unseemly abundant references to his own works: Haake 2003; Haake 2012; Haake 2013; Haake 2014; Haake 2015. For various reasons, I am deeply indebted to Anna Linnemann (Bielefeld), David Lambert (Münster), and Daniel Whittle (Montreal); for valuable suggestions my sincere thanks go to the anonymous reviewer.

1. *Context matters / contexts matter—preliminary remarks*

Στᾶλιν ἄναξ, ἄγαμαί σε· σὺ λευκολίθῳ ἐνὶ Κρέμλῳ
 ἐζόμενος κρατέεις πάντων Ῥώσων Τατάρων τε
 καὶ πολλῶν ἐθνῶν ἀμενηνῶν κράτων.
 ἔρποντες κονίη σε θεὸν ὥς εἰσορώσιν.

Stalin, lord, I revere you: you, seated in the white-stoned Kremlin,
 rule over all Russians and Tartars
 and many powerless peoples,
 who drag their feet in the dust and gaze upon you as a god.¹

What may seem at first glance like a specimen of rather crude, although elaborate Stalinist praise is in fact the beginning of a text, which is part of a highly sophisticated and most complex literary strategy. Formally, the quoted lines are the beginning of a hymn in ancient Greek under the title *ΕΙΣ ΣΤΑΛΙΝΑ*—*To Stalin*.² This is, however, only half the truth: for the poem *To Stalin* is an example of ‘veiled speech’.³

Reminiscent of a Homeric hymn due to its literary composition and its language, this ode was written by Václav Jaroslav Karel Pinkava.⁴ In 1984, he published the novel *Mrchopěvci* in Czech under the pseudonym of Jan Křesadlo with the émigré publishing house ‘68 Publishers at Toronto in Canada; its English translation under the title *GraveLarks* was released in 1999.⁵ The ode *To Stalin* is embedded in the story line of this novel, which takes place in Czechoslovakia in the early 1950s, when most parts of central and eastern Europe were under Stalinist

¹ For the Greek text, see Weise 2010, p. 440; Baltussen 2015, p. 226. The translation is taken from Baltussen 2015, p. 226.

² For the whole text and its recension, see Weise 2010, p. 438–441. He offers a German translation on p. 441 and a commentary on p. 441–445; an English translation can be found in Baltussen 2015, p. 226 (l. 1–4), 232 (l. 5–11), 233 (l. 12–17), and 234 (l. 18–21). For further explanatory notes on the text, see Baltussen 2015, p. 226–227, 231–235.

³ On the concept of ‘veiled speech’, see Baltussen & Davis 2015, esp. p. 4–8.

⁴ On the biography of the psychologist and author Pinkava, who was born in Prague in 1926, immigrated to England in 1968, and died in Colchester in 1995, see Weise 2010, p. 448–450; Baltussen 2015, p. 227–231.

⁵ The latest (and probably best accessible) English edition of this novel is Křesadlo 2015. Besides the references cited above in n. 1, the hymn *To Stalin* can be found in its setting in the novel in Křesadlo 2015, p. 36 with p. 215 n. 7.

rule. Even though this ode plays an important role in the plot and is penned by its protagonist according to the narrative, it did not originate in the making of *GraveLarks*, but had been written already in 1948.⁶

Against this background, it is possible to give reasons for Pinkava's rather complex literary construct, which is accounted for by a textual shift in the hymn *To Stalin*: after the quoted passage, it becomes more and more an accusation of Stalin and his regime. The intention of the author's literary play was thus a two-fold one: on the one hand, he intended (already in 1948) without doubt to parody the literary scene of the Stalinist era when the 'red tsar' ascribed to literature an affirmative function and an important role in the dictator's cult of personality. On the other hand, Pinkava aimed at avoiding the risk to write directly critical, subversive literature under Stalin's rule.⁷

The ways of praising and criticising monarchs in literary texts is a global and timeless phenomenon. The ode *To Stalin* illustrates instructively a crucial aspect that will also be most relevant in the course of the following considerations on the uses and disadvantages of the term *Mirrors for princes* in Graeco-Roman antiquity: the importance of context(s) for any understanding of texts.⁸

2. Mirrors for princes—a phenomenon around the world and through the ages?

At first glance, texts labelled *Mirror for* (or: *of*) *princes* in English (or, for example, *Fürstenspiegel* in German, *Miroir des* (or: *aux*) *princes* in French, *Specchio del principe* in Italian, or *speculum principis / regum* in Latin respectively) appear to be a universal, almost an 'anthropological constant' in the context of more or less elaborate theoretical reflections on the practices of (good, just, and

⁶ For a brief summary of the content of the novel, one might refer to Weise 2010, p. 445–448. On the date of the ode *To Stalin*, see Weise 2010, p. 439 n. 10; Baltussen 2015, p. 229.

⁷ For detailed explanations regarding these concisely delineated results, see Baltussen 2015, esp. p. 235–238.

⁸ In this context, see Jahraus 2007, p. 21–35, for a survey on the growing importance of context-related studies and their theoretical framework in the field of literary studies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.

wise) sole rulership in any shape or form in literate societies all over the world and at all times of history.⁹

At least that is what an examination of modern scholarship suggests:¹⁰ the occurrence of *Mirrors for princes* is accepted for Ancient Israel,¹¹ the Ancient Near East (in 2011, the producer and film director Lior Shamriz made a film drawing on Sumerian texts such as the *Instructions of Šuruppak*,¹² which bears the title *Mirrors for princes*) as well as for Ancient Egypt;¹³ for the Graeco-Roman world from Homer to Isidore of Seville;¹⁴ for

⁹ I make use of the terms sole rulership/sole ruler, monarchy/monocrat, ruling alone 'in order to convey the meaning of what in German would be called "Alleinherrschaft"; see Luraghi 2013b, p. 11.

¹⁰ See, e.g., Darling 2013, p. 227-228 with n. 10; Haake 2015, p. 60 n. 13. It might suffice to refer exemplarily to some entries in reference works to illustrate the widespread prevalence of the idea of *Mirrors for princes* as a global phenomenon: Hadot 1972; Singer 1983; Khalegi-Motlagh 1985, p. 439; Shaked 1987, p. 13; Philipp & Stammen 1996; Marlow 1998; Roberts 1998; Schmitt 2005, col. 436-438; Genet 2007; see also the overview in Haake 2015, p. 58-60 as well as the contributions in the collected volumes by De Benedictis 1999; Cogitore & Goyet 2003; Lachaud & Scordia 2007; Forster & Yavari 2015.

¹¹ See, e.g., Kaplan 2012 on a passage from 1 *Samuel* (8.11-18); see also Hadot 1972, col. 564-568. On *Mirrors for princes* in Jewish-Hellenistic literature, see in general De Brasi 2012. The so-called *Letter of Aristeas* is in this context of particular importance; on this text, see most recently Wright III 2015, esp. p. 372 n. 899; see also Murray 1987.

¹² The *Instructions of Šuruppak* (to his son Zi-ud-sura), dating to the third millennium BC, are one of the oldest pieces of literature; see Alster 1974; Römer 1990, p. 48-67.

¹³ This is at least true as regards the perspective of Classical studies on the Ancient Near East and Ancient Egypt; see most prominently Hadot 1972, col. 556-564; Schulz 2001, p. 12; cf. also Haake 2015, p. 59. In respect of Ancient Near Eastern studies, one might refer to a text dating to the first centuries of the first millennium BC, namely the so-called *Fürstenspiegel* (sometimes also mentioned as *Advice to a prince*) known from a copy found in Assurbanipal's library at Nineveh. For the transliterated text and a German translation, see Böhl 1937, p. 3-11; for introductory remarks, the text, plates and an English translation, see Lambert 1960, p. 110-115 (4.iv) with pl. 31 (DT 1 Obv.) and 32 (DT 1 Rev.); for a more recent German translation with introductory remarks, see von Soden 1990, p. 170-173; for the latest English translation, see Foster 2005, p. 867-869 (IV.13) with further literature. On this text, which is also known from a quotation 'from memory (?) by a scholar in a letter' and from an alluding reference in a late manuscript from Nippur (Foster 2005, p. 867), see additionally Llop & George 2001/2002, p. 18; Machinist 2005, p. 175; Paulus 2007, p. 19-20.

¹⁴ Next to Hadot 1972, col. 568-621, one might refer exemplarily to Schulte 2001; see also Haake 2015, p. 61-63, with respective references. An anthology of

the epochs of post-antique Europe from the early Middle Ages until the twentieth century;¹⁵ for the Byzantine empire;¹⁶ for the Wallachian principality;¹⁷ for the Slavonic and Russian realm;¹⁸ for the Islamic world throughout most parts of its history¹⁹ from its western edges, Umayyad Spain in the north and the sultanate of Kano in the Sahel in the south,²⁰ via Seljuk Ana-

alleged *Mirrors for princes* dating to the fourth century AD has been provided by O'Meara & Schamp 2006.

¹⁵ For medieval times, see, e.g., Berges 1938; Anton 2004; Graßnick 2004; Handy 2011. On *Mirrors for princes* from the early modern period, one might refer to Singer 1981; Stammen 1990; Giancarlo 2015; see also Reinle & Winkel 2011. It might be both, worth and sufficient to single out exemplarily a lavishly illustrated, mid-fourteenth-century *Mirror for princes* by an anonymous author, which is titled *Avis aus roys* (*Advice to kings*); the manuscript is kept in the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York (M 456). On this work, see Camille 1993; Sherman 1995, passim (see p. 407-408, s.v. *Avis au roys*); Lepot 2013. For collections of medieval or early modern *Mirrors for princes*, see Anton 2006 and Mühleisen, Stammen & Philipp 1997 respectively. For two respective examples from the early twentieth century, see below.

¹⁶ One might refer to Hunger 1978, p. 157-165; Blum 1981, p. 30-56. See now also Paidas 2005; Paidas 2006. Blum 1981, p. 59-193, has compiled an anthology of Byzantine *Mirrors for princes*. For critical remarks on *Mirrors for princes* in Byzantium, see Prinzing 1988; Angelov 2007, p. 184-197, 222-224; Angelov 2009; Odorico 2009; Reinsch 2012; Coufalová Bohrnová 2017.

¹⁷ A *Mirror for princes* worth mentioning in this context is the work of Neagoe Basarab, an early sixteenth-century voivode of Wallachia, who dedicated a respective text to his son that is known under the title *Învățăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul său Teodosie* (*The teachings of Neagoe Basarab to his son Theodosie*). On this text and its author, see Grigore 2015, p. 35-113.

¹⁸ In this context, one might refer to a work of Vladimir II Monomakh (1053-1125), a grand prince of the Kievan Rus', titled *Poučenie* (*Instruction*) and addressed to his children. On this text and its transmission, see Podskalsky 1982, p. 215-218, 319-320; Nenarokova 2008. On the Slavonic and Russian world in general, see Blum 1981, p. 23-30.

¹⁹ For a general overview on *Mirrors for princes* in the highly diverse literary traditions of the Islamic world, see, e.g., Lambton 1971; Aigle 2007; Marlow 2009; Klemm & Walker 2011, p. 8-13; Boroujerdi 2013 (see p. 458, s.v. *Mirror for Princes literature*); Vaiou 2015, p. 25-31, with 137-141. As in Western Europe, in the Islamic world, too, *Mirrors for princes* were occasionally still written in the early twentieth century; see Abbès 2015, p. 27, with reference to Dakhliā 2002, p. 1193. See also the remark of Bayly 2011, p. 18: 'Across the world of Islamic and Indo-Islamic Asia, the "mirror of princes" style of literature was taken up and embellished during the age of Ottoman, Mughal, Safavid, and Mataram empires'.

²⁰ As regards Umayyad Spain, one might refer to Ibn 'Abd Rabbih (860-940) and his work *al-Iqd al-farīd* (*The unique necklace*); on this work and its author, see Richter 1972, p. 72-79; Toral-Niehoff 2015, esp. p. 134-136. For the sultanate of Kano in the western Sahel, a text known under the title *Tāj al-dīn fi-mā yajib 'alā'l-mulūk* (*The crown of religion, concerning the obligations of princes*) is worth to

tolia²¹ to its eastern fringes, the Acehnese sultanate on Sumatra;²² and for the cultural spaces of India,²³ Mongolia,²⁴ China,²⁵ and Japan.²⁶

If this scenario—interestingly, by the way, predominantly present in (Western-)European and (North-)American research—is true, then *Mirrors for princes* are a rather rare literary phenomenon, which consists of a myriad of texts stemming from monarchic societies and that is to some extent timeless as well as culture-unspecific.²⁷ If that should be the case, then *Mirrors for princes* not only would be of interest for interpretations of specimens labelled in this way, nor only with regard to samples of such texts originating from a specific context (be it chronological, cultural, geographical, political, or even religious),²⁸ but they would be a quite productive subject in terms of a comparative, transepochal

be referred to; see Hunwick 1985, p. 137 no. 18 *Risāla (ilā sultān Kanū) fī umūr al-saltāna*. It was written by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Maghilī (c. 1440-1503/04 or 1505/06), an important as well as controversial figure (see, e.g., Batrān 1973; Hunwick 1985, p. 29-48; Hunwick 1986), and addressed to Muḥammad Rumfa, a ruler of Kano; this text is called a *Mirror for princes* by, e.g., Fisher 1977, p. 297.

²¹ See, most recently, Peacock 2016.

²² With respect to the Acehnese sultanate, a work titled *Bustān al-salāṭīn fī dhikr al-awwalīn wa l-ākhirīn* (*Garden of kings, concerning the recollection of the first and the last*) and written in Malay by Nūr al-Dīn al-Rānirī (d. 1658), native of the northwestern part of India, might serve as telling example; on the author and the mentioned work, see Wieringa 2015.

²³ The epic poem *Raghuvaṃśa* (*Dynasty of Raghu*) by the classical Sanskrit writer Kālidāsa (fifth century CE) has been labelled *Fürstenspiegel* by Ruben 1947/1948 in the title of his article. This choice was criticised by Weller 1949.

²⁴ Heissig 1964, p. 250-251 has applied the term *Fürstenspiegel* to the so-called Genghis Khan gnomic poetry.

²⁵ Von Gabain 1930 has called the text *Hsin-yü* (*New analects*) written during the early Han dynasty in the late third/early second century BC by Lu Chia a *Fürstenspiegel*; see von Gabain 1930, esp. p. 1-6; on this text, its context and author, see Ku 1988, p. 1-58; Loewe 1988a, p. 731-732; Loewe 1988b, p. 709.

²⁶ The *Jūshichijō kenpō* (*Seventeen-article constitution*), authored allegedly by the semi-legendary regent Shōtoku Taishi (574-622) in 604, is called a *Fürstenspiegel* by Badura 1989, p. 32 n. 19.

²⁷ Exemplarily, one might refer to Khoury 2010, p. 127-128. In comparison with the so-called *Wisdom Literature* (West 1978, p. 3-25; Martin 1984), the differences between a true universal genre and the alleged universal genre of *Mirrors for princes* become evident.

²⁸ Not only as a side note: It would be an interesting undertaking to analysing these texts with the help of Moretti's 'abstract models for a literary history'; see Moretti 2005.

and transcultural approach to analyse those monarchies, in which the texts in question were authored.²⁹

Yet, instead of describing and designing fields of research on *Mirrors for princes*, it is indispensable to focus on a basic, but most important and highly complex question: What is a *Mirror for princes*? Needless to say that this question has often been raised, and many an answer has been given.

3. Mirrors for princes—*definitions and descriptions*

The search for a definition of the term *Mirrors for princes* (and its equivalents in other languages) ends in a very rich collection of relevant passages of rather minor differences. To give an impression of this compilation, it might be worth presenting two more or less haphazardly chosen quotations as a narrow, but representative *florilegium*.

In his work on Smaragdus of Saint-Mihiel's alleged Carolingian *Mirror for princes* titled *Via regia*, the medievalist and German philologist Otto Eberhardt has outlined the following definition in the late seventieth of the twentieth century:

A *Mirror for princes* is a conclusive work, which discusses—with the purpose of a basic transfer of knowledge or exhortation—the proper behaviour of a ruler as exhaustively as possible with regard to his special position; often, a personal relationship to the ruler underlies these works.³⁰

A quarter-century later, the medievalist Hans Hubert Anton proposed the following definition:

A *Mirror for princes* is a text written with the intention, which either addresses a king, prince or regent as a person each or a (fictitious) official as representative of a social group. It is meant to be composed either as independent work or as cohered part in a wider context. The paraenesis can express

²⁹ Exemplarily, one might refer to Blaydes, Grimmer & McQueen 2018.

³⁰ See Eberhardt 1977, p. 280 (translated by A. Linnemann; see Haake 2015, p. 64): 'Ein Fürstenspiegel ist ein geschlossenes Werk, das mit dem Zweck der grundsätzlichen Wissensvermittlung oder Ermahnung möglichst vollständig das rechte Verhalten des Herrschers im Blick auf seine besondere Stellung erörtert; dabei liegt meist eine persönliche Beziehung zum Herrscher zugrunde'.

itself through direct admonitions concerning the ruler's ethics and administration as well as through considerations on political and social theoretical contexts related to the addressee. It can refer to the person and office of the ruler, and—in a wider sense—to the given comprehensive political and ecclesiastic orders. The texts' specific place is between 'is' and 'ought'; the discussion of political ethics they have in common with the (...) theoretical works.³¹

It becomes immediately clear when reading these exemplary passages that they are rather vague in terms of formal criteria to define *Mirrors for princes*—and this vagueness is, as can be stated with good reason, to a large extent one of the most important rationales for the success and the ubiquity of (the concept of) *Mirrors for princes*.³²

4. Mirrors for princes—a (hi)story of success

Bearing in mind the widespread assumption that *Mirrors for princes* existed in the ancient Near East as well as in the Mediterranean world of antiquity, and considering that *Mirrors for princes* are viewed as a flourishing genre in early medieval times, too,³³ it comes as a surprise that the term's first appearance was in a Latin writing by Godfrey of Viterbo dedicated to the later German emperor Henry VI. Titled *Speculum regum*, it combines the com-

³¹ See Anton 2004, p. 15 and, identically, Anton 2006, p. 3-4 (translated by A. Linnemann; see Haake 2015, p. 64): 'Ein Fürstenspiegel ist eine in paränetischer Absicht verfasste Ausarbeitung, gerichtet an einen König, Fürsten oder Regenten jeweils als Person oder an einen (fiktiven) Amtsträger als Repräsentanten einer sozialen Gruppe. Sie muss abgefasst sein als selbständiges Werk oder als abgeschlossener Teil in einem größeren Zusammenhang. Die Paränese kann sich ausdrücken in direkten Ermahnungen zur Gestaltung der herrscherlichen Ethik und Amtsführung, darüber hinaus in der Erörterung von auf den Empfänger bezogenen staats- und gesellschaftstheoretischen Zusammenhängen. Sie kann bezogen sein auf Person und Amt des Herrschers, im weiteren Sinne auf die vorgegebenen und umfassenden politischen und kirchlichen Ordnungen. Der konkrete Ort der Texte ist zwischen Sein und Sollen, mit den (...) theoretischen Werken ist ihnen die Behandlung der politischen Ethik gemeinsam.'

³² See also the compilation by Biesterfeld 2014, p. 2-8.

³³ See, e.g., Anton 2006, p. 4-5. For an attempt to explain the 'birth of a genre', the Carolingian *speculum principis*, see Falkowski 2008.

ponents ‘mirror’ and ‘prince/king’ and dates to AD 1183.³⁴ The evidence available indicates that it is in Norwegian that the term was used for the second time—in the form of the title *Konungs-Skuggsiá* (*The king’s mirror*) written by an unknown author in the middle of the thirteenth century.³⁵ The earliest attestations in French and English are dating to the fourteenth century—one might refer to *Le mireoirs as princes* of the poet Watriquet Brassenel de Couvain and the *Speculum regis Edmundi II* once attributed to Simon Islip, archbishop of Canterbury, but probably penned by the clergy William of Pagula³⁶—and in German it is, apparently, not earlier than the middle of the sixteenth century that in the *incipit* of a treatise its author, Wolfgang Seidel, made use of the wording *fürsten spiegel*.³⁷

This very brief *tour d’horizon* illustrates two different aspects of *Mirrors for princes*. In a narrower sense there are three features pertaining the talk about *Mirrors for princes*: first, they are titled respectively; second, they date back to periods not before the late twelfth century AD; and third, they are of a European origin. Yet, in a wider sense, there are three further features associated with *Mirrors for princes*: first, one deals with a vast corpus of texts predominantly not titled as such; second, broadly speaking, they date back to all periods of history ever since the late third millennium BC; and third, they are of a European as well as a non-European origin.

These observations necessitate asking for the reasons of the extended use of the term *Mirrors for princes* in modern research literature. To give an at least partially satisfying answer to this—surprisingly—rarely posed question, two aspects are of relevance: on the one hand, this is a question, which has to be taken into account with a focus on the history of scholarship; on the other hand, it is a matter of conceptual history.

³⁴ On Godfrey’s *Speculum regum*, see Dorninger 1997, esp. p. 60-54; Anton 2006, p. 24-26; cf., however, also Jónsson 2006, p. 156.

³⁵ On this text, see Bagge 1987; Schnall 2000.

³⁶ See Berges 1938, p. 342-343 nos 32-33; see also Jónsson 1987, p. 405-406; Graßnick 2004, p. 59-60.

³⁷ Singer 1981, p. 92 no. 24; on Wolfgang Seidel, see Singer 1981, p. 250-251.

4.1. *Mirrors for princes*—a very short history of scholarship

Of course, it is not possible to delineate here a comprehensive synthesis of the history of the use of the term *Mirrors for princes* and its equivalents in other languages in modern scholarship. This historiographical proposition is still unwritten, indeed, not even a respective outline does exist—and for the time being this desideratum must remain as it is.

Yet, some (cautious) statements based on rather unsystematic observations might suffice to give a vague (and provisional) impression. At least in German Classics, the widespread adaptation of the phrase *Mirror for princes* is apparently a phenomenon that emerged without any substantial considerations in the early 1920s,³⁸ even though Dio Chrysostom's first and third oration *On kingship* were already referred to as *Fürstenspiegel* in the late 1890s.³⁹ Remarkably enough, there is no entry on *Fürstenspiegel* in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*.⁴⁰ In the field of Byzantine studies in a German-speaking context, however, the development regarding the application of the term *Fürstenspiegel* took place earlier: a cursory survey shows that it has been used since the late nineteenth century.⁴¹ In medieval

³⁸ Busolt 1920, p. 86, denoted Xenophon's *Hieron* as *Fürstenspiegel* as did Schroeder 1922, p. 9, with Pindar's *First Pythian Ode*. Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1922, p. 303 considered Pindar's *First Pythian Ode* as the first specimen in the long tradition of the *peri basileias*-literature, which he labelled *Fürstenspiegel*, and of which—according to von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff—Isocrates would later author the paradigmatic work, with his speech *To Nicocles*. Today, all three texts are often considered as *Mirrors for princes*: see, e.g., Schorn 2010, esp. 60 as regards Xenophon's *Hieron*; Köhnken 1970, p. 1 with respect to the *First Pythian Ode* of Pindar; Dihle 1998, p. 241 in terms of Isocrates' *To Nicocles*.

³⁹ To my knowledge, one of the earliest attestations of the term *Fürstenspiegel* in the field of German Classics is Hans von Arnim's use of it to characterize Dio's first and third oration *On kingship*; see, rather incidentally, von Arnim 1898, p. 404. Both speeches, along with Dio's second and fourth oration *On kingship*, are still today generally seen as paradigms of *Mirrors for princes* from Roman imperial times. On these four texts, see, e.g., Moles 1990; see also Gangloff 2009; Haake 2012, p. 79–80.

⁴⁰ See Erler, Frateantonio, Kopp, Sigel & Steiner 1997; Gärtner & Wünsch 1980.

⁴¹ One might refer to Krumbacher 1897, p. 456 who has made use of the term *Fürstenspiegel* to characterize Agapetus' work dedicated to the emperor Justinian; see also Demandt 2002; cf. also Haake 2013, p. 167 n. 12. For another early instance of the use of the term *Fürstenspiegel*, see Emminger 1906 in respect of

studies, by contrast, an ongoing and growing interest in *Mirrors for princes* can be observed in the two decades after the end of the First World War, and thus after a radical change in the world of European monarchies,⁴² which were often seen in a long-lasting line of tradition from antiquity to the recent past.⁴³

Even though the aforementioned delineations present only a small selection of the respective evidence it seems reasonable to assume that the first instances of the term *Mirror for princes* (and its equivalents in modern languages other than English) in scholarly literature occurred at the same time as the latest examples of this kind of literature. It might suffice to mention two examples dating to the first decade of the twentieth century: the article *Prinzenziehung* by the Austrian major general Leopold Auspitz published in 1904⁴⁴ and Wilhelm Münch's book for a general audience *Gedanken über Fürstenerziehung aus alter und neuer Zeit*, published as a piece of 'edifying literature' in 1909, a slightly commented compendium of relevant text passages beginning with Isocrates' *To Nicocles*⁴⁵ and ending with rather lengthy considerations by the author.⁴⁶

Nicephorus Blemmydes' text *Imperial statue* ('statue' in the meaning of model) dedicated to the emperor Theodore II Laskaris.

⁴² Exemplarily, one might refer to Buschmann 1918; see also Kleineke 1937. However, in his magisterial work on *European Literature and Latin Middle Ages*, E. R. Curtius interestingly used the term *Fürstenspiegel* only once: Curtius 1948, p. 184.

⁴³ Highly instructive in this respect is Hugges 1925, p. 138: 'So ist das Herrscherbild, das diese Könige darbieten wollen. Es hat durch die Jahrhunderte fortgewirkt bis in die Gegenwart. Was wir noch vor wenigen Jahren am Tage des Königs und Kaisers in der Hymne gesungen haben, ist nichts anderes als die gerade Fortsetzung dieser Ideologie. Wie jene Könige vor 2 Jahrtausenden am Nil sich schmückten und zur Schau stellten, genau so zeigt sich der Monarch des 20. Jahrhunderts den modernen Menschen'.—An instructive example in this context is a short text by the German classical philologist Hans von Arnim: at the University of Frankfurt he delivered a speech titled *Ein altgriechisches Königsideal* (von Arnim 1916) on January 27, 1916, the birthday of the German Emperor Wilhelm II. See Barceló 1993, p. 15; Haake 2015, p. 60-61 n. 15.

⁴⁴ Auspitz 1904; on Leopold Auspitz, see Haake 2015, p. 60-61 with n. 15.

⁴⁵ Along with Isocrates' other 'Cypriote writings', *Nicocles or the Cyprians* and *Euagoras*, *To Nicocles* is often considered as part of the *Mirror for princes*-literature; see, e.g., Hadot 1972, p. 574-576; on these texts in general, see Eucken 1983, 213-269.

⁴⁶ Münch 1909, see esp. p. 13-18, 233-306. This book was 'reverently dedicated' to 'Seiner kaiserlichen und königlichen Hoheit dem Kronprinzen des

4.2. *Mirrors for princes*—tracking in the field of conceptual history

Following this admittedly brief histori(ographi)cal excursus,⁴⁷ it is necessary to consider the reasons for the success of the term *Mirror for princes*—this task is a matter of conceptual history. As has already been stated, the ‘invention’ of the term *Mirror for princes* in scholarly literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century took place without broader methodological considerations. One rather gets the impression that the term was considered among scholars as a reasonable label, based on a rather fuzzy perception of *Mirrors for princes* prevalent in common knowledge at that time. Since *Mirrors for princes* (be it contemporary writings or otherwise) were conceived in non-scientific contexts as texts that are not necessarily named respectively, but which present ideal images of princes as they should or ought to be,⁴⁸ it seems reasonable to assume that the term *Mirrors for Princes* found its way from the popular notion of a certain type of literary production into the scholarly conceptualisation of literary texts. The vagueness and indeterminacy of the definition of the term *Mirror for princes* were the reasons for its adoption by scholars and its ‘triumph’ in scholarly literature up to the present day.

This statement can be underpinned with reference to Pierre Hadot’s lemma *Fürstenspiegel* in the *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, which is now for more than four decades the most authoritative reference for *Mirrors for princes* in the field of Clas-

Deutschen Reiches und von Preussen’—i.e., Wilhelm, German Crown Prince (Münch 1909, p. [III]). On this book, see Eberhardt 1977, p. 269. Its author, Wilhelm Münch, was councillor, pedagogue and honorary professor at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität at Berlin; see http://lexikon.romanischestudien.de/index.php?title=Münch,_Wilhelm_Karl_Georg.

⁴⁷ For a more exhaustive approach, it would be necessary to analyse also nineteenth-century works in the field of governance and public policy as well as law. On ‘Hegel’s *Fürstenspiegel*’, for example, in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (§ 484–589), see Cole 2014, p. 109–117.

⁴⁸ See Münch 1909, p. 8–9: ‘Eine ganze Literatur für sich innerhalb der Gesamtliteratur dieses Gebietes bilden dann die sogenannten Fürstenspiegel, deren jeder ein ideales Bild des Fürsten, wie er sein soll oder sollte, bieten will (...) Und die Verfasser solcher Fürstenspiegel (die natürlich nicht immer gerade diesen Titel haben) (...)’.

sical studies.⁴⁹ The author frames his highly influential definition of *Mirrors for princes* in this text of reference with

(...) the fact that the literary genre of advice for princes has—from earliest antiquity on—always followed the same rules and conventions even though it appears in various forms and descriptions: that is as eulogium or execration, an unconnected sequence of sentences or a didactic and systematic treatise, biography or utopia.⁵⁰

5. Mirrors for princes—*splendour and misery of a vague concept: the case of Classical studies*

The passage quoted from Hadot's lemma *Fürstenspiegel* from 1972 is in a way both—the result of the success of the vague concept of the term *Mirror for princes* since about 1900 and a propagator of the ongoing success of the not too elaborated notion of this apparently iridescent term, which is still prevalent in the field of Classical studies despite all minor adjustments over the last decades. It makes perfectly clear what the consequences are, if *Mirrors for princes* are more or less exclusively defined with regard to their content: under these premises, almost every text can be classified as a *Mirror for princes* if the topic of the good ruler is present at least to some extent. This becomes immediately evident when bringing to mind all those texts from Graeco-Roman antiquity, which Hadot subsumes under the term *Fürstenspiegel*: amongst others, the Homeric Epics, Pindar's victory odes for tyrants, Attic tragedies, Platonic dialogues, Isocrates' 'Cypriote writings', treatises by Xenophon, and various texts by Aristotle, the *Res gestae divi Augusti*, Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations*, speeches by the emperor Julian, Seneca's *De clementia*, the *XII Panegyrici Latini*, orations by Libanius and Themistius, texts by Christian authors like Eusebius of Caesarea, Ambrose of Milan and Augustine of Hippo, the

⁴⁹ Hadot 1972.

⁵⁰ See Hadot 1972, col. 566 (translated by A. Linnemann; see Haake 2015, p. 62): 'Doch hat tatsächlich (...) die literarische Gattung der Ratschläge für Fürsten vom frühesten Altertum an stets die gleichen Gesetze u. Überlieferungen beobachtet, wenn sie auch unter sehr verschiedenen Formen u. Bezeichnungen auftritt: Elogium oder Verwünschung, unverbundene Sentenzenfolge oder didaktische u. systematische Abhandlungen, Biographie oder Utopie'.

writings *peri basileias* (*On kingship*) from Hellenistic times, the Roman imperial period and late antiquity, as well as inscriptions and papyri.⁵¹

As tempting as it might be at first glance to work with such a wide and vague conception of *Mirrors for princes*: the widespread acceptance notwithstanding the ubiquity of *Mirrors for princes* in classical antiquity has caused discomfort to at least some scholars in the recent past. This uneasiness is best expressed by the occasional critical remarks in respect of one particular aspect: this aspect concerns the question of genre.⁵²

6. Mirrors for princes—a matter of genre in antiquity?

If more or less every text from antiquity containing considerations on the good ruler and the practice of good rule can be subsumed under the label *Mirror for princes*, be it an epic, a piece of poetry, a tragedy or a historiographical account, a philosophical treatise, an oration, then genre in its very proper sense does not matter. Yet, does it matter? The answer should be ‘yes’.

Attempts to make general statements about the practice of good rule and the figure of the good ruler from all types of literary texts—either in the form of highly theoretical reflections or in terms of sparsely reflected moral sayings—are unquestionably important undertakings. Leaving aside the question whether every utterance on the practice of good rule in any text should be considered as indication for ‘the literary genre of advice for princes’,⁵³ Hadot’s lemma on *Fürstenspiegel* is certainly a most valuable contribution as well as a very learned and well-informed piece of scholarship, an indispensable tool for everybody interested in theories of monarchy in antiquity (and, to some extent,

⁵¹ See Hadot 1972, col. 568-621; regarding this conglomeration, see Haake 2015, p. 61-62. In terms of Synesius of Cyrene’s oration *On kingship*, see now Petkas 2018. In respect of papyrological evidence, one might refer now to Biagetti 2015 and Davide Amendola’s contribution to this volume.

⁵² See especially Eder 1995, p. 156-158; on Eder’s valid criticism and his less convincing conclusions for his own approach, see Haake 2003, p. 105 n. 10; Nippel 2017, p. 253 n. 47.

⁵³ This crucial question arising from Hadot’s delineations (Hadot 1972, col. 566; see above, p. 305) has never been seriously taken into account.

beyond).⁵⁴ Nevertheless, in a way, this text is an extraordinary example for a rather traditional (antiquarianesque) approach to the history of ideas. Taken by itself, this is unproblematic, of course; and this is all the more valid, as Hadot had to write a lemma for an encyclopaedia. The influence of this article as an authoritative work of reference and the mostly uncritical adoption of his conception of all kinds of texts as *Mirrors for princes*, however, has resulted in a widespread negligence of important aspects: next to the question of genre this affects the relevance of the historical contexts as well as the general problem of the applicability of the concept of *Mirrors for princes* to the conditions of antiquity.

*7. Writing on monocracy in the Graeco-Roman world,
the discourse(s) on one-man rule
and 'monocratological knowledge'*

Right from the beginning of literature in the 'classical' Mediterranean world, reflections on sole rulership are (omni)present in texts from Graeco-Roman antiquity. These reflections are part of the discourse on monarchy in the ancient world,⁵⁵ and they can be basically separated into two groups subject to the ideal-typical manifestation of the ruler as a bad monocrat, in other words: the tyrant, or as his antithesis, as a good monarch, to put it another way: the king.⁵⁶ As different as the specific contexts of all these writings from the world of Homer to the late antique world may have obviously been, they share one structural feature, which constitutes an enormous difference between Greece and Rome on the one side and the Near Eastern as well as the medieval worlds on the other:

The monocracies in classical antiquity had not (...) *primarily* shaped the historical orders, but had, in a way, secondarily,

⁵⁴ Hadot 1972.

⁵⁵ On 'antimonarchic discourse in antiquity', see the contributions in Börm 2015a.

⁵⁶ That the image of the good monarch is no independent construct, but, on the contrary, created by reversing the traditional negative image of the tyrant, has been pointed out by Haake 2003, p. 90; Haake 2013, p. 176. See also Lurgahi 2013a, p. 143-144.

placed themselves in basically differently oriented normative systems or—using another image—had covered the primary orders secondarily.⁵⁷

Yet, this common feature must not obscure the fact that the monarchic imprint on ‘monocratological texts’ from antiquity, i.e. ‘texts reflecting the available stock of knowledge about monocratic rule (...), resting upon either historical experiences or imagined conceptions’,⁵⁸ varied greatly depending first and foremost on the respective political contexts: were these texts written in the archaic period when tyranny was a rather common type of sole rulership? Were they authored in fifth-century Athens where the figure of the Persian ‘Great King’ was the imagination of the autocrat par excellence? Were they formulated in the Greek world of the fourth century when monarchs populated and shaped more and more the political sphere?⁵⁹ Were they penned in the Hellenistic age when the Greek world was a world full of kings (and a ‘veritable industry of “mirror for princes” publications’ flourished⁶⁰)? Were they put down in writing in republican Rome, where the figure of the sole ruler has always been an easily invoked stereotype until the Republic’s very end?⁶¹ Were they committed to writing under the conditions of Roman emperorship between the early principate and late antique monarchy?

Still, as important as the respective political context for a proper understanding of monocratological texts is, the consideration of generic aspects should not be disregarded.

⁵⁷ See Gotter 2008, p. 185 (translated by A. Linnemann; see Haake 2015, p. 72): ‘(...) die antiken Alleinherrschaften [haben] die historischen Ordnungen nicht (...) *primär* geprägt (...), sondern sich gewissermaßen sekundär in prinzipiell anders orientierte normative Systeme hineingesetzt oder—um ein anderes Bild zu benutzen—diese Ordnungen sekundär überwölbt (...)’. See also the short remarks by Börm 2015b.

⁵⁸ On the term ‘monocratological’ as well as for the quote, see Haake 2015, p. 73.

⁵⁹ For skeptical and critical remarks in respect of supposed *Mirrors for princes* addressed explicitly to contemporary non-Athenian sole-rulers, but basically intended to strengthen the aristocratic element in Athenian society in late classical Athens (as suggested by Eder 1995; see also Schulte 2001, p. 13, 35–41, 170–183), see Haake 2003, p. 105 n. 10; Haake 2015, p. 59, 67.

⁶⁰ See Gruen 1993, p. 3–4.

⁶¹ In this context, see Schulte 2005, p. 170–183.

8. Mirrors for princes, *monocratological texts* and the question of genre(s)

If one accepts the conceptualisation of monocratological texts outlined above, then one will most likely be convinced that the many texts from Graeco-Roman antiquity which Hadot has collocated in his lemma *Fürstenspiegel* can be subsumed under this term⁶² (even though Hadot's compilation is far from being comprehensive; e.g., one might think of passages in Aelian's *On the nature of animals*, where the author depicts 'three animals associated with kingship', namely the bee, the lion, and the eagle⁶³). Labelling the mentioned texts as monocratological, however, does not mean that this term is interchangeable with *Fürstenspiegel* (or *Mirror for princes*, respectively), because the notions behind these two terms are not identical.

Whereas all texts comprising statements on one-man rule and sole rulers are monocratological texts, strictly speaking only those writings can be considered *Mirrors for princes* in accordance with their general accepted definition as 'advice literature', which address the good ruler and the practice of good rulership and which are intended to make these considerations as guidance available to a ruler.⁶⁴ However, even though the aspect of advice is crucial for his definition of Graeco-Roman *Mirrors for princes* in the tradition of conceptions of respective medieval and early modern texts and is generally accepted as a decisive criterion in the field of Classical studies,⁶⁵ Hadot himself partially lost sight of this notion in his own contribution on *Fürstenspiegel*, when it became in a way a higher priority for him to gather relevant material on the good ruler and his way of ruling from a wide spectrum of textual evidence.

⁶² Hadot 1972, col. 568-621; see also above p. 305-306.

⁶³ See Smith 2015, p. 215-248.

⁶⁴ These explanations are in line with Hadot's idea of *Mirrors for princes* as 'advice for princes'; see Hadot 1972, col. 566; see also above p. 305. It is worth mentioning, by the way, that Hadot has nowhere outlined how the advice in the respective texts should have been enunciated nor in what way it should have been imparted to the monarchic addressees.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., above p. 304-305.

Notwithstanding the fact that Hadot did not explicitly discuss the question of genre with respect to *Mirrors for princes*, it is probably hardly wrong to presume that he had the idea of a loose ‘supra-genre’ in mind, or—to borrow a phrase from a study on fifteenth-century English *Mirrors for princes*—something like a ‘genre of genres’.⁶⁶ As catchy as the expressions ‘supra-genre’ and ‘genre of genres’ may appear at first glance, in the end they are only makeshifts and help merely in some sort to conceal the manifold difficulties in conceptualising the term *Mirror for princes* with respect to classical antiquity, because they displace the problem more than they contribute to its solution. Regardless of Hadot’s approach, however, among these difficulties is the problem how *Mirrors for princes* should be considered with respect to the question of genre. Are they ‘a literary genre that occurred in different forms’,⁶⁷ or are they not a specific literary genre, but rather to be understood as a kind of ‘collective concept’?⁶⁸ Related to these issues are to some extent two further crucial problems. The first one is of a literary nature and concerns the question whether *Mirrors for princes* could be written in both in prose and in verse.⁶⁹ The second aspect is by no means of less importance: down to the present day, the question when the first *Mirrors for princes* emerged has never been conclusively, not even extensively discussed and there is no consensus as to the date as well as to the premises for the existence of *Mirrors for princes*. Thus, alongside the widespread assumption that *Mirrors for princes* arose in the fourth century BC along with the ‘monocratisation’ of the Greek world, earlier as well as later dates are also under consideration in present scholarship.⁷⁰

If one takes the matter of genre seriously, then it should become clear that it is rather difficult to assume that a clearly defined

⁶⁶ See Giancarlo 2015, p. 35: ‘Even in a limited accounting the *Fürstenspiegel* appears less as a genre and more a genre of genres’.

⁶⁷ See Bertelli 2002, p. 54 (translated by A. Linnemann; see Haake 2015, p. 66: ‘(...) “Fürstenspiegel” (...) è un genere letterario che sotto varie vesti (...)’.

⁶⁸ See Nippel 2017, p. 252: ‘Es handelt sich allerdings (sc. bei der *Fürstenspiegel*-Literatur)—im Gegensatz zu dem mittelalterlichen Typus—nicht um ein spezifisches literarisches Genre, sondern um einen Sammelbegriff für Texte, (...)’.

⁶⁹ In this respect, see Eder 1995, p. 159.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Gray 2011, p. 5 n. 1; for a sample of respective points of view, see also Haake 2015, p. 67.

group of texts existed in Graeco-Roman antiquity worthy of the categorisation *Mirror for princes* in the sense of a literary genre as such. Incidentally, such an approach comes along with notions in respect to *Mirrors for princes* as a genre in the Middle Ages in medieval studies.⁷¹ However, it must appear at least to some degree astonishing that in the long-lasting discussion on *Mirrors for princes* in antiquity methodological considerations on genre in the field of literary studies have been rarely taken into account and have been seldom been applied.⁷² Nevertheless, according to a convincing definition of genre in the field of literary studies, there are five crucial elements: first, the author is seen not as an individual, but as a member of a specific social group with a characteristic social role; second, the addressee is regarded in the same manner. Both author and addressee constitute the explicit frame of the communicative situation of each text. Third, the form of the text in question; fourth, its actual content; fifth and finally, it is essential to discuss the problem of the implied audience of the texts, applying the same categories as used for the author and the addressee.⁷³ Against the backdrop of this definition and in the light of the respective texts, there can be no doubt that a genre of *Mirrors for princes* cannot have existed in antiquity.

This does not mean, however, that the presented generic model cannot be adapted in a productive way to a well-defined corpus of monocratological texts that are generally considered *Mirrors for princes*: the genre of writings *On kingship*.⁷⁴

9. *Mirror, mirror—the mirror metaphor
and the term Mirror for princes in antiquity:
an outline of an unresolved problem*

A crucial problem concerning the term *Mirror for princes* and its applicability to Greek and Latin texts from antiquity is the ques-

⁷¹ See, most prominently, Jónsson 2006, p. 164.

⁷² This holds even true, for example, for the monograph of Schulte 2001 on the '*Mirror for princes*-literature in Graeco-Roman antiquity'.

⁷³ See Raible 1980, esp. p. 342-345; see also Haake 2013, p. 167.

⁷⁴ It is not possible to explain this statement in the present context in greater detail. Therefore, I refer to Haake 2003; Haake 2012; Haake 2013; Haake 2014; see also Sidebottom 2006.

tion whether and in which way the mirror metaphor existed in the Graeco-Roman world, and whether it is reasonable to make use of it in respect of those texts which have been considered to be *Mirrors for princes* by modern scholars. It may come as a surprise, but this aspect has been seldom discussed in the field of Classical studies. This is probably because *Mirrors for princes* were generally seen as an omnipresent phenomenon beyond terminological aspects. In fact, it is above all in the context of the discussion of one (important and at the same time peculiar) text that such a question has been taken into account:⁷⁵ Seneca's *On clemency*. However, this is 'a unique document that has close affinities with three different kinds of classical prose writing: the kingship treatise, the panegyric oration, and the philosophical treatise' and to my knowledge it is the only supposed 'classical' *Mirror for princes* in which the author makes use of the word 'mirror' (*speculum*).⁷⁶ Due to its unique nature it is important for future research to consider carefully what general implications can be deduced from this text, in which—besides its innovative character—important lines of the tradition of Greek and Roman reflections on monarchical rule are combined by Seneca (and which has become, via its later reception, a highly influential text for *Mirrors for princes* in medieval and early modern times).⁷⁷

Although it cannot be denied that the mirror metaphor has its origins in antiquity, more precisely in the fifth and fourth centuries BC,⁷⁸ it is important to keep in mind that the function of a specific text or its author as mirror in front of the addressee and the readership of the respective piece of literature has not always been the same, but could differ throughout the course of history.⁷⁹ This is especially true regarding the exhortative and appellative nature of texts in which the author made use of the word

⁷⁵ See now also Albert Joosse's article on the Platonic *First Alcibiades* in this volume.

⁷⁶ For the quote, see Braund 2009, p. 17. The mentioned passage is Sen. *clem.* 1.1.1; on this passage and its peculiarities, see Braund 2009, p. 154 *ad loc.*

⁷⁷ See Braund 2009, p. 77-79.

⁷⁸ See Haake 2003, p. 106-107 n. 12. See also Fantham 1972, p. 68-69; McCarty 1989.

⁷⁹ See again Haake 2003, p. 106-107 n. 12.

‘mirror’ in order to characterise his literary work and to expound his intention.

Here a further important methodological question arises: is it justifiable to accept the existence of *Mirrors for princes* in antiquity based on the simple fact that the mirror metaphor was known in the Graeco-Roman world? At any rate, a body of literature comparable to the medieval *speculum* literature did not exist—in neither the Greek nor the Roman world.⁸⁰

10. *What shall be done with Mirrors for princes and antiquity—final, but not concluding remarks*

It is a difficult question whether it is possible that something exists *avant la lettre*.⁸¹ Of course, this holds true for the existence of *Mirrors for princes* in antiquity, too. That such a genre did not exist in the Graeco-Roman world (and, to complicate things further, this has occasionally also been claimed of later periods⁸²) can be reasonably demonstrated, especially considering that genre should be defined as a

historically coherent and limited bundle of *textual events* (in German: *Textereignisse*), which can socio-historically be reconstructed as ‘literary-social institution’.⁸³

However, it seems far from realistic to expect that the term *Mirror for princes* should grow obsolete in Classical studies in the future. Thus, it is necessary to consider how we ought to handle the term. From a literary point of view it seems possible to classify *Mirrors for princes* not as a genre, but rather as a ‘sort of texts’ (in German:

⁸⁰ On the medieval mirror literature, see Jónsson 1995.

⁸¹ In this respect, it is worth to quote the appropriate formulation of Silk, Gildenhard & Barrow 2014, p. 81: ‘Distinctive, and potentially more disturbing, was advice to those in power—the so-called mirror for princes—a genre with medieval precedents (like Aquinas’s *De regime principum*) and good classical models (like Seneca’s *De Clementia*), but also now the context for a controversial masterpiece in the shape of Machiavelli’s *The Prince* (...)’.

⁸² See Jónsson 2006, p. 164 as regards medieval *Mirrors for princes*.

⁸³ See Fricke 1991, p. 141: ‘Ein “Genre” (...) ist ein (...) historisch kohärentes und begrenztes Bündel von *Textereignissen*, das sich sozialgeschichtlich als “literarisch-soziale Institution” rekonstruieren läßt.’

Textsorte), which ‘combines similar phenomena, yet irrespective of their historical context, exclusively by means of a defined bunch of common *text features*’.⁸⁴ However, what are the ‘similar phenomena’ regarding texts which are generally considered to be *Mirrors for princes*? It seems justifiable to take the following vague, but telling definition as a basis; carefully read, the small but significant divergences from the attempts quoted earlier to define *Mirrors for princes* under generic aspects quickly become evident:⁸⁵

A *Fürstenspiegel* is a treatise written for a prince—and generally dedicated to him in some way—whose main purpose is to describe the ideal prince, his behaviour, his role and position in the world.⁸⁶

Taking this definition and adapting the idea of *Mirrors of princes* as a ‘sort of texts’ to Graeco-Roman antiquity would imply, that the corpus of texts labelled *Mirror for princes* would be smaller than it is according to Hadot’s lemma and the opinion of those, who are in line with his general concept. Yet, from a historical point of view, the fact remains that the term *Mirror for princes* tends to make things opaque rather than delineating a specific phenomenon. This is true not least because of the undeniable generic peculiarities of different texts such as philosophical-theoretical treatises or encomiastic eulogies in various contexts: even if several texts address the same topic (in the present case, the good ruler and his practice of rule), different historical and social communicative contexts determine their dissimilar meanings (not to mention the generic implications of the texts). These different historical and social contexts depend primarily on the varying embeddedness of monarchy in the respective societies;⁸⁷ by no

⁸⁴ See again Fricke 1991, p. 141: ‘Eine literarische Textsorte vereinigt dabei gleichartige Phänomene, noch ohne Rücksicht auf ihren historischen Zusammenhang, ausschließlich nach einem festgelegten Bündel gemeinsamer *Textmerkmale* (...)’.

⁸⁵ See above, p. 299–300.

⁸⁶ See Jónsson 1987, p. 394 (translated by A. Linnemann; see Haake 2015, p. 65): ‘Un *Fürstenspiegel* est un traité écrit pour un prince—et en général dédié à lui d’une façon ou d’une autre—qui a pour objet principal de décrire le prince idéal, son comportement, son rôle et sa situation au monde’.

⁸⁷ For a comprehensive overview as to antiquity, see Rebenich 2017. For a wider spectrum, see Gilissen 1970.

means of less importance is the figure of the author of the respective text and his social role as philosopher, religious specialist, or courtier.

For pragmatic reasons, the term *Mirror for princes* will probably be used to characterise various texts of monocratological content from the 'classical' Mediterranean world in the future (even if in medieval and early modern studies skeptical opinions on a wide distribution of *Mirrors for princes* in antiquity have become more common in recent research⁸⁸). However, it is much to be hoped that the awareness will increase that the categorisation of a text as *Mirror for princes* (due to its content⁸⁹) is of rather limited gain for all those interested in the specific ways in which a monocratological text or of a group of such texts operates in a concrete context. The same is true for those engaged with comparative studies on monarchies from global perspectives, since the comparison of various manifestations of monocratic rule needs well-defined parameters, but no comprehensive categories.

To conclude: The pivotal basis for the scholarly success of the term *Mirror for princes* in many scientific fields—the conceptional vagueness—is at the same time its greatest weakness. If the previous delineations will result in some critical reconsiderations of the colourful term *Mirror for princes*, then they will have been successful.

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⁸⁸ See, e.g., Anton 2004, p. 17; Stammen & Philipp 1996, col. 495.

⁸⁹ See Oswyn Murray's article in the present volume with a vast and learned overview on respective texts.

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Abstract

The aim of this contribution is an examination of the term *Mirror for princes* in the context of Greek and Roman literature on sole reign, more precisely on the figure of the good ruler and the practice of good rule. Being of post-antique origins in late medieval and early modern Europe, this expression is widely used in 'western' research on monarchies in literate societies all over the world from the third millennium BC until the twentieth century AD. To raise awareness of the question of the applicability of the term *Mirror for princes* on antiquity is the main target of this paper.

ZUR ‘CHRISTIANISIERUNG’ DES ‘FÜRSTENSPIEGELS’ IN DER SPÄTANTIKE: ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUR *EKTHESIS* DES AGAPETOS

1. *Einleitung*

Nach einer Entwicklung, gar einer möglichen ‘Christianisierung’ des hellenistisch-kaiserzeitlichen ‘Fürstenspiegels’ in der Spätantike zu fragen, ist konzeptionell wie auch methodisch nicht ganz unproblematisch. Hier gilt es zunächst einmal zu klären, welche Texte sich überhaupt unter diesem Begriff subsumieren lassen und inwieweit es gerechtfertigt ist, in dem Zusammenhang von einer ‘Gattung’ zu sprechen.

Die Forschung beschreitet dabei—ebenso wie bei der Frage nach dem hellenistischen und dem kaiserzeitlichen Befund—verschiedene Wege: einige Autoren orientieren sich an inhaltlichen Gesichtspunkten und gehen teils so weit, sämtliche Schriften einzubeziehen, die grundsätzliche und programmatische Aussagen über königliches resp. kaiserliches Handeln und dessen normative Grundlagen enthalten.¹ Auf die Weise geraten Zeugnisse sehr unterschiedlicher Gattungen in den Fokus, darunter panegyrische Texte paganer wie auch christlicher Autoren, biographische und autobiographische Dokumente oder christliche Traktate apologetischen, exegetischen bzw. pastoralen Charakters. Die Gattungsfrage ist bei ihrem Vorgehen zum Teil nur insofern relevant, als sie konstatieren, dass viele der inhaltlichen Motive jener Texte von den Verfassern mittelalterlicher und frühneuzeitlicher

¹ So praktiziert es etwa P. Hadot in seinem *RAC*-Artikel, einem der wichtigsten Referenztexte zu der Thematik; siehe Hadot 1972, p. 614-621; desgleichen speziell am Beispiel des vierten Jahrhunderts O’Meara & Schamp 2006, bes. p. 4.

‘Fürstenspiegel’ wieder aufgegriffen werden und sich damit gewissermaßen *ex post* eine Verbindung mit diesem Genre aufzutut.

Andere Historiker und Philologen, welche die spätantike Überlieferungslage zu bestimmen suchen, plädieren hingegen dafür, der Problematik der Gattung bereits für die Antike grössere Beachtung zu schenken. Sie knüpfen an entsprechende Studien zum Hellenismus und zur römischen Kaiserzeit an, die namentlich in der *peri basileias*-Literatur ein spezifisches Genre ausgemacht haben, das sich am ehesten mit späteren ‘Fürstenspiegeln’ vergleichen lässt:² Diese Texte adressieren einen konkreten Monarchen oder präsumtiven Thronfolger und haben allgemeine, nicht situationsgebundene Aussagen über die ideale monarchische Herrschaft zum Gegenstand.³ Dabei geht es ihnen nicht um herrschaftsorganisatorische Fragen, sondern um die Person des Regenten und dessen normative Orientierung. Demzufolge werden Verhaltenserwartungen expliziert und in paränetischer oder adhortativer Manier an den Adressaten gerichtet. In den Untersuchungen zu den *peri basileias*-Schriften ist demonstriert worden, dass diese—im Hinblick auf Autor, Adressat, Intention und Kommunikationssituation—ein besonderes Profil aufweisen, das sich von dem panegyrischen wie auch politisch-philosophischen Texte zum König- bzw. Kaisertum unterscheidet.⁴ Nichtsdestotrotz zeigen sie Schnittmengen mit anderen Gattungen, besonders der des *basilikos logos*,⁵ können etwa wie dieser paränetische mit enkomastischen Elementen verbinden.⁶

² Damit insinuierten sie jedoch keineswegs, dass die mittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen Texte als unmittelbare ‘Fortsetzung’ der antiken anzusehen seien; explizit zu den Diskontinuitäten u.a. Eder 1995, p. 157. Zur Problematik der Definition der Gattung eines ‘Fürstenspiegels’ auch im lateinischen Mittelalter Jonsson 2006, bes. p. 163–164.

³ Damit gehen sie konform mit der ‘Arbeitsdefinition’ O. Eberhardts für ‘Fürstenspiegel’, die sich in der Forschung weitgehend durchgesetzt hat: Eberhardt 1977, p. 280; ähnlich Anton 2006, p. 3–4.

⁴ Hierzu besonders Haake 2003, p. 91–96; speziell zu Spätantike und Byzantinismus Hunger 1978, p. 157.

⁵ Dies gilt noch stärker für entsprechende Befunde im lateinischen Westen, wo paränetische Aussagen an Kaiser sich vorrangig in panegyrischen Reden finden, die teils Funktionen erfüllen, die im griechischen Kulturraum von der *peri basileias*-Literatur wahrgenommen werden; hierzu Mause 1994, p. 52–53; Ronning 2007, p. 36.

⁶ Dies trifft in ähnlicher Weise auf die *panegyrici* im lateinischen Westen zu; dazu besonders Seelentag 2004, p. 30–34.

Möchte man diesbezüglich Veränderungen in der Spätantike untersuchen, empfiehlt es sich m.E., nach dem Fortleben und der Weiterentwicklung der *peri basileias*-Literatur in spätrömischer Zeit zu fragen.⁷ Damit beschränkt sich der Kreis der zu betrachtenden Texte erheblich, genau genommen auf nur drei Werke: die Schrift *De regno* des Synesios von Kyrene, die achte Rede des Themistios sowie die *Ekthesis* des Agapetos. Alle übrigen Schriften programmatischen Gehalts zum König- oder Kaisertum sind offenkundig anderen literarischen Gattungen zuzuordnen und scheiden damit für unser Anliegen aus. Betrachten wir die drei in Frage kommenden Texte: deren ältester, das Werk *De regno* des Synesios, ist insbesondere deshalb zu nennen, weil ihr Verfasser explizit an die Königsreden Dions von Prusa anknüpft, die im römischen Kontext am stärksten die Tradition der *peri basileias*-Schriften fortsetzen.⁸ Dennoch tun sich auch hier bei der Zuordnung Probleme auf: so sind in der Forschung Zweifel geäußert worden, dass diese Schrift angesichts ihrer ausnehmend kritischen, teils invektivenhaft anmutenden Formulierungen tatsächlich an Arkadios gerichtet gewesen sein kann, geschweige denn diesem vorgetragen wurde.⁹ Hinzu kommt, dass es sich bei dem Text, formal betrachtet, um einen—wenn auch ungewöhnlich langen—*stephanotikos logos* handelt.¹⁰ Daneben wird die achte Rede des Themistios diskutiert, die anlässlich der Quinquennalien des Valens gehalten wurde. Sie ist in der Handschrift A mit 'Valens oder über die königliche Natur' titulierte und enthält zahlreiche Motive, die sich auch in *peri basileias*-Schriften finden.¹¹ Allerdings ist sie insgesamt primär panegyrischen Charakters, nicht zuletzt weil der Autor seinem Adressaten konzidiert, sämtliche in der Rede formulierte Direktiven bereits vollumfänglich zu

⁷ Die Begriffe 'spätantik' und 'spätrömisch' verwende ich dabei synonym für den Zeitraum des vierten bis sechsten Jahrhunderts n.Chr.

⁸ Zu den Beziehungen zwischen diesen Texten Asmus 1900, bes. p. 85-104; Sidebottom 2006, p. 142-143.

⁹ Zu möglichem Anlass und Hintergründen Cameron & Long 1993, p. 103-142; optimistisch hinsichtlich des konkreten Vortrags hingegen Brandt 2003.

¹⁰ T. Schmitt spricht entsprechend von einer 'hybriden Mischform', welche die Kranzrede und eine Schrift der Gattung *peri basileias* verbindet: Schmitt 2001, p. 294-296.

¹¹ Zu Anlass und Forschungskontroversen über die genaue Datierung siehe Leppin & Portmann 1998, p. 150 mit Anm. 2.

erfüllen.¹² Bei beiden Texten haben wir es also mit dem Phänomen zu tun, dass sie im Hinblick auf ihre Gattung zwischen dem *peri basileias*-Genre und unterschiedlichen Typen von *basilikoi logoi* anzusiedeln sind. Für den dritten Text, der in dem Zusammenhang ins Visier genommen wird, die *Ekthesis* des Agapetos, gilt dies nicht. Hier handelt es sich definitiv um eine Schrift, welche die Mehrzahl der Kriterien des *peri basileias*-Genres erfüllt. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gebührt ihr in unserem Kontext überdies deshalb, weil sie das Bindeglied zwischen der antiken *peri basileias*-Literatur und den byzantinischen 'Fürstenspiegeln' bildet.¹³ Sie weist eine Vielzahl von Rekursen auf die einschlägigen klassischen Texte auf, markiert aber dennoch eine Zäsur, indem sie sie in einem neuen Kommunikationszusammenhang präsentiert.¹⁴

Letzteres trifft offenkundig noch nicht auf die genannten Reden des Synesios und des Themistios zu, die hellenistische und kaiserzeitliche Traditionen ungebrochener fortsetzen und kaum grundsätzlich Neues aufweisen. So enthalten beide Texte noch keine genuin christlichen Elemente, obwohl sie christliche Kaiser adressieren. Dies erklärt sich nicht nur aus persönlichen Präferenzen der Autoren—Themistios ist bekanntlich kein Christ, Synesios begreift sich eher als Philosoph denn als Christ und bevorzugt selbst in der Phase seines Episkopats herkömmliche Formulierungen, wenn er sich in politischen Zusammenhängen äußert.¹⁵ Hinzu kommt, dass die traditionellen Motive in der Zeit bereits so weit monotheistisch überformt sind, dass sie auch unter Christen konsensfähig sind und nicht unter religiösen Gesichtspunkten problematisiert werden.¹⁶ Werden die Transformationen im Kaisertum kritisch gewürdigt, sind hingegen auch ältere Vorstellungen noch vermittelbar. Dies gilt etwa für die Betrachtungen

¹² Zur Frage, ob dieser Text der Gattung *peri basileias* zuzurechnen ist, Haake 2011, p. 71; vgl. Gerhardt 2002, p. 200-202. G. Prinzing nimmt den Text in seine Liste der byzantinischen Fürstenspiegel nicht auf, sondern führt für die Spätantike nur Synesios und Agapetos an; siehe Prinzing 1988, p. 30.

¹³ Zur Einschätzung des Textes als ersten byzantinischen Fürstenspiegel Blum 1981, p. 32-39; Nicol 1988, p. 56; Riedinger 1995, p. 6-7; Mazal 2001, p. 97, 483-484; Rapp 2005, p. 392.

¹⁴ In einem solchen können auch herkömmliche Aussagen zum Kaisertum eine andere Konnotation erhalten; dazu grundsätzlich Martin 1984, bes. p. 115.

¹⁵ Dazu mit Belegen Piepenbrink 2013, p. 87-91.

¹⁶ Hierzu besonders Cameron 1991, p. 130-132.

des Synesios, der die Seklusionsneigungen des Arkadios moniert, allem voran dessen Rückzug aus der Kriegführung.¹⁷ Damit distanziert er sich ausdrücklich von den hieratischen Tendenzen des spätantiken Kaisertums und kontrastiert es mit dem Herrscherbild des Prinzipats, das dem des Hellenismus insofern ähnelt, als es die reale Bewährung des Kaisers im Krieg fordert. Im *peri basileias*-Genre, das er über Dion von Prusa rezipiert, findet er entsprechend geeignete Topoi. Themistios hingegen affirmiert die spätrömischen Veränderungen, darunter nicht zuletzt die Entrückung des Kaisers. Auch er aber vermag mit dem herkömmlichen *peri basileias*-Repertoire zu arbeiten, konkret den hier seit dem Hellenismus begegnenden Vorstellungen, dass der Herrscher göttlich erwählt sei und menschliche Handlungszusammenhänge transzendiere.¹⁸ Derartige Annahmen kann er unschwer mit dem spätantiken paganen Monotheismus und den zu seiner Zeit populären neuplatonischen Prämissen, denen er sich auch selbst verschrieben hat, harmonisieren.¹⁹

Anders steht es mit Agapetos. Für seinen Text ist zwar zum einen gezeigt worden, dass er in der antiken Tradition fest verwurzelt ist und in seinen Aussagen über herrscherliches Handeln einen Großteil der Topoi verarbeitet, die seit Isokrates bekannt sind,²⁰ zum anderen gilt er als erster christlicher 'Fürstenspiegel'. Die Agapetos-Forschung hat sich bislang auf zwei Problemkreise konzentriert: einmal die Frage nach der Identität des Autors sowie dem Entstehungskontext der Schrift und zum zweiten die Suche nach ihren Quellen, die—aufgrund der Zuordnungs- und Datierungsproblematik einiger Texte—nicht selten mit der Frage nach der Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte der *Ekthesis* verknüpft wird.²¹

¹⁷ Zu seinem diesbezüglichen Gedankengang Hagl 1997, p. 84-85; zur Kontextualisierung Icks 2015, 71-72; grundsätzlich auch Kolb 2001, p. 19-21, 126-127.

¹⁸ Hierzu und zum Folgenden mit Quellenbelegen und Literaturhinweisen Schulte 2001, p. 255-256.

¹⁹ Zur Konzeption des Kaisertums bei Themistios mit Hinweisen auf weitere Forschungen Stenger 2009, p. 115-135.

²⁰ Dazu Keil 1888, bes. p. 367-369; Frohne 1985, p. 179-184; Rocca 1989, p. 308-311.

²¹ Zur Quellenfrage besonders Frohne 1985, p. 165-208 mit Verweisen auf die ältere Literatur; speziell zur Wirkungsgeschichte Ševčenko 1978.

Was die Person des Autors und des Adressaten betrifft, vertraut die Forschung mittlerweile der Akrostichis, dass der Verfasser Diakon an der Hagia Sophia in Konstantinopel war und Kaiser Justinian als Adressat der Schrift anzusehen ist. In welchem Verhältnis Agapetos zum Kaiser bzw. zu Hofkreisen stand, entzieht sich jedoch unserer Kenntnis.²² Bezüglich der Quellen ist sicher zu sagen, dass der Autor auf das Gedankengut der *peri basileias*-Literatur und anderer paganer Gattungen sowie auf christliche Vorstellungen zum Kaisertum gleichermaßen rekurriert, wobei aber nach wie vor kontrovers diskutiert wird, aus welchen Texten er dabei jeweils schöpft, d.h. vor allem inwieweit er auf Primärtexte zurückgreift und in welchem Umfang er sich der Sekundärüberlieferung bedient.²³

Ich möchte die Diskussion über Person und Quellenfrage im Folgenden nicht fortsetzen, sondern mich stattdessen der Interpretation des Textes selbst zuwenden.²⁴ Konkret soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, wie sich traditionelle und innovative Elemente in den Aussagen zum Kaisertum zueinander verhalten und welche Rolle dem Christentum in dem Zusammenhang zukommt. Mein Interesse gilt dabei dem materiellen Gehalt des Textes; bezüglich der formalen Gestaltung der Schrift und ihren narratologischen Besonderheiten stütze ich mich auf die bisherigen Forschungen. So wurde bereits hinreichend gezeigt, dass Agapetos nicht nach inhaltlichen Gesichtspunkten gliedert, sondern seine Kapitel nach Maßgabe der Akrostichis arrangiert.²⁵ Stilistische Prinzipien rangieren bei ihm vor einer kohärenten Argumentation. Seine Formulierungen sind mehrheitlich gnomischen Charakters, zeichnen sich damit sowohl durch Kürze wie durch Grundsätzlichkeit in ihrem sachlichen Gehalt aus. Teils adressiert er den Kaiser direkt und operiert dabei mit

²² Dass er vormaliger Lehrer des Kaisers war, lässt sich aufgrund des Textes nicht verifizieren; dazu Henry III 1967, p. 283.

²³ Dazu zuletzt ausführlich Bell 2009, p. 27-32.

²⁴ Hierzu ist bislang vergleichsweise wenig gearbeitet worden; dies hat bereits Henry III kritisch bemerkt und trifft weitestgehend auch auf den heutigen Forschungsstand noch zu; vgl. Henry III 1967, p. 284.

²⁵ Darauf hat besonders K. Prächter in seiner grundlegenden Rezension zu Bellomo 1906 hingewiesen, der den Versuch unternommen hatte, in dem Text einen fortlaufenden Gedankengang auszumachen; siehe Prächter 1908, p. 154.

Paränesen, teils formuliert er allgemeine Sentenzen zum Kaisertum. Zuweilen tritt er als auktorialer Sprecher auf, dann wieder beschränkt er sich aufs Referieren—in beiden Erzählpositionen trägt er gleichermaßen fast ausnahmslos grundlegende Maximen vor, ohne sie zu spezifizieren, sie auf konkrete Handlungssituationen zu beziehen oder durch Beispiele zu illustrieren. Christliches und Nichtchristliches werden teils additiv gereiht, teils synthetisiert und teils gar nicht zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt. Desungeachtet wirken die Ausführungen speziell aufgrund ihres generalisierenden Charakters, des Verzichts auf Detailangaben wie auch auf konkrete Exempla ausnehmend homogen. Dies entspricht zweifelsohne der Intention des Autors, möglicherweise auch seiner persönlichen Perzeption der Verhältnisse, fordert uns aber dennoch zu einer differenzierteren Betrachtung auf. Dabei geht es mir nicht um die Identifikation einzelner paganer und christlicher Motive—dies ist bereits in zahlreichen Studien im Zusammenhang mit der Quellenfrage geleistet worden—, sondern um die Frage nach deren Zusammenspiel, nach der Relation traditioneller und neuartiger Elemente und schließlich deren historischer Kontextualisierung.

2. Zur Relation traditioneller und christlicher Komponenten in der Konzeption des Kaisertums in der Ekthesis des Agapetos

Herkömmlichen Reflexionen zu monarchischer Herrschaft entsprechend, differenziert Agapetos zwischen einem 'guten' und einem 'schlechten' Regenten.²⁶ Ersterer zeichnet sich insbesondere durch 'Selbstbeherrschung' aus.²⁷ Er versteht es, seine Emotionen zu kontrollieren, gerät nicht grundlos in Zorn und agiert nicht willkürlich.²⁸ Diese Zuschreibungen scheinen altbekannt und werden—nicht zuletzt in der *peri basileias*-Literatur—seit langem vorgenommen, um einen König in Abgrenzung zum Tyrannen zu

²⁶ Eine Übersicht über die betreffenden Topoi gibt Hadot 1972, p. 616.

²⁷ Agapet., *Ekth.* 18, 68. Als Textgrundlage verwende ich die kritische Ausgabe von Riedinger 1995, die sich an PG 86, 1164-1185 orientiert. Eine moderne kritische Edition des Textes liegt bislang nicht vor; vgl. CPG 6900.

²⁸ So z.B. Agapet., *Ekth.* 36, 55.

definieren.²⁹ Agapetos rekurriert an der Stelle zudem auf die gängige Vorstellung, dass ein hohes Maß an 'Selbstkontrolle' gerade für einen exponierten Monarchen mit außerordentlichen Machtmitteln, der sich der Kontrolle durch andere soziale Akteure weitgehend entzieht, von essentieller Bedeutung ist.³⁰ Insgesamt aber stellt er diese Überlegungen in einen genuin christlichen Begründungszusammenhang: Bezugspunkt seiner Überlegungen ist hier nicht mehr das 'Gemeinwohl', sondern der Wille Gottes. 'Selbstbeherrschung' korrespondiert seinem Verständnis nach mit 'Selbsterkenntnis', die bei ihm eindeutig christlich konnotiert ist, indem er sie mit 'Gotteserkenntnis' und daraus resultierender 'Gottesfurcht' assoziiert.³¹ Ähnlich verhält es sich mit seinen Überlegungen zur Gesetzesobservanz des Kaisers: auch hier handelt es sich zunächst um eine herkömmliche Erwartung an den Herrscher, die traditionell sowohl auf die Rechtssicherheit der Bürger wie auf die Integration des Kaisers in die staatliche Ordnung abhebt.³² All dies deutet auch Agapetos noch an, begründet die Forderung aber, indem er sie als ein göttliches Postulat präsentiert, das mit der Orientierung an göttlichen Satzungen der Gerechtigkeit einhergeht.³³

Zentral ist bei ihm die seit den hellenistischen *peri basileias*-Texten prominente und besonders in der Spätantike wieder aufgegriffene Vorstellung von der Kaiserherrschaft als *imitatio Dei*.³⁴ Sie korreliert mit der Idee, dass der irdische Handlungsraum als Abbild des himmlischen aufzufassen sei, der Kaiser auf Erden als Stellvertreter Gottes gebiete sowie als *mediator* zwischen Gott und den Menschen fungiere. Dieses Modell begegnet bekanntlich

²⁹ Zum Tyrannentopos und seiner Funktion in der Gattung Haake 2003, p. 92-95.

³⁰ Siehe etwa Agapet., *Ekth.* 10, 27, 36; zu dem Gedanken bei Agapetos Pazdernik 2005, p. 195-196.

³¹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 15, 17; zur Verknüpfung dieser Aspekte bei Agapetos auch Demandt 2013 (2002), p. 364.

³² Agapet., *Ekth.* 1, 27, 40-41, 49. Auch geht er davon aus, dass die Ausrichtung auf das Recht und damit die Vermeidung von Unrecht gegenüber den Untertanen die Sicherheit des Herrschers erhöhe (Agapet., *Ekth.* 47).

³³ Agapet., *Ekth.* 1-2.

³⁴ Siehe etwa Agapet., *Ekth.* 21, 37, 45; zu weiteren Belegen Blum 1981, p. 15; grundsätzlich zu dem Motiv und seiner Geschichte Dvornik 1966, p. 713-714; Schulte 2001, p. 255-256.

in zahlreichen Varianten und findet sich in der Spätantike im Neuplatonismus ebenso wie in der Konzeption des christlichen Kaisertums bei Eusebios von Caesarea und seinen Nachfolgern.³⁵ Eine Differenzierung zwischen den verschiedenen Traditionssträngen, insonderheit eine Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von 'christlich' und 'nichtchristlich', ist in diesem Fall besonders schwierig. Das gilt für die Thematik grundsätzlich und trifft auch auf die entsprechenden Überlegungen des Agapetos zu. Allerdings ist bei ihm in dem Zusammenhang eine bestimmte Tendenz zu erkennen: er verwendet das Motiv bevorzugt in Kontexten, in denen er die Superiorität des Imperators und die Dignität seiner Herrschaft hervorheben möchte.³⁶ Dabei ist das Moment der Erwählung des Kaisers durch Gott von hoher Relevanz; der im christlichen Kaisertum ansonsten prominente Gedanke, dass der Herrscher sich an genuin christlichen Normen und Werten zu orientieren und für deren Durchsetzung zu sorgen habe, ist bei ihm an der Stelle hingegen nicht prioritär. So thematisiert er weder das Eintreten des Kaisers für die Orthodoxie, noch seine Sorge für die Missionierung der *pagani*. Letzteres gilt nicht nur nach innen, sondern auch nach außen: adäquate externe Feinde sind seinem Verständnis nach—anders als etwa bei Eusebios—keine Ungläubigen, die im Interesse ihrer Christianisierung ins Römische Reich integriert werden sollten,³⁷ sondern schlicht Ethnien, die noch nicht der kaiserlichen Macht unterworfen sind und sich darin von dessen 'Untertanen' unterscheiden.³⁸

Die herausragende Stellung des *basileus* thematisiert Agapetos nicht zuletzt, um dessen eminente Verantwortung für das Reich hervorzuheben. Dazu rekurriert er auch auf Motive, die aus früheren *peri basileias*-Schriften vertraut sind: so sollte der Herrscher das gesamte Geschehen im Reich im Blick haben. Das erfordert von ihm nicht nur beständige Wachsamkeit und Verzicht auf

³⁵ Zu den neuplatonischen Vorstellungen, die ihrerseits an ältere neupythagoreische anknüpfen, welche ebenfalls in *peri basileias*-Schriften eingeflossen sind, siehe Straub 1939, p. 160-174; zu entsprechenden Befunden bei Eusebios Chesnut 1978, p. 1329-1331; Fears 1981, p. 1137; Bellen 1994, p. 13-14.

³⁶ So etwa Agapet., *Ekth.* 1, 37.

³⁷ Zum Missionsauftrag des Kaisers gemäß Eusebios Bellen 1994, p. 11-12; grundsätzlich auch Farina 1966, p. 252-255.

³⁸ Agapet., *Ekth.* 20.

Schlaf,³⁹ sondern setzt auch einen exzellenten Helferstab voraus. Entsprechend müsse der Regent bei der Auswahl wie der Beförderung von Mitarbeitern äußerst umsichtig verfahren. Zudem bedürfe er guter Freunde und Berater, die ihm nicht 'schmeichelten' und deren sachkundigen Rat er tatsächlich befolge—auch dies ein bekanntes Motiv.⁴⁰

Als entschieden christlich lässt sich demgegenüber die Aussage einstufen, dass auch der Kaiser ein Mensch und damit wie alle anderen sterblich und erlösungsbedürftig sei.⁴¹ Agapetos geht dabei nicht so weit wie Ambrosius, der die Sündhaftigkeit des Herrschers prononciert und hiermit das Postulat der 'Demut' verknüpft,⁴² sondern fokussiert die Tatsache, dass selbst der Kaiser sich für sein Handeln gegenüber Gott zu verantworten habe. Die bereits angesprochene Forderung nach 'Selbsterkenntnis', die Agapetos mit Gotteserkenntnis verknüpft, zielt auf genau diesen Zusammenhang.⁴³

Eine der zentralen Kaisertugenden ist im Verständnis des Agapetos die *philanthropia*, die sich etwa in Freigebigkeit und Milde äußert.⁴⁴ Diese hat bereits in älteren *peri basileias*-Schriften eine zentrale Rolle gespielt,⁴⁵ erfährt aber im christlichen Kontext einen neuen Begründungszusammenhang. Gleichwohl differiert Agapetos hier von Verfassern dediziert christlicher Texte, welche die *philanthropia* als göttliche Qualität verstehen und daher größere Scheu zeigen, sie mit einem Menschen in Verbindung zu bringen.⁴⁶ Markant ist, dass er die Auffassung vertritt, dass die *philanthropia* sich keinesfalls auf die gesamte Menschheit erstreckt, sondern allein auf die Angehörigen des Reiches, die

³⁹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 2; zu diesem Motiv Martin 1984, p. 127.

⁴⁰ Agapet., *Ekth.* 12, 22, 30-32, 42, 56.

⁴¹ So etwa Agapet., *Ekth.* 3, 8, 14, 21, 43, 70.

⁴² Besonders markant praktiziert er dies im Hinblick auf Theodosius I. und dessen Rolle beim Blutbad in Mailand; dazu Groß-Albenhausen 1999, p. 131-132, 134-135.

⁴³ Agapet., *Ekth.* 3, 15, 17.

⁴⁴ Agapet., *Ekth.* 6, 20, 40. Zum Verständnis der *philanthropia* bei Agapetos siehe Henry III 1967, p. 300-301.

⁴⁵ Zentral ist sie auch in spätantiken Reden, die Kaiser adressieren, namentlich denen des Themistios; dazu Leppin 2004, p. 70.

⁴⁶ Dies gilt etwa für die griechischen Kirchenhistoriker des vierten und fünften Jahrhunderts; dazu Leppin 1996, p. 163.

der kaiserlichen Herrschaft unterstehen. Im Umgang mit Personengruppen, die seiner Regentschaft nicht unterstellt sind, könne der Kaiser hingegen mit der Härte der Macht operieren. Agapetos arbeitet hier mit einem klassischen Freund-Feind-Schema, das in dem Zusammenhang für eine christliche Schrift ungewöhnlich ist.⁴⁷

Generell stellt das Geben und Nehmen in der *Ekthesis* eine wichtige Thematik dar. Der Kaiser wird wie in früheren *peri basileias*-Schriften als Euerget gezeichnet.⁴⁸ Er verfügt über umfangreiche Ressourcen und sollte daher reichlich geben.⁴⁹ Traditionell ist die Vorstellung, dass der *basileus* mit Geschenken operiert, um diejenigen zu belohnen, die sich ihm gegenüber loyal verhalten und seine Direktiven befolgen.⁵⁰ Gleiches gilt für die Annahme, dass Wohltätigkeit nicht zuletzt im Interesse der Herrschaftssicherung von Bedeutung ist. Auch wenn Agapetos den Kaiser als gotterwählt begreift, schätzt er ihn nicht als immun gegenüber Protesten und Widerstand ein.⁵¹ Der Herrscher müsse vielmehr darauf hinwirken, dass seine Regentschaft auf bereitwillige Zustimmung stößt. Dies soll nach Agapetos nicht durch Zwangsmittel geschehen, sondern setze Freiwilligkeit voraus,⁵² welche der Kaiser durch mildes und gerechtes Handeln befördern und ganz besonders durch euergetische Praktiken bewirken könne.⁵³ Die herkömmlichen Akzeptanzgruppen—Senatoren, Heer und die nichtprivilegierten Bewohner der Hauptstadt—und ihre spezifischen Erwartungen jedoch sind bei Agapetos nicht mehr von Belang.⁵⁴ Er operiert vielmehr mit einem allgemeinen Unter-

⁴⁷ Agapet., *Ekth.* 20. Nicht nur von christlichen Autoren, sondern auch von Neuplatonikern wird die *philanthropia* zumeist auf sämtliche Menschen bezogen; zur Schlüsselstellung dieser Tugend in der Spätantike Leppin 2011, p. 125.

⁴⁸ Agapet., *Ekth.* 7, 38, 44-45, 50-51, 53, 58, 60, 63.

⁴⁹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 44-45.

⁵⁰ Hierzu und zum Folgenden Agapet., *Ekth.* 39.

⁵¹ So bemerkt er, dass der Kaiser sich vor Schmähungen seines Ansehens in Acht nehmen müsse; Agapet., *Ekth.* 65.

⁵² Agapet., *Ekth.* 35.

⁵³ Agapet., *Ekth.* 19, 35.

⁵⁴ Die aktuelle Forschung spricht demgegenüber auch für die justinianische Zeit noch von einem 'Akzeptanzsystem', analog der Konzeption die E. Flaig anhand des Prinzipats entwickelt hat (Flaig 1992, bes. p. 174-207); siehe bes. Diefenbach 1996, p. 37-41; Pfeilschifter 2013, bes. p. 28-38.

tanenbegriff.⁵⁵ Die Vorstellung, dass bestimmte Gruppen für die Kaisererhebung essentiell seien, ist nicht mehr relevant—entscheidend ist hier einzig der Wille Gottes.⁵⁶ Dies korrespondiert mit der Annahme, dass der Herrscher allein Gott gegenüber verantwortlich sei.⁵⁷ Er bedürfe niemandes außer Gottes, was im Hinblick auf das Geben und Nehmen zur Konsequenz hat, dass er alle in gleicher Weise bedenken könne—unabhängig von ihrem persönlichen Nahverhältnis zu ihm.⁵⁸ Ein solcher Kaiser braucht nicht mehr mit Geschenken zu arbeiten, um sich den Empfänger der Gabe zu verpflichten, sondern kann sich in seiner Freigebigkeit ganz am göttlichen Gebot der *caritas* orientieren.⁵⁹ Wenn er dabei bestimmte Gruppen heraushebt, so sind es die Bedürftigen und damit Gruppierungen, die nicht zu den Statusgruppen zählen, mit denen der Kaiser traditionell kommuniziert.⁶⁰ In der Tradition christlicher Traktate zur Reichtumsthematik fordert Agapetos den Kaiser auf, Schätze nicht auf Erden zu sammeln, sondern im Himmel, was insbesondere meint, umfangreich karitativ zu wirken.⁶¹ Als entschieden christlich ist auch der Nexus zwischen göttlicher Berufung des Herrschers und der Forderung nach *caritas* einzuschätzen.⁶²

Ungewöhnlich ist die Überlegung, dass der Regent durch gezieltes Geben und Nehmen einen gewissen Ausgleich zwischen Besitzenden und Besitzlosen schaffen könne, der für beide von Vorteil sei.⁶³ Dies differiert von gängigen christlichen Vorstellungen zur Interdependenz von Armen und Reichen wie auch

⁵⁵ Agapet., *Ekth.* 1, 4, 20, 27, 35-36, 47-49, 65. An Präzision ist er diesbezüglich nicht interessiert, was etwa zur Konsequenz hat, dass sich dem Text nur wenige Informationen über sozialgeschichtliche Realien entnehmen lassen; dazu Irmscher 1978, passim.

⁵⁶ Agapet., *Ekth.* 45, 61.

⁵⁷ Agapet., *Ekth.* 5, 8, 23-24, 30, 68.

⁵⁸ Agapet., *Ekth.* 63. Zum Zusammenhang der Vorstellung von der Erwählung durch Gott und der Überzeugung, allein der Hilfe Gottes zu bedürfen, MacCormack 1981, p. 253, 260.

⁵⁹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 50.

⁶⁰ Agapet., *Ekth.* 45, 51, 53, 60; grundsätzlich zu dem Aspekt Diefenbach 1996, p. 35.

⁶¹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 38; vgl. Agapet., *Ekth.* 7.

⁶² Agapet., *Ekth.* 44-45, 50-51, 58, 60.

⁶³ Agapet., *Ekth.* 16; auch Bell bemerkt, dass ihm keine Parallele hierzu bekannt sei; siehe Bell 2013, p. 228; vgl. Evans 1996, p. 63. Auch in der Gesetz-

zur soteriologischen Bedeutung des Gebens für den einzelnen Vermögenden.⁶⁴ Grundsätzlich korreliert die Idee mit der bereits erwähnten Tendenz des Autors, von einer allgemeinen Untertanenschaft auszugehen, die jedoch nicht in eine nivellierende oder gar sozialrevolutionäre Politik mündet, sondern aus der Überhöhung des Kaisers resultiert und der Auffassung, dass der Herrscher nach Maßgabe Gottes in alle Bereiche gestalterisch eingreifen könne.⁶⁵

Eng verknüpft mit den Aussagen zum Geben und Nehmen wie auch dem Postulat der *philanthropia* ist der Gedanke der 'Zugänglichkeit' des Kaisers, der an die herkömmliche Forderung nach *ciuilitas* anknüpft. Dabei hebt Agapetos jedoch nicht auf die Frömmigkeit des Regenten und seine Teilhabe an Prozessionen ab, die in dezidiert christlichen Zusammenhängen an der Stelle gewöhnlich vorkommen.⁶⁶ Ebenso wenig attestiert er ihm in dem Kontext 'Demut'—diese neue, spezifisch christliche Kaisertugend begegnet bei ihm nur in Sentenzen,⁶⁷ in denen er den Kaiser zu Gott in Beziehung setzt: in Relation zu diesem ist er ein 'Sklave'; seine spezifische *eusebeia* konkretisiert sich darin, Gott in besonderem Maße zu ehren, da er selbst exorbitant von Gott bedacht worden sei.⁶⁸ Das aber praktiziert der Herrscher nach Agapetos vor allem dadurch, dass er im Sinne Gottes auf Erden herrscht, also durch *imitatio Dei*.⁶⁹ Auch 'Hochmut' zu vermeiden, der nach herkömmlichem Verständnis, aber auch bei Agapetos in Kontrast zur *ciuilitas* steht, lernt der *basileus* nicht im zwischenmenschlichen Umgang, sondern durch 'Selbsterkenntnis' und damit wiederum durch Gottesbezug.⁷⁰ 'Menschlichkeit' und

gebung Justinians begegnet diese Vorstellung nicht, dazu Krumpholz 1992, bes. p. 29, 49-51, 205, 207.

⁶⁴ Eine Übersicht hierzu bietet González 1990.

⁶⁵ Hierzu oben Anm. 55.

⁶⁶ Hierzu Diefenbach 2002, p. 31-39; Meier 2007, bes. p. 149; speziell mit Blick auf Justinian Pfeilschifter 2013, p. 104-122.

⁶⁷ Generell zur zentralen Rolle der 'Demut' als Kaisertugend in explizit christlichen Konzeptionen Groß-Albenhausen 1999, p. 137; grundsätzlich auch Bellen 1994, bes. p. 18-19; zur 'Demut' als Tugend speziell des byzantinischen Kaisers Treitinger 1938, p. 145-149.

⁶⁸ Agapet., *Ekth.* 5, 61.

⁶⁹ Zu diesem Motiv Agapet., *Ekth.* 1, 3, 5-6, 37, 45.

⁷⁰ Agapet., *Ekth.* 14, 21, 71.

‘Zugänglichkeit’ des Regenten manifestieren sich nach Ansicht unseres Autors vornehmlich in der Bereitschaft, sich sämtlichen Bittstellern freundlich und offen zuzuwenden.⁷¹ Konkrete Situationen, in denen dies geschieht, nennt er nicht.⁷²

Frappant ist, dass nicht nur die herkömmlichen Akzeptanzgruppen nicht mehr begegnen, sondern selbst die christliche Kirche und ihre Vertreter als Akteure nicht vorkommen.⁷³ Entsprechend wird auch eine Kommunikation zwischen dem Kaiser und diesen nicht in den Blick genommen. Die christliche Orientierung des *basileus* begreift Agapetos als unmittelbaren Bezug auf Gott; einer Vermittlung seitens der Kirche bedarf es dabei offenbar nicht.

Ein zentraler Unterschied zwischen der *Ektthesis* des Agapetos und allen vorangegangenen *peri basileias*-Schriften ist darin zu sehen, dass der Autor stark in den Hintergrund tritt. Selbstreferentielle Aussagen des Verfassers finden sich abgesehen von der Akrostichis nicht. Dort markiert er die eigene ‘Demut’, inszeniert sich darüber hinaus aber in keiner Weise und trifft auch keine Aussagen zu seinem Verhältnis zum Kaiser. Im Unterschied zu den früheren Autoren reklamiert er für sich nicht die Rolle eines Philosophen und beruft sich für seinen Vortrag nicht auf *parrhesia*.⁷⁴ Das ist gleichwohl eher mit dem hierarchischen Gefälle zwischen Autor und Adressat zu erklären, welches Agapetos voraussetzt, als mit der Annahme, dass Philosophie mit dem christlichen Kontext nicht kompatibel wäre. Er operiert im Gegenteil sogar mit dem Philosophenkönigsatz—allerdings ohne den Namen Platons zu erwähnen—, indem er Justinian als ‘Philosophenkönig’ tituliert, dem es im Unterschied zu sämtlichen seiner Vorgänger gelungen sei, seine Affekte ausreichend zu kontrollieren.⁷⁵ Dem

⁷¹ Agapet., *Ektth.* 8.

⁷² Auch Gastmähler am Hof, die in späteren byzantinischen Texten mit kaiserlicher *ciuitas* assoziiert werden, erwähnt er nicht; zu dem Motiv mit Belegen Treitinger 1938, p. 101–105.

⁷³ So auch Demandt 2013 (2002), p. 369.

⁷⁴ Dazu Haake 2003, p. 93–95; zur zentralen Bedeutung dieses Anspruchs im Selbstverständnis und der Selbstdarstellung nicht nur der hellenistischen, sondern auch noch der kaiserzeitlichen Philosophen Hahn 1989, p. 41, 190; grundsätzlich auch Murray 2007, p. 26.

⁷⁵ Das Motiv begegnet in justinianischer Zeit auch im anonymen Dialog *Über die politische Wissenschaft*—auch hier in einer Sprache, die sich stark an

liegt die populärphilosophische, letztlich auf Platon zurückzuführende Vorstellung zugrunde, dass eine Herrschaft des *logos*, wie sie bei einem wahren Regenten voraussetzen sei, nur unter dieser Bedingung zustande kommen könne.⁷⁶ In dem Zusammenhang konstatiert Agapetos mit Blick auf die Gegenwart gar eine Epoche des 'Glücks' und bemerkt ausdrücklich, dass ein 'glückliches Leben' aller Bewohner in der Vergangenheit mit der Philosophenherrschaft assoziiert worden sei.⁷⁷ Hier handelt es sich offensichtlich um irdisches Glück, das in christlichen Kontexten nicht in vergleichbarer Weise gerühmt wird. An der Stelle ist auch zu erwähnen, dass eschatologische, gar apokalyptische Vorstellungen, wie sie in christlichen Texten der Zeit prominent vertreten sind,⁷⁸ bei Agapetos nicht begegnen.

Er geht so weit zu sagen, dass der Kaiser als Philosoph der Herrschaft für würdig befunden worden sei und sich auch als Regent noch mit Philosophie beschäftige.⁷⁹ Dabei setzt er einen genuin christlichen Philosophiebegriff voraus, indem er die 'Gottesfurcht'—unter Rekurs auf *Spr.* 1.7—als zentralen Gegenstand der Philosophie charakterisiert.⁸⁰ Eine Problematisierung des Terminus der *philosophia*, wie wir sie bei vielen spätantiken christlichen Autoren finden, nimmt er nicht vor—ebenso wenig wie er die sonstigen Kategorien, mit denen er arbeitet, problematisiert. Aus dem Bereich der politischen Philosophie rekurriert er zudem auf die Metapher des 'Staatsschiffes' und charakterisiert den Herrscher als 'Steuermann', der auch in gefährlichen Situationen Kurs halte.⁸¹ Dies ergänzt er noch um die Vorstellung, dass der Kaiser sich—analog zu Gott—im Gegensatz zur Veränderlichkeit der Welt durch Konstanz auszeichne.⁸² Hier haben wir es wiederum

herkömmlichen Formulierungen orientiert und zugleich für christliche Leser akzeptabel ist; dazu Fotiou 1985, p. 17.

⁷⁶ Dies korreliert mit seiner Vorstellung von einer geordneten Seele, in der der *logos* über den Willen wie auch die Affekte dominieren müsse; vgl. Plat., *Rep.* 4.434d-445e; zu Agapetos' Rekurs auf das Motiv des Philosophenkönigs Schlang-Schöningen 1995, p. 34.

⁷⁷ Agapet., *Ekth.* 17.

⁷⁸ Zu derartigen Motiven Meier 2003, bes. p. 92-94.

⁷⁹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 17.

⁸⁰ Agapet., *Ekth.* 15, 17.

⁸¹ Agapet., *Ekth.* 2, 10.

⁸² Agapet., *Ekth.* 7, 11, 13, 33-34, 70-71.

mit einem Motiv mit langer Tradition zu tun.⁸³ Agapetos aber bietet hierzu eine christliche Begründung, indem er bemerkt dass der Regent eine unwandelbare Gesinnung zeigen müsse, gerade weil seine Herrschaft vergänglich sei und er sich dem Gericht Gottes zu stellen habe.⁸⁴

3. Zusammenfassung und historische Kontextualisierung

Die Frage nach der ‘Christianisierung’ des ‘Fürstenspiegels’ in der Spätantike führt unweigerlich zur Beschäftigung mit der *Ekthesis* des Agapetos: sämtliche andere von christlichem Gedankengut dominierte spätantike Texte mit programmatischen Aussagen zu monarchischer Herrschaft nämlich gehören augenscheinlich anderen literarischen Gattungen an. Diejenigen Schriften aber, welche sich mit gewisser Berechtigung dem *peri basileias*-Genre zurechnen lassen, das am ehesten als Vorläufer mittelalterlicher und frühneuzeitlicher ‘Fürstenspiegel’ betrachtet werden kann, enthalten keine christlichen Vorstellungen.

Die *Ekthesis* des Agapetos gilt demgegenüber gemeinhin als der erste christliche ‘Fürstenspiegel’, der in der Tradition der *peri basileias*-Literatur steht, deren Motive aufgreift und sie mit denen eines christlichen Kaisertums verknüpft. Die meisten herkömmlichen *Topoi* werden christlich überformt, indem sie in einen christlichen Legitimationszusammenhang gestellt werden. Das bedeutet insbesondere, dass sie nicht mehr im Rahmen der herkömmlichen Kommunikationsgefüge begründet, sondern als göttliche Postulate präsentiert werden. Dies forciert nachgerade die Tendenz zur Überhöhung des Kaisertums. Hinzu kommt die Vorstellung, dass auch der Kaiser ein Mensch, gleich allen anderen erlösungsbedürftig sei und sich Gott gegenüber zu verantworten habe. Bei Agapetos richtet sich der Fokus dabei aber auf den Umstand, dass die Verantwortung gegenüber Gott an die Stelle der Verantwortung gegenüber innerweltlichen Bezugskreisen

⁸³ Die Anfänge greifen wir bereits in der klassisch-griechischen politischen Philosophie und ihrer Betonung der Bedeutung der Stabilität politischer Ordnung.

⁸⁴ In dem Zusammenhang thematisiert er wiederum die Notwendigkeit der Gottesfurcht, die Kürze des Lebens sowie die Vergänglichkeit irdischer Herrschaft; vgl. Agapet., *Ekth.* 13, 28, 30, 33.

tritt, so dass auch dieser Aspekt letztlich die hieratischen Tendenzen befördert.

Unbeschadet der Tatsache, dass die Schrift aus einer Vielzahl von Komponenten unterschiedlicher Provenienz zusammengesetzt ist, wirkt sie erstaunlich homogen. Das hat zum einen mit dem generalisierenden Charakter der Aussagen zu tun, der zur Folge hat, dass Antinomien und Inkompatibilitäten zwischen Vorstellungen überdeckt werden, zum anderen mit der formalen Gestaltung des Textes, d.h. dem Verzicht auf eine durchgängige Erzählung mit argumentativer Kohärenz zugunsten gnomischer Sentenzen, die im Sinne einer Akrostichis angeordnet werden. Hinzu tritt ein weiterer Gesichtspunkt, der erst bei der Auseinandersetzung mit dem sachlichen Gehalt des Werkes deutlich wird: die Schrift ist insgesamt gekennzeichnet durch die Intention, die Superiorität des Kaisers herauszustreichen. Der Autor operiert nicht mit der Gesamtheit der *Topoi*, welche sich in der *peri basileias*-Literatur sowie in Texten zum christlichen Kaisertum finden, sondern geht selektiv vor, indem er bevorzugt Gesichtspunkte aufgreift, die seinem Bestreben förderlich sind, wohingegen er andere, die sich als kontraproduktiv erweisen könnten, übergeht oder sie überformt. Aus dem Repertoire an christlichen Motiven bedient er sich zuvorderst des Moments der Einsetzung durch Gott, das mit dem Gedanken der Verantwortung einzig gegenüber Gott und der Orientierung allein am göttlichen Willen einhergeht, vermeidet aber den Aspekt der 'Demut' in zwischenmenschlichen Zusammenhängen wie auch den gesamten Komplex der Erwartungen der Kirche an den Kaiser. In gleicher Manier verfährt er mit den traditionellen Motiven: er betont die unablässige Aktivität des Kaisers wie auch seine Rolle als zentraler *Euerget*, blendet jedoch seine Bindung an die Akzeptanzgruppen aus. Auf das Bild des Philosophenkönigs rekurriert er, um die außergewöhnliche Qualität eines Herrschers zu markieren, die sich auf dessen besondere Fähigkeit zur Selbstbeherrschung und Selbstkontrolle gründet und damit wiederum auf Eigenverantwortung beruht. Das Motiv der *parrhesia* des Philosophen, welcher den Regenten freimütig adressieren darf, kommt dagegen nicht mehr vor.

Von einer Christianisierung des Herrscherbildes der *peri basileias*-Literatur im Sinne einer umfassenden Adaption an Konzepte des christlichen Kaisertums kann im Falle der *Ekthesis*

streng genommen nicht gesprochen werden. Agapetos harmonisiert lediglich ausgewählte Aspekte beider Traditionen unter der Maßgabe der Überhöhung des Kaisertums. Er operiert in einem christlichen Rahmen, der aber seinen Vorstellungen zum Kaisertum entsprechend sehr spezifisch gestaltet ist.

Wie lässt sich dieser Befund historisch kontextualisieren? In der Forschung herrscht mittlerweile Konsens, dass die Ausführungen des Agapetos über weite Strecken mit der Selbstrepräsentation Justinians in den Jahren zwischen 532 und 539/40 konform gehen,⁸⁵ wie sie allem voran in den Proömien seiner Novellen zum Ausdruck kommt: zentrale Motive sind dabei die dezidiert theologische Begründung der Herrschaft sowie der Anspruch, ein 'glückliche Zeitalter' zu begründen.⁸⁶ Einige Formulierungen des Agapetos deuten darauf hin, dass der Kaiser bereits einige Zeit amtiert,⁸⁷ was dagegen spricht, dass er ihm die *Ekthesis* bereits zum Zeitpunkt seiner Inthronisation 527 gewidmet hat. Ob es sich um ein Auftragswerk handelt, wissen wir nicht; dass es in Abstimmung mit dem Kaiser entstanden ist, wird in der aktuellen Forschung für sehr wahrscheinlich gehalten.⁸⁸

Warum aber rekurriert Agapetos auf die *peri basileias*-Literatur und wählt nicht ein in seiner Zeit populäreres Genre? Da wir die genauen Entstehungsumstände nicht kennen, ist hierauf keine gesicherte Antwort zu geben; gleichwohl lasen sich einige begründete Überlegungen dazu anstellen. Die Wahl der Gattung hat offenkundig nicht damit zu tun, dass der Autor das Kaisertum Justinians in der hellenistisch-kaiserzeitlichen Tradition der *basileia* verorten möchte. Er imaginiert den Regenten nicht im herkömmlichen Kommunikationszusammenhang, in dem es gilt, *parrhesia* zu gewähren—etwa um möglicher Kritik seitens der Senatsaristokratie am autokratischen Herrschaftsstil Justinians entgegenzuwirken. Einer solchen Intention steht die Auswahl der Motive, die er praktiziert, entgegen. Das Genre scheint—auf

⁸⁵ Siehe etwa Dagron 2003 (1996), p. 18; Börm 2015, p. 317.

⁸⁶ Hunger 1964, p. 49-55; Meier 2003, p. 131-132, 135; zum Wandel des Selbstverständnisses Justinians nach dem Nika-Aufstand auch Karayannopoulos 1975 (1956), p. 257; allgemein zu den Bezügen zwischen den Aussagen des Agapetos und der Politik Justinians Irmscher 1980, p. 91-92.

⁸⁷ Siehe etwa Agapet., *Ekth.* 17, 20, 52.

⁸⁸ Meier 2003, p. 131.

den ersten Blick paradox anmutend—sogar in besonderer Weise geeignet, die Superiorität des Kaisers zu akzentuieren. Der Hauptgrund hierfür ist in dem Umstand zu sehen, dass es ein Motiv der *imitatio Dei* bereitstellt, das noch nicht im Sinne des christlichen Kaisertums ausformuliert, sondern noch stark durch die hellenistisch-kaiserzeitliche Philosophie geprägt ist.

Markant ist, dass die Operation mit der Gattung es Agapetos ermöglicht, an einigen Stellen sogar noch über die Selbstrepräsentation Justinians als allein Gott verantwortlichem Kaiser hinauszugehen und reale Abhängigkeiten von Institutionen und Personengruppen auszublenden: das betrifft insbesondere den Umgang mit der Kirche inklusive der Forderung nach Orthodoxie und die Begründung außenpolitischer Aktivitäten unter Verweis auf Missionierungsbestrebungen.⁸⁹ Es gilt aber auch für die Haltung zu nichtchristlichen Philosophen, die tatsächlich eine Herausforderung für den Kaiser darstellten und es jenem nicht erlaubten, sich als 'Philosophenkönig' zu inszenieren.⁹⁰ Hinzu kommt die Bindung an die Tradition im Bereich des Rechts—anders als Agapetos es unternimmt, durfte der Kaiser sich nicht allein als Innovator präsentieren, der uneingeschränkt zu gestalten vermag und sich lediglich am Willen Gottes zu orientieren hat.⁹¹ Schließlich kann Agapetos die—selbst im griechischen Osten nicht ganz unproblematische—Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche, mit der Justinian sich eingehend auseinandergesetzt hat, übergehen.⁹² Unser Autor kennt nur einen Handlungsraum, der exklusiv durch den Kaiser dominiert wird. Dies lässt sich in einem Text, der sich auf zentrale

⁸⁹ Auf diese Auslassungen ist bereits Kapitánffy aufmerksam geworden. Dieser begründet sie mit Hinweis darauf, dass Agapetos möglicherweise in keinem hinreichenden Nahverhältnis zum Kaiser stand, um auf sämtliche Aspekte, die für dessen Selbstverständnis von Belang waren, aufmerksam zu werden und sie im Sinne des Herrschers zu gewichten; siehe Kapitánffy 1994, p. 69-70; zu der Thematik ohne Festlegung auf eine bestimmte Begründung auch Bell 2009, p. 29-43. Zur Bedeutung des Schutzes der Orthodoxie sowie zu Missionierungsambitionen Justinians und der Rolle dieser Momente in seiner Selbstdarstellung mit Quellenbelegen Hunger 1975 (1965), p. 341, 349; Lee 2005, p. 113; Leppin 2011, p. 28.

⁹⁰ Dazu Wildberg 2005, p. 318-324.

⁹¹ Zum Traditionsbezug Justinians besonders in den Prooemien seiner Novellen Maas 1986, p. 19-23; Humfress 2005, p. 161-162.

⁹² Zu Justinians Vorstellungen zu dem Sujet und dessen Rolle in der kaiserlichen Repräsentation Ensslin 1954, p. 464; Clauss 1993, p. 580-581.

Motive der *peri-basileias* Literatur gründet und diese in sehr spezifischer Weise christlich überformt, augenscheinlich besser explizieren als in einer Schrift, die stärker dem christlichen Diskurs verpflichtet ist.

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Abstract

Just one of the late antique texts which stand in the tradition of the *peri basileias*-genre is marked by Christianity: Agapetos' *Ekthesis*. The paper examines how traditional and innovative, especially Christian,

elements relate to each other in this work. It shows that Agapetos places all his statements in a Christian reference framework which neither contains the whole range of components that may be found in late antique conceptions of Christian emperorship nor shows the complete variety of aspects included in the *peri basileias*-literature. Agapetos proceeds selectively—in line with the self-image of the emperor Justinian, his addressee. The reference to the *peri basileias*-genre allows him not only to follow Justinian's ideas concerning emperorship, but even to exceed them.

Zusammenfassung

Von den spätantiken Texten, die in der Tradition der *peri basileias*-Gattung stehen, ist allein die *Ekthesis* des Agapetos christlich geprägt. In dem Beitrag wird untersucht, wie sich herkömmliche und neuartige, insbesondere christliche Elemente in dem Werk zueinander verhalten. Es wird gezeigt, dass Agapetos sämtliche Aussagen in einen christlichen Bezugsrahmen stellt, der jedoch weder die Gesamtheit der Bestandteile umfasst, die sich in spätantiken Konzeptionen des christlichen Kaisertums finden, noch das komplette Repertoire an Komponenten der *peri basileias*-Literatur enthält. Agapetos verfährt vielmehr selektiv, entsprechend dem Selbstverständnis seines Adressaten, Kaiser Justinian. Der Rekurs auf das *peri basileias*-Genre erlaubt es ihm, der justinianischen Konzeption des Kaisertums nicht nur zu folgen, sondern sogar über sie hinauszugehen.

SHAUN TOUGHER

MACEDONIAN MIRRORS: THE ADVICE OF BASIL I FOR HIS SON LEO VI

1. *Introduction*

The holding of the *LECTIO* International Conference on Mirrors for Princes in Antiquity and their Reception delighted me for two main reasons. The first is that I wanted to learn more about so-called mirrors for princes, as I am interested in panegyric literature in general.¹ The second, more fundamental, reason was because ‘Mirrors for Princes’ related specifically to the subject of my PhD topic, the Byzantine emperor Leo VI (886-912), the son and heir of Basil I (867-886), the founder of the so-called Macedonian dynasty: there survive in the literary record two works of advice addressed by Basil to Leo. I discussed these briefly in the PhD and then the subsequent book, but I had long wanted to return to the texts and comment on them further; thus the conference provided the perfect opportunity.² My desire to return to the texts was fostered by a sense that they deserved more attention, but also because my research has turned to focus on a holistic treatment of the dynastic history and ideology of this very important Byzantine imperial family, which ruled Byzantium from 867 to 1056.³ The texts are also significant in that they form part of the narrative of the cultural revival of Byzantium in this period, often termed the ‘Macedonian Renaissance’, but usually under-

¹ See for instance Tougher 1998a and 2012.

² Tougher 1997, p. 54-55, 127-128.

³ See for instance Tougher 2013.

stood as a process with much deeper roots.⁴ In this chapter I will first provide historical context for the period in which the texts were produced. I will then turn to the texts themselves, examining the issues of dating, authorship and literary models, all topics that continue to be debated. Finally, I will consider to what extent the texts illuminate historical particularities of the dynasty. This is an aspect of the texts that is much less studied, perhaps understandably so given the general and generic nature of the advice given in such texts.⁵ The dynastic character of the texts has been recognised,⁶ but I will argue that further specifics are detectable, which enrich our understanding of the history and image of the dynasty in the early to mid-880s. This is valuable as so much of the knowledge of the history of the dynasty is based upon later texts such as the famous *Life of Basil* which dates to the mid tenth century.

2. Context

Writing in the eleventh century the celebrated Byzantine author Michael Psellos observed of the Macedonian dynasty:

I doubt if any other family was ever so favoured by God as theirs was—a surprising thing, when one reflects on the unlawful manner in which the family fortune was, so to speak, rooted in murder and bloodshed. Yet the plant blossomed out and sent forth such mighty shoots, each with its royal fruit, that no others could be compared with it, either in beauty or grandeur.⁷

The ‘unlawful manner in which the family fortune was, so to speak, rooted in murder and bloodshed’ refers to how Basil the Macedonian became emperor, and it is vital to be familiar with this as it has a bearing on the ideology of the dynasty and on

⁴ See for instance Lemerle 1971, Treadgold 1984, Ševčenko 1992, Magdalino 2013.

⁵ See for instance the comments on the letter of Photios to the Bulgarian Khan Boris by Odorico 2009, p. 87.

⁶ Markopoulos 1998.

⁷ Psellos, *Chronographia* 6.1, tr. Sewter 1966, p. 155.

the understanding of the parainetic texts.⁸ Basil's path to power was achieved through his predecessor the emperor Michael III (842-867). Michael was a member of the Amorian dynasty, and succeeded his father Theophilos in 842, when he was just a very young boy, having been born *c.* 840.⁹ Michael and Basil came into contact in the mid/late 850s, at a time when Michael was reaching maturity and becoming a more independent figure. While Michael was of imperial birth Basil seems to have been of lowly Armenian origins and to have come to Constantinople to make his fortune. According to our historiographical sources he was physically impressive and strong; he is depicted working as a groom and as taking part in wrestling matches. Coming to Michael's attention, Basil became a favourite of the emperor. By 864 Basil had become the emperor's *parakoimomenos* (grand chamberlain), a position usually held by a eunuch and which necessitated close physical proximity with the emperor.¹⁰ In 866 he became the co-emperor and adopted son of Michael, following the killing of Michael's influential uncle Bardas, who held the title of Caesar. The next year Michael himself was assassinated by Basil and his supporters, and Basil became sole emperor. The complex nature of the relationship between Michael and Basil is further intensified by the fact that in *c.* 864 Michael had married Basil to Eudokia Ingerina, reputedly Michael's own mistress. Eudokia gave birth to several children, including Leo and his brothers Stephen and Alexander, and one chronicle tradition (one that is less pro-Macedonian) asserts that only Alexander was a biological son of Basil; being born *c.* 870 he was conceived after the death of Michael.¹¹ In order to justify his bloody rise to power literary and visual images were created depicting Basil as God-favoured, as a new David, forced to eliminate the unworthy and wicked Michael III, who is portrayed as luxury-loving,

⁸ For Basil's life and reign see for instance Tobias 2007, Jenkins 1966, p. 183-197, Vogt 1908.

⁹ On Michael III see for instance Grégoire 1966, Jenkins 1966, p. 153-167, Karlin-Hayter 1971, Mango 1973, Tougher 2008.

¹⁰ On the nature of the relationship between Michael and Basil, which some have suggested was sexual, see for instance Tougher 1999, Schminck 2000.

¹¹ Symeon the Logothete, *Chronicon*, Reign of Basil 6, ed. Wahlgren 2006, p. 262.41-42.

degenerate, drunken, impious and unstable—in short, deserving of his death. These images of Basil and Michael date from Basil's reign and later. The most developed literary treatment of Basil is a life written in the mid tenth century under Basil's grandson Constantine VII (913-959, though he only reigned independently from 944), but there are also poems and artefacts from Basil's reign, as well as accounts of his building projects.¹² The artefacts include the illustrated manuscript of the homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus, which contains images of Basil and of Eudokia with Leo and Alexander, and accounts of his building projects include descriptions of his major foundation of the Nea church and of the mosaic of the imperial family in the Kainourgion in the palace, which depicted Basil and Eudokia and their children (see below). Clearly ideological dynastic concerns deeply affected how Basil and Michael have been presented, and this needs to be borne in mind when considering the parainetic texts ascribed to Basil.

3. *Texts*

Turning to the two texts themselves, aspects to be examined are authorship, dating and literary models. The discussion is particularly informed by key recent literature published since the PhD was completed. This includes articles on the texts themselves by Athanasios Markopoulos (1998) and Gioacchino Strano (2000), but also an article on Byzantine 'mirrors' generally by Paolo Odorico (2009).¹³ Odorico's article is particularly important for thinking about the approach to take to such texts; he asserts that what is prime is the immediate destination of the production, its practical function and its message. This approach resulted in him developing more challenging views on the purposes of these texts, e.g. Agapetus' advice to Justinian I and Photios' letter to Boris (see below). The advice texts which are the focus of this chapter were both writ-

¹² For the *Life of Basil* see Ševčenko 2011. For comment on the image of Michael see for instance Jenkins 1948.

¹³ On Byzantine 'mirrors of princes' (a term the Byzantines did not use) see also for instance Angelov 2007, p. 184-197, though with the reservations of Odorico 2009, p. 224-227.

ten as if from Basil to Leo.¹⁴ The first text is much longer than the second, running in the *Patrologia Graeca* edition to eighteen columns compared to two. The first parainesis is divided into sixty-six chapters, whilst the second parainesis has no chapter divisions. The first parainesis deploys an acrostic device, the initial letter of each chapter spelling out 'Basil Emperor of the Romans in Christ for his Beloved Son and Co-Emperor Leo'.¹⁵ The second is titled 'The Other Parainesis of Emperor Basil for his Son Emperor Leo'.

The first parainesis is, as one would anticipate, highly moralistic, idealistic and theoretical. It instructs Leo how to be a good emperor: how he must act, what his priorities should be, and ultimately how he will achieve the immortal empire after having ruled the mortal empire. The contrast between immortal and mortal, and between spiritual and physical, is a dominant thread in the text. Only through living a good spiritual life can immortality be achieved; physical possessions and qualities are ultimately transitory. Also emphasised in the text is the quality of virtue; by possessing this immortality is secured. Another major theme of the work is the emperor's responsibility to and for his subjects; the emperor must set them a good example, look after their needs, and aim to please them so that as a result they regard him as a father. It is useful to list the titles of the chapters from the *Patrologia Graeca* edition, to give the structure of the text but also to provide a fuller sense of the topics addressed, some of which explicitly feature more than once:

¹⁴ For the texts see Migne 1863, first parainesis xxi-lvi, second parainesis lvii-lx. For the first parainesis see also the edition of Emminger 1913, p. 50-73. Emminger notes (p. 23) that the chapters feature in twenty-five manuscripts, the earliest dating to the twelfth/thirteenth century: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, *Coislin*. 136 (fol. 239v-243). This manuscript contains in addition two historiographical texts (the chronicle of Kedrenos and the history of Michael Attaleiates), two speeches of Manuel Straboromanos to the emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118), a letter of Alexios responding to Manuel, and a funeral oration by Manuel on Michael Doukas (the brother of the empress Eirene Doukaina, Alexios' wife): see Gautier 1965. Thus the manuscript reflects an interest in imperial history, literature and ideology. It is notable that in his book on Basil I, Tobias 2007 does not discuss the Basilian paraineseis. For the two Basilian texts see now also Paidas 2009.

¹⁵ Alphabetic acrostics feature in hymns from the reign of Basil ascribed to Photios, and an acrostic is used in Leo VI's *Taktika*, Constitution 20: see respectively Ciccolella 1998, p. 320, and Grosdidier de Matons 1973, p. 241-242.

1. About Education (Περὶ παιδεύσεως)
2. Faith (Περὶ πίστεως)
3. Honouring priests (Περὶ τιμῆς ἱερέων)
4. Judgement and retribution (Περὶ κρίσεως καὶ ἀνταποδόσεως)
5. Almsgiving (Περὶ ἐλεημοσύνης) (see also chapter 37)
6. Diligence and vigilance (Περὶ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως) (see also chapter 39)
7. Associating with useful men (Περὶ συναναστροφῆς χρησίμων ἀνδρῶν)
8. Virtue (Περὶ ἀρετῆς)
9. Lust (Περὶ ἐπιθυμίας)
10. Virtue of character (Περὶ τῆς τῶν τρόπων ἀρετῆς)
11. Temperance (Περὶ σωφροσύνης) (see also chapter 19)
12. Loyal friends (Περὶ φίλων πιστῶν) (see also chapter 23)
13. Courage and intellect (Περὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως)
14. Humility (Περὶ ταπεινοφροσύνης)
15. Intellect (Περὶ φρονήσεως) (see also chapter 13)
16. Ways of life and speech (Περὶ τρόπων τοῦ βίου καὶ λόγου)
17. The care of sacred literature (Περὶ μελέτης τῶν θείων Λόγων)
18. Advice (Περὶ βουλῆς) (see also chapter 31)
19. Purity and temperance (Περὶ ἀγνείας καὶ σωφροσύνης) (see also chapter 11)
20. Honouring parents (Περὶ τιμῆς γονέων)
21. Righteousness (Περὶ δικαιοσύνης)
22. Doing good (Περὶ εὐεργεσίας) (see also chapter 57)
23. Friends (Περὶ φίλων) (see also chapter 12)
24. Contempt for money (Περὶ ὑπεροψίας χρημάτων)
25. Drunkenness (Περὶ μέθης)
26. Acquisition (of friends) (Περὶ κτήσεως)
27. Wealth and greed (Περὶ πλούτου καὶ πλεονεξίας)
28. Endurance and mildness (Περὶ μακροθυμίας καὶ πραότητος)
29. Truth and falsehood (Περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ ψεύδους)
30. Sovereignty (Περὶ ἀρχῆς)
31. Advice and consideration (Περὶ βουλῆς καὶ σκέψεως) (see also chapter 18)
32. Good order (Περὶ εὐνομίας)
33. Wicked men (Περὶ σκαιῶν ἀνδρῶν)

34. Compassion (Περὶ ἐλέους)
35. Love of friends (Περὶ ἀγάπης φίλων)
36. Speech and silence (Περὶ λόγου καὶ σιωπῆς)
37. Almsgiving (Περὶ ἐλεημοσύνης) (see also chapter 5)
38. That everything here is transitory (Ὅτι πρόσκαιρα τὰ τῆδε πάντα)
39. Diligence (Περὶ ἐπιμελείας) (see also chapter 6)
40. Watchfulness (Περὶ φυλακῆς)
41. The heavenly kingdom (Περὶ τῆς ἐπουρανίου βασιλείας)
42. The remembrance of God (Περὶ μνήμης Θεοῦ)
43. The taking of gifts (Περὶ δωροληψίας)
44. Injustice (Περὶ ἀδικίας)
45. Mortality and immortality (Περὶ θνητότητος καὶ ἀθανασίας)
46. Officials (Περὶ ἀρχόντων)
47. Peace (Περὶ εἰρήνης)
48. Praise (Περὶ ἐπαίνου)
49. Assiduity (Περὶ προσοχῆς)
50. Sympathy (Περὶ συμπαθείας)
51. Gentleness (Περὶ ἐπιεικειάς)
52. Returning kindness (Περὶ ἀντιχάριτος)
53. The beauty of the body (Περὶ κάλλους σώματος)
54. Healing (Περὶ ἰατρείας)
55. Slanderers (Περὶ συκοφαντῶν)
56. The care of writings (Περὶ μελέτης γραφῶν)¹⁶
57. Doing good (Περὶ εὐεργεσίας) (see also chapter 22)
58. Nobility (Περὶ εὐγενείας)
59. Patient endurance (Περὶ ὑπομονῆς)
60. Education (of children) (Περὶ παιδείας)
61. Talkativeness (Περὶ γλωσσαλγίας)
62. Good behaviour (Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ τρόπου)
63. Mastering pleasures (Περὶ τοῦ κρατεῖν τῶν ἡδονῶν)
64. The perfect logos (Περὶ λόγου τελείου)
65. Not being elated (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπαίεσθαι)
66. The reading of writings (Περὶ ἀναγνώσεως γραφῶν)¹⁷

¹⁶ The writings referred to are ancient histories.

¹⁷ The writings specifically referred to are those of Solomon, Isocrates and Jesus of Sirach, and more generally God-inspired writings.

The second parainesis also consists of moral and ideological observations, but is more focused, a consequence of its dramatically shorter length too of course. Its major theme is how Leo can please God. It emphasises the quality of wisdom (*σοφία*), opening with this subject. It is stated that wisdom was granted as a gift by the All Holy Trinity to man, through which he would recognise God and glorify Him in everything. Basil then addresses Leo, saying 'So you, my God-guarded child, being reared with wisdom become a philosopher for us from this—fearing God; for the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord' (*Ps.* 111.10, *Prov.* 9.10). Leo is then exhorted to occupy himself with the study of the wisdom taught by God.¹⁸ Markopoulous has emphasised the more religious character of the second text.¹⁹ Leo is urged, for instance, to honour priests and elders, perform charity, be mild to the good but severe towards the unjust, devote his mind to God, and reject conceit and vanity.

It is commonly agreed by commentators on the texts that Basil could not have been the real author of them as he was notoriously uneducated, unlike his sons, who were taught for a period in the 870s by Photios, the famous civil servant and man of letters turned patriarch, a position he held twice (858-867, 877-886).²⁰ Indeed, it is often suggested that Photios was the real author, of the first parainesis at least.²¹ He is associated with other texts from the reign of Basil, including hymns, a poem, and the illustrated manuscript of the homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 510), texts which all have a panegyric character.²² Photios was active during the reign of Michael too, and when patriarch composed homilies on court occasions, e.g. the dedication of the Pharos church c. 864 when Bardas was Caesar, and the inauguration of the Virgin and Child

¹⁸ For Leo's special association with *σοφία* see for instance Tougher 1994 and 1997, p. 110-132, and also below.

¹⁹ Markopoulous 1998, p. 474.

²⁰ For Basil's lack of education see for instance Magdalino 2013, p. 195-196. For Photios see for example Dvornik 1948, Lemerle 1971, p. 177-204, Tougher 1997, esp. p. 68-88, Simeonova 1998.

²¹ See for example Markopoulous 1998, p. 472-473.

²² For the hymns see Ciccolella 1998. For the poem see Markopoulous 1992. For the illustrated manuscript see Brubaker 1999.

mosaic in the apse of Hagia Sophia in March 867 when Basil was Michael's co-emperor.²³ Significantly, Photios is named as the author of an advisory text written to the Bulgarian Khan Boris following his conversion to Orthodox Christianity *c.* 864.²⁴ Further, he has been associated with a *gnomologion* known as the *Excerpta Parisina*, and it has been remarked that about a third of its 139 citations also feature in the letter to Boris.²⁵ However, there is the risk of crediting too much to Photios simply because he is such a dominating figure; other educated men certainly existed in this period. Markopoulos in fact doubts that Photios wrote the second parainesis, and suggests that the author was someone from the palatine clergy.²⁶ Strano argues that Photios did not write the first parainesis either, a view that raises the issue of the dating of the texts.

As noted, both texts are written as if by Basil to Leo when he was his co-emperor. Leo only became the leading heir after the death of Basil's eldest son Constantine in 879.²⁷ Leo's status as Basil's intended successor was consolidated in *c.* 882, when a bride was chosen for him, Theophano.²⁸ There is no doubt that the expectation was that Leo and Theophano should produce future emperors. This situation was endangered when Leo took a mistress, Zoe the daughter of a court official Stylianos Zaoutzes, which caused tensions between Leo and his father.²⁹ The *Life* of Euthymios, Leo's spiritual father, has Leo relate an episode where Basil seized him by the hair, threw him to the floor and beat him until he streamed blood.³⁰ Leo was even imprisoned for a period

²³ See Mango 1958, *Homily* 10 (p. 184-190), and *Homily* 17 (p. 286-296).

²⁴ See for instance White & Berrigan 1982, Odorico 1993, Simeonova 1998, p. 107-152, Barker 1957, p. 112-116. When Boris was baptised he took the name Michael, after Michael III.

²⁵ See Markopoulos 1998, p. 472-473, Odorico 2009, p. 234 (calling the text *Opusculum Paraeneticum*).

²⁶ Markopoulos 1998, p. 476.

²⁷ Tougher 1997, p. 52-53. The modern view that Constantine was a son of Basil by his first wife Maria rather than Eudokia has no explicit evidence to support it: Tougher 1997, p. 43-44.

²⁸ Tougher 1997, p. 55-56, 134-136.

²⁹ Tougher 1997, p. 90-91.

³⁰ *Life of Euthymios* 7, ed. tr. Karlin-Hayter 1970, p. 40-41. For Euthymios see Karlin-Hayter 1970, Tougher 1997, p. 50-51.

of three years (883-886), having been implicated in a plot against his father.³¹ It is natural to assume that the two texts date to this period from 879-886, excluding the period of imprisonment. Markopoulos has proposed that the first parainesis dates to soon after Leo's emergence as main heir (in the period 880-883), marking his status as such, and the second to the period of Leo's release from imprisonment during the feast of Elijah in July 886, marking his rehabilitation with his father, shortly before Basil's death in August of that year.³²

However, others have questioned whether the texts were produced in the reign of Basil; it has been suggested that they were written in the reign of Leo, and that they were even written by Leo himself.³³ This was mooted for instance by Albert Vogt in an article on the period of Leo's youth published in 1934, and proposed again more recently by Strano.³⁴ They are led to this view largely by finding it hard to believe that such texts were produced for Leo under Basil since the two men seem to have had such a difficult relationship. Not only is there the issue of Leo's affair with Zoe, but the question of the paternity of Leo is utilised to explain the strained relations between 'father and son', though there is no evidence to prove that Basil did agonise about the possibility of Leo being a son of Michael III.³⁵ The argument that the texts could not have been produced under Basil on the grounds of the difficult relationship between him and Leo is hard to accept anyway; Basil was enough of a political realist to know that the continuation of the dynasty came before his personal feelings for Leo. However, Strano is also exercised by the fact that Alexander does not appear in the advice texts although he was a co-emperor too.³⁶ This is not necessarily a problem either, as elder emperors were deemed the senior figure; it would not make sense to address the advice to both sons as only one was expected to be the ruler, as is seen in the Macedonian cases of Leo VI and Alexander and

³¹ Tougher 1997, p. 57-59.

³² Markopoulos 1998, p. 473-476.

³³ For Leo as an author see for instance Antonopoulou 1997, p. 3-23.

³⁴ Vogt 1934, p. 408-410, Strano 2000.

³⁵ Odorico 2009, p. 236, follows the particular argument of Mango 1973 that Michael was the father of Leo, but this has been challenged by Tougher 1997.

³⁶ Strano 2000, p. 156 n. 44. Vogt 1934, p. 409, did note this too.

Basil II (976-1025) and Constantine VIII.³⁷ It is quite clear that Basil did present Leo as his leading heir. In the image depicting Eudokia with Leo and Alexander in the illustrated homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus (an artefact generally considered to have been a gift to Basil from Photios dating to *c.* 880, the same year as the dedication of Basil's Nea church, which had a strong dynastic character) Leo is shown in the senior position on the right hand of his mother, as one would expect as he was older than Alexander; the verse running around the border of the image includes a description of Eudokia as 'the well-branched vineyard bearing the grapes of the empire, the gentle *despotes* [Leo and Alexander]'.³⁸ As already noted, Leo's marriage to Theophano in *c.* 882 indicates that Basil was expecting Leo to continue the dynasty.³⁹ It is true that the coinage issued in this period presents some oddities. It seems to have been limited and not to have declared strongly the succession of Leo: there were issued a solidus showing Basil, Eudokia and Constantine; a follis depicting Basil between Leo and Constantine; and fractional coins—semissis, tremissis, half-follis—of Basil, Leo and Alexander.⁴⁰ Yet the oddity of the coinage is general rather than particular and does not contradict the fact that Leo was the senior of Basil's co-emperors. The release and restoration of Leo shows that despite the existence of Alexander Leo was still considered the senior heir; Alexander faded into the shadows again.

Nevertheless, it is not impossible that the texts were produced under Leo, perhaps as a way to boost his legitimacy (autolegitimation, as Strano terms it: 2000, p. 163). Strano also argues, however, that the parainetic texts can be associated with other writings of Leo from the early phase of his reign. These are three texts with a family focus (and thus dynastic): his homily on his brother

³⁷ On the issue of Macedonian sibling co-emperors see for instance Tougher 2013.

³⁸ See Brubaker 1999, Fig. 2, *Paris. gr.* 510, f. Br., discussed at p. 162-163.

³⁹ It is known that Alexander eventually had a wife (*Life of Euthymios* 9.20, ed. tr. Karlin-Hayter 1970, p. 55.22-23, 127.33-129.4), as Leo separated Alexander from her in *c.* 900, but we do not know her name, or when they married. It is possible they married during the period 883-886, when presumably Alexander was the heir apparent during the confinement of Leo.

⁴⁰ On the coinage see for example Grierson 1982, p. 175, 178-179, 180-181, 183-185, 187.

Stephen becoming patriarch in 886 after the ousting of Photios by Leo, his homily on the feast of Elijah (a key heavenly patron of the dynasty, depicted with Basil in the illustrated homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus, for instance),⁴¹ and his funeral oration on his parents Basil and Eudokia which is usually dated to 888.⁴² It is argued that these texts show that Leo was also the author or architect of the advice texts ascribed to Basil. The funeral oration is particularly significant here, as it has echoes of the texts.⁴³ However, this does not mean that Leo also wrote the advice texts, or that they were written under him; there could be deliberate echoes of texts produced under Basil. Just because Leo wrote these three family focused texts it does not follow that the two parainetic texts were also his products. Further, why would two different advice texts be needed? If he was indeed the initiator or even author of the texts there would surely only be one required. Ultimately, it seems more natural to assume that the texts do date from the period 879-886, probably to *c.* 880 and then 886, as Markopoulos argued. This does not mean, of course, that the texts have to be taken at face value. Odorico has argued, for instance, that Photios' letter to Boris was produced primarily for internal consumption, and that Agapetus' advice to Justinian was part of the general debate about rulership at that time.⁴⁴ The *Muses* of Alexios I Komnenos (1081-1118) for his heir John II can be understood to relate to the contested succession, as Strano notes.⁴⁵

These reflections bring us neatly to the question of literary models for the Basilian texts. This question has also elicited much comment in previous study of the texts. The sixth-century advisory work for the emperor Justinian I (527-565) ascribed to Agapetus a deacon of Hagia Sophia has been argued to be a prime inspiration for the first parainesis of Basil; for example, Ihor

⁴¹ On Elijah and the Macedonians see for instance Dagron 2003, p. 192-198, 210, Magdalino 1988, Brubaker 1999, p. 158-162 and Fig. 5, *Paris. gr.* 510 f. Cv.

⁴² For the homily on Stephen see Antonopoulou 2008, p. 299-304, 1997, p. 245-246, Grosdidier de Matons 1973, p. 200-207. For the homily on Elijah see Antonopoulou 2008, p. 447-450, 1997, p. 234-236. For the funeral oration on Basil see Vogt & Hausherr 1932, Antonopoulou 2008, p. 195-218, 1997, p. 246-250.

⁴³ See also Odorico 1983, Vogt 1934, p. 409-410.

⁴⁴ Odorico 2009.

⁴⁵ Strano 2000, p. 157.

Ševčenko says that it was used extensively, asserting ‘Photius—or his *alter ego*—borrowed from Agapetus both the form (including the device of the acrostic) and most of the contents of Basil I’s *Chapters* to Leo VI’.⁴⁶ Certainly both works are divided into chapters, seventy-two by Agapetus compared to Basil’s sixty-six, though the chapters are shorter (twelve columns in the *Patrologia Graeca* for Agapetus compared to eighteen columns for Basil) and not given subject headings; the acrostic device in Agapetus spells out ‘Agapetus the Most Humble Deacon to Our Most Sacred and Most Devout Emperor Justinian’. However, despite the similarity of form of the texts there are differences between Basil’s work and Agapetus’. The character of the texts are similar in nature but the content is by no means identical. There is also the important distinction that one is written (as if) by a deacon to an emperor, the other is written as if by an emperor to his son and heir. Further, the identity of the recipient is different: Justinian is already sole emperor, Leo is waiting to become sole emperor. Other models are at play too.⁴⁷ Inevitably the influence of the fourth-century BC Athenian Isocrates has been detected: his oration to Nicocles, as well as the oration to Demonicus, the authenticity of which is debated.⁴⁸ The identity of addressees and author are interesting to bear in mind again. Both Nicocles and Demonicus are young men (though Nicocles is a king), and their fathers had recently died; Isocrates was a family friend in both cases, and possibly also a teacher of Nicocles. The influence of *To Demonicus* is especially to the fore in the first parainesis.⁴⁹ Of course, these texts were fundamental to advice literature in general and their influence by the ninth century had been felt for thirteen centuries. Thus Agapetus himself was influenced by earlier models, including these Isocratean works, but also Hellenistic writers and early Christian texts.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Ševčenko 1978, p. 8. For Agapetus see also Bell 2009, p. 1-49, and p. 99-122 (translation), Odorico 2009, p. 227-233, Henry III 1967, Barker 1957, p. 54-61.

⁴⁷ Krumbacher 1897, p. 457, identifies Isocrates in addition to Agapetus.

⁴⁸ For these texts see Norlin 1928, *To Demonicus*, p. 4-35 (text and translation), *To Nicocles*, p. 40-71 (text and translation).

⁴⁹ See Emminger 1913, p. 47-48.

⁵⁰ See for instance Bell 2009, p. 27-32.

While Agapetus seems the obvious primary model for the texts, and points to the wider revival of literary culture in Byzantium and a specific interest in the figure of Justinian (e.g. his legal work, and his association with Hagia Sophia seen in the *Patria* and the vestibule mosaic in the church), there is a more immediate text that needs to be considered: the already mentioned letter of Photios to Boris.⁵¹ This was written in the name of the patriarch Photios to the Bulgarian Khan following his conversion *c.* 864. It has often been assumed that it was written in response to a request from Boris for further information about his new faith, though as has been noted Odorico has argued that it was produced more for internal consumption. The letter supplies a summary of the seven ecumenical councils as well as of other points of Christian faith, including the Ten Commandments, but then provides guidance on the duties of a Christian ruler.⁵² This letter is found in several manuscripts, the earliest dating to the mid tenth century, the *Codex Baroccianus Graecus* 217 (Oxford, Bodleian Library), which contains letters of Photios. White and Berrigan usefully summarise the precepts section, which they assert is divided into six categories:

After an introductory paragraph on the particular responsibilities of a ruler (24), his religious obligations are presented (25-28). Secondly, his personal attributes and patterns of behavior are examined (29-52). The relations of a ruler with his subjects constitute the third general topic (53-65). Photios provides the khan with further personal advice in the fourth section (66-73). His faith [*sic.* fifth] division treats the public conduct of the ruler (74-101). Photios keeps for his final set of admonitions those matters that concern the strength of the state (102-113). The letter concludes with a final paragraph (114), which begins with an injunction by Photios to Boris that he model his conduct upon the precepts of the preceding letter and concludes with a prayer that Boris be granted the graces to become an ideal ruler.⁵³

⁵¹ For Justinian and the Macedonian dynasty see for instance Dagron 2003, p. 212-213, Magdalino 1987, p. 59, Tougher 1998b, p. 58-60.

⁵² There is also a second shorter letter of Photios to Boris, found in only one manuscript, on 'the efforts of Boris to perform his duties as a Christian prince': White & Berrigan 1982, p. 14.

⁵³ White & Berrigan 1982, p. 28.

Once again, the identity of the author and the recipient are particular: the author is the patriarch of Constantinople, a religious authority, the recipient is a new convert who is also a foreign ruler; the advice is both religious and political. Regarding the sources for Photios' letter, White and Berrigan state that the two orations of Isocrates are key, but also point to Biblical texts, the apocryphal books of Sirach and Wisdom.⁵⁴ They also comment on the influence of the letter on the first parainesis of Basil. They believe that Photios was the author of both, and that the same sources were used. They state that the two texts 'make the same points, sometimes in the same language'. Their notes specify times when there is an echo of Photios' letter in the chapters of Basil: they identify cases in chapters 3, 9, 21, 23, 28, 29 (twice), 30, 33 (four times), 38, 39, 41 (twice), 49, 55 (twice), and 60.⁵⁵ Markopoulos asserts that the letter of Photios to Boris and the first parainesis have sixteen passages in common, which he lists in his appendix: 3, 9, 15, 16, 23 (twice), 25, 26, 33, 38, 40, 44, 48, 63, and 65 (twice).⁵⁶ Odorico even goes so far as to say that the letter to Boris could serve as the first redaction of Basil's chapters.⁵⁷

Regarding models it is striking that the first parainesis itself urges Leo to read other texts, thus spelling out its literary debts. Significantly, in its very final chapter, Chapter 66 on the reading of writings, it advises:

In order to improve your attitude do not neglect the sayings of the old, for there you will find many useful [opinions], especially in those of Solomon and Isocrates. Also, if you want, read the advice of Jesus of Sirach [i.e. Ecclesiasticus], as from these you will draw political as well as kingly virtues.⁵⁸

Thus the finger is pointed towards Isocrates and specific Biblical texts associated with the imparting of wisdom (see further below). Chapter 17 (on the care of sacred literature) and Chapter 56 (on

⁵⁴ White & Berrigan 1982, p. 27.

⁵⁵ White & Berrigan 1982, nn. 18, 30, 33, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 54, 60, 63, 64, 73, 82, 91, 97, 98.

⁵⁶ Markopoulos 1998, p. 472, 479 (appendix).

⁵⁷ Odorico 2009, p. 240.

⁵⁸ Tr. White & Berrigan 1982, p. 81 n. 18.

the care of writings) underscore this concern with learning and benefiting from literature.

Overall then, it is clear that the Basilian texts (especially the first parainesis of course) have been influenced by a range of specific models, including the chapters of Agapetus, the letter of Photios to Boris, Isocratean works, and Biblical wisdom texts.⁵⁹ Such advice literature had a very long history by the time of ninth-century Byzantium, and as Strano sensibly remarks the texts in this chain were drawing on an extensive tradition so were not necessarily simply copying each other.⁶⁰ Indeed, for all its debts the first parainesis of Basil is not a direct duplicate of any of its forebears.⁶¹ We see similarity of topics, ideas and sentiments within a loose structure, gnomic advice mixing the practical and the ideological.

4. Dynasty: Historical Particularities

Given the generalised advice and traditional content of the Basilian texts it is natural to wonder then, do they reveal anything about the historical particularities of the Macedonian dynasty, either under Basil I or Leo VI. It is important to reflect that despite the character of the texts they are not just direct copies of models, as noted; clearly, the author/s have made a selection of the topics they want to deal with, and presumably shaped them to suit their own concerns. Patrick Henry III has made this point in relation to Agapetus' chapters, and Simeonova has discussed how Photios matched his advice to Boris, addressing some topics and leaving others out.⁶² One can also observe that the nature of Byzantine imperial ideology was forged by its long Greco-Roman history anyway, so even if the ideas and the ideals are familiar they can still have meaning.

While the dynastic character of the texts has been recognised, it can be argued that particular parts have further resonance, though the danger of over-reading texts has to be borne in mind. The texts are in essence presenting ideal behaviour for an emperor, and as

⁵⁹ See also the list of sources identified by Emminger 1913, p. 44-48.

⁶⁰ Strano 2000, p. 150.

⁶¹ See similar comments on Photios' letter to Boris by Odorico 1993, p. 84.

⁶² Henry III 1967, p. 284, Simeonova 1998, p. 132-149.

part of this objective, unideal behaviour can also be invoked as a negative example; for instance, in Chapter 10 on virtue of character there is a contrast drawn between being a genuine emperor and a counterfeit ruler. In some cases it can be wondered if the example of Michael III is in the mind of the author. For instance, Chapter 25 is devoted to the subject of drunkenness. This is also addressed in Photios' letter to Boris, which led Čičurov to suggest that 'it was disgust with Michael III's alleged drunken orgies that made Photios discuss drunkenness'.⁶³ In Photios' letter drunkenness is paired with luxury, and he compares an emperor with such predilections to the captain of a ship with the same vices who causes his ship to sink.⁶⁴ Drunkenness is dealt with in *To Demonicus* too, but there the imagery is related to chariots: it is observed that:

when the mind is impaired by wine it is like chariots which have lost their drivers; for just as these plunge along in wild disorder when they miss the hands which should guide them, so the soul stumbles again and again when the intellect is impaired.⁶⁵

Interestingly, in the first parainesis the Isocratean chariot replaces the Photian ship. However, some elements relating to the chariot imagery are altered: in the chapter of Basil the focus is on charioteers themselves, who are careless and unable to control the chariot so drive poorly and make themselves a laughing stock. Strano has noted and briefly discussed these differences from a literary point of view, but I would suggest they are historically significant too.⁶⁶ In the Basilian text the charioteer is the issue rather than the chariot; further, the mind is said to be tyrannised (τυραννηθῆ) by wine, rather than just impaired (διαφθαρῆ) by it. These differences are highly suggestive when considered in relation to Michael III. Not only was Michael presented as a drunk in later literature, his association with chariot racing (and horses generally) was well

⁶³ Simeonova 1998, p. 133 n. 114, citing Čičurov 1990, p. 43.

⁶⁴ White & Berrigan 1982, 95, p. 74. It is notable that they do not mention that drunkenness is also dealt with in the chapters of Basil: White & Berrigan 1982, p. 88 n. 84. Markopoulos 1998, p. 479, does note it.

⁶⁵ Isoc. *Or.* 1 (*Dem.*) 32, tr. Norlin 1928, p. 23.

⁶⁶ Strano 2000, p. 148-149. He also cites the comments on drunkenness in the *Excerpta*.

known, discussed in both chronicle traditions.⁶⁷ The focus on the charioteer as the problem rather than the unmanned chariot puts the emphasis on the man, and ‘tyrannised’ evokes bad imperial behaviour. Drunkenness on its own would not be enough to indicate a Michael III factor, especially as the image of him as a drunk is drawn from later texts, but combined with the focus on the bad charioteer, it can be argued that there would be resonances of this emperor for an audience in the late ninth century. Further, the fact that the first parainesis in Chapter 28 on endurance and mildness advises against immoderate laughter (γέλωτα ἀκρατῇ) as boorish (ἀπαιδευτον) could be suggestive of Michael too; his character as an inappropriate prankster is known from later literature, including the *Life* of Ignatios, who was patriarch under Michael III and then under Basil I (847-858, 867-877).⁶⁸ Chapter 38 on that everything here is transitory also warns against selfish laughter (γελοιάζων αὐθαδῶς) in an emperor. The topic of inappropriate mirth was also broached in Photios’ letter and in *To Demonikus* 15, which asserts that ‘violent mirth’ (γέλωτα προπετῇ) is a sign of ‘folly’ (ἀνόητον).⁶⁹

Thus Michael III may lurk in the texts in relation to specific topics, but more generally as a recent example of a ‘bad’ emperor. This leads one to wonder about the presence of Basil I himself. Although not the author of the texts Basil is very much present as the father of Leo (e.g. in the acrostic title and in Chapters 47 and 57, and in the second parainesis too, where Leo is Basil’s God-guarded child and urged to adhere to the advice of his father).⁷⁰ In Chapter 20 on honouring parents it is observed that since Leo has been crowned by Basil and God he needs to return the honour. It is interesting to note, however, that Leo’s mother is not mentioned explicitly in the text, despite being depicted for instance in the illustrated homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus and in the Kainourgion mosaic, and also being included by Leo in his funeral

⁶⁷ On Michael as a charioteer see for instance Karlin-Hayter 1987.

⁶⁸ See for instance the *Life of Ignatios* 42-43 and 45, ed. tr. Smithies 2013, p. 61-67, Tougher 2010, p. 140-142.

⁶⁹ White & Berrigan 1982, p. 101. Isoc. *Or.* 1 (*Dem.*) 15, tr. Norlin 1928, p. 13.

⁷⁰ Migne 1863, lvii a, lx b-c. See also the comments of Markopoulos 1998, p. 476.

oration on his parents.⁷¹ Further, in Chapter 12 on loyal friends it is stated that friends are to be more trusted than family, which seems an odd sentiment in a dynastic text. However, it is known that Basil did keep family at arm's length; for example, he did not marry off his daughters, and his siblings were not prominent in his reign.⁷² Notably Leo had an infamously difficult relationship with Alexander, though he did maintain him as his co-emperor.⁷³ Thus wariness of family could indeed be found in a dynastic context. The sentiment is also expressed in the Isocratean texts. *To Demonicus* 10 declares:

[Your father] prized more those who were devoted to him than those who were his kin by blood; for he considered that in the matter of companionship nature is a much better guide than convention, character than kinship, and freedom of choice than compulsion.

To Niccles 20 advises 'Honour with office those of your friends who are nearest of kin, but honour in very truth those who are the most loyal'.⁷⁴ It could be argued that the first parainesis is just blindly echoing these sentiments, but that seems unlikely in the circumstances; the process of selection and adaptation needs to be acknowledged.

Animal imagery found in the texts might be suggestive of Basil too, given his career as a groom and his strong associations with horses and hunting. In Chapter 30 on sovereignty it is recommended that an emperor should know his officials like a groom knows his horses and like a huntsman knows his dogs (as well as like a general knows his troops). Animals also feature in Chapter 58 on nobility, where it is remarked that man can excel in soul as well as body unlike animals, and characteristics of horses and dogs are given; the former are fearless and steadfast, the latter yelp and hunt. In the second parainesis there is also the image of putting a

⁷¹ It is possible she also appears with Basil on the lid of an ivory box in the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, which also features several scenes from the life of the Old Testament king David: see for instance Cutler & Oikonomides 1988, Brubaker 1999, p. 185-186.

⁷² See for example Tougher 1997, p. 227-228.

⁷³ See for instance Tougher 1997, p. 219-232, and 2013, esp. p. 314-316.

⁷⁴ Tr. Norlin 1928, p. 9, 53.

halter on a wicked man in order to bring him to understanding of God.⁷⁵ While dogs and horses feature in *To Nicocles* 15, the message is a different one; it is asserted that:

one must be a lover of men and a lover of his country; for neither horses nor dogs nor men nor any other thing can be properly controlled except by one who takes pleasure in the objects for which it is his duty to care.⁷⁶

Further, it is intriguing that Emminger can identify no source for Chapter 58.⁷⁷ This could suggest that these animal images have been utilised with the specific example of Basil in mind as appropriate to him.

Chapter 32 on good order might also connect with Basilian specifics. It emphasises the need for the emperor to keep and observe the laws of previous emperors, so that his own laws will be observed in their turn, and ultimately the nation will be preserved. It is well known that under Basil the project to reform and reorganise the code of Justinian I was initiated and then completed under Leo, with the production of the *Basilika*, and Leo went on to issue his own new laws, *Novels*.⁷⁸ One observation that might not appear to sit so well with Basil is the criticism of strength without intellect, found in Chapter 13 on courage and intellect.⁷⁹ However, the meaning of intellect here is practical wisdom rather than that of the educated intellectual, which Basil famously was not. Yet Basil did ensure that his children were educated which shows that he realised this was expected and useful for children of the imperial family. Such was Leo's education that he was a prolific author himself, and he earned the epithet of 'the Wise'. The wisdom Leo possessed was σοφία, which is very much the central quality being urged upon him in the second parainesis. As has been recognised, this fits perfectly with the Old Testament inter-

⁷⁵ Migne 1863, lx b.

⁷⁶ Tr. Norlin 1928, p. 49.

⁷⁷ A search of the *TLG* confirms this point.

⁷⁸ See for instance Van der Wal & Lokin 1985, p. 78-89.

⁷⁹ Simeonova 1998, p. 145-147, notes that in his letter to Boris Photios does not include ἀνδρεία 'in the portrait of the ideal ruler' and that this is 'a noticeable departure from the classics'. She says it and generalship only remerge as qualities for the ideal ruler in the eleventh century.

ests and Davidic ideology associated with Basil; Basil was cast as a new David, and his successor Leo was to be a new Solomon.⁸⁰ This idea is already present in the first parainesis; Biblical wisdom literature had an influence upon it, and the reading of it is encouraged directly. The second parainesis also urges study of divine books generally.⁸¹ In the first parainesis there is the emphasis on reading and education more broadly too. It is highly significant that the first parainesis both opens and closes with the subject of education and literature; Chapter 1 is on education, and Chapter 66 is on the reading of writings. Simeonova's observation that this text is the first in the middle Byzantine period to discuss 'the ruler's need of a good formal education', Photios having not included the topic in his letter to Boris, seems telling.⁸² Thus the dynastic concern with both intellectual wisdom and Christian wisdom is clear. The relevance of the texts to Leo himself is evident.⁸³ This can also be suspected in a less positive respect. Chapter 9 on lust might bring to mind Leo's feelings for Zoe Zaoutzina, if he was already attached to her before his marriage to Theophano; there is no mention of a wife in the text. However, in the second parainesis he is instructed to avoid scandals and to be a limb for his wife and not to look at another man's wife, which does make one think of the unhappy marriage to Theophano and his ongoing attachment to Zoe.⁸⁴ Despite Leo's release from confinement and rehabilitation, his card was being marked.

5. *Conclusions*

The parainetic texts ascribed to Basil I and addressed to Leo VI—especially the first parainesis of course—are familiar examples of

⁸⁰ See Dagron 2003, p. 192-219, Magdalino 1987, Tougher 1994 and 1997, p. 109-132. See also the comments of Strano 2000, p. 161-162.

⁸¹ Migne 1863, lx b.

⁸² Simeonova 1998, p. 135-136.

⁸³ Markopoulos 1998, p. 476, also detects in the second parainesis a suggestion of Leo's rivalry with Photios in the observation that a teacher envies the pupil who surpasses him: Migne 1863, lx b-c.

⁸⁴ Migne 1863, lx b. Simeonova 1998, p. 132, notes that Photios in his letter to Boris discusses 'women, marriage and procreation, and drunkenness', which she says 'are hardly ever mentioned in the early Byzantine *Fürstenspiegel*'.

Byzantine advice literature, if not as famous as Agapetus' advice to Justinian I or Photios' letter to Boris of Bulgaria. Debates exist about their dating, authorship and literary models, and it is likely that these debates will continue. My own view is that they date to the reign of Basil, to c. 880 when Leo was acknowledged as heir and to 886 soon after the release of Leo from confinement, significant dynastic moments. It is not certain that Photios was the author of either text, and given the dating I favour I do not think that Leo himself was the author of them or was their instigator. As for the models for the texts, it is clear that there are key inspirations in the shape of Agapetus' advice to Justinian, Photios' letter to Boris, and Isocratean texts, as well as Biblical wisdom literature, but the texts drew generally on the long tradition of such literature. More importantly, the texts are not a slave to any particular model; the author/s feel free to adapt and select as suited their purposes. Given this fact, it is likely that they did consider the specific political circumstances in which the texts were produced, and I would argue that some subjects can be detected relating to Macedonian realities, in terms of the histories and images of the emperors Michael, Basil and Leo himself. The texts need to be more fully integrated with other contemporary material from the reign of Basil, such as the poems and the illustrated manuscript of the homilies of Gregory of Nazianzus, to create a sense of the age of Basil; naturally, the *Life of Basil* can loom too large. What is required is a translation of the texts and commentary on them to achieve this goal.⁸⁵

The texts are also highly significant of course in that they speak to the cultural context of the period, the sense of rediscovery of the past and revival which had been developing apace already but which received particular impetus in the age of Michael and Basil in the shape of figures such as Photios and Bardas, but not just them. One aspect of the texts that is particularly arresting is that they were written in the name of Basil even though it seems clear that he could not have been their author; command of culture and the authority it gave was being claimed by the emperor. Tellingly Basil ensured his children were educated.⁸⁶ Leo emerged as an

⁸⁵ For a modern Greek translation see Paidas 2009, p. 103-257.

⁸⁶ On these points see also Markopoulos 1998, p. 470, Magdalino 2013.

emperor and author, the first significant example of this in Byzantium since the case of Julian (361-363), famous as the last pagan emperor but also a prolific author.⁸⁷ As a well-educated emperor and author Leo claimed wisdom of various kinds and the right to impart it in advice texts, e.g. his military manual, the *Taktika*.⁸⁸ Such activity was to be echoed by Leo's son and eventual heir Constantine VII, who in his reign advised his son Romanos II in the famous handbook on foreign affairs, the *De administrando imperio*.⁸⁹ Thus a chain of advice runs from Basil through Leo to Constantine and on to Romanos. However, this chain was to break. Romanos died prematurely leaving a widow and two young sons, Basil II and Constantine VIII. Infamously, Basil II did not realise the vital importance of being a father or an author, and the fate of the dynasty was sealed. Thus in the case of the Macedonian dynasty the presence and absence of 'mirrors' reflects its rise and demise.

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⁸⁷ On Julian as author see for example Baker-Brian & Tougher 2012. On the reception of Julian in Byzantium see Trovato 2014. It is interesting to note that Leo Choirosphaktes, a key intellectual, diplomat and official under Basil I and especially Leo VI, was known for his interest in the work and thought of Julian: see for example Trovato 2014, p. 25, Magdalino 1997, esp. p. 146-161.

⁸⁸ Dennis 2014.

⁸⁹ Moravcsik & Jenkins 1967.

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Abstract

This chapter will consider two works of advice written in the name of the Byzantine emperor Basil I (867-886) for his son and successor Leo VI (886-912). These parainetic texts are of great interest for political and cultural history. Basil I was the founder of a new dynasty (the so-called Macedonian dynasty) having cut a bloody path to power culminating in the murder of his patron and predecessor Michael III (842-867), and the texts mark the transmitting of power from Basil to his son and heir Leo VI. The chapter examines the cultural context of the texts, considering the questions of literary models and authorship. Key models are the advice of Agapetus to Justinian I and the letter of the patriarch Photios to the Bulgarian Khan Boris, as well as the Isocratean orations to Nicocles and Demonicus, but a range of influences are at work and the texts are not a slave to any of them. Basil himself was notoriously uneducated, and the real author is often thought to have been Photios (of the first, more substantial text, at least), though Leo VI, who was well educated and an author too, has also been proposed as the creator or inspirer of the texts. It seems likely that the texts do date to the end of the reign of Basil (probably in c. 880 and 886), and the author/s cannot be identified with certainty, but need not be Photios. The chapter also explores what the texts reveal about historical specifics of the dynasty, considering their context and particular details within them in relation to Michael III, Basil I and Leo VI. It is argued that despite their general and generic character they do reveal something of Macedonian dynastic concerns, and also reflect the emergence of the identity of the emperor as an author himself in the distinctive cultural context of the period. It is observed that a chain of advice texts marks the history of the dynasty up to the reign of Romanos II (959-963) but that at that point the chain broke; the lack of identity of Basil II (976-1025) as a father or an author symbolises the fate of the family. Thus, Macedonian mirrors reflect the rise and demise of this dynasty.

DAVID NAPOLITANO

FROM ROYAL COURT TO CITY HALL: THE *PODESTÀ* LITERATURE.

A REPUBLICAN VARIANT ON THE MIRRORS FOR PRINCES?*

1. *Introduction*

Throughout the Middle Ages the standard mode of government in Western Europe was the monarchy, while republican self-government constituted the proverbial exception to this principle.¹ Therefore, it is not surprising that much attention has been paid to medieval mirrors for princes, a corpus of texts designed to prepare princes for—and to assist and guide kings—in the fulfilment of their responsibilities.² In contrast, the didactic works aimed at initiating city magistrates to the exercise of their office have, a few exceptions aside, not really held the historian's interest.

The aim of this contribution is two-fold. Firstly, it intends to correct this imbalance in scholarly interest by providing an introduction to the *podestà* literature, a series of didactic treatises on

* This contribution has been written during a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship held at the Faculty of History of the University of Cambridge (2015-2018). I would like to thank the participants in the *LECTIO* 2015 Conference and the anonymous reviewers of the Brepols series 'LECTIO. Studies in the Transmission of Texts and Ideas' for their stimulating questions and helpful suggestions.

¹ Born 1928, p. 470; Duindam 2016, p. 1-2.

² For the field of medieval studies the term 'mirror-for-princes' has been popularized by the magisterial, though dated work of Wilhelm Berges: Berges 1938. For an introduction to this medieval genre (with further references to the vast bibliography on this topic): Anton 1988, col. 1040-1058; Bratu 2010, p. 1921-1949; Eberle 1987, p. 434-436. For brief summaries of late medieval mirrors: Born 1928. For excerpts (with a German translation), see Anton 2006. For a critical approach: Már Jónsson 2006, p. 153-166.

Italian city government,³ written in the thirteenth century and targeted at the *podestà*, the highest officeholder, and his retinue.⁴ After a brief overview of four surviving exemplars, set against the historical context of communal Italy, it will be argued that the label of *podestà* literature—and the examination of these texts as a (sub)group of didactic texts—is still warranted and justified, despite opposing views expressed by an authoritative current in scholarship. Furthermore, a typology of four didactic settings in which these texts originated and functioned will also be proposed as an alternative to the traditional, relatively flat and undiversified picture of the *podestà* literature as didactic instruments. This type of didactic literature did not develop overnight nor follow a ‘one size fits all’ model.

Secondly, the contribution continues with a synchronic comparison of two of these texts, Giovanni da Viterbo’s *Liber de regimine ciuitatum* (1234) and Brunetto Latini’s *Tresor* (1260-1266/7), with two *specula principis*, Gilbert of Tournai’s *Eruuditio regum and principum* (1259) and Vincent of Beauvais’ *De morali principis institutione* (1260-1263), in an effort to promote an approach of—and narrative on—the literary tradition on good government across institutional boundaries.⁵ Despite a long series of statements on the general resemblance between both corpora, these groups of texts have, as a rule, been studied separately—a fact which can, to a large extent, be attributed to a rigid opposition between monarchical and republican regimes. Taking the

³ The texts are sometimes referred to as treatises *de regimine ciuitatum*, a characterization that, although it can claim a medieval pedigree, obscures their specific link to the *podestà*.

⁴ For the *Stadtregimentslehre* (written in Germany and the Southern Low Countries from the mid-fourteenth until early-sixteenth centuries), see the overview studies by Bierschwale & van Leeuwen 2005; Isenmann 2003, p. 215-479. For its equivalent in Spain, see the overview by Villa Prieto 2015, p. 355-398.

⁵ This comparison focuses on four thirteenth-century texts. Working from a diachronic perspective, a group of historians of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, has traced the origins of Italian republican consciousness back to medieval texts. As part of this exercise, Skinner has opened up the traditional canon of political thinkers and drawn attention to less familiar figures, including the authors of the *podestà* literature. Skinner 2002, p. 19; Skinner 1997, p. 33. The present comparison is, however, purely synchronic in nature and it is not intended to make a contribution to this specific debate within the discipline of the history of political thought. For an introduction to this debate: Runciman 2001.

shared focus of both corpora, namely the betterment of one-man rule through moral instruction, as its starting point, this high-level comparison will allow us to move beyond these institutional differences, which undoubtedly have left their mark on the texts, and to concentrate rather on the shared concept of rulership underlying these texts and the factors driving this similarity. At the same time, this comparison will also bring out and situate the distinctive characteristics of both corpora. As a result, this comparison will provide us with a new angle on the legitimization issues surrounding the Italian commune as well as the efforts to promote group interests within the commune.

2. *Communal Italy, the podestà literature and its didactic settings*

According to Edward Coleman's deft definition, communal Italy is academic shorthand for the highly urbanised areas of Northern and Central Italy where self-government first emerged at the end of the eleventh century and came to institutional maturity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.⁶ Almost a millennium after its first appearance the communal age is still considered a key component of Italy's political heritage.⁷ Traditionally, historians divide the communal era up into three phases named after the government model dominant within each stage, namely the consulate (c. 1080-c. 1180), the *podestà* regime (c. 1180-c. 1250), and the popular commune (c. 1250-c. 1300).⁸

As its label implies, the *podestà* literature has to be situated during the *podestà* regime. Between the 1180s and 1220s the *podestà*, a single, salaried, and full-time city official, started to replace, alternate with or be joined to the consulate, a collegiate form of city government run by part-time, amateur, and honorary consuls. Up to the 1220s the *podestà* was usually a local figure. At times, more than one *podestà* was appointed. After forty years of inten-

⁶ Coleman 2004, p. 27.

⁷ For an overview: Zorzi 2008.

⁸ For a general survey of Italian medieval history in English, see especially: Luscombe & Riley-Smith 2004; Abulafia 1999. For an introduction to Italy in the High Middle Ages (1000-1300): Abulafia 2004.

sive institutional experimenting, a new balance between the need for a strong executive and a deep-rooted suspicion of unchecked power was, however, found. By the 1220s the *podestà* had grown into a lasting fixture of the communal framework. This *podestà* regime has been characterized as one of the most ingenious inventions of communal Italy.⁹ In fact, this institutional set-up did not only reinforce the political autonomy of the top executive position (held by a non-native professional, the *podestà*), but it also broadened the political participation of the citizenry through an increasingly complex council structure. Italian scholarship has, therefore, aptly coined the term '*il sistema podestarile-consiliare*' for this political constellation. As recently as 2014, the *podestà* has been highlighted as one of the most interesting research topics in Italian medieval history.¹⁰ This professional outsider, assisted by a staff of judges, notaries and armed horsemen, lifted Italian city government to a new, professional plane. As a matter of fact, the struggle for power became more formalized and institutionalized during the *podestà* regime and a qualitative change in administrative practices took place.¹¹ The so-called 'documentary revolution' and the embryonic development of a local administration are just two illustrations of this professionalization trend.¹² This structural shift also had an important cultural off-shoot. As the exercise of high office professionalized, there was an increasing need for reflection on—and training in—the exercise of this office. This reflection found its expression in the *podestà* literature.

Leaving aside Fra Paolino Minorita's *De regimine rectoris* (1313-1315), which is occasionally included in this corpus,¹³

⁹ Gilli 2005, p. 292. See also Artifoni 2005, p. 358; Cammarosano 1995, p. 137, 146, and 151; Maire Vigueur & Faini 2010, p. 36.

¹⁰ Grillo 2003, p. 558; Lazzarini & Menant 2014, p. 178; Milani 2007, p. 167; De Rosa 1995, p. 221.

¹¹ De Rosa 1995, p. 20-22; Maire Vigueur & Faini 2010, p. 36; Milani 2007, p. 167.

¹² This term, coined by Jean-Claude Maire Vigueur, refers to a surge in pragmatic writing and record-keeping that accompanied the *podestà* regime. It was even pushed further by the popular commune. See Maire Vigueur 1995.

¹³ Not only does this work fall outside the thirteenth century, but it was also written in a fundamentally different spirit. In the early-fourteenth century the *podestà* was no longer a political figure, but he had turned into an administrative agent within a *signoria* framework. Moreover, this work strongly built upon an

four thirteenth-century exemplars of the *podestà* literature have stood the test of time.¹⁴ The earliest surviving work is the *Oculus pastoralis*.¹⁵ This anonymous speech collection, interwoven with an introduction to the *podestà* office, is generally said to have been composed in the 1220s in a coastal city (possibly Genoa). It is followed by the *Liber de regimine ciuitatum*.¹⁶ This pro-imperial work, consisting of 148 chapters covering the one-year tenure of a *podestà* from the moment of his selection until the day of his departure, is generally attributed to Giovanni da Viterbo, an experienced *assessor* in the retinue of a Florentine *podestà*.¹⁷ A wide variety of dates has been proposed as its composition date, ranging from 1228 until 1264—with isolated, off-target attributions as late as 1270 or 1278.¹⁸ Recently, Zorzi's position (putting 1234 forward as its date of composition) has, however, attracted substantial support.¹⁹ The third work to survive is the *De regimine et sapientia potestatis*.²⁰ This didactic poem, which provides a reveal-

Aristotelian tradition—a tradition largely absent from the *podestà* literature (see below).

¹⁴ For a detailed discussion of this source material: Napolitano 2014, p. 43–113.

¹⁵ For the three editions of this text (in descending chronological order): *Oculus pastoralis*, ed. T. Tunberg 1986; *Oculus pastoralis*, ed. D. Franceschi 1966; *Oculus pastoralis*, ed. L. Muratori 1741. Tunberg also published a selection of speeches: Tunberg 1990. Unless indicated otherwise, references to or citations from the *Oc. past.* (including the line numbering) are taken from Tunberg's 1986 edition. These editions are all based upon a single copy of this text (Cleveland, Public Library, MS Wq 789.0921 M-C 37). Following up on a lead in a footnote in an article by Diego Quaglioni and information generously shared by Gérard Giordanengo I have confirmed the existence of a second copy unknown to—and untapped by—these editors (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS Latin 4686). Immediately following the consultation of this copy, I have flagged its existence in a short article published in Dutch: Napolitano 2013a. For a more detailed discussion (in English) of the significance of this copy and its implications for our understanding of this text, see: Napolitano 2018a. I am currently preparing a new critical edition of the *Oculus pastoralis*, taking into account both copies.

¹⁶ For the only existing edition of this text: Giovanni da Viterbo, *Liber de regimine ciuitatum*, ed. G. Salvemini 1901 (henceforth *De reg. ciu.*).

¹⁷ On this figure: Sensi 1971, p. 194; Zorzi 2001, p. 267–272.

¹⁸ For an overview of the different positions in this dating debate: Napolitano 2014, p. 70–78.

¹⁹ Zorzi 2001, p. 268–269. See also Zorzi 2012, p. 281. For this support, see, for instance, Artifoni 2011, p. 250 n. 24; Maire Vigueur 2001, p. 89–90.

²⁰ For the three editions of this text (in descending chronological order): Orfino da Lodi, *De regimine et sapientia potestatis*, ed. S. Pozzi 1998; Orfino da

ing look into the living arrangements, living habits, and leisure activities of the *podestà*, was written in the mid-1240s by Orfino da Lodi, another judge (*iudex generalis*), at the end of his career in the service of the highest imperial circles.²¹ This poem—essentially a literary testament—was designed to support and guide his son, Marco, starting out in a similar career. The fourth and final work is a political encyclopaedia, *Li Liures dou Tresor*.²² It was written in Old French by Brunetto Latini (c. 1220-1293/94), a Florentine notary-scribe, during his exile in France (1260-1266/7). Latini had gone into exile after the devastating defeat of the Florentine Guelfs at the Battle of Montaperti (1260).²³ This carefully designed treasure trove, filled to the brim with knowledge deemed useful for a patron whose identity will probably remain forever illusive (see below), concludes with a section, entitled *Des governemenz des citez*²⁴—a section largely based upon Giovanni's text.²⁵

Lodi, *De regimine et sapientia potestatis*, ed. L. Castelnovo 1968; Orfino da Lodi, *De regimine et sapientia potestatis*, ed. A. Ceruti 1869. Unless indicated otherwise, references to or citations from the *De reg. pot.* are taken from Pozzi's edition. The verse numbering has been introduced by Castelnovo. Pozzi introduced the rubric numbering.

²¹ At the height of his career (1245) Orfino acted as *iudex generalis* of Frederick of Antioch (1221-1256). Later, he served another illegitimate son of Frederick II, Richard, Count of Chieti (1225-1249). For an introduction to Orfino da Lodi: D'Angelo 2005, p. 423-425; Dillon 2004, p. 800. For a historical reconstruction: Caretta 1976, p. 242-248.

²² For the four editions of this text (in descending chronological order): Brunetto Latini, *Li Livres dou Tresor*, ed. P. Beltrami et al. 2007; Brunetto Latini, *Li Livres dou Tresor*, ed. S. Baldwin & P. Barrette 2003; Brunetto Latini, *Li Livres dou Tresor*, ed. F. Carmody 1948; Brunetto Latini, *Li Livres dou Tresor*, ed. P. Chabaille 1863. Unless indicated otherwise, references to or citations from the *Tresor* are taken from Beltrami's edition. The chapter and paragraph numbering was introduced by Carmody. For an English translation: Baldwin & Barrette 1993. For its characterization as a political encyclopaedia: Meier 1997, p. 113.

²³ The classic work on Brunetto Latini remains Sundby 1884. The standard biography is Ceva 1965. For other biographies: D'Addario 1971, p. 578-579; Bolton Holloway 1993; Carmody & Fery-Hue 1992, p. 213-215; Inglese 2005, p. 4-12; Mazzoni 1971, p. 579-588; De Vincentiis 2010, p. 41-47.

²⁴ On its tripartite structure, see especially: Meier 2002, p. 518; Meier 1992, p. 173-175.

²⁵ Prior to the discovery of the *De regimine ciuitatum* Latini's section on city government was deemed largely original. In 1869 Adolfo Mussafia drew attention to the fact that Latini must have known the *Oculus pastoralis*. However, once the *De regimine ciuitatum* was discovered in the late-nineteenth century, a sec-

Fritz Hertter put this corpus on the map more than a hundred years ago, in 1910, with his dissertation, *Die Podestàliteratur Italiens*,²⁶ and the latest overview studies examining these works in their own right date back to the mid-twentieth century, namely an article by Albano Sorbelli in 1944 and a study by Vittorio Franchini in 1954.²⁷ These academics—and others following in their footsteps—have defined this corpus as a series of didactic works, exclusively or partially targeted at explaining and exemplifying the duties of the *podestà* and his staff.²⁸ Inevitably, other scholars have called into question the existence of this canon. Some scholars, like Terence Tunberg, have questioned the attribution of this label to a specific work,²⁹ while other scholars have taken this criticism a step further. They have argued that this group of texts is neither so unitary nor so specific to the *podestà* as other readings take it to be. Enrico Artifoni, the leading expert on the *podestà* regime,³⁰ has especially voiced this opinion. He has repeatedly stated that these works do not merit a common label and that it is preferable to position them under the umbrella of rhetorical-didactic literature. According to Artifoni, the corpus is set up too broadly if having the *podestà* as its target audience is the mark, while it is defined

ond, more fundamental link between the *Tresor* and this work became apparent. While Francesco Novati already referred to the existence of ‘numerous close links’ between both works in 1888, Gaetano Salvemini deserves the credit for developing this intuition into a comparative table. Salvemini 1903, p. 293-294. This view is now generally accepted. Only Albano Sorbelli has challenged this thesis of direct borrowing. Sorbelli 1944, p. 78-79, 99-100, and 106-114. His argumentation has, however, not been followed. See especially Artifoni 1986, p. 712-713; Tunberg 1986, p. 119 n. 11; Zorzi 2001, p. 271. On the political character of this rewriting: Napolitano 2018b.

²⁶ Hertter 1910.

²⁷ Franchini 1954 (sharply critical of Sorbelli); Sorbelli 1944.

²⁸ Franchini 1954, p. 319; Franchini 1912, p. 233; further developed by Franceschi 1964-1965, p. 205.

²⁹ Terence Tunberg challenges the classification of the *Oculus pastoralis* as a guidebook for the *podestà*, ranking it under the heading of the *dicerie*, a collection of secular speeches. Tunberg 1986, p. 6, 18, and 21-33; Tunberg 1990, p. 4 and 6.

³⁰ Through his detailed and fertile studies Enrico Artifoni has turned the link between rhetoric and city politics into a commonplace of Italian historiography. See especially his pioneering studies: Artifoni 1994; Artifoni 1993; Artifoni 1986. For a recent summary of his main findings (with an updated bibliography): Artifoni 2014.

too narrowly if the test is whether it fully covers the knowledge required to govern an Italian city.³¹

Notwithstanding this authoritative current in modern scholarship, I am of the opinion that the *podestà* literature deserves its own chamber within the literary building of didactic literature in thirteenth-century Italy.³² In fact, I find it difficult to ignore that these texts repeatedly characterize their content specifically as a *sapientia* or *doctrina potestatis*.³³ I am also strengthened in my position by the presence of additional markers of a literary tradition, such as the use of programmatic titles (*De regimine ciuitatum*), the central theme of good government embodied by a virtuous *podestà*, the recurrence of certain topics (especially the impartial and incorrupt administration of justice), and the repetition of certain materials (such as quotes, anecdotes or proverbs). Finding further comfort in the confirmation of textual derivation across these works (see above), I am of the opinion that an element of unity within the undeniable diversity of the *podestà* literature can be discerned, namely its didactic function within a specific communicative setting. The prologues and epilogues explicitly underline their didactic value for those who are called to higher office, both newcomers and experienced officeholders.³⁴ For these reasons I hold the view that the use of a specific label for these texts—and their continued examination as a (sub)group of didactic texts—remains warranted and justified. Furthermore, this academic debate is not without practical consequences. The existence of a specific label colours the focus of the scholarly community, generates the attention of scholars particularly interested in a certain topic, and steers their reading of these texts. Just as Enrico Artifoni developed his position in reaction to a reductive, institutional reading of these texts which solely mined them for

³¹ Artifoni 2000, p. 276-277; Artifoni 1993, p. 64; Artifoni 1986, p. 678-688. This line of reasoning has also been picked up by other academics, such as Andrea Zorzi. Zorzi 2001, p. 269-270.

³² For my position in this debate, see also Napolitano 2013b.

³³ See, for instance: *De reg. ciu.*, p. 217, prologue; 221, XI; 232, XLVIII; 250, XCII; 267, CXXX; 277, CXL; *De reg. pot.*, p. 60, incipit; 106, XX; 226, explicit; *Tresor*, p. 852, III.101.

³⁴ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 217, prologue; 277, CXL; *De reg. pot.*, p. 224, XXXII, v. 1549 and 1555, and 104, XIX, v. 448-449; *Oc. Past.*, p. 135, prologue, l. 6-7; *Tresor*, p. 4, I.1.4; 852, III.101.1.

data on institutional structures and promoted his alternative label to facilitate an examination of the *podestà* regime from a broader, cultural perspective,³⁵ I trust that a renewed, but non-reductive use of the *podestà* literature label will allow us to move beyond a rhetoric-centric study of these texts.³⁶ Moreover, I am of the opinion that many of the differences in form, structure or content which have puzzled scholars looking for unity across these works become less baffling if one takes into account that these texts originated and functioned in different didactic settings. Contrary to the traditional, relatively flat and undiversified picture of the *podestà* literature as didactic instruments I would like to develop the hypothesis that the professional training of the *podestà* and his *familia* did not develop overnight nor did it follow a 'one size fits all' model. Given the dynamics involved in learning the ropes of this new office, its formation took on different shapes.³⁷ As stated above, the *podestà* office was still in an embryonic phase during an early, experimental stage (1180s-1220s) and, therefore, not yet ready to be fully articulated in writing. Moreover, the required number of *podestà* was relatively limited,³⁸ and the first generation of *podestà* could easily be recruited from the upper ranks of the *militia*.³⁹ Building upon their general education as *milites*,⁴⁰ and, in many instances, their previous political experience, these *podestà* discovered the ins-and-outs of the office on-the-job, through trial and error. They only needed educational support in specific areas or on particular topics. The production of the *Oculus pastoralis*, a speech collection covering a selection of thematic issues directly relevant to a *podestà*,⁴¹ fits such a con-

³⁵ Artifoni 1993, p. 63-64.

³⁶ Enrico Artifoni has substantially contributed to our understanding of the political culture of the *podestà* regime in his later work, such as the importance of counsel within this institutional framework, or recently, its ethical underpinnings. See Artifoni 2009; Artifoni 2004. See also Quagliani 2007, p. 239; Quagliani 1995, p. 18-19 (stating that another type of reading could yield new results).

³⁷ On these different didactic settings, see also Napolitano 2015.

³⁸ Vallerani 1994, p. 390 and 393.

³⁹ Maire Vigueur 2001, p. 83.

⁴⁰ Gilli 2005, p. 100; Maire Vigueur 2001, p. 80-81; Maire Vigueur 2000, p. 1097.

⁴¹ The *Oculus pastoralis* deals with topics as diverse as the pros and cons of entering into a city alliance, the appropriate response to a request for redress in

text of topic-specific training. Later, as family dynasties, or parts thereof, started to specialize in the paid exercise of governmental duties,⁴² political expertise was transmitted from one family member to another via oral, one-on-one education. The *De regimine et sapientia potestatis* is a written testament to this type of family-organized instruction. As underlined above, the *podestà* office became a stable feature of the Italian commune from the 1220s onwards. The office also spread more widely and a higher number of persons entered into the office.⁴³ Consequently, the proper exercise of the office was no longer self-evident to all new entrants and a need to put into writing what may once have been understood developed.⁴⁴ The *podestà* tended to look to his legal advisors for this kind of support and guidance. In fact, none of the surviving texts was written by a *podestà*. These legal practitioners were not only happy to oblige, but also perfectly equipped for this task. Accustomed to translating general principles to concrete circumstances and to writing for a non-specialist audience they were trained in the recording of practices and customs, they had access to source texts to be ransacked for useful principles, and they were familiar with the best governance practices of their time through their itinerant lifestyle in the retinue of a *podestà*. Furthermore, the retinue context, with its regularly held, informal meetings, *sero (...) post cenam et maxime tempore yemali et etiam wernali*,⁴⁵ formed the perfect laboratory for such a 'master class' in the art of city politics. The production of the *De regimine ciuitatum* corre-

case of a shipwreck, for restitution of stolen cattle or for payment of overdue debt, a plea for imperial mercy when faced with an accusation of *lese majesté*, or the ethical dilemma of engaging in a just war.

⁴² On this phenomenon: Artifoni 2005, p. 528. The prosopographical evidence shows that, as a rule, the fulfilment of this office had only an episodic character. Only rarely did a *podestà* occupy it more than once, and, if they did, these appointments were often not consecutively held. However, when one looks at this phenomenon at a family level, it becomes evident that certain families started to occupy these offices on a regular basis. For this evidence: Maire Vigueur 2000. See also Menant 2005, p. 80-81.

⁴³ This affirmation of the *podestà* institution is visible in an increase in the number of appointments. For the period 1201-1210 the number of appointments was 131. In 1211-1220 it climbed to 198, and in 1221-1230 it jumped to 309 appointments. See the tables prepared by Volterra & Maire Vigueur 2000.

⁴⁴ Epstein 2000, p. 284.

⁴⁵ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 217, prologue.

sponds to this type of retinue-based training. The fourth and final setting involves private teaching. As Brunetto Latini ended up living in exile, he had to look for new sources of income. In addition to his notarial services to exiled fellow-citizens,⁴⁶ he seems to have turned to teaching. In the process he found a literary outlet for his political commitment, re-inventing the *podestà* office as an attractive power-sharing structure suited for a changed political context in which Charles of Anjou (1227-1285) had appeared as a new player.⁴⁷ At the same time he managed to condense a library of *auctoritates* into a single, manageable volume, encapsulating the treatment of the *podestà* office in a full-blown encyclopaedic project and providing its recipient with a strong knowledge base, an effective moral compass, and the necessary rhetorical skills to govern an Italian city in accordance with Italian customs.⁴⁸

3. Comparison

Armed with these basic insights into the *podestà* literature it is now time to turn our attention to a comparison of two of these texts with two contemporary mirrors for princes—a literary tradition said to have reached its apogee in the thirteenth century in

⁴⁶ Traces in the archives show him travelling to and from Arras, Paris, and Bar-sur-Aube. For a detailed discussion: Cella 2003, p. 367-408. See also Maffia Scariati 2005.

⁴⁷ On this reinvention, see Napolitano 2018b.

⁴⁸ Unfortunately, there is no surviving evidence of the ownership of the original composition. Moreover, the patron is not named in the *Tresor*, but merely referred to in the prologue as a *biau douz amis*—a reference echoed in the introduction to the political section. See *Tresor*, p. 4, I.1.4; 788, III.73.1. See also *Tresor*, p. 126, I.93.2; 638, III.1.13. The identity of this recipient will, therefore, probably remain forever elusive. This conundrum has given rise to much speculation. Broadly speaking, two hypotheses have been put forward with respect to the identity of this patron. Both scenarios point to a person living in France. Traditionally, this patron has been sought within the exiled Florentine elite. Alternatively, Charles of Anjou – or someone in his entourage – has been advanced as a possible candidate. Scholars have even argued that both categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Brunetto Latini may have written the work for a wealthy Florentine living in France who, in turn, presented it to the French royal court. In a variation on this hypothesis of a native French patron, the urban elite of northern France has been suggested as its intended recipient. For an overview of this debate: Napolitano 2018b.

the context of the rapidly consolidating kingdom of France under Capetian rule.⁴⁹

Scholars working on either type of literature, such as Gustav Hanauer or Wilhelm Berges, have not hesitated to speak of a *Podestatspiegel*,⁵⁰ while Enrico Fenzi uses the term *specchio del podestà*,⁵¹ and Philip Jones, in his rich book on the Italian city-state, refers to the *podestà* literature as ‘mirrors for magistrates’.⁵² Likewise, Hans Hubert Anton, a specialist on the princely mirrors genre, calls the *podestà* literature ‘eine neue Form der Spiegel’.⁵³ Notwithstanding these general statements, the exact nature and degree of correspondence between both corpora still awaits examination.⁵⁴ In this contribution I intend to initiate this comparative exercise. This high-level overview of parallels and contrasts is, however, not intended to be exhaustive nor definitive. It is rather meant as an invitation and starting point for further investigation. Indeed provoking further research into the interconnectedness of both groups of texts is one of the goals of this contribution.

3.1. Texts, parameters, and underlying factors

Four mid-thirteenth-century texts will be compared. For the *podestà* literature, the focus is on the undisputed prototype of this corpus, the *Liber de regimine ciuitatum* (1234), and its abridged, revised and translated version, inserted as the last section of the *Tresor* (1260-1266/67) (see above), while, for the princely mirrors, the *Eruditio regum et principum* (1259) by the Franciscan Gilbert of Tournai (d. 1284)⁵⁵ and the *De morali principis institutione* (1260-1263) by the Dominican Vincent of Beauvais

⁴⁹ Anton 2006, p. 7; Bell 1962, p. 13; Genet 1977, p. xii-xiii; Le Goff 2012, p. 39. On this tradition and its model of rulership: Bell 1962; Guenée 1985, p. 69-74; Krynen 1993, p. 170-204; Quaglioni 1987; Senellart 1995, p. 47-52.

⁵⁰ Berges 1938, p. 106; Hanauer 1902, p. 411.

⁵¹ Fenzi 2008, p. 359.

⁵² Jones 2004, p. 486 and 530.

⁵³ Anton 2006, p. 26.

⁵⁴ In their discussion Bierschwale and Van Leeuwen briefly highlight certain areas of correspondence. See Bierschwale & Van Leeuwen 2005, p. 94-95 and 149.

⁵⁵ Gilbert de Tournai, *Eruditio Regum et Principum*, ed. A. de Poorter 1914 (*Erud.*).

(d. 1264) have been selected.⁵⁶ Both works were composed by these two Parisian mendicant-theologians for the French king Louis IX (r. 1226-1270), later Saint Louis,⁵⁷ and members of his Capetian dynasty.⁵⁸ They are deemed typical of this type of royal instruction.⁵⁹ This synchronic comparison is not set up as an investigation into—let alone, a claim of—textual links between both groups.⁶⁰ Its purpose is rather to discern the existence of a shared concept of temporal rulership (if any), irrespective of the differences in institutional form, and to bring out what is distinctive of each group. To this end four parameters have been selected as a guide of things to look for. Firstly, the underlying assumptions on the origins, purpose and exercise of temporal power are examined. Next, the general approach to good government is determined, followed by a discussion of the specific method deemed most appropriate for securing such government. Finally, the actual promise of good government is analyzed. Once this comparison

⁵⁶ Vincenti Belvacensis, *De morali principis institutione*, ed. R. Schneider 1995 (*De instit.*).

⁵⁷ On this figure: Le Goff 1996.

⁵⁸ According to certain scholarship (Berges 1938, p. 185-195; 302-308; as revised and developed by Schneider 1990), Vincent's text was designed to function as the opening section of a never completed *opus uniuersale de statu principis*, a series of interrelated works on the *status* of the prince and his royal court, the administration of the commonwealth and the governance of the whole realm. On the team effort behind this project, see Schneider 1990, p. 292. His earlier pedagogical work, *De eruditione filiorum nobilium* (1247-1250), was originally intended to conclude this opus as the fourth and final book. For this text: Vincent of Beauvais, *De eruditione filiorum nobilium*, ed. A. Steiner 1938. Louis IX also wrote a mirror for his son, Philip III the Bold (1245-1285), known as the *Enseignements*. This mirror is not so much an expression of his personal experiences as a king, but rather a reiteration of the admonitions of the mentioned friars. On this text: *The Teachings of Saint Louis*, ed. D. O'Connell 1972.

⁵⁹ Berges 1938, p. 80.

⁶⁰ Scholars have confirmed that the authors of the *podestà* literature used earlier mirrors as part of their source material. In addition, both types of compilations shared, to an extent, the same source material. See the editions cited above for more details. As far as the two selected mirrors are concerned, no claim of a direct link has, however, been formulated. Indirect links (in particular via John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* (1159)) deserve further examination. This work might have functioned as a node of contact between both circuits. Furthermore, the possibility of contact and exchange is not to be excluded, especially in the case of Brunetto Latini, who lived in France (*inter alia* in Paris) in the 1260s and was conversant with—and influenced by—French encyclopedic enterprises, especially that of Vincent of Beauvais.

is completed, the underlying factors driving the similarities and differences between both corpora are examined. In this context particular attention is paid to the link between these parallels and contrasts and the longstanding legitimacy issues surrounding the Italian commune and the continuing struggle between competing groups within the commune.

3.2. Assumptions on the origins, purpose and exercise of temporal power

As far as the first parameter is concerned, the *podestà* literature shares with the *specula* a basic reference to the Pauline doctrine that all power derives from God: *omnis potestas a Deo est* (Rom. 13.1).⁶¹ According to this divine sanction of worldly rulership, the king and city magistrate govern their respective communities *gratia Dei* (1 Cor. 15.10).⁶² In addition, the basic storyline on the origins of temporal power is Augustinian. Due to the fallen nature of mankind, earthly power is presented as a necessary evil, a *remedium peccati* permitted by God.⁶³ It has been instituted *ad uindictam malefactorum, laudem uero bonorum* (1 Petr. 2.14).⁶⁴ This power of correction is to be exercised by a man of the right caliber, that is to say a man who surpasses his subjects or citizens in virtue (see below). According to this narrative, such a king or city magistrate will earn the willing obedience of his subjects or citizens through his virtuous dispensation of justice, thus creating a bond of mutual love, built upon trust and care, and generating a spiral upwards for the community.⁶⁵ The *podestà* literature adds, how-

⁶¹ *De instit.*, p. 29, V; 112, XXII; *De reg. ciu.*, p. 219, IV; 222, XIII; 227, XXXII; 230, XLVI; 231, XLVII; 234, LVII; 237, LXI; 266, CXXVIII; 271, CXXXIII; 272, CXXXV; *Tresor*, p. 792, III.74.1; 814-818, III.82.3-14.

⁶² See, for instance: *De instit.*, p. 3, prologue; *De reg. ciu.*, p. 222, XIII; 223, XVI; 230, XLVI; 234, LVII; *Erud.*, p. 6, prologue.

⁶³ See, for instance: *De instit.*, p. 11-22, II-III; 55, X; *Tresor*, p. 790, III.73.2; 800, III.77.1; 806, III.79.3. This narrative is less pronounced, but not absent in *De reg. ciu.*, p. 218, I.

⁶⁴ See, for instance: *De instit.*, p. 17, III; *De reg. ciu.*, p. 235, LVIII; 249, LXXIX; 266, CXXVIII; 267, CXXIX; *Tresor*, p. 360, II.18.22; 802, III.77.3.

⁶⁵ Building upon the *Oculus pastoralis* (p. 135, I.1, l. 21-43), the *Tresor* (p. 792, III.74) lists three pillars of city government: *iustitia in rectore, reuerencia in subiectis, amor requiritur in utrisque*. Compare with *Erud.*, p. 83-91, III.1-7.

ever, two explanatory narratives to this traditional core of patristic ideas, namely the Ciceronian tale of a wise and eloquent legislator able to convince primitive man to abandon his brutish ways and to live together in a single place under the rule of law (a narrative which can rather easily be accommodated with the Augustinian storyline),⁶⁶ and, in the *Tresor*, a not so easily reconcilable Aristotelian account of man's natural sociability according to which man is fitted by nature to live in a community.⁶⁷

3.3. Actor-centred approach to good government

In other words, the *podestà* literature and the mirrors for princes share a moral, person-oriented approach to temporal power which equates good rule to good ruler. The moral integrity of the ruler (*bona uita*) is seen as a guarantee for responsible government (*bona administratio*),⁶⁸ while the peaceful and flourishing condition of the kingdom or city is said to reflect the virtue of its king or city magistrate, just as a good tree is known by the goodness of its fruit,⁶⁹ or the prosperity of a beehive is reflective of the health of its queen bee.⁷⁰ This antithetical set-up between good and bad government—i.e. a black-and-white opposition between the *rex iustus* and its malicious counterpart, the tyrant⁷¹—links directly into a praise-and-blame model designed to entice the king or city magistrate to act virtuously for the sake of earthly fame and salvation in the afterlife and out of fear for ill repute and future torment. In the context of the *podestà* regime this performance appraisal took the institutional form of the *sindicatio*, an *ad hoc* form of public scrutiny organized at the end of his term during which the *podestà* had to render an account of his performance to

⁶⁶ Given its characteristic emphasis on the historical figure and teachings of Cicero, this model is the most pronounced in the *Tresor*. See, for instance: *Tresor*, p. 32-34, I.17.1-2; 636, III.1.7; 790, III.73.3. See also *De reg. ciu.*, p. 219, III.

⁶⁷ *Tresor*, p. 336, II.5.2; 424, II.45.9.

⁶⁸ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 279, CXLIV.

⁶⁹ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 221, XI.

⁷⁰ *Tresor*, p. 266, I.154.6. See also *De reg. ciu.*, p. 221, XI.

⁷¹ On this distinction: *De reg. ciu.*, p. 262-265, CXXIV-CXXVI; *Erud.*, p. 83-86, III.1; *Tresor*, p. 838-842, III.96.

a panel of selected citizens.⁷² The outcome was either a honourable discharge or an obligation to indemnify the citizens for incurred damages.⁷³ A *podestà* should, however, not only fear *persone infamia* and *damphnum pecunie*, but also *anime detrimentum*.⁷⁴ In this respect the recurring echo of the first sentence of Solomon's Book of Wisdom, *diligite iusticiam qui iudicatis terram*, is not accidental.⁷⁵ For the monarchy (which, as a rule, is exercised until the king's death), the stress was even more on the prospect of salvation in the afterlife—and not on earthly monitoring, let alone sanctioning, of his performance. Despite the stress on the vanity of earthly power, the potentially positive effects of a desire for a good earthly reputation were, however, not entirely neglected in these mirrors.⁷⁶

In this rulership model the focus is clearly on the anthropomorphic head of the body politic and his virtue—and not on institutional arrangements. Except for Latini's *Tresor*, which has been recognized as an important tipping point in this respect,⁷⁷ these works are not primarily interested in the institutional structures best suited to secure good government. Rather than attempting to design the best constitution, these authors endeavored to make rule by one man better. To this end they strove to create a personal, internal check on the unbridled exercise of power. It was only in the wake of the reception of Aristotle's *Politics* in the late-

⁷² On this accountability mechanism: Boggetti 1933-1934; Crescenzi 1981; Engelmann 1938. See also, more recently, Isenmann 2010 and Sabapathy 2011 and 2014. For a salutary warning that the *sindicatio* process was less straightforward in practice than in theory: Geltner 2018.

⁷³ On the importance attributed to earthly honour in the *podestà* literature (i.e. it being worth more than a thousand treasures): *De reg. ciu.*, p. 241, LXIV; 259, CXIV.

⁷⁴ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 240, LXIV.

⁷⁵ See, for instance: *De reg. ciu.*, p. 246, LXXX; 257, CXIII; *Tresor*, p. 546, II.91.9; 838, III.95.2.

⁷⁶ See especially *Erud.*, p. 66-67, II.2.1. See, for instance, *De instit.*, p. 88, XVII and p. 94, XVIII.

⁷⁷ Brunetto Latini recognizes the existence of different government regimes. *Tresor*, p. 36, I.18.4; 412, II.44.1; 604, II.119.1; 800, III.77.1. He is also the first of these authors to introduce typologies of government forms. *Tresor*, p. 790-792, III.73.3-6. Finally, Latini is often credited as the first communal political thinker to have voiced a preference for republicanism. *Tresor*, p. 412, II.44.1. However, the weight of the Aristotelian input in the *Tresor* should not be exaggerated. Latini was receptive to Aristotelian learning, but he did not produce a synthesis.

thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries that a new vocabulary became fully available and that an in-depth discussion of institutional arrangements came to the fore in Italy, especially through the efforts of three Parisian-educated Dominicans, namely Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274) and two of his students, Ptolemy of Lucca (c. 1236-1327) and Remigio de' Girolami (c. 1246-1319), Giles of Rome (c. 1243-1316), an Augustinian who had also studied in Paris under Thomas Aquinas, and, finally, a rector of the University of Paris, Marsilius of Padua (c. 1275/80-1342/3).

3.4. *Mores and modi*

In line with this person-oriented approach the princely mirrors and *podestà* literature contain a program of self-examination and moral reform for the head of the political community—and this for both newcomers and more experienced officeholders. Such a call for voluntary moral reform still struck a chord at a time when politics had not yet developed into a distinctive discipline, but was still considered a branch of moral philosophy.⁷⁸ In other words, the authors of these works shared a basic confidence in the corrigibility of man, a belief that the corrupted nature of man could be disciplined through proper instruction. As underlined above for the *podestà* literature, this instruction took on different shapes, outside of an institutionalized context (e.g. university), and required continuous—or at least, regular—efforts. Ideally it became part of daily practice (e.g. through regular, open discussions at the retinue level). The same observation can be made for the mirrors in which the recipient was encouraged to incorporate his reading of the mirror, divided into easily digestible parts, into his daily meditations.⁷⁹ In both instances this educational enterprise was mainly driven by vocational motives (i.e. to prepare for the proper exercise of an office), and not pursued out of mere intellectual curiosity. The formulation of this ethical ideal did, therefore, not remain theoretical and abstract. Both groups of authors

⁷⁸ See, especially: *Tresor*, p. 10-12, I.4.1-5. On politics as a discipline in medieval times: Coleman 1996.

⁷⁹ On the principle of daily meditation, see, for instance: *De instit.*, p. 80, XV; *Erud.*, p. 10, I.2.1; 24, I.2.6.

made substantial efforts to translate the core values and general principles laid down in their works (see below) into functional rules and guidelines for their respective audience, thus creating a hybrid between a value- and rule-based approach to good government. Through their works they aimed to raise the level of ethical awareness of their audience by creating a dialogue on the proper way to handle the ethical challenges faced by them, especially in ‘red flag’ areas such as the administration of justice and the military protection of the city. The *podestà* literature takes this guidance and support, however, a step further than the mirrors. For instance, the authors of the *podestà* literature did not merely discuss the virtue of justice, but they also showcased their first-hand knowledge of its day-to-day administration, including a detailed discussion of procedural steps reminiscent of manuals *de ordine iudiciario*—and even concrete stage directions for the public pronouncement of a judgment.⁸⁰ They also provided the city magistrate with a set of hands-on tools for the exercise of his office. For instance, one will not find an equivalent of the detailed script, outlining the term of the *podestà*, in the mirrors.⁸¹ Nor are there any model letters or speeches to be found in the mirrors. In other words, Giovanni da Viterbo and Brunetto Latini did not solely deal with the contemplation and operationalization of an ethical ideal of rulership (its *mores*), but they also taught the ‘mechanics’ of the craft of city governance (its *modus*).⁸² Politics became more of a profession, and not only a fight for justice. Deliberately mixing moral precepts and guidelines with technical advice and concrete tools, Giovanni and Brunetto aimed to enable the city magistrate not only to be morally virtuous, but also politically effective.⁸³

⁸⁰ Compare, for instance, *De reg. ciu.*, p. 247-250, LXXXIV-XCI with *Erud.*, p. 67-82, II,2.2-10.

⁸¹ This observation should not come as a surprise since kingship was not taken up for a fixed term, but for a potentially long lifecycle. It would be rather cumbersome to design a script for this cycle. Nor does this exclude the development of detailed scripts for specific key events during the reign outside of the mirrors genre (e.g. in *ordines*).

⁸² This observation does not exclude that technical aspects of the education of a prince (e.g. his martial training) took place via other channels.

⁸³ On the distinction between the promotion of moral virtue and political effectiveness, see the contribution of Susan Jacobs to this volume.

3.5. Ideal ruler

As already indicated above, the core message of the *podestà* literature and the *specula*—their ethics of power—was largely similar. Nevertheless, upon closer reading telling shifts in emphasis can be discerned. Although their world view (including their ‘mission statement’ for temporal power) was—and remained—deeply religious (see above), Giovanni da Viterbo and Brunetto Latini purposefully skipped over the city of God, considered the privileged domain of theologians. They were exclusively oriented towards the sphere of worldly government, the *ciuitas terrena*,⁸⁴ while Gilbert of Tournai and Vincent of Beauvais showed a continued concern with the salvation of the king’s soul and his place in the *regnum aeternum*.⁸⁵ As to the ideal profile of the city magistrate and its stress upon moral excellence (see above), Giovanni da Viterbo and Brunetto Latini managed to give a political twist to the centuries-old debate on the true essence of nobility by promoting, albeit to different degrees, an open recruitment of the city magistrate based upon individual talent and merit (understood as personal virtue or *nobilitas animi*), instead of an appointment based upon rights of blood (*nobilitas generis* or *corporis*).⁸⁶ Even the mirrors did not solely play the descent card—a strategy probably inspired by the debatable nature of such blood ties for the Capetian dynasty. In a key passage Vincent of Beauvais had to list no less than four grounds supporting their claim to the throne: divine sanction, consent of the people, church approval and passage of time in good faith.⁸⁷ Furthermore, although the ideal *podestà* was presented as a man of orthodox faith in the *podestà* literature, a *defensor ecclesiae* who would protect and uphold the rights and immunities of the church and its clergy,⁸⁸ this presentation did not assume the saintly proportions characteristic of French king-

⁸⁴ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 218–219, III. See also *Tresor*, p. 152, I.107.3.

⁸⁵ See, for instance, *Erud.*, p. 38–41, I.2.11; 90, III.7.

⁸⁶ For the differences between both authors (with further references), see Napolitano 2018b.

⁸⁷ *De instit.*, p. 22, IV.

⁸⁸ See, for instance, *Tresor*, p. 794–798, III.75. See also, on the support traditionally provided by French kings, *De instit.*, p. 94, XIX.

ship.⁸⁹ The ethical discussion was also structured differently in both groups. While Gilbert of Tournai gave an allegorical exegesis of the Deuteronomic laws on kingship (*Deut.* 17.14-20) the place of pride in the first of his three epistles,⁹⁰ setting out a *regula regis* (as a sort of variant on a monastic rule),⁹¹ and Vincent of Beauvais used the Trinitarian *imago Dei*, consisting of *potestas*, *sapientia* and *bonitas*,⁹² as his basic structuring principle, Giovanni da Viterbo and Brunetto Latini fell back on the seven capital vices and four cardinal virtues to keep their republican version of the *rex iustus* on the right path.⁹³ Even in this republican context the city magistrate remained, however, the proverbial good shepherd who had to keep his flock of sheep together and to protect its weakest members against the attacks of rapacious wolves.⁹⁴ The city magistrate was also strongly urged to observe the Golden Rule (*dilectio proximi*—*Mt.* 22.35-40; *Lc.* 6.31),⁹⁵ while both Giovanni and Brunetto stressed the importance of *timor Dei* (1 Petr. 2.17), inducing God-fearing man to do good and flee from evil.⁹⁶ Through these differently structured discussions both groups of authors not only depicted an ideal, but also voiced their criticism of contemporary

⁸⁹ See, for instance, Krynen 1993; Le Goff 1996.

⁹⁰ Gilbert's work consists of three epistles, dealing with four basic maxims going back to the *Institutio Traiani*. The first letter treats *reuerentia Dei* and *diligentia sui*, while the second one deals with *disciplina debita potestatum et officialium*. The final epistle discusses the *affectus et protectio subditorum*. See *Erud.*, p. 3-5, table of contents.

⁹¹ For this concept, see, for instance: *Erud.*, p. 9, I.2.1; 13, I.2.2; 16, I.2.3. For this exegesis: *Erud.*, p. 9-42, I.2.1-11.

⁹² On this principle: *De instit.*, p. 54-59, X. The concept of power is discussed in the first nine chapters (p. 11-54), while wisdom takes up chapters 11-16 (p. 59-84) and goodness chapters 17-28 (p. 94-143).

⁹³ The three theological virtues are largely left out of the equation. For the motive behind the reticence to discuss these virtues: *Tresor*, p. 626, II.130.1. On the concept of the *rex iustus*, see, for instance, *De reg. ciu.*, p. 246, LXXVII; *Tresor*, p. 792, III.74.2; 844, III.97.2. For the image of the right path, see for instance, *De reg. ciu.*, p. 231, XLVI. In the *Tresor* Latini adds the Aristotelian virtues to the equation. See *Tresor*, p. 364-388, II.19-29, and 392-398, II.32-38.

⁹⁴ For the shepherd metaphor, see, for instance, *De reg. ciu.*, p. 274, CXXXVI. For the recurring references to the citizenry as a flock, see, for instance, *De reg. ciu.*, p. 231, XLVI; 234, LVII; 235, LVIII; *Tresor*, p. 412-414, II.44.4.

⁹⁵ See, for instance, *Tresor*, p. 112, I.85.4; p. 546, II.91.10; p. 572-574, II.101; p. 624, II.127.2.

⁹⁶ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 245-246, LXXVII. See also *Tresor*, p. 544, II.91.5. On Latini's reticence to discuss theological virtues: *Tresor*, p. 626, II.130.1.

society, albeit aimed at different targets. Giovanni da Viterbo and Brunetto Latini did not hesitate to direct their criticism against a particular type of *podestà*, highlighting, for instance, the dangers of greed and avarice, responsible for theft and plunder on the part of certain city magistrates,⁹⁷ or addressing the widespread practice of severe and cruel sentencing in their treatment of the *quaestio* whether it was better to be loved or feared as a city magistrate.⁹⁸ Gilbert of Tournai and Vincent of Beauvais, on the other hand, singled out the court as the main target of their criticism. They discussed in great detail the negative aspects of envy—a vice certainly not foreign to Italian cities deeply divided by factional strife, and therefore, together with pride, not absent from the *podestà* literature.⁹⁹ According to Gilbert and Vincent, the vicious aspects of envy manifested themselves, however, particularly within the context of a court, vividly depicted as a vicious world, tarnished by ambition, flattery and adulation¹⁰⁰—temptations from which even a member of the church was not necessarily immune.¹⁰¹ In contrast to their direct—and rather sharp—criticisms of the public performance of the *podestà*, Giovanni and Brunetto put less stress than Gilbert and Vincent on the rigid adherence to an ascetic lifestyle by the officeholder. For instance, Giovanni and Brunetto adopted a rather pragmatic approach towards festive exuberance,¹⁰² leaving sufficient room for the requirements of a time in which conspicuous wealth and lavish entertaining were considered an integral part of the art of politics,¹⁰³—or even

⁹⁷ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 220-222, XI; *Tresor*, p. 794-798, III.75.

⁹⁸ On this practice: *De reg. ciu.*, p. 249, LXXXVIII; *Tresor*, p. 834, III.92.2. For the *quaestio*: *De reg. ciu.*, p. 262-265, CXXIV-CXXVI; *Tresor*, p. 838-842, III.96.

⁹⁹ Brunetto Latini even argued that envy within the Lombard nobility had paved the way for the German emperors. *Tresor*, p. 124, I.93.1.

¹⁰⁰ Similar warnings are not entirely absent from the *podestà* literature, but they are less developed. The fact that the retinue of a city magistrate (sometimes designated as a *curia*) was smaller than a king's court is probably not foreign to this observation.

¹⁰¹ *Erud.*, p. 50-65, II.1.7-17.

¹⁰² *De reg. ciu.*, p. 236, LX and 241, LXV; *Tresor*, p. 508, II.76.4.

¹⁰³ As indicated above, the *De regimine et sapientia potestatis* provides a revealing look behind-the-scenes of the *podestà* office, discussing in detail his living arrangements, living habits and leisure activities. See especially, *De reg. pot.*, p. 120-132, XXI-XXII, v. 609-796.

towards an overactive libido.¹⁰⁴ Giovanni and Brunetto formulated, however, an important exception to this principle, namely when personal behavior risked having a negative impact on the proper performance of the office, as, for instance, in the case of drunkenness. Under no circumstances was the consumption of wine allowed to jeopardize the orderly proceedings of a council.¹⁰⁵

3.6. Underlying factors

Having completed the high-level comparison of both corpora, a few, final words need to be said on the underlying factors which drove these similarities and differences. By tapping into the same assumptions on the origins, purpose, and exercise of temporal power as the *specula* and by formulating a similar promise of good government, the authors of the *podestà* literature strove to support the legitimacy of the Italian commune—a key issue throughout the communal era. As demonstrated above, these authors extended the religious foundations of royal power to the sphere of the self-governing city. They also established a similar benchmark of moral excellence for the city magistrate. He had to be a good shepherd, a *rex iustus* watching over his flock—an image particularly attractive to the legalistic Italian commune. Finally, they designed a program of voluntary self-regulation in order to prepare the city magistrate to live up to this benchmark, built around the principles of self-restraint and virtue (or better, avoidance of vice). Through this focus on the internal struggle to be waged by the city magistrate against *malitia* they formulated an alternative—or at least, complement—to the traditionally expected display of military prowess on the battlefield.¹⁰⁶ In completing this transfer—and, where appropriate, adaptation and revision (see below)—of an already existing concept of temporal rulership and the adoption of a preventive, person-oriented approach to good government the fundamental objective of these authors was to

¹⁰⁴ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 241, LXV. See also: *Tresor*, p. 508, II.76.4. For a considerably stricter view on the topic of *castitas regalis*, see, for instance: *Erud.*, p. 16-18, I.2.3.

¹⁰⁵ *De reg. ciu.*, p. 236, LX.

¹⁰⁶ For the wordplay on *militia* and *malitia*, see *Erud.*, p. 6, I, prologue.

develop and preserve public trust in the *podestà*, a key asset for what was after all a relatively new figure on the political scene.

As far as the differences between both corpora are concerned, it has already been pointed out that the institutional characteristics of both offices inevitably left their mark on the texts, as illustrated by the dissimilarities linked to the different duration of both offices (for life versus for a fixed term). A second factor deserves, however, to be highlighted here, namely the didactic contexts in which the texts were produced and functioned. First of all, it should be noted that the authors of both types of texts were intimately familiar with the workings of the halls of power, albeit to different degrees and in different roles. In addition, both groups of authors used their intellectual expertise and know-how to carve out a position as trusted advisor to a politically senior figure. The main difference between both didactic settings consists, however, in the fact that the mirrors were produced by two mendicants-theologians for a reputedly monastic king, while, in the Italian context, lay legal practitioners put their expertise into writing at the request of (future) lay city magistrates.¹⁰⁷ By opening up the clerical monopoly on this type of teaching¹⁰⁸—which was certainly not the primary component of their job description and a time-consuming task to boot¹⁰⁹—these legal practitioners contributed to the gradual emancipation of the sphere of worldly government, without, however, rupturing their basic agreement on the concept of temporal rulership (see above). This emancipation is *inter alia* discernible in the exclusive focus on the *ciuitas terrena*, the shift from monastic asceticism to civic pragmatism, the introduction of *ad hoc* monitoring and sanctioning instru-

¹⁰⁷ This observation should not be read as a claim of an intransgressible dichotomy between the religious and secular spheres within the Italian commune. For studies stressing the interconnectedness of both spheres, see, for instance, Andrews 2013 and Thompson 2005.

¹⁰⁸ Opening up a monopoly did not mean replacing it. As illustrated by the list of later political manuals given above, the clergy (and especially the regular clergy) continued to play a significant role in Italian city politics and the development of its political thought.

¹⁰⁹ Brunetto Latini completed his work in exile, when he was forcefully exempted from his normal duties in city government, while Giovanni da Viterbo wrote his text during those rare stolen moments in an overloaded work schedule. *De reg. ciu.*, p. 217, prologue.

ments to complement the learning process, or the greater openness towards types of source material other than the Bible (especially legal and pagan). Given their direct involvement in city government and their specific know-how (e.g. in rhetoric), these judges and notaries also demonstrated a keen interest in the ‘mechanics’ of city politics (its *modus*), and not only its *mores*—which remained the focus of the friars-theologians. In other words, the royal model was not simply copy-pasted to a city context. It was adapted and revised. These adaptations and revisions did not only contribute to the necessary feelings of ownership of the adapted and revised model, but they also ensured the continued relevance of this model to a new context with its particular needs and dilemmas. Moreover, these educational efforts were not entirely disinterested. In the process these legal practitioners managed to secure their future as trusted advisor to the city magistrate, and some of them even earned lasting recognition as master in the art of city politics (*regimen ciuitatum*).¹¹⁰ At the same time, they made, however, sure not to trespass on the privileged domain of the theologians (*regimen animarum*).¹¹¹ This valorization of the handling of city affairs also underlined the value and utility of their expertise as ‘officials of the word’ vis-à-vis that other group dominating Italian city life, the carriers of the sword. Their tongue—and by extension their pen—became their ‘sword’ and they did not hesitate to promote fame achieved in the corridors of city hall as an alternative to glory won on the battlefield. This promotion of a group identity, with its own ethos and cohesion, did, however, not imply that these legal practitioners always acted as a monolithic bloc. Different categories continued to jockey for supremacy. It is, for instance, telling that, while Giovanni da Viterbo underlined the importance of judges,¹¹² Brunetto Latini did not hesitate to highlight the role played by notaries.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Giovanni Villani (c. 1280-1348) and Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) have immortalized Brunetto Latini as a master in the art of ruling. See Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, Canto XV; Giovanni Villani, *Nuoua Cronica*, Libro nono, X.

¹¹¹ See, for instance, *Tresor*, p. 152, I.107.3.

¹¹² *De reg. ciu.*, p. 226, XXV. Compare to *Tresor*, p. 806-808, III.79.5-7.

¹¹³ *Tresor*, p. 808, III.79.8. Compare to *De reg. ciu.*, p. 226, XXVI.

4. Conclusion

This contribution started with a brief overview of the four surviving exemplars of the *podestà* literature, set against the historical context of communal Italy. Building upon the argument that the label of *podestà* literature—and the examination of these texts as a (sub)group of didactic works—remained warranted and justified, it was argued that this type of didactic literature did not develop overnight nor follow a ‘one size fits all’ model. More precisely, four didactic settings were identified in which these texts originated and functioned: topic-specific training, family-organized instruction, retinue-based training, and private teaching.

Armed with these basic insights into the *podestà* literature, a synchronic comparison of two of these texts, Giovanni da Viterbo’s *De regimine ciuitatum* and Brunetto Latini’s *Tresor*, with two princely mirrors, Gilbert of Tournai’s *Eruditio regum et principum* and Vincent of Beauvais’s *De morali principis institutione*, was undertaken. This high-level comparison looked for similarities and differences between both corpora using the following four parameters as its guide: the underlying assumptions on the origins, purpose and exercise of temporal power, the general approach to good government, the specific method deemed most appropriate for securing such government, and, finally, the actual promise of good government. This comparative exercise was concluded by a discussion of the underlying factors driving the identified parallels and contrasts. A basic agreement on the concept of temporal rulership was mainly ascribed to the efforts of the authors of the *podestà* literature to support the legitimacy of the Italian commune, while the most telling differences could, to a large extent, be attributed to their struggle to secure their own professional niche as trusted advisor to the city magistrate. Furthermore, the resulting transfer of ideas, values and norms on political leadership from a monarchical to a republican context was not simply a matter of scaling down the royal model. Even a high-level comparison of both groups of texts indicates that this transfer from royal court to city hall involved adaptation and revision. In the process the authors of the *podestà* literature contributed to the gradual emancipation of the sphere of worldly government and opened up the traditional discussion of the *mores* of the city mag-

istrate to an investigation of the *modus* of city politics. By adding Aristotelian material to the traditional mix, the *Tresor* even laid the basis for an institution-driven approach to good government in later Italian works—without, however, breaking with the traditional actor-centred approach, oriented towards the betterment of one-man rule through moral instruction.

Finally, I hope that this comparison has whetted the reader's appetite for further research into this topic, resulting in more, detailed and intertwined investigations of both corpora (e.g. on the possible links between both didactic circuits, the didactic strategies used in both corpora, the fundamental building blocks of the texts (such as their structuring principles, hierarchies of values, methods to confront conflicting values and resolve ethical dilemmas, translation of core values and principles into functional norms and guidelines), the indicators of an implementation deficit in the texts, the 'teeth' of the overall framework as presented in the texts, i.e. the monitoring and sanctioning instruments, etc.). In short, the literary tradition on good government truly deserves to be studied across institutional boundaries.

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Abstract

In contrast to medieval mirrors for princes, didactic works targeted at city magistrates have not really held the historian’s interest. This contribution aims to correct this imbalance by starting with an introduction to the *podestà* literature, a series of thirteenth-century didactic works aimed at initiating the *podestà*, the highest officer in an Italian commune, to the exercise of his office. This contribution also intends to promote an approach of—and narrative on—the literary tradition on good government across institutional boundaries through a high-level comparison of two exemplars of the *podestà* literature with two contemporary *specula principis*. This comparison provides us with a new angle on the legitimization issues surrounding the Italian commune as well as the efforts to promote group interests within the commune.

RICHARD STONEMAN

PLATO'S ADVICE TO ALEXANDER:
AMIR KHUSRAW'S *MIRROR*
OF ALEXANDER (1299)

Amir Khusraw of Delhi (1251-1325) is widely reputed the greatest of the Persian poets of India, 'the parrot of India' as he is often called. I. H. Siddiqui calls him 'the most gifted and entertaining of medieval writers, who wrote on contemporary history in prose and verse, in addition to Persian poetry in general'.¹ His poem, *The Mirror of Alexander*, was completed in the year 1299, some twenty years before his western contemporary, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), produced his *Divine Comedy*. Hafez of Shiraz, perhaps the greatest of all poets in the Persian language, was born in the year that Amir Khusraw died. *The Mirror of Alexander* is one of many accounts of the career of Alexander the Great (Iskandar) in Persian literature, and approximately one-sixth of it is devoted to the hero's meeting with the hermit sage Plato, who plies him with advice on kingship. This paper sets out to explain the choice of these two historical figures as vehicles for political wisdom in the Delhi Sultanate, and to characterise the main features of Plato's discourse while setting it in a context of Arabic and Persian *Mirrors for Princes*.

1. *Amir Khusraw*²

Amir Khusraw was both a sufi and a courtier, who served five successive rulers under the Delhi Sultanate which began with the con-

¹ Siddiqui 2006, p. 294.

² For the following summary of Amir Khusraw's life I draw mainly on Sharma 2005.

quest of India by Mahmud of Ghazni (r. 997-1030). Mahmud was also the patron of the Persian national poet, Firdawsi, and of the geographer and of the polymath scholar al-Biruni, best known for his geography of India. Two centuries later, in the early thirteenth century, many Persians fled from Iran and Central Asia to Delhi in the face of the Mongol invasions; the last Caliph of Baghdad was executed in 1258, and Delhi became both a hub and a refuge for Muslims. The state that was established there under the Delhi Sultans caused considerable heart-searching among Muslims, and later historians have been unsure whether to characterise it as a secular state or a theocracy. Kingship is problematic in Muslim thought, so that the Sultans needed to lay claim to the religious authority that had belonged to the caliphs to justify their rule.³

Amir Khusraw's father served under Iltutmish (r. 1211-1236), and the poet himself attracted patronage first from Malik Chajju and then from his cousin, the emperor's son, the artistically inclined Bughra Khan. In 1280 he joined the court of Khan Malik Sultan Muhammad at Multan; known as the Maecenas of his time, his court rivalled that of Delhi, and he even tried to lure the Persian poet Sa'di to settle there. Prince Muhammad was killed in an attack by Timur Khan Tatar in 1285 and Amir Khusraw himself was taken captive, fortunately not for long. His next patron was Sultan Kaiqubad (r. 1287-1290), followed by Jalaluddin Khalji (r. 1290-1296)⁴ and then his nephew and murderer Ala al-Din Khalji, who ruled for twenty years (1296-1316) and styled himself on his coinage 'the second Alexander'.⁵ Ala al-Din was the first Sultan in Delhi to toy with the idea of styling himself Caliph—in which he was encouraged by Amir Khusraw—and his son Qutb al-Din did actually proclaim himself Caliph.⁶ Thus Amir Khusraw, who drafted many political and administrative documents

³ There were a number of works on the duties of the Sultan in this period, including the *Muqaddima* of Fakhr-I Mudabbir for Qutbuddin Aybek (1206-1210) and the *Chachnama* for Iltutmish (1211-1236). These duties include justice, maintenance of peace and order, maintenance of bridges, roads and forts, and creating the conditions for prosperity. See Siddiqui 2006, p. 44-45; also Siddiqui 2003, p. 81, on the distinction between the roles of the sultan and of the *'ulama*.

⁴ On the Khalji takeover, see Siddiqui 2006, p. 95-98.

⁵ Seyller 2001, p. 9. He maintained a total of 66 scholars at his court: Siddiqui 2003, p. 87.

⁶ Auer 2012, p. 119-120.

as well as writing poetry, could celebrate India as a place where the cawing crows of Hinduism were subdued, and even the fish were Sunnis.⁷ Siddiqui characterises Ala al-Din's reign as 'a classic example of a centralized polity that went a long way to inspire rulers throughout the medieval period'.⁸ He reorganized the provincial administration, maintained an efficient network of spies, and built the first canals as well as a number of tanks or reservoirs, turning Delhi into the largest city in the Islamic world.⁹ John Keay describes him as 'an illiterate of unremarkable physique and unendearing presence';¹⁰ nonetheless, he surrounded himself with writers who, it was hoped, would celebrate his many victories and his acquisition of wealth from conquered rivals. He nursed a vision of Islamic domination of the whole of India and religious reform. Some contemporary writers regarded Ala al-Din as a bad king, who went beyond the requirements of justice and *shariah* in his infliction of extravagant punishments.¹¹ Amir Khusraw speaks of these with apparent approval:

Over the heads of all of them, men as well as women, the saw of punishment was drawn (...) the saw with its heart of iron loudly laughed over their heads with tears of blood. Those, who by a secret stroke had become one, were now openly sawed into two, and the soul that had sought union with another soul was now compelled to leave its own body.¹²

He also had eighteen envoys of the Ilkhan Sultan of Persia, Uljaytu, trampled to death by elephants, because of a high-handed message from Uljaytu demanding one of Ala al-Din's daughters.¹³

In addition to his court patrons, Amir Khusraw enjoyed a life-long association with his *pir* or spiritual adviser, Nizam al-Din Awliya. This charismatic spiritual leader was a leading presence in the Chishti order of Sufis, contemplative mystics who practised

⁷ Seyller 2001, p. 10; Siddiqui 2003, p. 84.

⁸ Siddiqui 2006, p. 115.

⁹ Siddiqui 2006, p. 272; Siddiqui 2003, p. 85 and 87.

¹⁰ Keay 2000, p. 255.

¹¹ Auer 2012, p. 142, citing the historian Baranī.

¹² Auer 2012, p. 144, citing *The Campaigns of 'Ala'u'd-Din Khilji: Being the (...) Treasures of Victory*, translated by M. Habib (Madras 1931, p. 12).

¹³ Siddiqui 2006, p. 190-191.

poverty and austerity.¹⁴ Amir Khusraw celebrated his teacher in heartfelt words:

You have the elixir of love in your goblet,
Your message is the timely word from a beloved.
The course of union of both worlds
Is in the space of your two steps.¹⁵

Nizam may have been in his mind when he created the ascetic, mystical figure of Plato who instructs Alexander on the duties of a king

Amir Khusraw's *Āīne -ye Eskandari* or 'Mirror of Alexander' is a very different poem from its main predecessors, by Firdawsi (completed in 1010) and Nizami (1197-1203). It is far more a spiritual quest than an account of the reign and conquests of Alexander. These aspects are disposed of in the first half of the poem, which culminates with the conquest of the Emperor of China and the monstrous Yajuj, and the destruction of the Zoroastrian temples of Iran; there follows Alexander's marriage to the Turkish Amazon warrior Kanifu, fighting in the Chinese army, which unites 'the Moon of China and the Sun of Rum'. Alexander also invents various useful devices, including the astrolabe and the mirror. The whole of Greece is then submerged beneath a flood (the idea may be inspired by Plato's myth of Atlantis), and of the seven philosophers associated with Alexander only Plato, Heraclitus and Porphyry survive by swimming to safety. In the remainder of the poem, to quote Angelo Michele Piemontese, 'this universal king is portrayed as a wise strategist, equanimous (*sic*) ruler, industrious scientist, explorer and conqueror of the world, intrepid navigator of the unknown ocean, all by the grace of God and the favour of Fortune'.¹⁶

The story of the Emperor of China goes back to the Syriac version of the *Alexander Romance*, but had acquired a new edge as a result of the Mongol incursions into Central Asia and India. The alleged destruction of the Zoroastrian books made Alexander 'accursed' for one strand of opinion in Iran, but for good Mus-

¹⁴ Sharma 2005, p. 12-13.

¹⁵ Sharma 2005, p. 31.

¹⁶ Piemontese 2007, p. 31.

lims like Nizami or Amir Khusraw it was *de rigueur*.¹⁷ Alexander is now effectively ruler of the world, and his aim is to seek the best possible advice on how to be the best possible ruler. To this end he seeks out the philosopher Plato. However, the philosopher rebuffs his invitation: 'the ant who wanted to visit Solomon was crushed under the heels of a mule', he pronounces, and insists that it will be better if Alexander comes to him. Alexander duly goes to visit Plato in his 'dragon's cave', where he finds the philosopher, who seems to him to resemble an angel:

His curly locks flowed down over his shoulders, and over them was a thick scarf made from a fox's skin. The row of his teeth, gleaming like a precious porcelain jar, concealed within his mouth his tongue, invisible as the Persian key to a treasure. His chest was thin from his many privations. His body was transparent because of his regular fasting. The veins stood out on his white limbs, like filaments in yellow amber. His face as he spoke shone with the light that emanated from his soul.¹⁸

His wisdom, says the poet, was as vast as the sea.

Plato's cave clearly has a complex ancestry. First of all it recalls the myth of the cave in the *Republic*, in which the inhabitants gaze all their lives at shadows, while thinking that they are observing reality. Secondly it reminds us of Alexander's expedition to kill a dragon that lives in a cave in Nizami, and also of the same author's account of his visit to the 'occulted' Persian emperor Kai Khusraw, which is in turn modelled on Alexander's visit to the 'Cave of the Gods' in the Greek *Alexander Romance*. However, the dragon's cave, as Amir Khusraw calls it, is transformed from a den of evil into the lair of a contemplative: it has much about it of the barrel of Diogenes. As Michael Barry writes, 'Amir Khusrō, as it were, fuses the old archetypes of Dandamis the Brahmin, Diogenes the Greek, and Khizr the Mesopotamian hero in his single figure of Plato as the sage seated within the cave'.¹⁹ In Nizami's account of the cave of Kay Khusraw, the *nur-i-siyah* or black light of the cave

¹⁷ Stoneman 2008, p. 42-43, with further bibliography.

¹⁸ Translated from the Italian of Piemontese 1999, p. 127.

¹⁹ Barry 2004, p. 320.

gives place to a luminous well in the depths of the cave²⁰ which represents the essence of the godhead. This 'luminous darkness', which in an anonymous medieval western writer was once called 'The Cloud of Unknowing', is the unmanifest essence of divinity, and is expressed in the Sufi concept of the 'black light'.²¹ It is this that Alexander enters as he arrives at Plato's threshold.²²

Plato's discourse to Alexander, 'the sage who recognizes the wise man', occupies the longest section of the poem (about 14% of the whole). Alexander invites Plato to join his court, as his minister; he will be a colleague of Aristotle there, but Alexander is sure that Plato is the greater philosopher. Plato speaks in large part in parables: his response to this invitation is to ask how the ruler of the world can possibly be interested in a single individual: the chameleon simply stands and stares at the sun, and if you throw stones at a bare tree, stones fall on you, not fruit. He is like a bat, he says, old and lazy and lurking in a corner of his cave. A series of more or less disconnected aphorisms follows. The grass has withered and tomorrow it will be straw. And so on. But the king insists that he needs help in bearing the heavy burden of kingship. Plato points out that Alexander is already being led by Fortune and the Invisible One. However, he does now go on to give some advice.

He begins by enjoining the fear of God, and humility; the king must remember that world rule is not absolute sovereignty. He must know that he is a withered flower, but remember the perfumes of Paradise. Dervishes, he insists, are superior to kings. Sobriety, attention to conscience, moderation in sleep, faith, and clemency are the essential moral qualities. The king should pay attention to military leadership and to the preservation of alliances.²³ He should also look after his horses.

The discourse becomes metaphysical again: the world is an image shown in a mirror, and as such it can never be captured

²⁰ The author calls it a 'sulphur mine': Manteghi 2016, p. 145 suggests that this 'burning pit' is actually a volcano.

²¹ On this concept see Corbin 1978, p. 4-5 and 99-120.

²² Barry 2004, p. 316-320.

²³ However, there was notably little diplomatic activity on Ala al-Din's reign in contrast to that of his Tughluq successors: Siddiqui 2006, p. 190-191. Also, Plato makes no allusion to the spies who were so crucial to Ala al-Din's government.

or grasped for good. The conqueror is like the Sun, which leaves the world every day. The world is a handful of dust. It consists of two gardens, of which Alexander has attained just one. Life is a moment; the tomb is your true home; 'a breath of wind in your garden can blow your crown away, while your head falls from your neck'.²⁴ The world is vanity; regal power is seated on an ever-turning wheel. Solomon was able to fly on his throne, but Bahram Gur dug his tomb while hunting. Plato then speaks of the great hero Kay Khusraw and the great villain, the demon-king Zakhak.

He now returns to practical admonitions. Kingship is to let no one go hungry. One should be a father to one's people, give power to the faithful and those of good family. Practice justice and set a good example. If you cannot attack an elephant, why trample the ant? Be kind to dumb animals. And if you must use violence, at any rate avoid torture and cruelty. Eventually Plato sums up: you must take responsibility for your actions, and a drop of wisdom goes a long way.

Alexander praises Plato for his advice and announces his imminent departure to explore the Ocean. His diving bell, which Aristotle helps him build, is in fact the true Mirror which reveals the secrets of the Universe.²⁵ This expedition occupies the next section of the poem (about 14 pages) up until the hero's death and exequies. In another text, *Dāstān-e Dhū'lqarnayn* (Story of the Two-Horned), Plato actually accompanies Alexander in the diving bell.²⁶

2. *Alexander's Philosophers*

The first question to be addressed is why Alexander is persistently associated with philosophers, and Plato in particular, in the Persian tradition. Alexander the Great (356-323 BC), the Macedonian conqueror, lived with philosophers from his earliest years. As is well known, his education was put in the hands of Aristotle, whose influence was lasting. A famous anecdote has him

²⁴ Piemontese 1999, p. 138.

²⁵ Piemontese 2007, p. 43, suggests that the secrets he observes are those of the drowned country of Atlantis, but this is not stated in the text.

²⁶ Casari 2012, p. 198-199, with illustration.

encounter the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, living in his *pithos* in Corinth; when asked to choose a gift, Diogenes asked the king to get out of his sunshine. On his expedition to the east he was accompanied by Aristotle's nephew, Callisthenes, who seems to have been a historian of some kind as well as a philosopher; by Anaxarchus, who once depressed the king by expounding his doctrine of 'infinite worlds', at which Alexander reflected that he had not yet conquered even one of them; and by Pyrrho, who seems to have been influenced by Buddhist philosophy and logic in the development of his own system.²⁷ Best known of all is the impact of his encounter with the Indian 'naked philosophers', whether or not he met them face to face or simply sent Onesicritus (himself a man with philosophical interests) to interview them.²⁸

When Alexander became a hero of Persian literature through his assumption of the kingship after his defeat of Darius III in 330 BC, the writers of his story liked to present him as surrounded by a variety of Greek philosophers.²⁹ In this they seem to be presenting him as a typical Persian king. From the reign of Darius I onwards, Greek intellectuals, notably physicians, were in demand in Persia.³⁰ Democedes treated Darius for a sprained ankle and his wife for an abscess, and won favour and fortune thereby. Artaxerxes I (465-424 BC) pressingly invited Hippocrates to come and work for him, but the invitation was declined ungraciously. The doctor Ctesias of Cnidus spent seventeen years at the Persian court after the battle of Cunaxa, working for Artaxerxes II, and turned himself into a kind of historian during that time. I have suggested that Greek and Persian storytelling began to interact as a result of Alexander's mingling of the two cultures.³¹ In the collection of letters between Alexander III and Darius III preserved in *PSI* 1285 Alexander expects Darius to understand who Zethus and Amphion are, and assures him that Darius' philosophers 'can translate the stories for you'; he refers to one Polyidus, presumably the dithyrambic poet, who is currently living at the Persian

²⁷ D.L. 9.61; Frenkian 1957; Flintoff 1980; Beckwith 2015.

²⁸ Stoneman 1995.

²⁹ Casari 2010.

³⁰ Stoneman 2015, p. 63-66.

³¹ Stoneman 2012.

court.³² Perhaps because of this exchange of letters, Alexander was later conceived of as the originator of Sassanian diplomatic practices.³³ The interchange of stories is very evident in the transference of 'Metiochus and Parthenope' to the Persian *Vamiq o Adhraa*.³⁴ Persian fascination with ancient Greece continues in later literature, not least in Jami's (d. 1499) *Salaman wa Absal*, in which the king of Greece stands for the ideal ruler, and is accompanied by a live-in philosopher:

A Shah there was who ruled the Realm of Yun,
And wore the Ring of Empire of Sikander;
And in his Reign a Sage, who had the Tower
Of Wisdom of so strong Foundation built
That Wise Men from all Quarters of the World
To catch the Word of Wisdom from his Lip
Went in a Girdle round him.³⁵

Abstract thinkers appealed to the Sasanians: Khusraw I Anushirvan (AD 531-579) offered a place of refuge to Damascius and the other philosophers of the Neo-Platonist school of Athens when it was closed down by Justinian; but the philosophers did not like it in Persia, and soon went home again.³⁶ Another Greek thinker at the Persian court of Khusraw I was Paul the Persian, as he was known; his writings included an introduction to Aristotle, known from its Syriac version though Paul probably wrote in Greek.³⁷ In Nizam ul-Mulk's *Siyasatnameh* the adviser to Khosrow Anushirvan, the sage Buzurjmehr, is described as a 'Yunan', a Greek. A Persian romance about Buzurjmehr recalls Alexander's encounter with Sesonchosis.³⁸ It is therefore no surprise to find that the medieval Persian writers count a group of philosophers as among

³² Merkelbach 1977, p. 237-239; Whitmarsh 2013, p. 98.

³³ Bagley 1964, p. lxxii.

³⁴ Hägg & Utas 2003.

³⁵ Fitzgerald n.d., p. 9. The work is much less well known than his reinvention of Omar Khayyam. See Lingwood 2013, p. 22: he also provides a more modern translation of the whole poem; this passage is on p. 184.

³⁶ Agathias 2.30; Procop., *Anecd.* 18.29: 'instead of devoting himself to [warfare], scanning the heavens and becoming over-curious about the nature of God'. Peters 1979, p. 22 and Peters 1996, p. 44.

³⁷ See e.g. *Encyclopaedia Iranica online* s.v. Paul the Persian.

³⁸ Bagley 1964, p. lxxvii.

the typical accoutrements of a Persian ruler. In fact, the presence of a philosopher at court might almost count as a leitmotif of Persian literature: every king should have one (or more).

In Firdawsi's *Shahnameh* (completed 1010), the earliest surviving Alexander text in Persian, the role of Aristotle is prominent. In the eleventh century Abu Taher Tarsusi's *Darabnameh*, a rollicking tale of adventure, Aristotle features as educator of the king; but the latter is accompanied through most of his adventures by the physician or 'wise man' Hippocrates. The latter assists him in his search for the elusive Plato, who is hiding in a cave and when discovered promptly leaps into the sea to escape—a clear foretaste of his secretive behaviour in Amir Khusraw. Aristotle is to the fore again in Farid ud-Din Attar's (1120 or later-1220 or earlier AD) *Conference of the Birds*. In a passage about how one should face up to death, a story is told about how Alexander, on the point of death, received advice from Aristotle that he should reject all Greek philosophy in favour of Islamic enlightenment:

How will you know the truths religion speaks
While you're philosophizing with the Greeks? (...)
Medina's wisdom is enough, my friend,
Throw dirt on Greece, and all that Greece might send.³⁹

The association of Alexander with philosophers is developed to a new level in the *Iskandarnameh* of Nizami Ganjavi (1140-1208). In the second part of this long work, the *Iqbalnameh* or 'Book of Blessings', the story is told of a group of seventy philosophers who refuse to accept the doctrines of Hermes Trismegistus as truth. Hermes paralyses the sceptics, and Iskandar comes on the scene to approve his action. In the next episode (the chronology is somewhat indeterminate) a babble of philosophers is quelled by Aristotle announcing that he is the one universal knower who gets everything right. Plato, who is also present, is annoyed by his arrogance and retreats from human company into his Barrel, where he listens to the music of the seven spheres⁴⁰ and then

³⁹ Tr. Dick Davis. See Michael Barry, *The Canticle of the Birds* 2013, p. 385. The passage is omitted from Dick Davis' Penguin translation.

⁴⁰ The word *khom* means a barrel or bowl, so can also be used as shorthand for *khom-e-falak*, the bowl of heaven: Nizami II. 89. Cf. Bürgel's translation (1991, p. 433).

composes music that gives him the power to put animals to sleep. The story is interrupted by Alexander's interview with the Indian philosopher, Keyd, but in the next episode the Greeks reappear. Now there are seven philosophers, and their names are given as 'Aristotle, the king's minister, the old man Socrates and the young man Apollonius (Balinas), Plato (Aflatun), Valis, Porphyry (Furfurius) and Hermes'..⁴¹

Each gives a short discourse on the origins of Creation; Alexander and the poet himself do the same, and Alexander then achieves the rank of a prophet.

The number seven is significant, in view of the 'rule of seven' that characterises so many descriptions of the Persian court from Achaemenid times onwards.⁴² Manteghi has drawn attention to the likely influence on Nizami of the Greek tradition of the Seven Sages, as well as the *Tale of the Seven Wise Masters* attributed to the Indian sage Syntipas or Sindbad, known in Greek and Persian versions deriving from a Syriac original.⁴³ Nizami was a learned man, and he more than once refers to his use of 'Rumi' authors, by which he most probably means Syriac rather than Greek texts.⁴⁴ Also relevant here is the tradition of the 'Sayings of the Philosophers' at the death-bed of Alexander: the first such collection appeared in Hunayn ibn Ishāq's *Kitāb ādāb al-falāsifa*, and was later reworked not only in Arabic but in Hebrew, Syriac and Spanish. It entered western literature through the Latin of Petrus Alphonsus' *Disciplina Clericalis* (twelfth century) and then

⁴¹ This motley collection presents some problems of interpretation. Balinas is generally taken to be Apollonius of Tyana, but may be Apollonius of Perge. Piemontese interprets him when he appears in Amir Khusraw as the engineer Eupalinus, but this seems far-fetched. My student Haila Manteghi has suggested that Apollonius of Tyana is introduced because of his known connection with another Alexander, the false prophet Alexander of Abonuteichos. Valis is even more problematic. Bürgel interprets the name as Thales, while Chelkowski thinks it should be the second-century astrologer Vettius Valens: Manteghi 2018; Bürgel 1991, p. 459, Chelkowski 1977, p. 47-48.

⁴² Stoneman 2015, p. 61 and n.

⁴³ The Persian version may be as late as 1157 (Manteghi 2016, p. 100), the Latin was made before 1342; in the fifteenth century it was translated into German and many other European languages. For a recent discussion of this text and its translation history see Roth 2004 and Roth 2008; there are English translations by Clouston 1884 and Gollancz 1897.

⁴⁴ Bürgel 1991, 378, Manteghi, 2018, 79.

became widely diffused and entered the third recension of the Latin version of the *Alexander Romance*, the *Historia de Proeliis*, in the fourteenth century.⁴⁵ Many of the philosophers here are unnamed, and others are obscure; their remarks are, furthermore, platitudinous, but still, they are philosophers surrounding Alexander. One of the things that the Persian Alexander does is to talk to philosophers, and his conversation with Plato is the subject of a large part of Amir Khusraw's poem.

3. *Plato in Persian Poetry*

Plato's first appearance in Persian poetry is in Tarsusi. The story, as I mentioned briefly before, involves Alexander's long search, aided by Hippocrates (Boqrat), for the philosopher in order to enlist his aid in his exploration of the world. Some twenty pages of Marina Gaillard's abridged French translation are devoted to the search: the first clue that he is getting close comes with his encounter with Queen Jamarah of India, who has been a pupil of Plato.⁴⁶ She rules a kingdom of women that resembles the Amazon kingdom of the *Alexander Romance*, but before she can lead him to Plato she is unfortunately abducted by Dog-Heads and is not seen again. However, the search persists. When Alexander and Hippocrates do run Plato to earth he is living in a cave; he promptly runs away and disappears into the sea, recalling the elusive wisdom of the Old Man of the Sea in Greek literature.

Further amusing tricks follow. Plato reappears and makes himself useful by constructing a burning mirror to destroy the fortress of Nowt. He frightens off some sea-crows, discovers luminous stones and explains their properties. But they fall out when Plato steals a talisman from another companion; Alexander banishes him but later lets him return. We now hear about Plato's astrolabe, and the wheels with which he controls the springs of the Ocean. He makes a robot in the shape of Alexander. After participating in a long war between the divs and the peris, Plato leads an expedition to meet a talking tortoise, which turns out to be Jarut,

⁴⁵ Brock 1970, p. 205-206. From the *HP* it entered, for example, the Spanish *Libro de Alexandre* 2648 ff.

⁴⁶ Gaillard 2005, p. 254.

a wicked king, in disguise. In time the expedition reaches Mecca, where Alexander is keen to replace the gilding on the Ka'aba, which has been stolen; Plato advises him against it on the grounds that it will only be stolen again. Plato's last action in the poem (after some hundred pages of Gaillard's abridgement) is to build a tower in Alexandria, much better than Ptolemy's, with a magic mirror on top of it which shows up enemy ships approaching at a distance. (This is a common legend in Arabic and Persian literature, appearing also in Mas'ūdi.) Through most of this rigmarole one cannot escape the feeling that Tarsusi is pulling the reader's leg. The one dominant feature that emerges is that Plato is a magician rather than a philosopher.⁴⁷

4. *Plato and Aristotle in Muslim Thought*

The relative positions of Plato and Aristotle in Muslim thought are rather complicated. As is evident from the preceding account, Plato in the eleventh century was regarded primarily as a magician. The true philosopher was Aristotle. No Arabic translation of a Platonic dialogue survives (though there were some),⁴⁸ while Ibn al-Nadim's catalogue of books shows that Aristotle and Galen were the most widely translated of all the Greek authors.⁴⁹ Yet the

⁴⁷ On Plato the magician, see Schimmel 1992, p. 121; Doufikar-Aerts 1996. This is not always so in other appearances of Plato in Persian poetry, though it is difficult to extract a consistent picture from these. In one poet, Anwari, he is treated as a metonym, along with Alexander, of supremacy in his field: Schimmel 1992, p. 125. In Hafez he appears infrequently; in one poem (256 Avery) 'the Plato in the wine-barrel' (*Falātūn khom-neshīn*) is a metaphor for the wisdom that comes from intoxication (itself a metaphor for spiritual rapture). Anne-Marie Schimmel thinks that the wine barrel here also assimilates Plato to Diogenes: Schimmel 1992, p. 121, 277. Schimmel's conclusion is that the poets in the end 'reject Plato's (and Aristotle's) philosophy: for both are helpless against death'. The only solution open to philosophers would be to forget their intellectual stance in order to learn love, and to become demented in love, as Amir Khusraw says (Schimmel 1992, p. 122):

'I have seen many Platos and Aristotles,
Who had become in love Majnun and Buhlul'.

In another passage, Isfahani says 'Anyone who does not believe in him is ignorant, / Even if he be the wise Aristotle and Plato' (Schimmel 1992, p. 125).

⁴⁸ Peters 1979, p. 15; Walbridge 2000, p. 88. The *Fihrist* refers to both *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*.

⁴⁹ Gutas 1998, p. 144.

Arabs' Aristotle was a heavily Platonized Aristotle, and their view of his teaching was formed in large part from a work called *The Theology of Aristotle*, which was actually a set of selections from Plotinus.⁵⁰ The origin of this philosophical hybrid lay in the Neo-Platonic schools of late antiquity, which responded to Christian pressure by making their Plato more Aristotelian. Thus Ammonius, Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponus tried to harmonise the two philosophies, and the move culminated in Porphyry's work *On the Identity of Plato and Aristotle*.⁵¹

The two great incompatibilities that had to be reconciled were the philosophers' respective doctrines on the eternity of the world (eternal for Aristotle, created for Plato) and on the immortality of the soul (immortal for Plato, dissoluble on death for Aristotle).⁵² These differences meant that Aristotle was only acceptable to Muslims in a broader sense after he had been Platonized, despite their unbounded admiration for his scientific and logical works. F. E. Peters writes 'Why the philosophers under Islam were so transparently NeoPlatonists and were, at the same time, so oblivious to the true nature of their Platonism that they could not identify its author is one of the abiding mysteries of *falsafah*'.⁵³

Plato himself was important for al-Fārābī (c. 872-951 CE), whose version of the ideal city derived from Plato's *Republic* (though he knew none of his actual works),⁵⁴ while there seems to have been no awareness of Aristotle's *Politics*.⁵⁵ Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) in his political writing attempted to find agreement between Plato and Aristotle, though in his other writings he is aware of their incompatibility.⁵⁶ However, mystical knowledge, as

⁵⁰ Adamson 2002.

⁵¹ Kotzia 2007, p. 217. Porphyry also wrote the first Platonic commentary on Aristotle: Peters 1979, p. 25, Kotzia 2007, p. 216. See Shayegan 1996, p. 2-4.

⁵² The first is the subject of John Philoponus' *On the eternity of the world against Proclus* (529 CE); the second is exhibited in the strangely titled *Liber de pomo*, an account of the death of Aristotle modelled on Plato's *Phaedo*: see Kotzia 2007.

⁵³ Peters 1979, p. 17. Cf. Peters 1996, p. 43.

⁵⁴ His *Harmony of Plato and Aristotle* is 'a perfectly crazy position that proved philosophically fruitful', according to Richard Sorabji, quoted in Walbridge 2000, p. 116-119.

⁵⁵ Peters 1979, p. 29-30.

⁵⁶ Urvoy 1996, p. 342.

distinct from rational knowledge, began to gain increasing respect from Islamic philosophers. Ibn Sinā (981-1037) was already prepared to concede its possibility, while al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), in rejecting Peripateticism and reason, took refuge in mysticism. Half a century later there emerged a very different philosophical outlook, that of the Illuminationists. This derived essentially from the mystical philosopher Suhrawardī (1154-1191), in whose philosophy light is the source and symbol of knowledge and enlightenment.⁵⁷ Suhrawardī wrote

This science [of light] is the very intuition of the inspired and illumined Plato, the guide and master of philosophy, and of those who came before him up to the time of Hermes.⁵⁸

It seems clear, however, that there was very little knowledge of Plato's actual works.⁵⁹ The *Letters of the Brethren of Purity* express admiration for Socrates even while confusing him with Diogenes in his barrel, while later writers only made use of excerpts and summaries; even Suhrawardī seems more familiar with the Plato of the *Theology of Aristotle* than with his actual works. It was the idea of Plato the illumined one that counted.⁶⁰

This increasingly dominant Sufi strand in Muslim thought—especially in India⁶¹—emphasised the disciplines of meditation and the methods of transmission of the divine light from teacher to student, rather as in the relations of Nizam al-Din with Amir Khusraw. When Amir Khusraw sat down to write, then, Plato was known in part as a political theorist but mainly as a Sufi mys-

⁵⁷ The starting point is Qur'an 24.35, 'God is the light of the heavens and earth'. Corbin 1978 is an eloquent exposition of the philosophy of Suhrawardī. The doctrines of the Brethren of Purity, *Ikhwan al-Safa*, taking shape in the eleventh century, also tended in this direction. See also the pregnant footnote in Lewisohn 2009, note 4: 'there is not even one good study comparing Sufi philosophy to Platonic/Neoplatonic thought'. Most of his scholarly works were written in Arabic, but his more accessible and popular treatises were in Persian: Walbridge 2001, p. 58-59.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Walbridge 2001, p. 14. See also Walbridge 2000, *passim*, especially chapter 10 on epistemology.

⁵⁹ Walbridge 2000, p. 88-90 for details.

⁶⁰ Rosenthal 1940. At p. 398-401 he draws attention to Miskawayh's direct use of Themistius on friendship, as well as his use of Plato's arguments for the immortality of the soul.

⁶¹ Siddiqui 2003, p. 90-91.

tic, and this is the model that he presents in his poem. This strand, deriving from the popular imagination, is distinct from a more intellectual genre that also informs Amir Khusraw's portrait of Plato.

5. *The 'Mirror for Princes' Genre in Islamic Sources*

There are many examples of manuals of statecraft addressed to kings in Persian and Arabic literature, among which the 'Mirror for Princes' is a distinctive form that emphasises matters of morality and metaphysics rather than practical detail. The title of Amir Khusraw's poem, 'The Mirror of Alexander' explicitly aligns his work with that genre, although the mirror in question is also the world-seeing mirror, instantiated in the diving bell, through which Alexander is enabled to contemplate the nature of the universe in the final section of the poem.⁶² The classic account by Ann Lambton, 'Islamic Mirrors for Princes', published in 1971, enumerates nine Mirrors in Persian and Arabic from Ibn al-Muqaffa's *Adab al-Kabir* in the eighth century to the *Adab al-Harb wa'l-Shuja'a* of Fakhr-i Mudabbar, written under the Delhi Sultanate, plus several more from the Mongol and post-Mongol periods. This list could easily be extended: the earliest relevant text may be the 'epistolary novel of Aristotle and Alexander', on which see below. The *Bahr al-Fawa'id* or *Sea of Precious Virtues* has been edited by Julie Scott Meisami.⁶³ One of the most important is al-Ghazali's *Book of Counsel for Kings*, edited by F. R. C. Bagley in 1964.⁶⁴ The first Persian examples of *Mirrors* are the *Qābūs-nāma* of Kai Ka'us ibn Iskandar (1083 CE) and the famous *Siyasatnamah* of Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092 CE).⁶⁵ The latter, however, as a manual of statecraft, is more practical and less homiletic. The *Book of the Seven Sages* or *Sindbadnama* of Zahirī Samarqandī was written probably

⁶² See further Stoneman 2016.

⁶³ Meisami 1991.

⁶⁴ See also Khismatulin 2015, who also discusses Nizam al-Mulk.

⁶⁵ The latter is edited by Schabinger 1987. See on these works Crone 2004. Another example is Balasaguni's *Turkic Wisdom of Royal Glory* written in Kashgar in 1069: see Starr 2013, p. 326-330. It is at once a story and an allegory about the four key requirements: Justice, Fortune, Intellect and Spiritual awareness.

some time after 1157.⁶⁶ More recently, Chad Lingwood has interpreted Jami's (1414-1492) *Salaman wa Absal* as a book of advice, and traced again the long tradition that preceded Jami.⁶⁷

The roots of the Mirror for Princes can be traced back to ancient India, where the *Pancatantra* was a repository of animal fables designed to give wise advice to rulers: the frame story is a meeting of the kings of China, India, Persia and Greece to discuss good government.⁶⁸ This was translated into Syriac about 550 CE and thence entered the Islamic mainstream. The genre in Arabic and Persian has generally been treated as predominantly eastern in origin, since Sasanian and Islamic institutions were in many respects continuous,⁶⁹ and Sasanid books of etiquette have been added to the mix by Lambton (420-421) and Crone (150-151). The Mirrors set out to Islamicize older Persian concepts of kingly rule. Bagley (lxiii) raised the question 'whether any Platonic, Aristotelian or other Greek ideas are to be found among these purported sayings of the philosophers, or among the teachings of *Nasihāt al-Muluk* and Mirrors for Princes generally', and concluded that this 'can only be decided by competent classical scholars'. In the succeeding fifty years the state of the question has advanced a little. Several works of statecraft have Aristotle as their actual or supposed source, and can be aligned with the Wisdom tradition involving Alexander and Aristotle.⁷⁰

One of the earliest of these is the Epistolary Romance about Alexander and Aristotle (*Rasā'il 'Aristātālisa 'ilā-l-Iskandar*). This includes two treatises ascribed to Plato, one on asceticism, as well as a short treatise about Aristotle's *de Anima* which is ascribed to Themistius, and a selection from the funeral orations over Alexander. Mario Grignaschi argued that the whole was a translation of a Greek original, but it has no common ground with the *Alexander*

⁶⁶ Manteghi 2016, p. 100.

⁶⁷ Lingwood 2014. See also Bosworth 1998 on the genre.

⁶⁸ See also Marlow 2013, who draws attention to Buddhist elements as well as the influence of *Kalila wa Dimna* on Pseudo-Mawardi's *Nasihāt al-Muluk*. The teaching of the work is associated with Aristotle, presumably because of his connection to Alexander, who went to India.

⁶⁹ Lingwood 2014, p. 35.

⁷⁰ Doufekar-Aerts 2010, p. 102-133.

romance of Pseudo-Callisthenes.⁷¹ More recently, Emily Cottrell has defined it as an ‘Umayyad ‘Mirror for Princes’.⁷²

Other ‘Aristotelian’ works existing in Arabic include the *De Mundo*,⁷³ which, though not a work of statecraft, is known through an Arabic version: chapter 6 is a description of the Persian ruler as a model of God. The widely diffused *Secret of Secrets* pretends to be a work addressed by Aristotle to Alexander on physiognomy as a key to kingship, though it has no genuine Greek original.⁷⁴ In addition the Wisdom tradition gives a prominent position to Alexander as a ‘philosopher-king’.⁷⁵

One important model from late antiquity is the letter of Themistius to Julian ‘On government’. Themistius is particularly important because his Letter was translated from Greek into Arabic by al-Dimashqi in the early tenth century, and immediately incorporated by Qudama ibn Ja’far in his *Kitab al-siyasa*. It became well-known in medieval Islam.⁷⁶ The recovery of these works has made it more likely that there is a Greek as well as an eastern component to the Perso-Arabic genre.

Whether any of the content of the Mirrors can really be traced back to Plato or Aristotle is a moot point, however. Plato’s recipe for the benevolent dictator in *Laws* 4.709-710 insists that such an institution is the best and quickest way to create an ideal state, but he acknowledges the pitfalls. His Athenian speaker lists various requirements for such a ruler: he should be young, have a good memory, be quick to learn, be courageous and of good character, and accustomed to exercise self-control.⁷⁷ He should also have the

⁷¹ Published by Maroth 2005. See Grignaschi 1967 and 1996. The understanding of this work has been consolidated by Maroth 2005 and by Doufika-Aerts 2010, p. 103-113, and by Cottrell 2016.

⁷² Cottrell 2016.

⁷³ Thom 2014.

⁷⁴ Ryan & Schmitt 1982.

⁷⁵ Doufika-Aerts 2010, p. 113-128.

⁷⁶ Both the ‘Letter of Aristotle’ and that of Themistius have now been edited and discussed by Swain 2003. On p. 8 he cites the bibliographic survey by Dairber. As far as other Greek texts are concerned, Patricia Crone drew attention to Bryson’s *Oikonomos* (possibly second century AD), a treatise on household management (edited by M. Plessner 1928). In addition, there were several Byzantine ‘Mirrors’, from 530 CE onwards, briefly mentioned by Lambton (421) and more fully discussed by Dagron 2003.

⁷⁷ Similar points are made in Themistius 27.

benefit of association with a skilled lawgiver. The Athenian longs for 'a situation in which an inspired passion for the paths of justice and restraint guides those who wield great power' (711); but he goes on to say that 'such a paragon is certainly unheard of today'. The 'Mirror for Princes', by definition, assumes the existence of the potential good ruler and concentrates on the means by which the sage will mould him to his task. The starting point is Plato's ideal, but Plato did not write down any such manual as the later Mirrors. The Seventh Letter, too (334a-b), seems pessimistic:

Natural intelligence and a good memory are equally powerless to aid the man who has not an inborn affinity with the subject (...) Hence all who have no natural aptitude for and affinity with justice and all the other noble ideals (...) will never attain to an understanding of the most complete truth in regard to moral concepts.

Any correspondences between these ideas and those of the Mirrors are likely to be coincidental, since neither the *Laws* nor the *Letters* were known to the Muslim Middle Ages. Plato's ideas as filtered through intermediaries provide a general framework, as also for the classification of types of government in, for example, al-Ghazali, which according to Aziz al-Azmeh is 'correlative with the philosophical classification, built upon Platonic models, that abound in Muslim philosophical discourse'.⁷⁸ Al-Farabi read Plato for his politics,⁷⁹ while Aristotle's *Politics* was unavailable except in a brief summary.⁸⁰ In general Islamic political theory has a strongly ethical cast, which harmonises with an interest in Plato.⁸¹ The turn from Aristotle to Plato comes in the eleventh century, as discussed above, away from practical advice (more Aristotelian) and towards the idea of the ruler as a sufi philosopher king.⁸² In many of the Mirrors the homiletic aspect is to the fore. The authors are sages or Sufis, not philosophers: *falsafah* is bad, pagan, while *hikma* is good, Muslim. So Plato the magician and

⁷⁸ Al-Azmeh 1997, p. 109.

⁷⁹ Rosenthal 1975, p. 109-112.

⁸⁰ Crone 2004, p. 190-191.

⁸¹ Rosenthal 1975, p. 83.

⁸² Crone 2004, p. 184; cf. p. 193 her phrase 'to actualise the intellect'.

sage⁸³ becomes a vehicle for teaching preferable to Aristotle the philosopher. In an ideal world, the ruler himself should be a Sufi, but then he would be unable to exercise the tasks of rule: 'Short of becoming a saint himself, it was incumbent on the ruler to be deferential to the *auliya*' in order to earn their blessings'.⁸⁴ For Amir Khusraw, such an approach to rule was a way of engaging with the question of the legitimacy of a secular Sultanate in Delhi divorced from the Caliphate.

It is fair to say that the range of topics to be found in 'Mirrors for Princes', both Arabic and Persian, is somewhat predictable. They are written from the point of view of a ruler whose prime interest is to 'stay in the saddle' (as Crone puts it). The Byzantine Mirrors, too, 'did not offer a political ideology, that is, an advanced system, which had perhaps existed in the Hellenistic and Roman models on which they were more or less loosely based. Nor did they amount to an independent and theoretical reflection on the nature of power; they aimed rather to provide whoever exercised power with an antidote which would protect him against the dangers to which he was inevitably exposed'.⁸⁵

Al-Ghazali's work, for example, concentrates on the ethical dimension. The author begins from God: Your kingship is from God, he insists, in a passage which echoes the opening of Themistius' Letter to Julian, and then elaborates the point under ten headings that summarise the orthodox Muslim theology. He goes on to enumerate the Branches of the Tree of Faith, first among which is Justice, again dissected under ten headings including the importance of taking the advice of the *Ulama*, the avoidance of pride, passion and harshness, the need to 'do as you would be done by' and to please one's subjects—but not if it goes against God's law. The 'Springs which Water Faith' are knowledge of this lower world and of the last breath. Ten analogies and five anecdotes elaborate this point, and in the fifth anecdote he speaks of Dhu'l-Qarnayn (Alexander) and his encounter with the people who had graves at the doors of their houses: here he is clearly drawing on the *Romance* tradition about Alexander, who provides a repertory

⁸³ Thus a Pythagorean kind of Plato: Walbridge 2000, p. 182.

⁸⁴ Lingwood 2014, p. 64.

⁸⁵ Dagron 2003, p. 18.

of anecdotes and aphorisms that are deployed in the work: these anecdotes were mediated through the Arabic compilations of Hunayn ibn Ishaq, Mubashshir, and others.⁸⁶ Part II is devoted to Justice, much elaborated through anecdotes and aphorisms, and then to the management of staff, where magnanimity is enjoined. But there is nothing on the army, foreign relations or intelligence, for example, all of which are prominent in Themistius (38–42). A series of aphorisms of the sages follows, and—rather tacked on—a discussion of the two specific topics of intelligence and of women.⁸⁷

The anonymous *Bahr al-Fava'id*, dedicated to the tutor of prince Arslan of Aleppo, is likewise more homiletic than practical, and notably anti-Shia in tendency. Its ten main 'action points' are: to perform an act of charity every day, to resolve each day on justice, to sit in open court, to treat the populace with benignity, not violence, to make one's subjects content, not to prefer pleasing men to pleasing the Creator, to act justly, to frequent the 'ulama for advice, and to restrain wrongdoers and their mercenaries.⁸⁸ A further ten rules emphasise the avoidance of haste in decisions, forgiveness, justice, strengthening religion, avoidance of false pride, and piety and preparation for the next world.⁸⁹

A notable feature of these and other 'Mirrors' is the extensive use of historical anecdotes deriving from the more popular tradition, and the collections of maxims and sayings. As mentioned, many of those in al-Ghazali refer to Alexander (or Dhu'l-Qarnayn). One not mentioned above is that of the dilemma of the man who sold a house which subsequently turned out to contain a buried treasure.⁹⁰ The story goes back to Plato's *Laws*, but is told in the Hebrew *Romances* about Alexander. Here it is transferred to the just king Khosrow Anushirvan. (The solution in all cases is the same; one of the two men has a son, the other a daughter, who are obliged to marry each other to establish equilibrium).⁹¹ Nizam al-Mulk, too, made use of Alexander stories: in most cases he is the

⁸⁶ Bagley 1964, p. 75.

⁸⁷ Bagley 1964.

⁸⁸ Meisami 1991, p. 82–83.

⁸⁹ Lambton 1971, p. 431–434.

⁹⁰ Deriving from Mubashshir's *Mukhtar-al-bikam*.

⁹¹ Stoneman 2008, p. 121, with previous bibliography.

recipient of wise advice from Aristotle (never Plato).⁹² There are also many Alexander stories in the *Bahr al-Fava'id*, for example the famous story that Dhu'l-qarnain, who conquered the world, insisted that on his bier, one hand be left hanging loose from the shroud, to indicate that he departed from the world empty-handed.⁹³ The story is used to illustrate a couplet that could almost have come from the pen of Omar Khayyam:

O child of earth, eaten by earth, tomorrow you will be eaten
and drunk.
Since life is short, what use is abundant wealth?

Another story in this work is about David, entering a cave near Jerusalem where he sees a dead man. It is based on the story that is told originally of Alexander in the *Romance*, of how he encountered the ancient Pharaoh Sesonchosis in a cave, who warned him of the fragility of mortal power. 'David saw a throne there, and a man upon it; a golden tablet was placed upon the throne, on which was written, "I am Fulan ibn Fulan. [The name means 'Somebody son of Somebody']'. I was king for a thousand years, built a thousand cities, took a thousand women to wife, and defeated a thousand armies, but today my station and abode are in the dust. I could get no bread for dirhams, or gold or jewels; finally I counted the jewels, and ate them, and died of hunger".'⁹⁴ Another half dozen stories in the book also refer to Alexander.⁹⁵ It is impossible to imagine Themistius, let alone Plato, deploying these admonitions about the vanity of kingship in the way that comes as second nature to the Persian writers.

It can readily be seen that Amir Khusraw's Plato covers much of the same ground as his prose forbears. In Jami's *Salaman wa Absal*, written a century and a half after Amir Khusraw, it is the tale itself that enshrines the message to the king; in the earlier work it takes the form of an episode within the larger narrative. This may betray either a more primitive technique on Amir Khus-

⁹² Schabinger, p. 197, 422, 423 (Buzurjmehr); at p. 244 Alexander is a model of justice.

⁹³ Meisami 1991, p. 51.

⁹⁴ Meisami 1991, p. 52.

⁹⁵ Pages 65, 204, 205, 216, 217, 310.

raw's part, or his awareness of the wider demands of his patron. The prevalence of Alexander-stories in the anecdotal portions of the texts is perhaps the reason that makes Alexander a particularly suitable recipient for advice. In composing his poem, Amir Khusraw had an eye not only to creating a lively poetic contribution to the 'Mirror for Princes' genre, but also to his patron's styling of himself a 'second Alexander'. The poem abounds in Sufi metaphors, not least that of the 'mirror' that pervades the second half of the poem and gives the title to the whole. If the king and the Sufi could never, in the nature of things, be combined in a single person, both Plato and Alexander, and Amir Khusraw and Ala al-Din were shining symbols of the symbiosis that had the potential to create the ideal state.

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Plato's Advice to Alexander

Dramatis Personae

Plato	429-347 BC
Aristotle	384-322 BC
Alexander III of Macedon	356-323 BC
Plotinus	205-269/70 CE
Themistius	317-c. 388 CE
Al-Kindi	801-866 (all dates CE hereafter)
Al-Farabi	c. 870-950
Al-Mas'udi	fl. 940, d. 957
Ibn al-Nadim	d. 990
Ibn Sina (Avicenna)	981-1037
Brethren of Purity	C10-11
Abu'l-Qasim Firdawsi	c. 946-1020
Nizam al-Mulk	1018-1092
Abu Taher Tarsusi	C11-12
Al-Ghazali	1058-1111
Ibn Rushd (Averroes)	1126-1198
<i>Bahr al-Fava'id</i> (anon)	1157-1162
Suhrawardi, Shikah al-Din Yahya	1126-1189 or 1191
Nezami Ganjavi	1140-1208
Farid ud-Din Attar	d. 1230
Rumi	1207-1273
Sa'di	1210-1290
Ibn Abi al-Rabi'	d. 1250
Amir Khusraw	1251-1325
Hafez	c. 1320-1388
Jami	1414-1492

Abstract

Amir Khusraw of Delhi's poem, *The Mirror of Alexander* (1299 CE) takes one episode of Alexander's legendary career, his visit to the sage Plato in his mountain cave, and uses it as a vehicle for Plato to convey to Alexander numerous precepts on good rulership. It is directed at Amir Khusraw's patron, Ala-al Din Khalji, who styled himself a second Alexander but whose reputation as a monarch was not universally good. The paper examines the development of the image of Plato in Persian poetry and Islamic philosophy, and sets his discourse in the context of other Arabic and Persian *Mirrors for Princes* from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries CE.

ELISA TINELLI

ERASMUS' *PANEGYRICUS*
AD PHILIPPUM AUSTRIAE DUCEM
(1504)

1. *Introduction*

The reign of Philip the Handsome was a crucial period in the history of the Netherlands. Upon assuming power in 1494, the young prince immediately started a policy of peacemaking and international concord, against the aggressive directives of his father, the Emperor Maximilian of Hapsburg. However, in 1496 he married Joan of Castile and therefore became a candidate for the succession of his wife's mother, Isabella of Castile: indeed, the primary purpose of the journey undertaken by the Archduke to Spain in 1502—which Erasmus describes in detail in his *Panegyricus*, a work drawn up at the end of 1503 and delivered in the presence of Philip and his court on January 6, 1504 in the Ducal Palace of Brussels—was, in fact, the solemn investiture of the Castilian throne and of the throne of Aragon. These dynastic ambitions had evidently alarmed the representative delegation of the Brabantian 'Provincial States',¹ who chose to remind their prince, by means of the *Panegyricus* commissioned to Erasmus, the benefits of the policy of neutrality and conciliatory balance pursued up to that point for the survival of the small Dutch homeland, which certainly would be threatened by any heightening of tensions with neighboring and powerful France, as well as with the equally powerful England. Such a worsening of tensions, in all probability, would have resulted from the passage of the Spanish crown on

¹ For a description of the political organization of the Netherlands at the time of Philip and his predecessors, see Mesnard 1963, p. 204-205.

Philip's head and the consequent union of the Spanish domains and the Empire.

The *Panegyricus ad Philippum* has, therefore, at the same time, the nature of a laudatory oration and the character of a mirror for princes (*speculum principis*)² and combines, in a subtle way, compliance with conventions and formal issues of the panegyric genre on the one hand with the consideration of the demands of an education project on the other. The project leads the author to call on Archduke Philip not to celebrate him as the very embodiment of the principle of royalty, but, rather, to remind him his extraordinary good fortune and his duties, particularly, as I have said, the vital necessity of maintaining peace.

Erasmus himself provides the key to understanding his text in a well-known letter he sent to Jean Desmarez (February, 1504):

*Principio qui panegyricos nil aliud quam assentationes esse putant, prorsum ignorare uidentur quo consilio, cui rei, genus hoc scripti sit a prudentissimis uiris repertum; nempe in hoc ut obiecta uirtutis imagine improbi principes emendarentur, probi proficerent, rudes instituerentur, admonerentur errantes, extimularentur oscitantes, denique ipsi apud sese pudescerent deplorati. An vero credendum est Calisthenem tantum philosophum, quum Alexandri laudes diceret, an Lysiam atque Isocratem, an Plinium et cum hiis innumerabiles, quum hoc in genere uersarentur, alio spectasse quam ut sub laudandi pretextu cohortarentur ad honesta? An tu censes regibus sic natis, sic educatis, tetrica illa Stoicorum dogmata et Cynicos latratus esse proponendos? Scilicet ut aut cachinnum moueas aut acrius etiam irrites? Generosus animus quanto commodius ducitur quam trahitur, quantoque melius blandimentis sanatur quam conuiciis! Quod autem efficacius, imo quod aliud prudentibus est usurpatum cohortandi genus, quam ut magna iam ex parte tribuant ea decora ad quae prouocant?*³

² See Tracy 1978, p. 17-19; De Bom 2008, p. 43-47 and Yoran 2012, p. 49-51. For humanists like Erasmus, the line between panegyrics and *specula principum* was rather fluid; Erasmus himself compares his *Panegyricus* and his *Institutio principis Christiani* with one another in a letter to Martinus Dorpius: *In libello De principis institutione palam admonemus quibus rebus principem oporteat esse instructum. In Panegyrico sub laudis praetextu hoc ipsum tamen agimus oblique quod illi egimus aperta fronte* (*Opus epistolarum* II, p. 93: *epist.* 337).

³ *Opus epistolarum* I, p. 399: *epist.* 180.

Attempting to escape the strictures of flattery, Erasmus tried to compose a theoretically valid work and to offer a complete picture of the ideal ruler, in compliance with the unshakable and characteristically humanistic confidence in the power of education and, above all, in the educability of power and its owners.⁴

In other words, in the letter to Desmarez, Erasmus emphasizes the importance of the educational inspiration and the affinity of his *Panegyricus* with the paraenetic genre rather than with the encomiastic one. At the same time, he stresses a considerable difference from the ancient models, such as, among others, Pliny the Younger. The author of the *Gratiarum actio* in fact suggests, in *epist.* 3.18.2-3, that his speech is not, in the first instance, didactic, because it is not intended to persuade Trajan to virtue, but merely to describe his virtue, exhorting his successors to imitate him and to achieve the same glory. Pliny's educational intent is therefore directed not to the prince to whom his speech is devoted, but to the successors of the prince himself: the *Gratiarum actio* is an authentic mirror-for-princes for them. Erasmus goes one step further in his *Panegyricus*, because the pedagogical intent of the genre becomes more important: 'his speech contains in the first place moral lessons for the prince which he has made acceptable and pleasant by giving them through praise'.⁵

In this regard I am partially in agreement with the interpretation proposed by D. Rundle, who stresses that 'by emphasising the advisory aspect of the genre, Erasmus is implicitly suggesting that modern princes are no Trajans. Unlike Pliny's emperor, these rulers need teachers in some form or other'.⁶ Philip the Handsome is depicted in the *Panegyricus* as a great prince, with all virtues, and

⁴ A similar perspective will animate the *Institutio principis Christiani*, the education handbook which Erasmus will devote, in 1516, to the future Charles V, son of Philip the Handsome: it is no coincidence that the spread of this work, at least in the sixteenth century, proceeded together with that of *Panegyricus*, with editions that approached the two texts; moreover, even the *Institutio* was born from a careful assessment by the Dutch humanist of the political fortunes of the country where he came from, after the Spanish coronation of Charles, who was Prince of the Netherlands from 1506 on and would soon become Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. See Mesnard 1960, p. 45-56 and De Michelis Pintacuda 2001, p. 115-119.

⁵ De Bom 2008, p. 47.

⁶ Rundle 1998, p. 159.

as a true benefactor of his people, far from despicable tyrannical deviations: he is therefore an *optimus princeps* as well as Trajan. It is true that Erasmus redefines the panegyric, which, in his hands, becomes ‘a means of serving up lessons to a prince by making them palatable with praise’,⁷ but the Dutch humanist does not endow his work with critical elements, as Rundle states:⁸ his vision of power is not at all ingenuous, but he sincerely praises Philip, and the insistence on the need to avoid any suspicion of flattery is, in this regard, a relevant proof. What matters is that Erasmus is proposing to offer a lesson also in these ‘institutional’ pages, where irony cannot be used: in the *Encomium Moriae* the attack on the madness of the powerful will be explicit and unprejudiced, but in the *Panegyricus* the author wants to make clear—as I am going to show in this paper—that to testify the importance of virtuous behaviour in the face of a wise prince is, for a literary man, an even more responsible attitude.

2. *The praise of the pacifist policy in the Panegyricus*

The theme of peace and its specular opposite, war, is an important one in the *Panegyricus*, as well as in subsequent Erasmian writings.⁹ The opposition of the cosmopolitan humanist of Rotterdam to war was always firm and eloquent: war in his eyes is in fact true madness, the origin and cause of countless evils, which fall for the most part, first of all, on the innocent subjects of princes who fall prey to negative passions, such as anger, cruelty, ambition, greed for money and decide to move under arms against an enemy for the most different and petty reasons, reasons that generally are nothing more than mere pretexts.¹⁰

⁷ Rundle 1998, p. 162.

⁸ Rundle 1998, p. 162-167.

⁹ In the pamphlet entitled *Querela pacis*, of course, but also in the comment to the adage *Dulce bellum inexpertis* and in the *Utilissima consultatio de bello Turcis inferendo*: see the selection of these texts published in Erasmo da Rotterdam 2004.

¹⁰ The bibliography about the question of war and peace in Erasmus is very wide: see, for example, Bainton 1951; Halkin 1966, p. 13-44; Heat 1980, p. 991-999; Margolin 1980; Dust 1988; Pasini 2012.

The 'two-faced' theme of war and peace is, therefore, a vantage point for understanding the text of the *Panegyricus* in the fullness of its meanings and implications, because it is the meeting point and the place of confrontation of the need inherent to the panegyric genre to praise and even to flatter the dedicatee on the one hand, and on the other, of the opportunity—strongly and sincerely felt by Erasmus—to lead, even in deference to the wishes of his patrons, a serious moral discourse, marked by the steadfast refusal of the horrors of war. He juxtaposes seamless, hyperbolic praise addressed to the aristocratic culture and to the traditional ethics of chivalry and the detailed, painful, description of the evils that war entails, with the parallel exhortation, that he repeatedly addressed to Philip, to prefer the civil glory to the military one and an unjust peace to the most just war, because the prince will one day give an account to God for every single drop of human blood spilled and will do well, therefore, to avoid claiming this or that territorial right and this or that possession with recourse to arms.¹¹

In the *Panegyricus*, therefore, two considerations alternate and overlap each other: Philip is at the same time praised as a peace-maker and as *euersor* of the pagans, as mediator of wide kingdoms and as the defender of Christianity against the Turkish danger, as leader with extraordinary value, before whom the enemy cannot help but give in and surrender, and as one who spreads happiness and joy everywhere, contributing also to the flourishing of nature: this is, of course, a *topos* of the ancient panegyric genre.¹² I refer, in

¹¹ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 74-75: (...) *audacter affirmauerim pio principi nimio consultius esse pacem quantumuis iniquam amplecti, quam bellum etiam aequissimum suscipere, ut quod tam ingens malorum pelagus, tanta lerna uiciorum, tam atra morum pestis et praeceat et comitetur et consequatur. Num Christianus dux, quem oportet esse clementissimum, qui non modo numen aliquod esse iustumque memorque credit, uerum etiam mox illi de minutissima quoque guttula sanguinis humani exactissimam rationem esse reddendam intelligit, cui non totum imperium, non etiam uita sua tanti debet esse, ut quemquam innocentem sua causa uelit perire, postulabit, ut ius illud nescio quod suum (neque enim hic laboro, quanti referat, hic an ille potiatur) tot lachrymis tot orbitatibus tanto luctu tam multo cruore miserrum tot mortalium capitibus tot periculis tot uulneribus et (quod his omnibus damnosius) tanta morum pernicie sibi constet?*

¹² *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 50: (...) *quum tu interim quoquo te conuerteres ueluti sol quidam iucundo affulgens lumine discussis undique tristitiae nebulis festiuis gaudiis omnia serenares. Neque prorsus aliter, quam simul atque nouum uer*

particular, to *XII Panegyrici Latini*, which very frequently linked the *aduentus* of the Emperor to the start of a season of well-being and prosperity. So, if Erasmus repeatedly reiterates that on the one hand the competence in matters of war does not reveal the virtues of the perfect statesman and—a precise political indication is provided here to the dedicatee—that the people of Brabant are pleased to live in a peaceful and golden century, on the other hand he hastens to clarify that this does not mean at all that Philip is less able to fight than to preserve the peace, or that he does not know how to cope with the blows of doom.

Erasmus moreover says that the greatest fortune of the dedicatee of *Panegyricus*, with proper consideration of his outstanding virtues, is that of having inherited at birth great power, for which he did not have to fight or shed blood, although the power itself would normally require of being defended by the sword and with difficulty and danger.¹³ In Philip's *felicitas*, therefore, there is nothing cruel, nothing that others have had to pay dearly. For this reason, in just wars, divine favour cannot be lacking in the Archduke, the divine favour that, in times of peace, always accompanies his clemency.¹⁴ The Dutch humanist touches, here, on the vexed question of just war, a theory, as is well known, developed in antiquity, culminating in the formulation of Cicero's *De republica* and *De legibus*¹⁵ and then Christianized by St Augustine.¹⁶

At the height of *Panegyricus*, Erasmus uses the concept of *bellum iustum* in a more casual way than he will do in the commen-

terris hyberna niue horrentibus suis illis fauoniis aspirarit, repente omnis rerum facies mutato squalore enitescit. Ita ubiubi locorum tua pompa appareret aut nunciaretur aduentus, illic mox omnia noua quaedam laetitia occupauit.

¹³ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 53: *Ne id quidem referam tametsi memorabile, quod quum plaerisque necesse sit imperium sibi multa cede ac sanguine asserere, ferro tueri, periculo ac scelere propagare, tu sine ullo negotio et in amplissima ditione natus es et diis (ut aiunt) hominibusque plaudentibus ad maiora ultro ascisceris, adeo nihil in tua foelicitate cruentum, nihil emptum cuiusquam malo.*

¹⁴ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 82-83: (...) *certissimo nimirum augurio ducimur nos te bellicis in negociis ducem habituros non solum egregie strenuum, uerum etiam foelicem. Neque enim in bellis iustis deerit uirtuti tuae fauor diuinus, qui in pace sic moderationi tuae semper adfuit. Praestitisti alteram gloriae partem eamque maiorem; non est periculum, ne in altera praestanda tui dissimilis quasique mancus sis futurus.*

¹⁵ Cic., *rep.* 3.35; 2.31 and *leg.* 3.9.

¹⁶ Aug., *ciu. Dei* 4.15 and 19.7.

tary on the adage *Dulce bellum inexpertis* (1515) or in his *Querela pacis* (1516). He is convinced that in just wars—in wars fought against the Turks and Saracens, the enemies of the *pax Christiana*—Philip, the *optimus princeps* devoted to the achievement of the *felicitas* of his people, cannot lack divine favour. Such non-chalance should not, however, imply that Erasmus accepts lightly the idea that the prince can start a war, though fought for noble reasons: the proof is the bleak picture of the wrongs and vices that spread in wartime hatched in a large section of *Panegyricus*.¹⁷ Erasmus hopes that the military glory of the Duke will only be foreshadowed and not also tested in practice and that, if there is fatal necessity, his banners only terrorize the enemies of the *pax Christiana* and his sword be drawn only against the throats of Turks and Saracens. At the same time, he cannot fail to prophesy

¹⁷ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 73-74: *In pace calent artes, florent honesta studia, uiget legum reuerentia, augescit religio, crescunt opes, pollet morum disciplina. In bello collabuntur defluunt commiscuntur haec omnia et simul cum omni genere calamitatum nulla non lues morum ingruit. Sacra prophanantur, cultus diuinus neglectui habetur, in iuris locum uis succedit. Silent enim (ut ait Cicero) leges inter arma, ut si quid loquuntur salutare, non queunt (ut aelegerat dixit Marius) ob armorum strepitum exaudiri. Quis autem interim locus litteris ac musis in tanto fremitu militum, tanto clangore tubarum, tanto crepitu cornuum, tam surdo tamque insano strepitu timpanorum, tanto fragore telorum, tam horrendo tonitru saxorum uolantium, quo ferae quoque et pisces et aues offensae relictis natiuis sedibus alio procul uelut exulatum demigrare solent? (...) Neque segnius interea miseri senes in luctum indignum coniciuntur, oritur infantia patribus, uxores maritis spoliantur, uasantur agri, deseruntur uici, exuruntur delubra, subuertuntur oppida, diripiuntur domus et optimi cuiusque fortunae ad sceleratissimos latrones traducuntur. Quibus ipsis ex malis maxima pars semper ad innocentissimum quemque redit. Sed haec misera tantum; illa capitaliora et que uix etiam deus ipse resarciat, quod inter ista gliscunt adulteria, dediscunt pudorem mulieres, uirgines passim stuprantur, iuuentus per se procliuus in uicia sublato rerum ordine obiecta impunitate consuescit nihil habere pensi ac praeceps in omne genus facinorum fertur. Atque omnino, si quod pium numen inter mortales uersabatur, id protinus nos relinquit. Prorumpunt ab inferis Erynnēs ira rabie cede sanguine scelere perturbantes inuoluentes permiscentes uniuersa. Sunt quidem et pacis temporibus sua quaedam uicia, sed comica, at in bello omnium tragicorum malorum agmen quasi mare quoddam exundat semelque cuncta quacunque peruaserit, calamitatum ac scelerum fluctibus operit. Coeterum quicquid insignium flagitiorum in pace quoque leges ferro ignique puniunt, id totum e bellis natum, e bellis nobis reliquum est (...). Hoc, inquam, hoc fonte nobis scattet detestanda illa colluies facinorosorum hominum raptorum stupratorum lenonum praedonum pyratum latronum sicariorum ueneficorum furum speculatorum abigeorum seditiosorum proditorum sacrilegorum periurorum blasphemorum, tum scortorum luparum lenarum maleficarum. Vox me citius defecerit, quam nomina tantum recensuero portentorum, quae nobis bellum parit, dum in pace non possunt homines dediscere, quae in belli tumultibus didicerunt.*

the extraordinary glory that awaits Philip, the triumphs that he will celebrate defeating the enemies of Christ, the praise that gods and men will turn to him when he will destroy the last remnants of the Iron Age and give to the world a new Golden Age.¹⁸ These praises are obviously characteristic of the panegyric genre: nevertheless the speech of Erasmus proceeds on two parallel tracks, so that while he exalts, in deference to the tradition of the genre, the military virtues of the dedicatee,¹⁹ the author is concerned to disseminate, in the plot of his oration, clues—not at all subtle—from which it becomes clear that, in his opinion, the highest morality of peace is always a winner in the sight of the glory that war can give.²⁰ In the *Panegyricus ad Philippum*, in other words, is already contained, *in nuce*, a pacifist program to which Erasmus would

¹⁸ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 83: *Optamus, ut istam gloriae partem augurari tantum in te liceat, non etiam spectare; ut pereat positum rubigine ferrum aut si quando ita feret fatalis necessitas, cui ne dii quidem (ut ait Homerus) repugnant, praecamur ut tua vexilla non nisi Christianae pacis hostes terreant, tuus ensis non nisi in Turcarum et Saracenorum iugulos stringatur. (...) iam animis praesentire iuuat, quantarum te rerum gloria maneat, quibus sis imperiis praeficiendus, quantis augendus titulis, quos olim ex impiis Christo relaturus triumphos, quae fixurus ex immani illa barbarie spolia, quam late Romanae pacis fines prolaturus, quas gentes Christianae ditionis prouinciis additurus, quam foelicibus momentis publicum saeculi tui statum in melius commutaturus, quanto coelitem ac terrigenum applausu prouehente uirtutem tuam immortali principe abolitis ferrei saeculi reliquiis auream aetatem mundo renouaturus.*

¹⁹ For example, see *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 80: (...) *bellicae laudis specimen iampridem tam multiplex elucet in te, ut si quod inciderit bellum (quod quidem abominamur et speramus non futurum tua uidelicet foelicissima pietate freti) sed tamen, si quod inciderit, metuendum non sit, ne quando (te sospite) dux aegregius nobis defuerit. Quis enim te uno inter militares procures uel ad cursum perniciosior uel ad saltum agilior uel ad luctum neruosior uel arcum torquere melior uel feram certis assequi iaculis callentior uel hastam uibrare scientior uel ense ferire peritior, uel equestri certamine concurrere doctior (...). Quem alium crista minaci galea quem aereus thorax quem balthus quem ensis quem clypeus in summa quem uniuersus ille mauortius ornatus sic mire decet, ut te?*

²⁰ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 76: *Pax (...) per se bonum quiddam est, uincere nunquam ex eo bonorum genere est, in quibus conquiescit, sed conducibile tamen quiddam est, at ita demum, si non alia patet ad pacem uia. Optimus est eius reipublicae status, non quae mauortii studiis fines imperii profert, sed quae ad coelestis ciuitatis imaginem quam proxime accedit. Ea uero non alia magis re quam ocio pace concordiaeque foelix est. Ergo Christiani principis, quem oportet ab hoc exemplari nusquam oculos dimouere, praecipua gloria sit id summa ui summaque ope tueri ornare amplificare, quod Christus etiam principum princeps nobis optimum ac dulcissimum reliquit, nempe pacem. Coeterum maximi animi maximum esse documentum arbitror bella nec formidare, quum declinari nequeant nec prouocare, quum queant, et ad depellenda semper esse paratum atque instructum, ad inferenda nunquam animatum.*

later give a very different hue. It is a program that, while not taking shape as a systematically structured *Friedenstraktat*, as O. Herding states,²¹ welcomes suggestions and guidelines that came from the General States of the Netherlands and assimilates them into the calls for a policy of good governance founded on the care of national interests and respect of international balance.

3. *The Panegyricus as speculum for the prince and his people*

The *Panegyricus*, as I have said, also performs the function of a mirror for princes, characterized by the narrow intertwining of political issues and pedagogical issues common to all the literature of *specula* and *institutiones principum* flourished from antiquity to the Middle Ages.²² Political requirements (by the patrons of Erasmus) and ideological beliefs (of Erasmus himself) are here closely intertwined, because, on the one hand, the Erasmian vision of the nature of power—by which it is not lawful to the prince to do whatever he likes—is perfectly suited to the strong tradition of the Brabant limited princely power and, on the other hand, to the pacifist aspirations strategically fed from the homeland of Philip the Handsome, which found a very fertile ground in the sincere pacifism that the humanist of Rotterdam professed throughout the entire course of his existence. In the *Panegyricus* Erasmus weaves, parallel to the praise of Philip, the praise of a paternalistic policy aimed at achieving the collective good, the common good, and, while sketching the portrait of Philip as the *optimus princeps*, he seizes the opportunity to give him valuable teachings. The exercise of sovereignty is essentially, for Erasmus, the profession of the *philosophia Christi*, a fusion of wisdom and compassion, which can be taught, and thus learned; through rigorous education, in other words, it is possible, in the opinion of Erasmus, to shape the perfect philosopher-prince, who is also the perfect Christian prince, devoted father and responsive to the people, pious, gracious, respectful of laws, conscious of the difficulties that the management of power produces, ready to sacrifice his tranquillity

²¹ See *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 9-14 (*Einleitung*).

²² About this tradition, with particular reference to Italian Fifteenth century, see Gilbert 1939; Pastore Stocchi 1987; Ferraù 1992; Quondam 1997.

to ensure the safety of subjects, strict in demanding integrity and honesty in his ministers, and careful to weed out the multitude of vices—ambition, vanity, flattery, luxury—crowding the princely courts.

The education of the sovereign is also reflected in the character of all his subjects, and thus triggers a general educational movement involving the whole of society:²³ nothing, says Erasmus, that regards the correction of the manners of the people, has the same value as the upright life of the prince, because everybody turns his eyes to the prince's life and considers the prince's life as an actual way of life. The theme to which Erasmus alludes here is that of the extraordinary public visibility of the ruler, a Senecan theme that was variously attended by the political treatises of the humanistic age and of the Renaissance: in the *Encomium Moriae* Erasmus would later state that the prince is the only one to be exposed for all to see and that, therefore, while the importance of the vices of ordinary citizens is limited, the position of the prince is likely to ensure that his moral backsliding, even in unimportant matters, is sufficient to spread a serious epidemic among all his subjects.²⁴ Even later, in the *Institutio principis Christiani*, Erasmus, turning

²³ Erasmus' pedagogical reflections, although expressed in works dedicated to future princes (it is not just the case of the *Panegyricus ad Philippum* or of the *Institutio principis Christiani*, but also of the *Declamatio de pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis*, which in 1529 Erasmus dedicated to William, son of John III, Duke of Cleves, who would inherit a small principality in the Northern Rhineland and Westphalia—and of the *De ciuilitate morum puerilium*, a text that the humanist wrote in 1530 for the eleven-year-old Henry of Burgundy, son of Adolphus, Prince of Veere), give rise to 'un discorso unitario e coerente, imperniato sul valore di ogni singolo individuo e sulla necessità di iniziarlo sin dalla sua più tenera età a realizzare le sue più alte capacità, quelle alle quali è legata la sua stessa qualità di uomo e che vanno dal possesso del linguaggio all'uso della ragione e all'esercizio di una libertà morale posta al servizio del bene comune. È un discorso di valore generale, tanto da giustificare il carattere universalistico attribuito alla pedagogia di Erasmo' (De Michelis Pintacuda 2001, p. 116-117).

²⁴ Erasmo da Rotterdam 1989, p. 210: *Neque enim existimabit uel periurio parricidioque parandum imperium quisquis secum perpenderit, quam ingens onus sustineat humeris qui uere principem agere uelit: eum qui rerum gubernacula suscepit, publicum non priuatum negotium gerere, nihil nisi de commodis publicis oportere cogitare (...); sese esse unum omnium oculis expositum, qui uel ceu sidus salutare morum innocentia maximam rebus humanis salutem possit adferre uel ueluti cometa letalis summam perniciem inuehere; aliorum uitia neque perinde sentiri neque tam late manare; principem eo loco esse, ut si quid uel leuiter ab honesto deflexerit, grauis protinus ad quam plurimos homines uitae pestis serpat.*

to the dedicatee of the manual, the future Charles V, had stressed this crucial point:

*Tua in conspicuo uita est, latere non potes: aut magno omnium bono bonus sis necesse est aut magna omnium perniciē malus (...). Nullius pestilentiae neque citius corripit neque latius serpit contagium quam mali principis. Contra non alia breuior aut efficacior ad corrigendos populi mores uia quam principis incorrupta uita.*²⁵

The common people, Erasmus still says in the *Institutio*, willingly imitate the behavior of their sovereign, and this is why, just as you cannot imagine anything more beneficial than a wise and benevolent monarch, there cannot be a more serious scourge than a crazy and evil prince. The responsibility of the prince is therefore decisive in the formation of good (or bad) customs of his people. It follows that the private citizen is far more free than the prince, who, acting as a prompt reference for his subjects, must pay attention to his every act and every word: so there is a link between the issue of the visibility of the *princeps* and the Senecan conception of political power as *nobilis seruitus*,²⁶ that draws the good sovereign near to God and that, at the same time, is a heavy burden for the sovereign himself.²⁷

4. *The Erasmian vision of political power and its connection with classical and humanistic sources*

Already at the height of the *Panegyricus ad Philippum*—which chronologically precedes the *Encomium Moriae* and the *Institutio principis Christiani* and can consequently be taken as a significant starting point for the political reflection of Erasmus—we can delineate clearly the cornerstones of Erasmian vision of power,

²⁵ Erasmo da Rotterdam 2009, p. 54-56.

²⁶ Sen., *clem.* 1.7; 1.8.4 and 1.8.1-3.

²⁷ In the *Institutio principis christiani* Erasmus will say that the distance between the Christian prince and the pagan prince is that domination befits the latter, while for Christians the principedom is only appropriate for administration and general benefit, not tyranny: *Cogitato semper dominium imperium regnum maiestatem potentiam ethnicorum esse uocabula, non christianorum: christianum imperium nihil aliud esse quam administrationem quam beneficentiam quam custodiam* (Erasmo da Rotterdam 2009, p. 106-108).

which is affected not only by classical models, but even by some works of the Italian Fifteenth century:²⁸ I refer, in particular, to *De infelicitate principum* by Poggio Bracciolini, a summary of the political treatises of the humanistic age, but also to *Momus siue de principe* by Leon Battista Alberti, texts that are characterized by a radical pessimism, which was the instrument that allowed to expose what illusory and deceptive power hide and represented the decisive step towards the demolition of the 'static' image of medieval power and, ultimately, toward the secularization of power.²⁹ Even if Erasmus does not talk about a political power separate from religion, there are many points of contact with the authors cited above: first of all, the distinction between king and tyrant, which is based not on the titles of which those in power can boast but, rather, on their actual behavior and, in particular, on the attention to the common good, or, on the contrary, to self and private interest; moreover, the theme which is discussed above, that of the heightened visibility of the ruler and the related issue of the burden of power.

The great trust placed by the Dutch humanist in the power of education, the educability of human nature, and (therefore) also in those intended to wield power marks the distance that separates Erasmus from Fifteenth century Italian intellectuals, despite the points of contact that I have noted. The decline of the so-called 'civil Humanism' had pushed those intellectuals to challenge the holders of political power; the humanist of Rotterdam would later implicitly distance himself from such outcomes in his *Institutio principis Christiani*,³⁰ but already at the height of the *Panegyricus* his position is well defined: it is essential for the prince to have

²⁸ Note that Erasmus almost never explicitly quotes modern sources: his knowledge of the authors of the Italian Fifteenth century is, however, undeniable, since in *Ciceronianus* dialogue—which deals with the vexed question of imitation—he provides a detailed list of humanists' names, each accompanied by a detailed critical judgment.

²⁹ See Canfora 2005, p. 39.

³⁰ Erasmo da Rotterdam 2009, p. 156: *Ad gratiam non raro loquuntur et ii, qui de rebus sacris contionantur aucupantes principis et aulicorum fauorem aut, si quid reprehendunt, ita mordent, ut tum maxime adulentur. Non haec loquor quod istos probandos existimem, qui seditiosis clamoribus debacchantur in uitam principum, sed quod ab his citra contumeliam boni principis exemplar proponi cupiam nec probari per adsentationem in christiano principe, quae in ethnicis damnarunt ethnici.*

an adequate education which does not corrupt his good nature and urges him to pursue the true virtues rather than ambition and good luck. It is no coincidence that Erasmus ascribes to Philip, among his many merits, also that of providing a very good education for his children and it is no coincidence that Erasmus takes the opportunity to offer to Philip some suggestions.³¹ The same suggestions will be replicated in almost identical form in the first and largest section of the *Institutio principis*, which is dedicated to the birth and education of the prince: the children must be entrusted to pious and honest nurses; a teacher in charge of their education must be wise and upright man, able to convey healthy opinions; in particular, the future prince must not grow up amongst crowds of flatterers, from which he will hear nothing serious and beneficial, since what is learned in the first years of life is crucial for everyone and, therefore, especially for the man who will inherit his father's power and whose conduct will determine the customs and the fate of an entire people.

5. Philip the Handsome as *optimus princeps*

Erasmus is sure that the welfare and prosperity of a nation depend, for the most part, on the goodness of its ruler: describing Philip's

³¹ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 81-82: *Itaque sic (sc. liberos) instituendos curas, quasi patriae illos genueris, non tibi. Quos equidem non alia re magis foelices existimo, quam quod tales parentes sortiti sunt, non dico tam illustres aut opulentos, sed quibus ex aequo mens ista sit, ut eos iam inde a teneris unguiculis non ad ambitionem strepitumque fortunae, sed ad ueram uirtutem fingi formarique studeant. Nec enim usquam infortunatiores esse solent ii, qui in aliis sunt omnium fortunatissimi, quam quod implerumque optime nati non optime (ne pessime dicam) instituantur. Nam fere isti delicatius educantur idque inter greges adulatorum, qui totam uirtutis uiam ignorent, quorumque mores et oratio nihil nisi fortunam sapiat, a quibus nihil audiant serium ac salutare neque quicquam omnino discant, nisi unum hoc fastu uiolentiaque principem agere. Atqui quum nostrum cuiuslibet tanti referat, quibus primis illis annis imbuamur, deum immortalem, quae tandem cura suffecerit educandis iis, quos paulo grandiores factos ne monere quidem quisquam ausit et de quorum moribus totius populi mores fortunaeque pendeant? Proinde tu tua pignora non nisi piis et integris nutricibus uirisque sapientibus et incorruptis mandas, a quibus nihil oculis, nihil auribus hauriant patre indignum, qui rudem adhuc puerilis animi testulam salutaribus opinionibus imbuere et norint, quia prudentissimi, et audeant, quia tibi placere sciunt, et uelint, quia optimi, et efficiant, quia diligentissimi. Iamudum autem (ut audio) circumpicis aliquem litteris ac moribus spectatum uirum delecturus ex uniuersa patria, cui teneros adhuc alumnos in gremium tradas iis disciplinis, quae principe dignae sint, erudiendos.*

mission to Spain, he recalls all the concerns and fears of the people of Brabant, who had anxiously followed, from afar, the events and the misfortunes of the long journey of their beloved prince. The people had exulted at the news of his many diplomatic successes and, when Philip was ill, were anxious about his health and aware that *omnem suam incolumitatem fortunas opes pacem ocium, breuiter uniuersam foelicitatis suae summam de [principis] salute pendere*.³² Implicit here is a negative consequence: if the prince's life is inextricably linked to the fortunes of his subjects, the worst calamity for any people will then be found in the government of a tyrant. The key factor that allows you to recognize the good prince is, for Erasmus, as we have already said, the focus on the common good and not on mere personal profit. A bad ruler is, in fact, the one who acts according to his own exclusive interest. Erasmus certainly knows, already at the height of the *Panegyricus*, the Aristotelian definition of 'tyranny',³³ although he does not mention, here, explicitly, the *auctoritas* of the philosopher of Stagira, as he will do in the violent anti-monarchist pamphlet that is the adage 2601, *Scarabeus aquilam quaerit*.³⁴ There, the beetle of the Aesopic fable—the one that tries to save a hare from the claws of an eagle and that, despised for its smallness by the eagle, takes revenge by breaking the eggs laid by the bird—becomes the starting point for an essay in which the ethical-political nature of the two animals of the fable becomes a metaphor for the real behavior and the ideal behavior of kings and military leaders. After describing the characteristics of the eagle (*carniuorum esse auem, quietis ac pacis inimicam, pugnis, rapinis ac praedationibus natam*), Erasmus imagines the objection of his good reader: what kind of analogy can ever exist between the bird thus described and the king *cuius propria laus est clementia, cumque plurimum possit, nulli tamen uelle nocere ac solum aculeo carere seseque totum in populi sui commoditates impendere*? If the princes, Erasmus answers, were like those that Plato imagined in charge of his republic—if, in other words, they were philosophers—they would have nothing in common with the eagle: they, on the contrary, are, in most cases, δημοβόροι

³² *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 32.

³³ Arist., *EN* 8, 1160 b.

³⁴ For this adage, see Erasmo da Rotterdam 1980, p. 120-195.

and *δωροφάγοι* and pursue nothing but their own personal interest, a feature that Aristotle, in fact, ascribes to tyrants. It should be noted here that next to Aristotle, the other essential influence on Erasmus' political thought was indeed Plato,³⁵ who in the *Panegyricus ad Philippum* sets forth a vision that would later be crucial for Erasmian conception of royalty: when listing the many virtues of the dedicatee, the Dutch humanist implicitly suggests that the opposite vices characterize the tyrant and that the two models of *optimus princeps* and of the evil ruler become ethical-political concretions of the two Platonic ideas of the highest good and absolute evil—for the Greek philosopher teaches that there is not only a paradigm or form of good, but also one of evil, in which all empirical manifestations of evil itself participate—and, in the singular mixture of motifs of pagan philosophy and Christian theology that characterizes the Erasmian vision, they refer, respectively, the living image of God, who graciously rules and governs all things, and that of a malicious and obnoxious demon.

If Philip is, of course, an authentic model of perfection, an example of what a prince should not be is offered by a large group of rulers of myth and ancient history, from Achilles to Agamemnon, from Alexander the Great to Julius Caesar, from Nero to Vespasian, to whom the Archduke of Austria, in the *Panegyricus*, is repeatedly compared, of course with the intent to highlight his virtues and idealize his figure.³⁶ The appeal to the ancient *exemplum*—in conformity with the canons of the panegyric genre formalized by the Greek rhetorician Menander of Laodicea, in the

³⁵ See Erasmo da Rotterdam 1977, p. 20-22.

³⁶ For example, see *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 67: *Tanta conscientiae tuae puritas tanta concordia tantus concentus omnium laudum, ut nihil referat, quid uituperetur apud te aut quid praedicetur in te. In aliis fere quod laudes eligendum est, quedam arte declinanda, ne incurras, idque etiam in iis, qui inter optimos numerantur. Nam nemo temere est omnium, qui sic numeros omnis innocentiae implevit, ut non uicium aliquod ceu nebula reliquum uitae splendorem obscurauerit. Catone Censorio quid laudatus? At in hoc mussandum, quod uinosus, quod prae fractus, quod aliena etiam aetate mulierosus. Octauii Caesaris tam multas tamque praeclaras laudes aleae studium et adulteria contaminarunt. Titum Vespasianum alioquin optimum se uiciae suspicio lesit. Flauio Vespasiano nulla alioqui uirtute non absoluto foedissima principi pecuniae cupiditas maculam attulit. Quidam ita demum boni uidentur, si cum pessimis conferantur. Tu uero totus tui similis, optimus prognatus ex optimis, optimus succedens optimis, cum quibus si conferare, non solum deterior non uideris, uerum etiam uti gemma auro admota mutuum decus et das et accipis.*

third century BC³⁷—allows Erasmus, even if it is a partially positive example, to urge the dedicatee of *Panegyricus* to the emulation and, indeed, to the overcoming of the good quality of which even some pagan princes give evidence: Augustus, for example, more than once, says Erasmus, thought that he would give up power, probably because he hated to note the loss of human blood that power implied; still, Otho, *ethnicus imperator*, so hated civil war that he was horrified even when he heard its mere mention and would rather die than let his subjects run the risk because of him.³⁸ Hence the wish of the Dutch humanist, who hopes that the Christian princes might reveal even more magnanimous soul and understand that their chief glory is to defend and to increase with great strength and with high commitment the precious gift that Christ, the prince of princes, has left to men, namely peace.

6. Conclusions

The tone, sometimes excessive, of Erasmus' praise in the *Panegyricus*—quite usual, however, in a genre traditionally and programmatically devoted to the exaltation of the dedicatee—must not lead one to believe that the humanist had a very poor understanding of the power. He is, on the contrary, well aware of the fact that a prince rarely lives up to his difficult and delicate task. For this reason he provides valuable political directions to Philip, urging him

³⁷ Menander was the creator of the theory of the βασιλικὸς λόγος, which was to develop the following points: 1. preamble, with rhetorical statement of author's inadequacy in the presence of dedicatee's greatness; 2. homeland, origin and people of the dedicatee; 3. lineage; 4. birth; 5. natural gifts; 6. children and their education; 7. occupations; 8. deeds that could illustrate the virtues of the dedicatee; 9. fortune; 10. epilogue, including comparisons with other celebrities.

³⁸ *Opera omnia* (IV, 1), p. 75: *Augustus item de abrogando imperio non semel deliberauit. Oderat enim illud opinor, quod uideret sibi tanta sanguinis humani iactura constare. In extrema uero coniuratione, cuius auctor L. Cinna, ne uiuere quidem tanti clamabat esse, ut incolumitatem suam tot ciuium interitu redimeret. Idem negabat omnino bellum capessi oportere, nisi quum maior emolumentum spes quam damni metus ostenderetur. Alioqui perinde fieri ac si quis aureo piscetur hamo, cuius abrupti iactura nullo captu pensari queat. Ad hanc profecto rationem nullum prorsus ineundum bellum, nisi quod indixit necessitas. Extat in Caesarum actis Othonem ethnicum imperatorem usque adeo ciuile bellum detestari solitum, ut ad eius mentionem quoque semper exhorruerit, ac demum e uita maluerit excedere quam sua causa tantum hominum uitae subire discrimen. O generosum animum, quem utinam nunc passim prestarent nostrae religionis principes.*

to pursue honesty and uprightness and be for his subjects a loving and considerate father. He is also well aware that, in most cases, the reasons why a sovereign decides to declare war to another one are anything but noble and legitimate: thus he resolutely exhorts Philip to his duties as *alumnus pacis*. Here, too, Erasmus' artistry consists in the simultaneous capacities to observe (and celebrate) power and its holders with keen and disenchanted eyes and yet not to indulge in sterile considerations about the intrinsic evil of the power itself: at the bottom of the *Panegyricus* he places the very humanistic trust in the potentiality of human reason, in the possibility, for mankind, of raising himself and, after forgetting selfishness and rivalry, of being the architect of his own existence, contributing at the same time to the common good. Facing of the reality of a power that too often expressed itself in despotic abuse, the Dutch humanist constructively prefers to put his hopes in the desirable outcomes of a serious and rigorous education, of which he took charge through a large group of writings: in his utopian thought (and we call it 'utopian' not because it is naively separated from 'real truth', but because history showed and current times still proves that it can be only considered as such) can be found, perhaps, one of the reasons for his works have endured as classics of occidental thought.

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Abstract

In 1503, Erasmus of Rotterdam was commissioned by the General States of Brabant to compose the welcome speech for the Archduke Philip of Austria (1478-1506), son of Emperor Maximilian of Habsburg, who was returning from a long journey that had led him, in the previous two years, throughout Spain, France and Germany. The *Panegyricus ad Philippum Austriae ducem* was pronounced by the humanist of Rotterdam on January 6, 1504: attempting to escape the strictures of flattery, Erasmus tried to compose a theoretically valid work and to offer a complete picture of the ideal ruler, in compliance with the unshakable and thoroughly humanistic confidence in the power of education, and, above all, in the educability of power and those who were to wield it. Philip the Handsome of Castile is exalted as great prince, with all virtues, and as a true benefactor of his people, far from despicable tyrannical deviations. Erasmus certainly knows the Aristotelian definition of tyranny—the tyrant is who only thinks to his own interest and not to the common good—but his conception of kingship also involves a Platonic component: the two opposing models of good prince and of tyrant become ethical and political concretions of the two Platonic ideas of the highest good and of the absolute evil. The *Panegyricus ad Philippum* is an authentic *speculum principis*, characterized by the narrow intertwining of political and pedagogical issues that

is common to all the literature of *specula* and *institutiones principum* that flourished from antiquity to the Middle Ages. This paper aims to illustrate the most significant themes (for example, the praise of a pacifist policy) of the Erasmian text—also with some references to the other important *speculum principis* by Erasmus, the *Institutio principis christiani*—and to highlight the classical and humanistic sources used by the Dutch writer.

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